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To cite this version:
Andrew E. Clark, Claudia Senik. Will GDP growth increase happiness in developing countries?. PSE Working Papers n°2010-43. 2010. <halshs-00564985v2>
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JEL Codes: D63, I3, O1
Keywords: Income, subjective well-being, comparisons, adaptation, development
Will GDP Growth Increase Happiness in Developing Countries?

Andrew E. Clark and Claudia Senik

March 20th 2011

Summary

This paper asks what low-income countries can expect from growth in terms of happiness. It interprets the set of available international evidence pertaining to the relationship between income growth and subjective well-being. Consistent with the Easterlin paradox, higher income is always associated with higher happiness scores, except in one case: whether growth in national income yields higher well-being is still hotly debated. The key question is whether the correlation coefficient is “too small to matter”.

The explanations for the small correlation between national income growth and subjective well-being over time appeal to the nature of growth itself (from negative side-effects, such as pollution), and to the psychological importance of relative concerns and adaptation. The available evidence contains two important lessons: income comparisons do seem to affect subjective well-being, even in very poor countries; however, adaptation may be more of a rich-country phenomenon.

Our stand is that the idea that growth will increase happiness in low-income countries cannot be rejected on the basis of the available evidence. First, cross-country time-series analyses are based on aggregate measures, which are less reliable than those at the individual level. Second, development is a qualitative process involving take-off points and thresholds. Such regime changes are visible to the eye through the lens of subjective satisfaction measures. The case of Transition countries is particularly impressive in this respect: average life satisfaction scores closely mirrored changes in GDP for about the first ten years of the transition process, until the regime became more stable. The greater availability of subjective measures of well-being in low-income countries would greatly help in the measurement and monitoring of the different stages and dimensions of the development process.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Is income growth the only thing that matters in development, and does it raise the level of well-being of the population? De facto, economic development is generally identified with growth in GDP per capita: International organizations, such as the United Nations Organization, the OECD, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, classify countries as developed, intermediate or low-development, depending on whether they are above or below certain thresholds of GDP per capita. However, development is of course more than just income growth. It is a multi-dimensional process, which involves not only a quantitative increase in capital accumulation, production and consumption, but also qualitative social and political changes that enlarge the choice set of the individuals concerned. Institutional progress, human rights, democracy, gender equality and other capacities are an integral part of development. We can then ask whether these qualitative objectives can be attained by maximizing GDP. And in addition, we might worry that income growth will yield negative side-effects, which reduce well-being, such as environmental externalities, the destruction of traditional social links, the concentration of the population in urban and suburban centres, the development of work-related stress, and so on.

“Is growth obsolete?” The provocative title of the paper by William Nordhaus and James Tobin (1973) reflects the radical questioning of growth as an engine of well-being. Although the authors answer this question in the negative, many economists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that, in developed countries, economic growth per se has little impact on well-being and should therefore not be the primary goal of economic policy (see Oswald, 1997). How much of this argument can we extend to developing countries? Or should we follow the proposition of Inglehart et al. (2008) that material growth, as measured by GDP per capita, is welfare-improving in developing countries, as it takes people out of poverty and precarity, but that it is useless in modern and “post-modern” societies where survival is taken for granted and human development becomes the only valuable goal?

This paper will address the relationship between GDP growth and well-being in developing countries through the lens of subjective well-being measures, i.e. self-declared satisfaction judgements collected in surveys of nationally-representative samples of the population over
the world. Using these measures as a shortcut to people’s well-being, we will try to see whether GDP growth is really a proxy for and a valuable route to happiness.

One of the most important but equally most controversial issues in the subjective well-being literature is precisely the income-happiness relationship. In a famous article, Easterlin (1974) ironically asked whether “raising the incomes of all will raise the happiness of all?” This was based on the observation that average happiness measures remained flat over the long-run in countries which had experienced high rates of GDP growth. The income-happiness nexus has been vividly debated for the past two decades by economists, psychologists and political scientists. However, most of the evidence to date on the relationship between income and subjective well-being is based on developed countries. Is the Easterlin paradox also valid for developing countries, or is it a rich country phenomenon?

This paper presents an overview of the evidence that has accumulated during the past twenty years of research and illustrates some of the findings using a widely used international database (the World Values Survey, 1981-2005) containing individual life satisfaction and happiness information. In a first section, we present the relationship between income, income growth and subjective well-being and ask to what extent the patterns usually observed in developed countries also hold in developing countries. We discuss the potential existence of a threshold effect in the welfare returns of growth, where the latter are higher in low- as opposed to high-income countries. Sections 2 and 3 then present the classic explanations of the Easterlin paradox and their relevance to developing countries. Here, we distinguish the positive and negative side-effects of growth, and the limits to the way in which income can produce subjective well-being that stem from human nature itself (comparison and adaptation effects). Finally, we provide some reasons why we believe that cross-section and panel analysis based on individual data is more reliable than that using aggregated times-series. Accordingly, we conclude that the positive income-well-being gradient, supported by individual and cross-sectional data, is difficult to dismiss.

1.1 The data used in the paper

This paper essentially hinges on results in the existing literature. However, we have added a number of figures of our own, using the five waves of the well-known World Values Survey (WVS, 1981-2008) database covering 105 countries, including high-income, low-income and Transition countries, which account for 90% of the world’s population. Happiness measures
were mostly taken from the WVS and the European Social Survey (ESS): this is the case for 250 out of 368 observations. When happiness data was missing, we used information from the ISSP (101 observations) and 17 observations from the 2002 Latino barometer. All of these datasets are available at http://worldvaluessurvey.org. The happiness and life satisfaction questions were administered in the same format in all these surveys, with equivalent translations for all countries. The wording of the Happiness question was: “If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole?: 1. Not at all happy; 2. Not very happy; 3. Fairly happy; 4. Very happy”. In the WVS, the wording of the Life Satisfaction question was: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?: 1(dissatisfied) ... 10 (very satisfied)” The surveys cover representative samples of the population of participating countries, with an average sample size of 1400 respondents at each wave. We calculated the national average value of the answers to each of these questions (treating them as continuous variables). We also created a misery index defined as the percentage of people who declare themselves to be very happy, or very satisfied, minus the percentage of respondents declaring themselves to be not at all happy, or not at all satisfied. As the results from the two aggregate well-being measures were very similar, we only present here the Figures based on average well-being.

The paper also appeals to a measure of trust, which is available in the WVS: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?: 1. Most people can be trusted; 0. Can’t be too careful”. The GDP per capita and annual GDP growth information comes from Heston, Summers and Aten – the Penn World Table. We also use other quantitative indicators which are available in the World databank, such as the Gini measure of income inequality, women’s fertility rates, adult literacy rates, and life expectancy at birth (see http://data.worldbank.org/). The qualitative indicators of governance were taken from Freedom House and Polity IV (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/, http://www.freedomhouse.org, http://www.govindicators.org, and http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). All these data are available from the World Data Bank: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

1.2 Subjective well-being measures: why use them and are they reliable?

The critical quality of subjective well-being is that it is self-reported. Instead of a third person designing some set of criteria (income, health, education, housing etc.) which will define how well an individual is doing, individuals themselves are asked to provide a summary judgement
of the quality of their life. While some have doubted the usefulness of subjective measures, we think that there are fairly compelling reasons to include them in the Economists’ arsenal.

Think of an individual’s level of well-being as being some appropriately-weighted sum of all of the aspects of life that matter to her. There are at least two significant obstacles for it to be measured objectively. The first is that we need to be sure that we cover all of the aspects of life that are important to the individual, and it seems a priori difficult to make up a definitive measurable list of these. The second problem is that we have to apply appropriate weights to construct the final well-being index. This might appear problematic right from the start: in the context of the aggregate data used in the Human Development Index, for example, how much is literacy worth in terms of life expectancy? Moreover, it would appear extremely likely that any such weighting will differ between individuals, and probably in ways that it is not easy to observe. It is consequently very tempting to sidestep the difficulties involved by asking individuals to make these calculations themselves, in responding to evaluative questions about their own lives.

The well-being questions asked in this context are often very simple ones, such as “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?” (from the British Household Panel Survey), which is answered on a seven-point scale, with one referring to “Not satisfied at all”, four to “Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” and seven to “Completely satisfied”. Alternatively individuals may be asked about their happiness, as in the following question from the American General Social Survey (GSS): “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days, would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” Other questions may refer to positive and negative affect or mental health.

These questions are increasingly widely included in surveys across the social sciences. One reason for their popularity is that they are simple to put into questionnaires, as probably the majority of those that appear are single-item (although there are very many multiple-item scales that are also available in the literature: see http://acqol.deakin.edu.au/instruments/instrument.php for a summary of some of these). A second point is that the vast majority of respondents seem to understand the question: non-response rates are very low. The third reason, which from our point of view is the most important, is that the answers to these questions do seem to pick up how well people are doing.
This last statement might seem to be rather uncontroversial: after all, we would expect a question on life satisfaction to measure exactly that. The potential problem lies exactly in the subjectivity of the reply. In particular, if individuals understand the question differently, or use the response scales differently, then there is a danger that someone who answers six on a one to seven satisfaction scale is no better off than another person who has given an answer of five. Luckily there is by now a varied body of evidence suggesting that these subjective well-being measures do contain valid information.

A first point to make is that subjective well-being measures are well-behaved, in the sense that many of the correlations make sense. In cross-section data, variables reflecting marriage, divorce, unemployment, birth of first child and so on are typically correlated with individuals’ subjective well-being in the expected direction.\(^1\) If the answers to well-being questions were truly random, then no such relationship would be found.

We want to know whether asking \(A\) how happy she is will provide information about her unobserved real level of happiness. One simple check, called Cross-Rater Validity, is to ask \(B\) whether she thinks \(A\) is happy. This work has been carried out in a number of settings (see Sandvik \textit{et al.}, 1993, and Diener and Lucas, 1999), including asking friends and family, or the person who administered the interview. Alternatively, we can use individuals who do not know the subject: \(B\) may be shown a video recording of \(A\), or may read a transcription of an open-ended interview with \(A\). In all cases, \(B\)’s evaluation of the respondent’s well-being matches well with the respondent’s own reply.

Another approach to validation consists in relating well-being scores to various physiological and neurological measures. It has been shown that answers to well-being questions are correlated with facial expressions, such as smiling and frowning, as well as heart rate and blood pressure. The medical literature has shown that well being scores are correlated with digestive disorders and headaches, coronary heart disease and strokes. Research has also looked at physical measures of brain activity. Particular interest has been shown in the differences in brain wave activity between the left and right prefrontal cortices, where the former is associated with positive and the latter with negative feelings. These differences can

\(^1\) See, for example, the findings in Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003), based on the analysis of the well-being reported by levels of a quarter of a million randomly-sampled Europeans and Americans from the 1970s to the 1990s.
be measured using electrodes on the scalp or scanners. Research has shown (for example, Urry et al., 2004) that these differences in brain activity are correlated with individual well-being responses. These measures of brain asymmetry have been shown to be associated with cortisol and corticotropin releasing hormone (CRH), which regulate the response to stress, and antibody production in response to influenza vaccine (Davidson, 2004). Consistent with subjective well-being and brain asymmetry measuring the same underlying construct, individuals reporting higher life satisfaction scores were less likely to catch a cold when exposed to a cold virus, and recovered faster if they did (Cohen et al., 2003).

The last block of evidence that people “mean what they say” is that, in data following the same individual over a long period of time, those who say that they are dissatisfied with a certain situation are more likely to take observable action to leave it. This phenomenon is apparent in the labor market, where the job satisfaction that the individual reports at a certain point in time is a good predictor of her being observed in the future to have quit her job (examples are Freeman, 1978, Clark et al., 1998, Clark, 2001, and Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2006). One important subsidiary finding in this literature is the job satisfaction predicts quits even when we take into account the individual’s wages and hours of work. This prediction of future behavior seems to work for the unemployed as well as for the employed. Clark (2003) shows that mental stress scores on entering unemployment in BHPS data predict the length of the unemployment spell, with those who suffered the sharpest drop in well-being upon entering unemployment having the shortest spell. This finding has been replicated in using the life satisfaction scores in GSOEP data by Clark et al., 2010). Outside of the labor market, well-being scores have been shown to predict the length of life (Palmore, 1969, Danner et al., 2001). Satisfaction measures have also recently been shown to predict future marital break-up (Gardner and Oswald, 2006, Guven et al., 2010).

One potential use of the analysis of subjective well-being is that it arguably provides us with information on trade-offs between different aspects of an individual’s life. If one extra hour of work per week has the same effect on well-being as does 80 Euros in additional earnings per month, then the shadow wage (the wage that would compensate for one extra hour of work) is around 18 Euros and 50 cents per hour. Some of examples of these well-being trade-offs have appeared in the recent literature. For example, Blanchflower and Oswald (2004, p 1381), using American and British data, came to the conclusion that: “To compensate men for unemployment, it would take a rise in income at the mean of approximately $60000 per
annum. A lasting marriage is worth 100000$ per annum (when compared to widowhood or separated)’.

This capacity of subjective data to weight the different dimensions of development one against the other (to calculate marginal rates of substitution between two dimensions) is particularly adapted to the multidimensionality of economic development. The structure of the well-being equation, as estimated in a country, can be seen as a synthetic measure that would have aggregated the different arguments of a social welfare function. The usual problem of the social planner (and of the social choice school of normative economics) is indeed to decide on the weights that should be attached to the different arguments of the social objective function. Subjective measures allow avoiding this obstacle by measuring directly the synthetic result of the weighting alchemy made by individuals themselves. An illustration of this is the paper by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008, pp.31-33), where the authors use the American GSS and the Eurobarometer to estimate national welfare functions. They propose such marginal rates of substitution:

- Life expectancy / income: “A person who expects to live one year longer due to the reduction in the risk of death is willing to pay $5052 in annual income in exchange (6.6% of GDP per capita)”.

- Life expectancy / unemployment: “In terms of the unemployment rate, denying an individual one year of life expectancy has an equivalent cost to increasing the unemployment rate by 1.1 percentage point”.

- Pollution/GDP: “a one standard deviation increase in SOx emissions, equal to a rise in 23kg per capita, has a decrease on well-being equivalent to a 15% drop in the level of GDP per capita.”

- Inflation/unemployment: “a 1% point rise in the level of inflation reduces happiness by as much as a 0.3 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate”.

- Crime/GDP: “a rise in violent crime from 242 to 388 assaults per 100000 people in the United States (i.e. a 60% rise) … would be equivalent to a drop of approximately 3.5% in GDP per capita”.

- Working hours/GDP: “a 1% rise in working hours would have to be compensated by a 2.4% rise in GDP per capita (to leave happiness unchanged)”.
These examples illustrate the capacity of subjective well-being measures to serve as a useful tool for public policy aimed at maximizing well-being as countries develop.

Before we turn to the evidence on growth and subjective well-being, we should warn the reader of two abusive approximations contained in this paper. First, we use the terms happiness, life satisfaction and well-being indiscriminately. Second, we treat these measures as though they were cardinal, although they are more properly ordinal. In doing so, as do the bulk of economists working on happiness measures, we follow the route opened by Ferrer-i-Carbonnell and Frijters (2004).

I. THE PARADOXICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROWTH AND WELL-BEING

One of the main catalysts in the voluminous and rapidly expanding literature on income and happiness has been Easterlin’s seminal article (1974; updated in 1995), setting out the ‘paradox’ of substantial real income growth in Western countries over the last fifty years, but without any corresponding rise in reported happiness levels. This finding is paradoxical for a number of reasons. First it runs counter to the popular prior that increased material wealth and greater freedom of choice should go hand-in-hand with higher well-being. In a way, our societies are organized on this implicit principle. Second, it seems to contradict a large body of scientific empirical evidence based on cross-sections of countries, and on within-country individual panel data. This section presents and discusses the available evidence on these contradictory findings, and asks whether the Easterlin paradox is a rich-country phenomenon or also something relevant for policy-makers in developing countries. A summary of the wide-ranging data sources and results appears in Appendix A.

I.1. Income raises happiness in the cross section

a. Within-country cross-section

“As far as I am aware, in every representative national survey ever done, a significant bivariate relationship between happiness and income has been found” (Easterlin 2005, p. 67).

Almost all of the empirical work based on within-country surveys include individual income or household income (or more precisely, the log of income) as a control variable to explain well-being. Log income invariably attracts a positive and statistically significant coefficient,
of considerable size. It is typically one of the most important correlates of self-declared happiness. “When we plot average happiness versus average income for clusters of people in a given country at a given time...rich people are in fact a lot happier than poor people. It’s actually an astonishingly large difference. There’s no one single change you can imagine that would make your life improve on the happiness scale as much as to move from the bottom 5 percent on the income scale to the top 5 percent” (Frank, 2005, p. 67). This holds for both developed and developing countries, even if it has sometimes been suggested that the income-happiness slope is larger in developing or transition than in developed economies (see Clark et al., 2008, for a survey).

Layard et al. (2010) for instance, report that within a country, a unit rise in log income raises individual self-declared happiness by 0.6 units on average (on a 10-point scale). Stevenson and Wolfers (2008, p. 13) estimate the within-country well-being-income gradient over each of the countries available in a number of international datasets (the American General Social Survey, the World Values Survey, the Gallup World Poll, etc.). They conclude that: “Overall, the average well-being-income gradient is 0.38, with the majority of the estimates between .25 and .45 and 90 percent are between 0.07 and 0.72. In turn, much of the heterogeneity likely reflects simple sampling variation: the average country-specific standard error is 0.07, and 90 percent of the country-specific regressions have standard errors between 0.04 and 0.11”.

As an illustration, Figure 1.A depicts the household income-happiness gradient in the United States. The fitted relationship is well-described by a log-linear function. The same findings hold in a series of surveys covering developing countries. Figure 1.B shows the income decile-happiness gradient in China in 2007 (based on World Values Survey data): the same positive relationship appears. In general, the fact that in a given society the rich are happier than the poor is a well-established and undisputed empirical finding in this literature.

b. Cross-sections of countries

The empirical evidence is even more conclusive and consensual regarding the income-happiness gradient across countries. Deaton (2008), for example, finds an elasticity of 0.84 between log average income and average national satisfaction across a large set of nationally representative samples of individuals living in 129 developed and developing countries, collected by the 2006 Gallup World Poll. In the same spirit, Inglehart (1990, chapter 1) analyzes data from 24 countries at different levels of development and finds a 0.67 correlation
between GNP per capita and life satisfaction. In a more recent paper, Inglehart et al. (2008) report a correlation of 0.62 using all available waves of the World Values Survey. Wolfers and Stevenson (2008, p. 12), using a very comprehensive set of data, uncover “a between-country well-being-GDP gradient [...] typically centered around 0.4”. In the surveys analyzed by Inglehart et al. (2008), 52% of the Danes indicated that they were very satisfied with their life (with a score of over 8 on a 10-point scale) and 45% said they were very happy. On the contrary, in Armenia only 5% said they were very satisfied and 6% very happy.

Figure 2.A (taken from Inglehart et al., 2008) shows the concave relationship between income per capita and average happiness across developed, developing and Transition countries of the world, over the 1995-2007 period. A similar graph appears in Deaton (2008) based on the World Values Survey (1996) and the Gallup World Poll (2006), which we reproduce here as Figure 2.B. As shown in Figure 2.C, “Each Doubling of GDP is Associated with a Constant Increase in Life Satisfaction” across countries (Deaton, 2008). Figure 2.D illustrates the good fit of a log-linear relationship between income per capita and average life satisfaction across countries of the world, in the late 2000s, using the most recent waves of the World Values Survey.

Many other contributions to the “macroeconomics of happiness” have documented the fact that individuals in general report higher happiness and life satisfaction scores in higher-income countries (see for example Blanchflower, 2008), even if certain types of societies seem to be more conducive to happiness than others (Inglehart et al., 2008). In Figure 2.A, for example, Latin American countries are systematically found above the regression line, while Transition countries form a cluster lying below the regression line tracing out the average relationship in the data.3

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2 These estimates vary because of the composition of the sample and the controls included in the regressions.
3 According to Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), the reasons for the lower happiness level in Transition countries are the deterioration in public goods provision, the increase in macroeconomic volatility and mismatch of human capital of residents educated before transition (unemployment).
As a complement to the average income - average happiness relationship, we have also looked at the relation between average life satisfaction scores and their standard deviation (treating well-being as a continuous variable). Cross-country analysis produces a striking observation: the higher is average national happiness, the lower is the within-country standard deviation of happiness. As such, richer countries have both higher average scores and lower standard deviations of life satisfaction (Figure 6). This suggests one potentially important benefit of GDP growth for low-income countries. If individuals are risk-averse, reducing the variance of SWB in a given society is a valuable objective of public policy.

### c. A positive relation in individual panel data

Thanks to the increased availability of population panel surveys in a number of different countries, a variety of analyses of individual well-being have been able to control for unobserved individual fixed effects, such as personality traits. All of this work has concluded that there is a positive correlation between the change in real income and the change in happiness (see, for example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998, Ravallion and Lokshin, 2002, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004, Senik, 2004 and 2008, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005, and Clark et al., 2005). Further, a number of these articles have appealed to exogenous variations in income in order to establish more firmly the causal effect of individual income on happiness (e.g. Gardner and Oswald, 2007, Frijters et al., 2004a, 2004b and 2006, and Pischke, 2010). The slope of the income-happiness relationship is not necessarily the same between groups (Clark et al., 2005, Frijters et al., 2004a, and Lelkes, 2006). The coefficient on the within-individual change in log income is typically found to be in the vicinity of 0.3 (Layard et al., 2010, and Senik 2005).

There is thus both single-country and international evidence showing that the rich are happier than the poor within a given country, that those in richer countries are on average happier than those in poorer countries, and that an increase in individual income over time is associated with increasing happiness. At this stage then, the evidence is strongly in favour of a development policy based on GDP growth in low-income countries.
I.2. The diminishing returns to income growth

The situation is not completely clear-cut, however, as illustrated by the panels of Figures 1 and 2: the positive relationship between income and happiness exhibits diminishing returns. This comes as no surprise to economists, who are accustomed to the idea of the concavity of preferences, i.e. decreasing marginal utility and risk-aversion. Concretely, this means that the effect of earning an additional ten thousand dollars on subjective well-being becomes progressively smaller as one’s initial level of income increases. This is consistent with the good fit of the log functional form for income-happiness relationship, which is a familiar result in the empirical analysis of subjective well-being across the social sciences.

a. Is there a threshold in the utility of growth?

“Once a country has over $15,000 per head, its level of happiness appears to be independent of its income per head” (Layard, 2003, p. 17)

Many authors have suggested a threshold in the welfare effect of income. They recognize that rich countries are happier than poor countries, but believe that there is no strong relationship between GDP per capita and happiness among rich countries. This threshold separates “survival societies” and “modern societies” (Inglehart et al., 2009). It is usually found to be in an interval from US$10,000 to $15000 per annum (Di Tella et al., 2007). Layard (2005, p. 149) thus writes: “if we compare countries, there is no evidence that richer countries are happier than poorer ones—so long as we confine ourselves to countries with incomes over $15,000 per head.... At income levels below $15,000 per head things are different....”. Frey and Stutzer (2002, p. 416) similarly claim that “income provides happiness at low levels of development but once a threshold (around $10,000) is reached, the average income level in a country has little effect on average subjective well-being”.

This notion of a satiation point also goes back to Adam Smith’s concept of “a full complement of riches”, beyond which there could be not be desire for more money. The large landholders of the 18th Century had (according to him) reached this limit. However, there may be a limit to the quantity of wealth someone can enjoy in a given society at a certain point of time, but this does not mean that this limit cannot be stretched by the set of new choices brought about by economic growth (e.g. the internet). In other words, the “full complement of riches” could be wider in richer than in less-developed countries.
Even more explicitly, Inglehart (1997, pp. 64-65) concludes that: “the transition from a society of starvation to a society of security brings a dramatic increase in subjective well-being. But we find a threshold at which economic growth no longer seems to increase subjective well-being significantly. This may be linked with the fact that, at this level, starvation is no longer a real concern for most people. Survival begins to be taken for granted […] At low levels of economic development, even modest economic gains bring a high return in terms of caloric intake, clothing, shelter, medical care and ultimately in life expectancy itself; [...]. But once a society has reached a certain threshold of development ... one reaches a point at which further economic growth brings only minimal gains in both life expectancy and subjective well-being. There is still a good deal of cross national variation, but from this point on non-economic aspects of life become increasingly important influences on how long and how well people live”… The authors continue to reach the same conclusion with updated data: “Happiness and life satisfaction rise steeply as one moves from subsistence-level poverty to a modest level of economic security and then levels off. Among the richest societies, further increases in income are only weakly linked with higher levels of SWB” (Inglehart et al., 2008, p. 268).

If true, the implication of these findings for developing countries is that GDP growth should be seen as a temporary objective, to be retained only up to a certain level.

b. But the happiness-log GDP per capita gradient does not tend to zero.

In spite of these strong claims, the cross-country evidence in favour of such a subsistence level is far from consensual. Bringing together a number of international survey datasets that covering about 90% of the world’s population, including many developing countries (based on the World Values Survey and the Gallup World Poll), Stevenson and Wolfers (2008, pp. 11-12) test for the idea of a cut-point at $15,000 per capita per annum (in constant 2000 dollars). They estimate the happiness-GDP per capita gradient, and find that: “the well-being-GDP gradient is about twice as steep for poor countries as for rich countries. That is [...] a rise in income of $100 is associated with a rise in well-being for poor countries that is about twice as large as for rich countries”. However, the marginal utility of GDP growth is still positive in developed countries. “The point estimates are, on average, about three times as large for those countries with incomes above $15,000 compared to those countries with incomes below $15,000”. [...] Taken at face value, the Gallup results suggest that a 1 percent rise in GDP per capita would have about three times as large an effect on measured well-
being in rich as in poor nations. Of course, a 1 percent rise in U.S. GDP per capita is about ten times as large as a 1 percent rise in Jamaican GDP per capita”.

This result is consistent with Deaton’s analysis of the same Gallup World Poll data (Figure 2.B): “the relationship between log per capita income and life satisfaction is close to linear. The coefficient is 0.838, with a small standard error. A quadratic term in the log of income has a positive coefficient: confirming that the slope is higher in the richer countries! […] Using 12000$ of income per capita as a threshold between rich and poor countries shows that the slope in the higher income countries is higher! [...] If there is any evidence for a deviation, it is small and is probably in the direction of the slope being higher in the high-income countries”.

Deaton (2008) concludes that “the slope is steepest among the poorest countries, where the income gains are associated with the largest increases in life satisfaction, but it remains positive and substantial even among the rich countries; it is not true that there is some critical level of GDP per capita above which income has no further effect on life satisfaction”. In other words, there is indeed diminishing marginal utility to GDP growth, as the level of GDP per capita increases, but the return to growth does not converge to zero.5

To summarize, an undisputed finding of the happiness literature based on cross-sections of countries is that the relationship between income per capita and happiness is concave, i.e. has diminishing returns. However, there is no consensus on the existence of a subsistence threshold beyond which the marginal utility of income falls to zero.

1.3 “Rather than diminishing marginal utility of income, there is a zero marginal utility of income”

The most powerful criticism of pro-growth policy hinges on the empirical evidence regarding the within-country long-run changes in GDP and happiness. Visual evidence provided by Easterlin and his co-authors (1974, 1995, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010) illustrates the flatness

5 It is worth underlying that while the log function is indeed concave, it is not bounded from above. If y=log(x), then y does not tend to any fixed value as x tends to infinity. Yet, this is the message that a vast majority of specialists in the field have drawn from the decreasing marginal utility of income and the good fit of the log-linear functional form for the relationship between income and happiness.
of the long-run happiness curve plotted against time. One of the most famous and spectacular of these flat curves is show in Figure 3.A, taken from Easterlin and Angelescu (2007). In spite of the doubling of U.S. GDP per capita over a 30-year period (1972-2002), the average happiness of Americans has remained constant. Average happiness is calculated using repeated cross-sections from the American General Social Survey. The same type of pattern has been uncovered in a number of other contributions, with long time-series data covering different developed countries (see Diener and Oishi, 2000). The claim supported by these graphs is radical: in the words of Richard Easterlin, “Rather than diminishing marginal utility of income, there is a zero marginal utility of income” (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2007, p. 8).

The absence of any long-run correlation between growth and happiness could be explained by the decreasing marginal utility of income uncovered in the cross-section. However, Easterlin strongly rejects this interpretation: “The usual constancy of subjective well-being in the face of rising GDP per capita has typically been reconciled with the cross-sectional evidence on the grounds that the time series observations for developed nations correspond to the upper income range of the cross-sectional studies, where happiness changes little or not at all as real income rises.” But “the income change over time within the income range used in the point-of-time studies do not generate the change in happiness implied by the cross-sectional pattern”. (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2007, p. 24). For example: “in 1972, the cohort of 1941-1950 had a mean per capita income of about 12000$ (expressed in 1994 constant prices). By the year 2000, the cohort’s average income had more than doubled, rising to almost 27000$. According to the cross-sectional relation, this increase should have raised the cohort’s mean happiness from 2.17 to 2.27. In reality, the actual happiness of the cohort did not change”.

In some of his articles (Easterlin, 2005a, and Easterlin and Sawangfa 2005), Easterlin has forcefully underlined that cross-section evidence cannot be transposed to the relationship over time. The change in average self-reported happiness in a country, in the long-run, is not correctly predicted by the instantaneous cross-section relationship between income per head and happiness. Hence: “knowing the actual change over time in a country’s GDP per capita and the multi-country cross-sectional relation of SWB to GDP per capita adds nothing, on average, to one’s ability to predict the actual time-series change in SWB in a country” (Easterlin and Sawangfa, 2009, p. 179). This is illustrated in Figure 3.B, taken from Easterlin (2005a, p. 16), which contrasts the actual (flat) evolution of happiness in Japan, and the predicted (log-linear) change over time.
Hence, the positive concave relationship between GDP per capita and SWB, observed in the cross section, cannot be used to predict the change in SWB in developing countries over time. This new “no bridge” theory underlines the “fallacy” of transposing cross-sectional relations to time-series data. The lesson for developing countries is that they should not necessarily expect to reach the higher level of well-being that is typical of developed countries by growing over time.

I.4 Is the time-series correlation small enough to ignore?

In spite of the spectacular visual evidence offered by Easterlin, his rejection of any correlation between over time between growth and happiness is still the object of vivid controversy. In particular, one disputed point is whether the size of the correlation coefficient between SWB and GDP per capita is statistically significant, and large. It is small, but is it “small enough to ignore”? (Hagerty and Veenhoven, 2000, p. 4).

For instance, the absence of correlation between growth and happiness in the fast-developing countries of Japan (after WWII) and China (after 1980) is particularly disappointing. However, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) have noted a number of discontinuities in the wording of the happiness question and in the sampling of the Japanese cross-sections used by Easterlin. With respect to China, the evidence is scarce (only three points in time) and Hagerty and Veenhoven (2000) underline the fact that the Chinese sample is not representative of the population, as it was initially biased towards more urban demographic groups.

Other work on the long-run macroeconomic time series of happiness has concluded that there is a positive relationship between growth in GDP per capita and well-being. Exploiting the World Values Survey, Hagerty and Veenhoven (2003) found that GDP is positively related to the number of “happy life years” in 14 of the 21 countries available in the dataset. In a later paper, Hagerty and Veenhoven (2006) observed a statistically-significant rise in happiness in 4 out of 8 high-income countries, and 3 out of 4 low-income countries. Inglehart et al. (2008) also exploited the most recent waves of the World Values Survey, spanning from 1981 to 2005. They found that, over the complete period, happiness rose in 45 out of the 52 countries for which substantial time-series data is available. Kenny (2005) appeals to data on 21 Transition and Developed Countries and runs regressions of the change in happiness on the growth in GDP, separately for each country. He finds that 88% of correlation coefficients are
positive; the overall regression coefficient for all countries together is positive and significant at the 5% level.

Inglehart et al. (2008) present a series of graphs plotting average happiness against time in different countries, based on the first four waves of the World Values Survey. As they point out: “in many cases, the results contradict the assumption that, despite economic growth, and other changes, the publics of given societies have not gotten any happier. They show that the American and British series show a downward trend in happiness from 1946 to 1980, but an upward trend thereafter” [this was confirmed by Easterlin]. “In general, among the countries for which we have a long-term data, 19 out of the 26 countries show rising happiness levels. In several of these countries- India, Ireland, Mexico, Puerto Rico and South Korea- there are steeply rising trends. The other countries with rising trends are Argentina, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, Spain and Sweden. Three countries (the U.S., Switzerland and Norway) show flat trends from the earliest to the latest survey. Only four countries (Austria, Belgium, the U.K and West Germany) show downward trends” (the Appendix to Inglehart et al., 2008). Figures 4.A to 4.E taken from their paper illustrate the positive slope of the happiness curve in India, Mexico, Puerto Rico, South Africa, and the downward slope in China.

Some work has thus uncovered a positive and statistically-significant correlation between growth and well-being over time, using within-country time-series data. This includes Hagerty and Veenhoven (2003), Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), Inglehart, et al. (2008). In turn, many of these results have been criticized by Easterlin (2005) on the basis of the choice of countries, the confusion between long-run dynamics and the business cycle, and the absence of controls in some of the estimates. Easterlin, with a number of different co-authors, has confirmed and developed his initial conjecture. Authors such as Ed Diener, Rafael Di Tella, Bruno Frey, Robert MacCulloch, Andrew Oswald and Alois Stutzer have provided additional empirical evidence in this direction.

**A note on statistical power**

The dispute over the long run income-happiness gradient revolves around the magnitude of the correlation coefficient and its statistical significance. A number of authors have underlined that there is less statistical power in long-run series of well-being than in the cross-section,
due to the smaller standard deviation. With less variation to explain, it is difficult to obtain statistically-significant correlations.

Hagerty and Veenhoven (2000, p. 5) for instance, note that: “the standard deviation in GDP per capita in the cross section from Diener and Oishi was about 8000$, whereas the standard deviation in Hagerty time-series (for the same countries) was only about ¼ of that (2000$) [...] within a country in 25 years”. Hence, the statistical power to detect the effect is lower in time-series work. Equally, Kenny (2005), using data on 21 Transition and developed countries, found a standard deviation in happiness over time within countries of 0.28 on average, as compared to a standard deviation of average scores across countries of 0.65 (p. 212). Layard et al. (2010, p. 161), using Eurobarometer time series for 20 Western European countries, also report an average standard deviation of national happiness scores over time of 0.2, as compared to an average of 0.5-0.6 in the individual cross-sections.

We calculated the standard deviation in happiness and life satisfaction in the World Values Survey cross-sections from 1981 to 2007. The average standard deviation within a cross-section (250 observations) is 0.67 for happiness (4-point scale) and 2.14 for life satisfaction (10-point scale). But the standard deviation of average national happiness across countries is 0.28 for happiness and 1.04 for life satisfaction. Finally, the standard deviation of national happiness over time fluctuates around 0.1 for happiness and from 0.13 to 0.41 for life satisfaction. In other words, the variability of subjective well-being measures is much lower in time-series than in the cross-sections within countries and across-countries. The implication is that the difference between cross-sectional versus time-series correlation coefficients is difficult to interpret.

In summary, the long-run relationship between GDP growth and subjective well-being is still a subject of some controversy. As pointed by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), one cannot reject the null that the correlation coefficient is equal to zero, but this does not mean that one can reject the null that it is greater than zero. The nature of the long-run relationship between GDP and well-being is far from being firmly established.

1.5 Subjective well-being and the business cycle

One of the reasons why it is difficult to admit no correlation between income and well-being is that this appears in sharp contradiction to the undisputed welfare effect of the business cycle.
There is first of all considerable consensus that recessions make people unhappy. Di Tella et al. (2003) showed that macroeconomic movements, in particular unemployment, inflation and the volatility of output exert strong effects on the happiness of nations. The negative impact of volatility on subjective well-being was also established by Wolfers (2003). A powerful illustration of the business cycle-happiness correlation is given in Figure 5.A, taken from Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), which shows the spectacular parallel dynamics of the output gap and the average happiness in the United States from 1972 to 2008. This does not mean that the influence of the business cycle can be equated with the influence of long-run growth, however. It is indeed easy to imagine happiness and the business cycle fluctuating around a flat long-run trend. While it is uncontroversial to say that happiness rises in booms and falls in busts, the key question is whether four percent growth in GDP per annum (for example) will produce a happier society in the long run than one percent GDP growth per annum.

One particular episode which is often considered as an illustration of the correlation between income fluctuations and well-being, rather than between long-term growth and well-being, is the transition process in Central and Eastern European countries from socialism to capitalism. All of the work here recognizes the statistically-significant correlation between the dynamics of GDP and that of subjective well-being. Figures 5.B to 5.D, taken from Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2008) and Easterlin (2009), illustrate the concomitant evolutions in income and happiness in a number of transition countries. Similar evidence can be found in Sanfey and Teksoz (2008).

However, these trends are qualified as short term by Easterlin and Angelescu (2009), who warns that one should avoid “confusing a short-term positive happiness-income association, due to fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions, with the long-term relationship. We suggest, speculatively, that this disparity between the short and long-term association is due to the social psychological phenomenon of “loss aversion”.

However valuable the interpretation in terms of loss-aversion, it is perhaps surprising that Transition is considered to be only a short-term phenomenon. In a way, Transition is the best example of regime change that we can think of. It is a deep and irreversible structural transformation, not a short-lived phenomenon. It shares the essential features of development, including the take-off period and the profound qualitative and institutional changes. Hence, whether Transition should be treated as a short-term or a long-term phenomenon remains an open question. Only the passage of time will enable us to see whether the increase in
subjective well-being continues with GDP growth, stagnates at a certain point, or falls back down to the initial (1990) level.

II. EXPLANATIONS RELATED TO GROWTH ITSELF: CHANNELS AND NEGATIVE SIDE-EFFECTS

The flatness of happiness curves is therefore consistent with GDP growth not yielding higher well-being over time. More generally, it may suggest that whatever changes a country experiences over time have no long-run effect on individual average happiness. If this is true, the prospect is dark for developing countries, which are locked in at their current low level of happiness. The message is also very discouraging for public policy in general: if happiness cannot be raised in the long run, not only should growth be abandoned as an objective, but so should any other public policy measure.

Before jumping to these radical conclusions, the two next sections discuss possible explanations of the flatness of the happiness curve. A first series of explanations pertain to the nature of growth itself, i.e. the channels of growth and the fact that growth is accompanied by negative externalities (pollution, inequality etc.) that cancel out its subjective benefits. The second series of explanations cover social and psychological processes, such as comparisons and adaptation, that may well reduce the happiness benefits of growth.

II.1 Quality of Life: channels from GDP growth to happiness

Statistical estimates of subjective well-being most often include time and/or country fixed effects, as well as other controls that are introduced in order to pick up any changes in the demographic composition of the population (in terms of age, occupation, health, number of children, etc.). Some analyses also control for political variables such as democracy, gender equality, trust, etc. However, in terms of the empirical strategy retained for the estimation of the relationship, there is always a trade-off between controlling for variables that reflect the channels via which the phenomenon under consideration works, and not controlling for omitted variables and obtaining a biased measure of the relationship. For example, in the context of the current question of growth and well-being, a well-being regression that controlled for both GDP and the positive side-effects (or channels) of growth runs the risk of concluding that growth doesn’t matter for well-being. Indeed, we expect growth to bring about higher well-being not only via greater purchasing power (income), i.e. through higher
consumption, but also via other transformations (education, health etc.) which accompany the growth process. Controlling for these latter transformations may render GDP itself insignificant in a well-being equation, but that does not mean that greater income does not produce greater happiness, it rather means that we have identified the different processes via which income produces well-being.

Greater income per capita always comes with increased labour productivity, which means a greater choice in time-use for those who are concerned. As argued by Sen (2001), it is because it enhances the freedom of choice (by enlarging their set of capacities) that growth is expected to raise people’s well-being. Identically, GDP growth is known for being associated with demographic transitions in developing countries. This is certainly “a revolutionary enlargement of freedom for women”, as put by Titmuss (1966, quoted by Easterlin and Angelescu 2007, p. 9), and a rise in the education and resources for self-development that children can count on. Growth also comes with higher life expectancy, reduced child mortality and child underweight (see for instance Becker, Philipson and Soares, 2005 and Easterlin and Angelescu, 2007). Finally it is well-known that democracy and development go hand in hand, even if the direction of causality is not as clear as was believed in the 18th Century (e.g. by Montesquieu, Steuart and Hume). Lipset (1959, p. 80), for example, claims that: “industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards and a steady increase in the overall wealth of society [are] basic conditions sustaining democracy”. Without inferring any causality, we can observe the statistical association between GDP growth and progress in terms of political freedom and human rights. With respect to the empirical strategy, any attempt to capture the global effect of GDP growth on subjective well-being should not control for any such variables which represent the channels of transmission. It is likely regrettable that much of the work on the GDP growth-happiness relationship does indeed include such controls.

The following sections review the available evidence on the correlation between GDP growth and such quality of life indicators. These latter are measures of the non-income quantitative and qualitative dimensions that constitute the channels from income growth to well-being.

a. Cross-section correlation between GDP growth and Quality of Life indicators

Easterlin and Angelescu (2007) illustrate the sizeable positive correlation in cross-section data between a number of quality of life indicators and GDP per capita across countries at different
levels of development. The clear upward slopes relate subjective well-being to quantifiable factors, measured on continuous scales. These latter include food, shelter, clothing and footwear, energy intake, protein intake, fruit and vegetables, radios, cars, TV sets, mobile phone subscriptions, internet users, urban population, life expectancy at birth, gross education enrolment rate, and the total fertility rate. These kinds of relationships have been documented by a considerable number of other authors, including Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Inglehart et al. (2008), Layard et al., 2010, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008), and Becker et al. (2005).

Along analogous lines, some authors have insisted on the relationship between subjective well-being, on the one hand, and procedures, governance and institutions, democratic and human rights, tolerance of out-groups, gender equality, on the other (for example, Barro 1997, Frey and Stutzer 2000, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Schyns 1998, and Inglehart et al. 2008).

b. Time-series correlation between GDP growth and Quality of Life indicators

Figure 7 illustrates the spectacular take-off of life expectancy in England and Wales in the 19th century. More generally, Easterlin and Angelescu (2007) provide a detailed account of the progress in the different dimensions of quality of life over time, in a large set of developed and emerging countries. They document the different dimensions of changes in the Quality of Life during “modern economic growth”. The latter is defined as a “rapid and sustained rise in real output per head and attendant shifts in production technology, factor input requirements, and the resource allocation of a nation”, where “rapid and sustained” is defined as being equal to at least 1.5% per year (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2007, p. 2).

Easterlin and Angelescu document the turning points in GDP growth and other indicators of the Quality of Life. Although both variables move in parallel, they insist that the dates of their respective take-offs do not systematically coincide. Qualitative indicators sometimes lag behind and sometimes are lead the date of GDP take-off. “If social and political indicators of QoL are, at present, positively associated with GDP per capita, it is often because the countries that first implemented the new production technology underlying modern economic growth were also the first to introduce, often via public policy, new advances in knowledge in the social and political realms” (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2007, p. 21). Whether the co-movements between growth and quality of life indicators represent a causal relationship is controversial and difficult to establish (see also Easterly, 1999). However, it is undeniable that overall there is no progress in quality of life without GDP growth.
In their provocative paper “Is growth obsolete?”, William Nordhaus and James Tobin (1973) advocated for an alternative indicator, integrating leisure, household work, costs of urbanization, and constructed a “Measure of Economic Welfare”. However, this index turned out to grow in a way that was similar to GDP over the period under study, albeit more slowly. This, to our knowledge is a universal observation. Pritchett and Summers (1996), for example, note that “wealthier is healthier” in the long run. Using time-series data from a variety of countries, they find that “The long-run income elasticity of infant and child mortality in developing countries lies between 0.2 and 0.4”. This implies that “over a half a million child deaths in the developing world in 1990 alone can be attributed to the poor economic performance in the 1980s”.

In summary, GDP growth goes hand-in-hand with a series of quantitative and qualitative non-monetary improvements in quality of life. These constitute the channels from growth to well-being that we argue should not be controlled for in the statistical analysis of the former relationship.

II. 2. Negative side-effects of growth

The flatness of the GDP-happiness graphs may be due to the negative influence of some side-effects of growth, such as pollution, income inequality, work stress, and so on. The influence of these “omitted variables” could then well hide the positive influence of GDP growth on subjective well-being in econometric analyses (see Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2008).

The most widely-discussed negative side-effects of growth are: inequality, crime, corruption, extended working hours, unemployment, pollution and other environmental degradation (as measured by SOx emissions, for example). These are discussed in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2003 and 2008). Kenny (2005) also emphasises the social cost of economic transformation, and the ensuing shift from local to global relative income concerns. The impact of urban concentration and sub-urbanization is not so clear-cut, however. Easterlin and Angelescu (2007) also underline the effects of carbon dioxide emissions and fat intake (obesity and blood pressure). Clark and Fischer (2009) provide a useful summary of the macro-economic correlates of life satisfaction in OECD countries.

Among the list of usual suspects, income inequality occupies a particular place. In the first place, the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being has been the subject of a considerable body of work, much of which has concluded to a negative
correlation (see Senik, 2009, for a survey, and Clark et al. 2008 and Alesina and la Ferrara, 2008, for surveys of the self-reported demand for income redistribution). Income inequality will reduce well-being if people dislike it as such (although, on the other hand, it will be associated with higher well-being if it is interpreted as reflecting a greater scope of opportunities: see Alesina et al., 2004). However, it can also exert a mechanically negative effect on average SWB, due to the concave relationship between income and SWB (see Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). However, this mechanical effect does not seem to be sufficient to explain the flatness of the curve. As illustrated by the different panels of Figure 8 (taken from Layard et al., 2010, p. 142), income inequality increased sharply from 1970 to the end of the 2000s, but average happiness has remained flat. In addition, the income of the upper quintile of the income distribution has risen, but the happiness scores within this quintile have not. Hence, even for highest income quintile, the happiness curve has remained flat in the USA.

One important note that can be made here is that many of the negative externalities of growth seem to exhibit an inverted U-shape, i.e. they increase in the initial stages of development and then subsequently fall in the later stages. Income inequality, pollution, long hours of work, poor working conditions, etc. are phenomena that initially seem to have grown in importance with income growth, but which have then been attenuated at some point in high-income countries. This is not only the result of purely mechanical forces, but also of public policy: this is an important point to make in the context of developing countries. Should these negative factors then be taken into account when evaluating the effect of GDP growth on well-being? This an open question. If these negative side effects constitute inevitable companions to growth, then the answer is Yes: they have to be counted negatively in the welfare accounting of growth. However, if these side-effects can potentially be attenuated or suppressed by public policy, then they are not necessarily intimately linked with higher income, and as such their well-being effect can be removed from the welfare effect of growth.

III. EXPLANATIONS RELATED TO THE HAPPINESS FUNCTION ITSELF (HUMAN BEINGS ARE SOCIAL ANIMALS)

III.1. Income comparisons

One simple explanation of the lack of any long-run relationship between income and well-being is that this does not reflect that there is something wrong with growth per se, but rather
that this reflects the very structure of individual well-being functions. The broad idea is that income does not bring well-being in a vacuum, but is rather intensely social, in that it is evaluated relative to some benchmark, reference or comparison level of income. There are many synonyms for the latter: this can be thought of as what is normal in the society, or what is fair. Forgetting about the other determinants, we can then write the relationship between utility and income as:

\[
U_{it} = U(y_{it}, y_{it}^*)
\]

The well-being of individual \( i \) at time \( t \) rises with their own income, \( y_{it} \), but falls with the level of comparison income, \( y_{it}^* \). Comparison income acts as a deflator with respect to own income here, in the sense that the higher it is the less good the individual’s own income looks. Much of the empirical literature exploring this relationship has explicitly parameterized the well-being function as a function of both \( y_{it} \), and \( y_{it}/y_{it}^* \). If the income effect of income on well-being is mostly absolute, so that absent the externalities mentioned above greater GDP will increase individual well-being, then the second term will play only a minor role. On the other hand, if income comparisons are very important, so that most of the effect of income works through how well I am doing compared to some reference group, then it is the second term that will be preponderant. If it is mostly relative income (\( y_{it}/y_{it}^* \), which is homogeneous of degree zero) that matters, then, answering Dick Easterlin’s 1995 question, Raising the Incomes of All will not Increase the Happiness of All.

Distinguishing between these two scenarios has been the goal of a considerable amount of empirical work over the past fifteen or so years. A variety of different empirical approaches across various disciplines have been mobilized to answer the question of how much income comparisons matter in the determination of well-being. All of this work has had to set out a priori exactly to whom or to what individuals are thought to compare themselves: this has included the individual’s spouse, to people with the same characteristics as the individual, those in the same region, other participants in experiments, hypothetical individuals, or even a measure of the individual’s expected income. Some of the key findings in developed countries are described below.
a. Evidence in Developed Countries

One direct approach to the question of income comparisons has been to estimate well-being regressions in which both the individual’s own income and the comparison income level appear: these are the empirical counterpart to equation (1) above. This literature has appealed to different datasets (in terms of countries and years), different measures of well-being (job and life satisfaction being the most predominant), and various measures of comparison income, \( y_{it}^* \). The typical finding is that own income is positively correlated with well-being, but that the correlation with others’ income is negative.

Clark and Oswald (1996) use the BHPS to calculate the income of ‘people like me’ from a wage equation, and show that this is negatively correlated with individual job satisfaction. Own income attracts a positive coefficient, and the sum of the two estimated income coefficients is zero: pay rises for everyone have no effect on satisfaction. More recent work along the same lines using, respectively, German and American data is Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) and McBride (2001). Vendrik and Woltjer (2006) extend the analysis of the German GSOEP data in this respect, by considering asymmetric reactions to gains and losses (relative to the reference group).

An alternative measure of \( y_{it}^* \) is at the local level: What do my neighbours earn? Both Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) and Luttmer (2005) calculate regional average income in US data, and show that this is negatively correlated with respondents’ well-being: an individual earning $40 000 per year is happier in a poorer than a richer region. However, at the very local level of a few hundred metres, Clark et al. (2009) find that in Danish panel data, conditional on my own income and local median income, my satisfaction is strongly positively correlated with my rank in the local income distribution. Other work here has considered comparisons to the income of the individual’s work colleagues (Brown et al., 2006), partner (Clark, 1996) and parents (McBride, 2001).

Running well-being regressions is only one way of addressing the question of income comparisons. One early method (the first published contribution being Van Praag, 1971) is that of the Welfare Function of Income. Here individuals assign income levels (per period) to verbal labels (such as excellent, good, sufficient and bad): these stated values form the basis of individual-level regressions estimating a lognormal Welfare Function of Income. The
resulting individual estimated means ($\mu$) reveal which individuals require greater income in order to be satisfied. Comparison income is introduced into the analysis, typically as average income over age, education and other characteristics. The regression results (for example, Van de Stadt et al., 1985) show that, given own income, the higher is reference group income, the more money individuals say they need to reach a given verbal well-being level, which is consistent with income comparisons.

Separate evidence on comparisons is found in experimental economics. In Zizzo and Oswald (2001), experimental participants paid out of their own winnings in order to burn the money earned by other participants. An alternative approach is to ask individuals to choose between hypothetical outcomes, as in Alpizar et al. (2005), Johannsson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Solnick and Hemenway (1998). A typical income choice is as follows:

A: Your current yearly income is $50,000; others earn $25,000.

B: Your current yearly income is $100,000; others earn $200,000.

The key here is that one choice has a greater absolute return while the other is more advantageous in relative terms. In line with the experimental work, there are strong positional concerns over income, in that individuals choose $A$ over $B$. While the above example is couched in terms of income, the same method can be used to compare the degree of comparisons across domains. For example, relative concerns in Alpizar et al. are stronger for cars and housing, and weaker for vacations and insurance.

A recent randomized experiment was set up by Card et al. (2010), showing evidence of relative concerns among employees of the University of California when they had access to internet information about the wage of their colleagues.

Last, we can appeal to recent neurological work. Fließbach et al. (2007) use MRI techniques to measure the brain activity of pairs of individuals engaged in identical guessing-game tasks. Each individual’s monetary reward for a correct guess was announced to both subjects, and these rewards were varied. In some conditions a correct guess by a participant earned 60 points; in other conditions the subject’s guess earned 60 and the other’s correct guess earned 30, or 60 and 120. As such, the individual’s relative payoff for a correct guess changed, while keeping the absolute reward fixed. Blood oxygenation analysis showed that brain activity in
the ventral striatum was increased with relative income. Related work in this area appears in Takahashi et al. (2009).

b. Evidence in LDCs

The majority of the work on income comparisons and individual well-being has covered OECD countries. However, the increasing availability of data including subjective questions undoubtedly allied with the increasing interest that researchers have in these issues, have produced a small but growing number of pieces of evidence regarding the correlates of individual well-being in poorer countries. The key question that we want to answer here is whether positional concerns are less important in poorer countries: Are comparisons luxuries?

Regarding the direct estimation of individual well-being, Graham and Felton (2006) have replicated the finding of a negative effect of regional income on individual well-being across 18 Latin American countries. Kuegler (2009) analyzes self-collected data on 400 Venezuelans in 2005, and shows that those who say that they are better off than their own siblings report higher life satisfaction. This is consistent with relative income effects in a relatively poor country. The strength of this correlation depends on the individual’s own characteristics, being stronger for respondents with above-median incomes and those who work in higher-rank professions. Stark and Taylor (1991) present indirect evidence of the role of income comparisons by looking at the decision to migrate. Using Mexican data, they show that relative deprivation is a significant predictor of Mexico-US migration.

Castilla (2010) also considers Mexican data, including information on subjective poverty (whether the respondent’s income is sufficient for their needs) and income satisfaction. Relative concerns are introduced by considering these two welfare measures as a function of both own expenditure and the respondent’s evaluation of their own income relative to people with whom they live, to how much they aspired to have at this stage of their lives, and relative to the income they earned three years ago (all three of which are measured on a seven-point scale). The empirical results show that welfare rises with own expenditure, but falls with income relative to others and income relative to aspirations. The results with respect to past income are significant only in the life satisfaction equation and when the individual reports being worse off than three years ago (which is consistent with loss-aversion).

Rojas and Jiménez (2007) also appeal to Mexican data to show respondents’ subjective poverty evaluations are partly determined by the gaps between own income on the one hand
and comparison and aspired income levels on the other. Comparison income is measured directly by asking about the income gap ‘with respect to those you usually compare yourself to’. Guillen-Royo (2010) analyzes small sample data from seven communities in Peru, and shows that satisfaction with a number of different life domains is positively correlated with own expenditure but negatively correlated with average community expenditure. Last, Rojas (2010) uses data from 20 Latin American countries found in the 2007 Gallup survey. Two measures of individual well-being, the ladder question of worst to best possible life and satisfaction with standard of living, are related to both own income and the average income in the reference group (defined by age, sex and country). The empirical results show that well-being rises with the log of own income but falls with the log of comparison income. In the case of satisfaction with standard of living, the coefficients on the two variables are equal and opposite, suggesting that a rise in everyone’s income would leave no-one in Latin America better off.

Moving from Latin America to Asia, there has been a spate of recent work on the determinants of well-being in China, some of which has appealed to the notion of reference income. Appleton and Song (2008) conclude that the life satisfaction reported by urban Chinese is affected by status considerations, and Smyth and Qian (2008) analyze data from 31 Chinese cities in September 2002, finding that the log of average monthly income in the city in which the respondent lives is negatively correlated with happiness, controlling for own income. Gao and Smyth (2010) appeal to two different datasets to present some evidence that job satisfaction is negatively related to reference group income, where this latter is either average income in the firm in which the respondent works, or the predicted income of “people like me” (as in Clark and Oswald, 1996).

Recent work by Cojocaru (2010) appeals to cross-section 2007 data from the LSMS in Tajikistan. He finds a mostly insignificant effect of regional income on individual life satisfaction, but suggests that this might reflect the fact that the wrong reference group is being used. When however a qualitative variable is used which measures the individual’s evaluation of their household’s welfare relative to that of their neighbours, strong effects are found in the expected sense: those who rank their household relatively lowly compared to their neighbours report lower levels of life satisfaction, controlling for the household’s own expenditure.
Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) consider a direct measure of relative utility in a developing country by analysing the answers to a question on consumption adequacy in Nepalese data. Consumption adequacy rises with own income (but falls with the distance to the nearest market). Critically, conditional on these and other control variables, consumption adequacy also falls with reference group consumption, as in a relative utility model. Here reference group consumption is defined in a geographical way as the mean or median consumption of other households living in the same ward as the respondent.

Carlsson et al. (2009) look at hypothetical preferences over different absolute and relative income situations (as used by Alpizar et al., 2005) in India. They find that around half of the effect of income on well-being comes from some kind of status or relative income concern. Crucially, they note that this figure is around the same as that found in rich countries. They moreover note that low caste and low income respondents seem to be more sensitive to relative income.

John Knight has authored a series of papers using Chinese data from the 2002 CHIP national household survey. Unusually, this survey included not only questions on subjective well-being but also asked direct questions about who individuals considered as their reference group. Knight et al. (2009) appeal to cross-sectional information on 9,200 households in China. The authors first show that comparisons in China are local, in that 70% of individuals see their village as their reference group. Further, conditional on both own and village income, those who report that their own income was much above the village have higher happiness scores. Knight and Gunatilaka (2010a and 2010b) also emphasize the importance of relative income rather than absolute income, and the role of changing reference groups, in Chinese data. Mishra et al. (2010) show that reporting an income below that of a self-reported reference group is associated with lower well-being for the Korean minority in China.

Well-being work using Chinese data has thus uncovered a number of pieces of evidence consistent with the presence of income comparisons in a developing country. This is consistent with the results in Brown et al. (2010), who do not measure well-being directly, but instead appeal to the literature that has analyzed conspicuous consumption in developing countries. They use data from a Chinese household panel, and show that spending on funerals and gifts is consistent with status-seeking behaviour. Last, Fließbach and co-authors followed up their 2007 work by running the same relative income Neuro experiments in China (although the results have not yet been written up).
Turning to Africa, Kingdon and Knight (2007) consider the role of relative income in South Africa. The authors find evidence of negative relative income effects within race groups (whereby life satisfaction is lower the more others earn), but positive relative income effects within neighborhoods.⁶

Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2010) analyze South African SALDRU data from the early 1990s. They find no significant effect of local (cluster-level) income for Whites, but a positive and significant effect of others’ income for non-Whites. However, similar to Cojocaru (2010), dummy variables for one’s own income compared to that of one’s parents attract significant estimated coefficients consistent with income comparisons (with feeling less well-off than one’s parents having a far larger absolute effect on satisfaction than feeling better-off than one’s parents).

Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) appeal to large-scale 2004 household data from Malawi, which includes measures of satisfaction with life and consumption expenditure. More unusually, the data also includes measures of own subjective economic welfare, from respondents’ answers to the question “Imagine six steps, where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the sixth, stand the rich (show a picture of the steps). On which step are you today?”, as well as their assessment of the economic welfare of their neighbors and their friends. Ravallion and Lokshin model individual life satisfaction as a function of both own and local neighbourhood consumption, and as a function of both own and others’ economic welfare. Although they argue that the results show that comparisons are not important for the majority of Malawians, others’ consumption reduces individual life satisfaction in the urban sample, and there is some evidence of a negative effect of friends’ economic welfare on those who report a relatively high level of own economic welfare.

On a smaller scale, Kenny (2005) uses data from a survey of 566 Tanzanian households, in which respondents report the amount of income necessary to be wealthy. Similar to the European results in Van Praag’s work, it is shown that the average income in the area is one key determinant of what people consider to be a healthy income.

⁶ So that higher neighbourhood income is associated with greater satisfaction. This mirrors the finding in Danish small neighbourhood data in Clark et al. (2009).
Akay and Martinsson (2008) use a cell-mean approach similar to that in Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) applied to 2004-2005 household survey data in Northern Ethiopia. They find no significant effect of reference group income on life satisfaction. A companion paper (Akay et al., 2009) again looks at Ethiopia, but this time considers hypothetical preferences over absolute and relative income scenarios. The results here are that the choices of most Ethiopian subsistence farmers are based on absolute income alone. However, there are still an arguably considerable number of some of the poorest people in the world who take status considerations into account. Corazzini et al. (2010) use the same approach to compare the degree of relative income concerns across eight different countries. While they argue that there is a broad pattern of individuals in richer countries being more sensitive to relative income, it is striking that one of the most comparison-conscious countries in this respect is Kenya.

c. Absolute versus relative poverty

One of the reasons why we are interested in income comparisons, especially in the context of less well-off countries, is that they impinge on the concept of poverty. The distinction between poverty as an absolute lack and a relative lack goes back at least to Adam Smith: in the mid-18th Century the Scots were not seriously deprived if they did not have shoes, whereas in England, only the truly destitute had no shoes. The stigma from being shoeless was therefore greater in England than in Scotland, because of the social norm that was attached to it. As such, the impact of a given lack on individual well-being may depend on the degree to which this lack is stigmatised in society, which itself is likely related to the incidence of the lack under consideration.

Moving back to income and appealing to equation (1) above, the critical distinction is then whether poverty is defined by an individual’s income falling below a certain critical level, or whether other people’s outcomes play a role. Absolute measures of poverty include the cost of minimum calorie intake line, the minimum consumption basket defining the poverty line in the US, and the World Bank’s 1$ a day poverty line. Relative measures of poverty take context into account, such as the commonly-used relative poverty line set at 60% of median income. The evidence of relative income concerns in low-income countries seems to constitute an argument in favor of measures of relative poverty.
Another important question that we are unable to answer to date, is whether relative concerns are less important, i.e. have smaller welfare effect in low-income countries than in high-income countries. Income interactions can be thought about as some kind of luxury good, that come into attention only once survival is taken for granted. We have reviewed the evidence that relative concerns do exist in developing countries. But whether their importance is smaller than in developed countries remains an open question that would need specific data – maybe experimental data- to be answered. Analyzing the data from the third wave of the European Social Survey, Clark and Senik (2010) focused on the answers to the question “How important is it to you to compare your income with other people’s incomes?” across European countries. They found that this importance is greater in poorer countries than in richer countries, and that, within countries, this comparison is more often said to be important by poorer people. Comparisons are most often upward directed and people suffer more from upward-directed comparisons. This is consistent with the literature’s general findings (see for example Ferrer-i-Carbonnell 2004, or Card et al. 2010). If this finding could be extended to poor countries, this would rule out the idea that income comparisons are a rich country phenomenon.

Knowing that local income comparisons matter for low-income countries’ citizens, one should consider the possibility that global income concerns may also be important, especially in view of the development of information and communication technologies. If the latter allow the inhabitants of low-income countries to be aware of the life-style and consumption possibilities of high-income country citizens, this is likely to generate feelings of relative deprivation. This might explain the steeper curve of the relation between GDP per capita and subjective well-being in developing countries (see section I.1). We are not aware of any direct evidence of global income concerns. One exception is Clark and Senik (2010), who noted that in the above-cited recent survey of Europeans, respondents who did not have internet access were less subject to income comparisons.

The most radical view about the importance of income comparisons would lead to the conclusion that it is only because they compare to others that the richer inhabitants of the globe are more happy and the poorer less happy. Does this mean that low-income countries should give up pro-growth policy? This would be surprising policy advice. Indeed, if relative concerns are important, many may well find it strange to recommend that low-income countries should remain at their current low rank in the concert of nations. Even if income
comparisons lead to a vain zero-sum rat race between countries, it is not clear that not competing is an avenue for happiness.

**III.2. Adaptation**

Adaptation and the associated “hedonic treadmill” is another classic explanation of the Easterlin paradox. Habituation effects destroy the welfare benefit of growth. This is because of the deleterious role of aspirations: “Material aspirations increase commensurately with income, and as a result, one gets no nearer to or farther away from the attainment of one’s material goals, and well-being is unchanged” (Easterlin, 2003).

Adaptation is a central issue in the social sciences: to what extent do we get used to any specific life situation? The psychological basis of adaptation is that judgements of current situations depend on the experience of similar situations in the past, so that higher levels of past experience may offset higher current levels of these phenomena due to changing expectations (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Some psychologists draw a parallel between the homeostasis that leads us to hold body temperature steady and homeostasis in subjective well-being (Cummins, 2003), which latter is argued to hold well-being at some constant individual-specific set-point (argued to be between 60 and 80 on a standardised 0-100 scale, with an average figure of 75). This may be partly biologically determined, underlying a potential role of genetic factors. In any case, the key element is that, although positive and negative events will have short-run effects on well-being, in the longer-run most individuals will return to their set-point level.

Although initially partisans of the adaptation hypothesis, Fujita and Diener (2005) note that in 17 years of GSOEP data, around one quarter of people changed well-being significantly from the first five to the last five years. Diener *et al.* (2006) propose 5 significant revisions to hedonic-treadmill theory: 1) individuals’ set-points are not hedonically neutral; 2) individuals have different set-points; 3) a single person can have multiple set-points depending on the components of happiness (emotions, life satisfaction); 4) well-being set-points can change under some conditions, 5) individuals differ in their adaptation to events.

In the context of the Easterlin paradox, we are particularly interested in adaptation to income. With respect to equation (1) above, we again introduce an additional income term into the utility function; however, this time the newcomer is not the income of others or expectations, but rather the income that the individual themselves had earned in the past. Individual well-
being is thus still subject to income comparisons, but here the comparisons are within subject, to use the psychological term. Those who have earned more in the past are less satisfied with any given level of income today.

While in theory any past income level could negatively affect well-being today, in practice empirical work has appealed to the income that the individual received one year ago (in panel terms, this is the income that the individual reported in the previous wave, as most panels are carried out on a yearly basis).

\[ U_{it} = U(y_{it}, y_{it-1}) \]  

(2)

This kind of utility function implies that any attempt to raise happiness via higher income is potentially subject to debate. If the effect (negative) of past income, via habituation, is strong enough then income will have no long-lasting well-being effect, at both the individual and the societal level.

**a. Evidence in Developed Countries**

Perhaps the best-cited piece of work in the domain of adaptation to income is that of Brickman et al. (1978), who show that a very small sample (22) of American lottery winners report no higher life satisfaction than a control group. The authors' interpretation of this finding is in terms of adaptation to higher income. Much as this paper has been cited, it does not necessarily tell a clean story. Two points of note in this respect are that the winners were actually more satisfied than non-winners, but the small sample size did not yield a significant difference. Further, the analysis is cross-section, rather than panel. As such, it could well be the case that the lottery winners were less happy to start with, before they won. As such, they would have experienced an increase in well-being on winning the lottery, but this would not have been visible in the cross-section analysis.

An early piece of evidence that does appeal to explicit information on income changes is Inglehart and Rabier (1986), who use pooled Eurobarometer data from ten Western European countries between 1973 and 1983 to show that well-being scores are essentially unrelated to current income, but are positively correlated with the change in financial position over the past twelve months. They conclude that aspirations adapt to circumstances, such that, in the long run, stable characteristics do not affect well-being.
More recently, Clark (1999) used two waves of BHPS data to look at the relationship between job satisfaction and current and past labour income. Considering those who stay in the same firm in the same position, past income reduces job satisfaction while current income increases it. This is consistent with a utility function that depends on changes in these variables. The data suggest a completely relative function, with job satisfaction depending only on the annual change in the hourly wage. More recent results in German and British panel data are reported by Di Tella et al. (2005) and Burchardt (2005), respectively. Layard et al. (2010) appeal to GSOEP data to show that the long-run effect of a rise in income is smaller than the initial effect.

Instead of using own and past individual income, we can also consider aggregate income. Di Tella et al. (2003) examine individual happiness in data covering 18 years across 12 European countries, and argue that some of their results on current and lagged GDP per capita show that ‘bursts of GDP produce temporarily higher happiness’ (p.817).

The Welfare Function of Income, described above, also produces evidence consistent with adaptation to income. In this context, a common finding is that a $1 increase in household income leads to a 60 cents increase (within about 2 years) in the income that individuals consider to be ‘excellent’, ‘good’, ‘sufficient’, ‘bad’ etc.. Hence, 60% of the welfare effect of income is dissipated by adaptation.

b. Evidence in LDCs

Much of the work on adaptation to income changes has appealed to panel data to follow individual well-being over time as their income moves around. While there is now a thriving literature looking at adaptation in this way in rich countries, there is at the same time an almost total lack of evidence in poorer countries, undoubtedly due to the lack of panel data in the latter.

Knight and Gunatilaka (2009) is an exception. The work here appeals to data from a household survey for rural China. The survey includes information on life and income satisfaction, but also the minimum income that respondents consider necessary to sustain the household for a year. This latter measure, sometimes known as the Minimum Income Question, was introduced in Goedhart et al. (1977). Knight and Gunatilaka consider the answer as a measure of income aspirations. These aspirations are found to be positively correlated with actual income, so that the more individuals earn, the greater the income level
they consider as the minimum necessary. Subjective well-being is positively correlated with own income, but negatively correlated with aspiration income. As such, the results are consistent with at least partial adaptation to income in China.\textsuperscript{7}

Barr and Clark (2010) analyze South African data, and consider the levels of income that individuals say are necessary to get by, and to live well. In a regression analysis, these are shown to be positively correlated with own income and with reference group income (geographically defined). This is again consistent with a certain amount of adaptation. Along the same lines, Herrera et al. (2006) provide a comparative analysis of survey data in Peru and Madagascar. A three-level satisfaction with standard of living variable is shown to be positively correlated with own income, but negatively correlated with average neighbourhood income and the minimum amount the individual thinks is necessary to get by. In turn, this latter minimum amount is positively correlated with own income, suggesting the existence of a ratchet effect whereby higher income increases aspirations and reduces satisfaction.

An impressive piece of evidence by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2010, chapter 8) is based on repeated cross-sections. The authors uncover a positive happiness gradient over time in low-income but not high-income countries. In the latter, the level of GDP per capita attained in 1960 is sufficient to explain the level of happiness as of 2005. By contrast, in low-income countries, both the 1960 level and the later growth in GDP per capita exert a statistically significant impact on 2005 subjective well-being. The authors conclude that adaptation is less important in low-income countries: “The past 45 years of economic growth (from 1960 to 2005) in the rich nations of the world have not brought happiness gains above those that were already in place once the 1960s standard of living had been achieved. However, in the poorest nations, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the happiness gains they experienced from the past half century of economic growth have been the same as the gains from growth prior to the 1960s. In other words, for these nations, it is still the absolute level of (the logarithm of) income that matters for happiness.” (2010, p. 219). This finding with respect to adaptation is thus reminiscent of the concept of threshold effects in the GDP-happiness gradient.

\textsuperscript{7} Castillo’s (2010) work mentioned above also shows that income satisfaction in Mexico is positively correlated with the respondent’s evaluation of their own current income relative to aspirations. If aspirations rise with own income, then this is also consistent with adaptation.
**III.3 Bounded scales: What exactly is relative?**

Is the welfare effect of income purely relative (to other people’s income or to one’s past level of income)? Or, on the contrary, could it be the case that happiness measures themselves are relative (to some implicit context)? This question is similar to the distinction made in Psychology between the hedonic treadmill (whereby individuals' affect levels gradually adapt back to their initial level following a positive or negative event) and the satisfaction treadmill (in which affect levels do not adapt, but individuals change the way in which they use numbers).

We believe that it is likely that satisfaction judgements expressed on a bounded ordinal scale express relative judgements, i.e. the relation between individuals’ attainments and the existing possibilities (as represented by the scale). Van Praag (1991), for instance, has illustrated this phenomenon in experimental settings involving bounded scales: subjects tend to divide the total length of the scale into quantiles, equating the higher step with the maximum amount of the proposed magnitude. If this is so, it is not surprising that only a small minority of the population chooses the upper 10th rung on the happiness scale, which is interpreted as “having it all”.

Of course, the fact that the happiness scale is interpreted as being context-dependent is difficult to disentangle from happiness itself being context-dependent. However, in order to illustrate the particularity of bounded scales, we separate the quality of life indicators (which are positive correlates of growth) into two groups: the cardinal measures that can be measured on a continuous scale (although often not infinite), such as life expectancy, the percentage of literate population, women’s fertility, or the gross enrolment rate in school; and variables that are measured on an ordinal bounded scale, such as happiness, the index of Democracy (Polity IV), the Human Rights index or the Trust variable (see section I.1). Keeping only the countries which were observed for at least ten years in the World Values Survey, and which had experienced an episode of positive growth, we plot the values of these different measures against time. The separate panels of Figure 9 depict these time evolutions in Asian and Western OECD countries.

Two observations are in order. First, objective but ordinal and bounded measures (democracy, human rights) tend to converge to their maximum value as development unfolds via GDP growth, whereas the subjective ordinal variables (happiness and trust) remain below the
maximum value. Second, the graphs showing average happiness, trust, human rights and democracy tend to be much flatter than those from the cardinal indicators, such as fertility, school-enrollment rates, life expectancy, and infant mortality, which show much clearer trends over time.

In conclusion, we should not therefore necessarily expect bounded ordinal measures to behave like quantitative cardinal measures in the long run. Instead of looking at long-run changes in the average level of subjective well-being (which cannot increase without limit), it is perhaps of more interest to look at the distribution of the answers on the scale proposed. The fact that the variance of SWB tends to fall as GDP grows is on the face of it a promising return to higher GDP for low-income countries.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND TAKE-HOME MESSAGES: HOW CAN WE USE SUBJECTIVE VARIABLES IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE GDP-HAPPINESS RELATIONSHIP?

• The evidence presented in this paper indicates how subjective satisfaction variables can be used in order to measure well-being in developing countries. First of all, subjective well-being measures are particularly well-fitted to capture the multi-dimensional aspect of growth, and can be used to estimate the marginal rates of substitution between different aspects of development that may well have to be traded off against each other, such as higher consumption, greater life expectancy, worsening quality of air, urban congestion, etc. This creates a useful tool for public policy which is aimed at maximizing well-being as countries develop.

• Subjective data contain a number of lessons regarding the well-being benefits that growth may confer on developing countries. Cross-sectional data clearly show that income growth yields sizable benefits in terms of self-declared happiness and life satisfaction, although with decreasing marginal returns (i.e. the functional form is concave). Within a given country, the richer report higher happiness levels than do the poorer; equally those who live in richer countries are happier than those in poorer countries.
• However, the evidence is much less clear-cut regarding long-run changes in well-being, in growing economies. Whether GDP growth yields rising well-being is still hotly debated: essentially, the question is whether the correlation coefficient is “too small to matter”. This of course has very important consequences for developing countries, which need to know the potential gains that are associated with growth-oriented policies.

• The explanations for the small correlation between income growth and subjective well-being over time appeal to the nature of growth itself, and the way in which humans function psychologically. First, growth may go hand-in-hand with non-monetary qualitative changes that improve the “quality of life”, but may well also be accompanied by unwanted side effects such as pollution, income inequality or stress on the job. Second, greater purchasing power increases individual happiness, but man is a social animal and relative concerns (income comparisons) may well diminish the absolute effect of greater wealth. This is consistent with the positive income-happiness gradient that is regularly observed within countries; it is also consistent with the same gradient across countries, if income comparisons are global instead of local. A very pessimistic view of growth is then that it may be a zero-sum game, whereby the richer are happier and the poorer less happy, both across populations within a country and across country, but rising income for all may not change the relative income positions. This explains why happiness does not seem to increase with GDP in time-series data. However, even if this is true, many may well find it strange to recommend that low-income countries should remain at their current low rank in the concert of nations. Any single country will always have an incentive to climb up the ranking. The problem is that any gain by one country may well involve losses for other countries, when income is evaluated by comparisons across the globe. Similarly, within a country income growth for one part of the population will benefit them, but may reduce the well-being of others.

• An analogous phenomenon is that of adaptation to the standard of living, whereby individuals tend to return to some set-point level of well-being. Growth changes both the environment and aspirations. If both expectations and outcomes increase at the same rate, then individuals will not feel any happier. If they do not realise that their expectations and outcomes tend to move together, individuals will aspire to grow richer, but doing so will not increase their happiness as soon as their expectations catch up with their outcomes. This might be an illusion, as suggested by Easterlin, but can also be seen as some kind of hard-wired mechanism, built into human beings by evolution, to ensure that they keep trying to improve their lot (Rayo and Becker, 2007).
• One crucial question in this literature is the relative importance of absolute versus relative income concerns. Is the welfare effect of income entirely relative? And is the relative/absolute proportion the same in developing and developed countries? Empirical evidence on the extent of income comparisons is much scarcer in developing countries. The evidence that we do have so far contains two important lessons: income comparisons do seem to affect subjective well-being even in very poor countries; however, adaptation may be more of a rich country phenomenon.

• Finally, growth and development do not just concern quantitative increases in consumption, production and the accumulation of capital. They also involve the qualitative transformation of political governance and market development. These qualitative and quantitative processes likely involve take-offs and thresholds. Regime change is an important dimension of these non-linear changes. It is striking that such regime changes are visible in subjective satisfaction measures. The case of Transition countries is particularly impressive in this respect: average life satisfaction scores closely mirror changes in GDP for about the first ten years of the transition process, until the regime becomes more stable. By way of contrast, in given stable regimes, such as France, we no longer find any relationship between GDP growth and life satisfaction changes. Our interpretation is that once it becomes stable, the regime becomes the population’s frame of reference.

• While it is not easy to find large welfare benefits of growth using subjective well-being, there is nonetheless an interesting finding concerning the level and distribution of subjective well-being depending on the country’s level of development. The stylized facts are as follows: (i) average SWB rises with GDP per capita, but (ii) the standard deviation of SWB falls with GDP per capita. As such, (iii) there is a strong negative relationship between the average and standard deviation of SWB within a country. Consequently, GDP growth reduces the inequality in subjective well-being. This is certainly a desirable outcome. If individuals are risk averse, then behind the veil of ignorance they would prefer a society in which well-being is more equally distributed, ceteris paribus.

• The recourse to subjective measures of well-being is particularly welcome for assessing social phenomena that are not measurable using the standard approach of revealed preference. Whenever social interactions, social preferences or externalities are involved, it becomes more difficult to trace out the link from individual preferences to individual actions. There is no price one can pay to buy less inflation, unemployment or income inequality.
However, subjective variables should be used as a complement to action-revealed preferences, rather than as a replacement. When people clearly vote with their feet, it is difficult to dismiss their actions on the ground that the message is not confirmed in subjective data. With respect to growth and well-being, as long as international migrations remain clearly unidirectional, from low- to high-income countries, it would appear extremely difficult to argue that GDP growth, in the mind of less-developed countries, does not bring higher well-being. The revealed preferences here are consistent with the cross-sectional evidence of a positive income-well-being gradient.

Our stand is that the dynamic evidence based on subjective well-being is much less solid than the cross-sectional and panel evidence, based on individual data. This is because cross-country time-series comparisons are based on aggregate measures, which, by definition, have lower variance and are less powerful in terms of statistical inference. Moreover, it is possible that the satisfaction judgements expressed on a bounded-scale yield relative judgements by their very nature, due to the relation between outcomes and the set of possibilities (represented by the bounded scale). In this case, it is to be expected that only a small minority of individuals choose the 10th rung on the scale, which is interpreted as “having it all”. De facto, quantitative variables, such as fertility, life expectancy or literacy, exhibit much clearer trends over time than do these bounded-scale qualitative variables, such as governance indicators.

The relationship between income growth and well-being is still the object of ongoing debates that would undoubtedly be better illuminated by the development of panel surveys of the populations of low-income countries.
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TABLES
Figure 1.A. Income and happiness in the American General Social Survey (1972-2006).

Taken from Stevenson and Wolfers (2008).

Source: General Social Survey (USA), 1972–2006; authors’ regressions.

a. Each circle aggregates income and happiness for one GSS income category in one year, and its diameter is proportional to the population of that income category in that year. The vertical axis in each panel plots the coefficients from an ordered probit regression of happiness on family income category x year fixed effects; the horizontal axis plots real family income, deflated by the CPI-U-RS. In each panel the short- and long-dashed lines are fitted from regressions of happiness on family income and the log of family income, respectively, weighting by the number of respondents in each income category x year. Survey question asks, “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”

Figure 1.B. Income and Happiness in a Chinese cross-section.


We group together the three deciles (7, 8, 9) which were only rarely reported in the Chinese sample. We have dropped the two extreme deciles.
Figure 2. A GDP per capita and SWB in the world.
Taken from Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, Welzel (2008), p. 269.

Fig. 2. Subjective well being (SWB), per capita gross domestic product (GDP), and different types of societies. Well-being index is based on reported life satisfaction and happiness, using mean results from all available surveys conducted 1995–2007 (cubic curve plotted; r=.62). PPP = purchasing power parity estimates.
Life Satisfaction in the World Poll and the World Values Surveys

(World Poll data shown as hollow circles, World Values Surveys data as shaded circles)

Figure 2.B. GDP per capita and Life satisfaction
Taken from Deaton (2008), p. 57.

Source: Penn World Table 6.2.
Note: Each circle is a country, with diameter proportional to population. GDP per capita in 2003 is measured in purchasing power parity chained dollars at 2000 prices.

Figure 2.C. GDP per capita and Life satisfaction
Taken from Deaton (2008), p. 57.

Each Doubling of GDP is Associated with a Constant Increase in Life Satisfaction

Source: Penn World Table 6.2.
Note: Each circle is a country, with diameter proportional to population. The scale on the x-axis is logarithmic. The middle line shows average life satisfaction for each level of per capita GDP, while the outer two lines show the same thing, but for two age groups, ages 15 to 29—the upper line for most of the figure—and ages 60 and over—which is usually the lower line. GDP per capita in 2003 is measured in purchasing power parity chained dollars at 2000 prices.
GDP and average satisfaction are calculated for the last available year for each country (spanning from 2001 to 2008).
Figure 3.A The American paradox. Happiness and Real GDP per Capita, United States, 1972-2002
Taken from Easterlin and Angelescu (2007).

Figure 3.B Misleading cross-sections. Actual versus predicted happiness in Japan, 1958-1987.
Taken from Easterlin (2005).
Figures 4.A to 4.E are taken from Inglehart et al. (2008, statistical appendix).

**Figure 4.A. The Happiness Trend in India**

**Figure 4.B. The Happiness Trend in Mexico**

**Figure 4.C. The Happiness Trend in Puerto Rico**

**Figure 4.D. The Happiness Trend in South Africa**

**Figure 4.E. The Happiness Trend in China**
Figure 5.A Happiness and the Business Cycle.
Taken from Stenvenson and Wolfers (2008)

Figure 5.B Happiness and Transition in Russia.
Taken from Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009)

Left-hand scale: Life satisfaction for an average individual from the panel regressions with individual fixed effects and other usual controls (95% CI). Right-hand scale: Real GDP per capita in PPP-adjusted 2000 US dollars. Sources: for satisfaction, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey; for GDP per capita, the World Development Indicators data base.
Figure 5.C Happiness and Transition in several countries. Taken from Easterlin and Zimmerman (2009)


* Former GDR, 1989-2005
Figure 6. GDP, and the Average and Standard Deviation of Happiness

**Average satisfaction and ln(GDP)**

**Life satisfaction: Av. and S.D.**

**S.D. of satisfaction and ln(GDP)**

Figure 7. The take-off in life expectancy
Taken from Easterlin and Angelescu (2007).

Figure II B-3. Life expectancy in England and Wales since the sixteenth century

Figure 8. GDP Growth, Inequality and Happiness. 
Taken from Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2010, p. 142)
Figure 9. The Evolution of Cardinal versus Ordinal Quality of Life Indices over a Period of Growth

1) Asia:

Source: WVS (1981-2008)
2) Western countries:
Evolution of trust
Western countries with a positive growth of gap in the period

Source: WVS (1981-2008)
**APPENDIX**

**Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the variables from the WVS database**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No. Countries</th>
<th>No. Years</th>
<th>Mean value</th>
<th>Std.Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>First year</th>
<th>Last year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average happiness</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average satisfaction</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of children per woman</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>Freedom house</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>Freedom house</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth per year</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>-14.57</td>
<td>46.50</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita in constant 2000 dol</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>11536.26</td>
<td>11138.87</td>
<td>175.01</td>
<td>43420.52</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth GDP per capita</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>-14.57</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita in ppp</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>16508.83</td>
<td>11547.53</td>
<td>236.94</td>
<td>57034.16</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>78.87</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>32.77</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>39.82</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>19.40</td>
<td>60.24</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>72.89</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>42.19</td>
<td>82.51</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate per 1000</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>14.23</td>
<td>19.52</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>120.00</td>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average trust</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Variable description

All variables are available in the World Data Bank: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

Happiness: “If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole?” (the question and different response categories are the same in the three studies): 1. Not at all happy; 2. Not very happy; 3. Fairly happy; and 4. Very happy.

Life satisfaction: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”. The response categories go from 1(dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied).

Trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?”, Answers: 1. most people can be trusted; 0 . Can't be too careful.

Fertility rate: This measure represents the number of children that would be born to a woman were she to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with the current age-specific fertility rates.

GDP growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices in constant local currency. Aggregate figures are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars.

GDP per capita in 2000 dollars: GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in constant U.S. dollars.

Gini index: the Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.

Life expectancy at birth: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live were prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth to stay the same throughout their life.

Infant mortality rate (per 1000 under one): the number of infants dying before reaching age one, per 1,000 live births in a given year.

Gross Enrolment Rate in %: enrolment in primary, second and tertiary education.

Adult Literacy rate in %.

Freedom house (http://www.freedomhouse.org): Political rights that enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are
accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

**Democracy:** Average of Freedom House and Polity, transformed to a scale 0-10, where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic (http://www.govindicators.org).
A.2 THE INCOME – HAPPINESS NEXUS: SOURCES AND ESTIMATES, SUMMARY.

SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING MEASURES

- **Happiness**: If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole: Not at all happy; not very happy; Fairly happy; Very happy.

- **Life satisfaction**: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? 1 (dissatisfied) – 10 (very satisfied).

1) THE STATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS

**Consensus**: higher income → higher happiness. In a country, richer individuals are happier than poorer individuals.

Nationally representative household surveys. Individual level analysis. Within-country cross-section estimates.

**Western developed countries**

German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Swiss household panel, Australian household survey (HILDA), General Social Survey (America), Japanese household survey, data from Netherlands, Denmark, etc.

European Values Survey (EVS), European Social Survey (ESS), Eurobarometer.

**Transition countries**

Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania Russia, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Belarus, Poland, Ukraine, etc.

Life in Transition Survey (LITS, 2006), European Social Survey, European Values Survey.

**Asian household surveys**

China, India, Shanghai.

**African and Middle-East national household surveys**

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, Mexico, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, South Korea, South Africa (SALDRU), Tanzania, Turkey, Venezuela.

**International surveys**


International Social Survey Program (ISSP, 101 countries)
2) **THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS**

Within country estimates. Individual level panel data analysis.

**Consensus:** higher income \(\rightarrow\) higher happiness. Individuals become happier as they grow richer.

*Individual Panel Data in Developed Countries*

GSOEP, BHPS, HILDA, data from Netherlands and Denmark.

*Individual Panel data in LDCs*

RLMS (Russia), ULMS (Ukraine), Peru, LSMS (Tajikistan).

3) **THE STATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL INCOME AND AVERAGE HAPPINESS**

Aggregate measures, cross-country estimates.

**Consensus:** higher income \(\rightarrow\) higher happiness. Individuals living in richer countries are happier than those living in poorer countries.

4) **THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL INCOME AND AVERAGE HAPPINESS**

Aggregate measures, cross-country estimates.

**No consensus. Divergent findings.**

\(\rightarrow\) Income growth does not increase happiness over time

- Layard; Brockmann, Delhey, Welzel, Yuan (2009)

\(\rightarrow\) Income growth does increase happiness over time

- Stevenson and Wolfers (2008)
- Helliwell (2002)
- Blanchflower (2008)
Income growth does increase happiness over time but not always and weakly

- Hagerty and Veenhoven (2000, 2003, 2006), WVS (positive and statistically significant coefficient, but not in all countries).
- Inglehart, Peterson and Welzel (2008): WVS, BHPS, GSS (positive and statistically significant coefficient, but not in all countries), Kenny (2005), idem.
- Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2010) (positive coefficient but not always statistically significant).
- Oswald (1997) in GSS and Eurobarometer survey series, positive coefficient but not always statistically significant.