On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements

Grégoire Rota-Graziosi (1)

1 CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International

We consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation' rule in a political integration process between two countries. We study three potential types of delegation: strong, weak or no delegation, this last case corresponding to a referendum. We show that populations decide to bind themselves by delegating the national policy decision to a "powerfull conservative representative", in order to improve their bargaining position. These non-cooperative behaviors of countries when they decide on their delegation rule induce negative political externalities between countries, which cancel the gains achieved by the internalization of economic externalities in the case of political integration. We then propose two extensions. First, we assume a pre-play game where the countries choose whether or not to initiate political integration. Secondly, we examine the consequences of ratification by referendum. We conclude that a Pareto improvement of the political integration process would be to specify within the international treaty itself the means for its ratification; more precisely, to incorporate a formal ratification procedure, corresponding to an ex post referendum.

Mots clés: Delegation; International Agreements; Nash Bargaining Solution; Political Integration; Ratification; Referendum

Domaines: Economies et finances

Grégoire Rota-Graziosi. On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements. 2011. ⟨halshs-00562632⟩