CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L’ARCTIQUE
ENJEUX ET EQUATIONS GEOPOLITIQUES AU 21E SIECLE
23è
Rencontres Jacques Cartier - Lyon, 22-23 novembre 2010
NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION
Lyons
Conference,
21-24
November 2010
23
November session, 14.30 to 17.30
Beggar
at the Feast?
International,
Regional Regulation
of
the Arctic:
is
there a role for the EU?
Clive
Archer
Emeritus Professor,
Manchester Metropolitan
University
Introduction: The Demand for Regulation
This paper will examine the regulation of
activity in the Arctic and, in particular, look at the development of the
European Union’s interest in the Arctic region to see how that fits into the
wider picture. This introduction will make some background points about the
need for regulation in the Arctic.
Given the
varied nature of the Arctic, both in physical and legal terms, it is perhaps
not surprising that a variety of requests have been made for greater regulation
of the area in one form or another.
One way to
estimate the demand for regulation is to examine the national Arctic strategies
of the coastal states to see whether and where such a requirement exists. It is
noticeable that the states with by far the greatest share of Arctic
territory—the Russian Federation and Canada—stress aspects of
national control and interest in their Arctic strategies, whereas the other
Arctic states are more concerned with pursuing their interests through
international cooperation and possible regulation.
The Arctic
strategy of the Russian
Federation defined the national interests of Russia in the Arctic as using
it as a strategic resource base for the Federation, preserving it as a zone of
peace and cooperation, conserving the unique ecosystems there and using the
Northern Sea Route as a national integrated communications system. These
interests were fleshed out in national terms but international cooperation with
other Arctic states on the basis of international treaties and agreements, to
which Russia was party, was also mentioned. The functional areas for such
cooperation included: agreeing maritime boundaries; search and rescue;
strengthening economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation; the
efficient use of natural resources and the conservation of the Arctic
environment; and facilitating shipping and air transport (Security Council of the Russian Federation 2008). The emphasis was on using existing
international institutions, with mention given to international law and the
Arctic Council, but with an emphasis on the importance of the five Arctic
coastal countries (“the A5”).
The Canadian Arctic strategy likewise placed
emphasis on national control: ‘Exercising sovereignty over
Canada’s North…is our number one Arctic foreign policy priority’ (Government of
Canada 2010: 3). Likewise much of the sections on economic and social
development, devolved governance and even protecting the environment was
nationally-oriented. Particular areas are picked out for international
cooperation such as the regulation of oil and gas operations, shipping and
health issues (Government of Canada 2010: 13-15). In particular, Canada pointed
to the Arctic Council as the most appropriate forum for cooperation, though
bilateral relations with the US also receive close attention (Government of
Canada 2010: 22-5).
The Arctic
strategy of the United
States emphasized a number of functional areas where further regulation
might be considered. For example, in maritime transportation additional measure
could be developed with other nations ‘to address issues that are likely to arise from expected increases in
shipping into, out of, and through the Arctic region’ (White House 2009: F4). A
watwerway management regime could be developed ‘in accordance with accepted
international standards’ (ibid.). The strategy noted the need for environmental
protection and the conservation of resources, as well as for international
fisheries management (White House 2009: H2 & H4). More generally it called
for
new
or enhanced international arrangements for the Arctic to address issues likely
to arise from expected increases in human activity in that region,
including shipping, local development and subsistence, exploitation of living
marine resources, development of energy and other resources, and tourism. (White House 2009: C5b)
This is fairly
long list and one that provides the opportunity for regional and international
cooperation as well as increased national control.
The strategy for Norway covered
what it has called its High North, covering the northern-most counties of
Norway and the adjacent offshore areas. As with Russia and Canada, the policies
included in the government’s High North strategy tended mostly to be inwardly
directed, and are especially concerned with the balance between the utilisation
of resources and environmental factors (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2006: 5-8) . However, there was attention given to the external dimensions of
the strategy—not least relations with Russia—and to the wider
aspects of regulation. In particular, consideration was given to the
utilisation of resources, both fisheries and hydrocarbons, and the development
of environmental monitoring, improving research and development and improving
transport (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006: 9-10).
The Danish Arctic
strategy had a similar list of areas of interest, but this time the concern has
been for Greenland and, especially, for the interests of its indigenous
population. The developing relationship between Greenland and Denmark was
placed in a wider international context, including relations with the European
Union and membership of the Arctic Council. Energy and minerals; the sustainable
use of resources; climate nature and the environment; research; infrastructure;
trade and commerce; and culture and further education were all elements covered
by the report (Udenrigsministeriet 2008).
These national
strategies show that the the Arctic coastal states have a similar list of
concerns for the Arctic region and that even Canada and Russia—perhaps
the most intraspective of the five—seek international cooperation to
regulate the expected growth of activitiy in the Arctic and to moderate in particular
the competition between resource exploitation and environmental requirements.
A more
comprehensive appraisal of the existing regulation of activity in at least the
maritime areas of the Arctic has been undertaken for the WWF International
Arctic Programme. It should be remembered that this report excluded the Arctic
lands, thereby not covering what is the main interest of the national
strategies. It therefore complements these strategies in any consideration of
the requirements for regulation in the Arctic.
The report pointed
to three major regulatory institutions in the marine Arctic: the Arctic
Council, the international law of the sea and the OSPAR Convention[1]
(Koivurova and Molenaar, 2009: 12-19). It also dealt with sectoral governance and
regulation of the marine Arctic for such areas as fisheries, shipping, and
offshore hydocarbon activities, cross-sectoral issues such as environmental
impact assessments under the Espoo convention, and a range of other agreements
such as those on endangered species and the polar bear (ibid.: 19-34). Despite
a wealth of institutions, agreements and laws, the report found a number of
gaps in marine Arctic regulation.
Clearly the marine
Arctic has both of these and the WWF report outlined these gaps in, inter alia,
the Arctic Council (e.g. obligations not legally binding, limited membership,
project-driven), international law of the sea (e.g. need for regional
implementation, US not ratified UNCLOS, gaps in the fish stocks agreement) and
shipping (e.g. lack of Russian participation in some areas, shortcomings in
global rules, weak compliance and enforcement) (Koivurova and Molenaar 2009:
35-42).
Turning from the
requirement for regulation in the Arctic region, and the apparent shortcomings
of existing institutions, it is well to remind ourselves of some of the
regional and international institutions that do exist for regulation of
activity there.
Regional
and International Regulation
First, it should
be reiterated that much regulation of the Arctic takes place on land and is
distinctively national. Secondly, international agreements cover not just the
marine Arctic but many also refer to Arctic land areas and/or the Arctic air
space. Thirdly, as can be seen by the WWF report which only covered the marine
part of the Arctic, there is a wide range of institutions available for
regulation. Some are regional, covering only the Arctic or part thereof, while
others are more truly international, if not global. Two institutions will be
covered here: the Arctic Council and international law.
The Arctic Council
has a family of working groups—on Conservation for Arctic Flora and Fauna
(CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Emergency
Preparedness, Prevention and Response (EPPR), the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Programme (AMAP), the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG),
and the Arctic Contaminants Action Programme (ACAP). The Arctic Council can,
and does, make policy recommendations, but much of the output of the working
groups is in the form of information, guidelines and good practice. It is thus
at the “softer” end of regulation, where “hardness” is taken to indicate
mandatory implementation. Nevertheless, the Arctic Council has as its strength
the involvement of all eight Arctic states plus the presence as “Permanent
Participants” the indigenous peoples’ groups in the Arctic.
The international law of the sea,
expressed mainly in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, can also be seen
at the softer end of regulation, especially as the United States is not a party
to the Convention. The US Arctic strategy actually pointed to the benefits of
ratification: ‘The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance
U.S. interests, including with respect to the Arctic.’ (White House 2009:
C4) The Convention
divides the seas into internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic
zones, high seas and areas where the sea-bed and ocean floor is beyond any
national control. This effectively provides for national control over much of
the Arctic seas and the seabed in the Arctic region with only four
comparatively small areas beyond such national reach (Koivurova and Molenaar 2009: 14). Furthermore, of
importance for the Arctic, the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf provides a method to decide on the extension of national continental
shelves in the Arctic region. This allows the Arctic states to extend their
jurisdiction over the Arctic sea-bed in a relatively orderly fashion. It does
not, however, solve disagreements between states about dividing lines, which
can be done either by bilateral agreement—as in the case of the agreement
between Russia and Norway over the Barents Sea—or by arbitration or other
adjudication.
So far, one can typify the Arctic region
as one of law and diplomacy with relatively few international disputes, with
only the occasional resort to force between states, and then at a very low
level. Another area where there is curerently disagreement about the
implementation of international law in the Arctic region of Svalbard. Norway
currently is in dispute over the relevance for Svalbard waters of the 1920
Treaty of Paris which granted Norway sovereignty but allowed foreigners the
same commercial rights as Norwegians on the archipelago. Norway contends that
this treaty does not apply to areas beyond the territorial sea of Svalbard,
whereas others claim that it is (Pedersen 2008: 6-7).
The 1992 Paris Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR) covers
part of the marine Arctic area and encompasses all human activity that could
pollute the area with the exception of fisheries management and certain
shipping regulation (Koivurova and Molenaar 2009: 16). Fisheries activities in
some of the Arctic seas are covered by a range of regional and bilateral
agreements such as the 1980 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention which
established a Commission (NEAFC) and the Norwegian-Russian Federation Fisheries
Commission (ibid.: 20). Shipping is covered by the relevant parts of the UNCLOS
and a number of more specific agreements such as the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), with over-arching
supervision being taken by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Again
there is a much wider network of agreements and guidelines that cover shipping
in the Arctic region (Koivurova and Molenaar 2009: 24-25).
As well as these institutions, there is a
range of other international organizations (such as NATO and the OSCE) whose
remit covers the Arctic region, as well as international agreements that are of
particular importance for the regulation of the Arctic region. The US Arctic
strategy makes favourable mention of some:
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution and
its protocols, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer. (White House 2009: C5a)
Furthermore the strategy refers to ‘the
Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), wildlife
conservation and management agreements, and many other mechanisms’ (White House
2009: C1) and comes to the conclusion that ‘an "Arctic Treaty" of
broad scope -- along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty -- is not appropriate or
necessary.’ (ibid.: C3)
Despite the presence of both ‘governance
gaps’ and, perhaps more seriously, ‘regulatory gaps’ in the regulation of
activity in the Arctic region, the most notable feature is the extensive nature
of existing regulation. Much of this is national, even that which affects the
maritime areas, but there is also a swathe of international agreements and
institutions that affect the Arctic in one way or another. Does this leave any
room for the European Union at the regulatory table?
The
European Union’s Involvement in the Arctic
That the EU should be involved in Arctic matters is not immediately obvious. After all, none of the territory of the EU borders the Arctic Ocean and the two EU member states that are members of the Arctic Council are relatively new Union members (1995). The third AC member—Denmark—is “Arctic” by virtue of Greenland (which is not part of the European Union) being a home rule entity within the Danish realm. However, three EU members are Arctic Council members, two members of the European Economic Area—Norway and Iceland—are also members, and a whole range of EU policies, ranging from environment to free trade and shipping impinge on the Arctic area.
The EU’s first direct policy involvement with the Arctic was through the Northern Dimension (ND) initiative, introduced in the 1990s, which was primarily of relevance for the Baltic Sea area and, to a lesser extent, the Barents region. On behalf of Greenland, Denmark encouraged the development of an Arctic Window in 2002 (Borg 2008). However, this aspect never really took off and has not really been an active part of the ND, itself a low-key policy area (Archer & Etzold 2010, 339-40).
The Commission’s 2007 Integrated Maritime
Strategy made mention of the Arctic region, placing the Arctic Ocean in the
context of global warming. This also promised a Commission paper on strategic
issues relating to the Arctic Ocean for 2008 (Commission of the European
Communities 2007: 13). In March 2008 the EU’s High Representative and
Commission issued a policy paper on Climate Change and International Security
suggesting an EU Arctic policy (High Representative and the European Commission
2008). The issue was debated in the European Parliament in October 2008 leading
to a resolution and to the subsequent Commission Communication on EU and Arctic
region in November 2008. This was welcomed by the Council in December 2008, but
it was December 2009 when the Council issued a Conclusion on the Arctic issue.
The region was again debated in the European Parliament in March 2010. This
treatment of the region by the institutions of the European Union will now be
examined in more detail, with special reference to particular events and
publications.
The European Parliament’s initial
involvement[2]
The European Commission’s October 2007
Communication on Integrated Maritime Policy had promised that the Commission
would consider the EU and the Arctic by the end of 2008. The European
Parliament (EP) responded with questions and a debate led by Diana Wallis of
the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). A resolution on
Arctic governance was adopted on 9 October 2008 by the EP. The prime reasons
for concern listed in the resolution were: the Integrated Maritime Policy and
the Climate Change and International Security policy paper, the Russian flag
incident of August 2007[3],
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the meeting of Arctic
parliamentarians, the effects in the Arctic of global warming and other
environmental concerns, increased traffic and security issues, expected oil and
gas reserves in the Arctic, the Ilulissat Declaration of the Arctic coastal
states (“A5”) and the Ilulissat meeting on the Arctic of the Nordic Council of
Ministers, the effects of climate change, especially on the livelihood of
indigenous peoples, and the presence of three EU and two other EEA states as
members of the Arctic Council. This list indicated the reasons for EU
involvement in the Arctic and also hinted at possible areas where the EU could
be interested in regulation. There was one major stimulus from an external actor—the
Russian flag incident—plus the ongoing UNCLOS process (with the work of
the UN Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf providing a more time-sensitive element) acting
as an external factor. Resolutions by two groups that might be seen as pace-makers
in Arctic policy—the Nordic Council of Ministers and the A5—seemed
to encourage the European Parliamentarians to have their say, and membership of
the Arctic Council by EU and EEA states provided some standing in Arctic
matters for the EP. Other drivers were those of climatic, economic and
technological change: the regional effects of global warming, the prospectivity
of hydrocarbon resources, the greater availability of shipping routes and
changes to the lives of indigenous peoples (European Parliament 2008).
In terms of policy
outcome, the EP saw the EU moving beyond treatment of the Arctic as part of the
Northern Dimension to a more ‘standalone EU Arctic policy’ (European Parliament
2008: Point 5). An indication was given on the expectations of the Commission’s
paper – climate change, indigenous populations, energy security policy,
cross-border issues and a future political/legal structure for the area were
mentioned. It proposed a role for the Arctic in the Energy Policy for Europe
and working through IMO for greater safety at sea for shipping. A special mention of the Arctic at the Copenhagen climate change
conference in 2009 was desired and the resolution suggested permanent observer
status for the EC in the Arctic Council. Furthermore, the resolution wanted
negotiations for an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic based
on the Antarctic Treaty, taking into account the dissimilarities between the
two regions (European Parliament 2008).
The European Parliament’s involvement was
based on an integrated view of the Arctic region and demonstrated that the
interest was not one that followed the oil but was concerned about wider
questions such as the environment and the position of indigenous peoples.
Nevertheless, it pressed for an EU engagement in Arctic affairs. Furthermore,
it looked to a number of deliverable policy outcomes that both supported the
Commission view but, especially on one point about governance, was also at odds
with the Commission.
The European Commission’s Arctic
Paper 2008 and after
The Commission’s Communication to the EP and the Council on the subject of the European Union and the Arctic in November 2008 had a number of reasons for EU engagement in the region. Again there was reference to the three EU Arctic states and the two EEA ones, but also to Russia, the US and Canada (the other three AC members) being ‘strategic partners of the EU’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2008: 3). Reference was made to climate change and the assertion made that ‘EU policies in areas such as environment, climate change, energy, research, transport and fisheries have a direct bearing on the Arctic’ (ibid.). Climate change was seen as a “threat multiplier” that may affect ‘the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests’ (ibid.), thus leading the Commission and High Representative to develop an EU Arctic policy. As might be expected in a joint paper involving the High Representative, the emphasis had shifted from concern over functional policies in the Arctic for their own value to a more security-related agenda.
With this in mind, the Communication set out EU interests under three headings:
– Protecting
and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population
– Promoting
sustainable use of resources
– Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008: 3)
This reflected the balance struck by member states and the
Commission on various aspects of the Arctic—the concern for the
environment and for the indigenous peoples, access to resources, and the
governance of the Arctic—and it showed the willingness of the Commission
to become engaged in the region. In all, the Commission had 49 proposals for
action under the three above headings, and some of these had relevance for the
regulation of the region such as strengthening the international effort to
mitigate climate change, coordinating with other Arctic states over maritime
management, high environmental standards and the effective use of environmental
impact assessments (ibid.: 3-4). The Commission supported an agreement on
disaster response in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, long-term cooperation
with Russia ‘facilitating
the sustainable and environmentally friendly exploration, extraction and
transportation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources’ (ibid.: 7), avoiding ‘discriminatory practices…by any of the
Arctic coastal states towards third countries’ merchant ships’ (ibid.: 8), and
discussing with Northern Dimension partners projects under the Northern
Dimension Environmental Partnership to cover wider areas in the European
Arctic. The sensitive subject of the control of whaling and seal-hunting was
also mentioned, but it was clear that there was a tension between the strong
animal rights lobby within the EU and the concerns of the indigenous peoples in
the Arctic (ibid: 5).
The EU’s engagement in the Arctic
suggested by the joint Communication was a mixture between interacting with
other international organizations such as the IMO, and with non-EU Arctic
states and Arctic indigenous groups, and pursuing general EU policies on the
fairness of markets, strategic investments (such as in monitoring and surveillance),
encouraging research and its coordination, and putting in place a fisheries
management framework for the Arctic seas not covered by the current regimes.
This list indicated that, while the EU had a range of interests in the Arctic,
it had a limited capability to act there and could only contribute to
regulation by negotiations with third parties such as NEAFC or the IMO.
On the issue of governance, the Commission paper noted the maritime
disputes in the Arctic and also the extensive legal framework already in place
in the form of UNCLOS, which could provide the basis for settlement of disputes
including those on delimitation (ibid.: 9). It noted the May 2008 Ilulissat
Declaration of the A5 that committed these countries to using legal instruments
to solve their disputes in the Arctic. The Commission wanted negotiations and
discussions on international marine protected areas, to explore ‘the possibility of establishing
new, multi-sector frameworks for integrated ecosystem management’ (ibid.: 11)
and to enhance its input into the AC. To that latter end, it wanted to apply
for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. Unlike the EP, it did not
want new legal instruments for the Arctic but rather aimed at the
implementation of existing agreements (ibid: 10). As expressed by the then
maritime Commissioner, Joe Borg (2009):
We believe an UNCLOS-based governance system could deliver security and stability, strict environmental management and the sustainable use of resources subject to open and equitable access – precisely the aims contained in our strategy.
Clearly the Commission agreed with the EP that the EU was involved in the Arctic and needed to enhance and integrate its policy presence. The main area of disagreement was about the EP’s suggestion for a new legal framework for Arctic regulation.
The Council Conclusions on Arctic issues, adopted on 8 December
2009, showed the Council agreeing with the Commission that using existing
instruments of governance for the Arctic was more important than creating new
legal institutions. The 23 points in these Conclusions included areas such
as ‘climate, safeguarding the law of the sea, environmentally hazardous
chemicals, research, shipping, cooperation with indigenous peoples and
cooperation with existing forums, such as the Arctic Council’ (Swedish Presidency of the European Union 2009;
see also Council of the European Union 2009: 2-5). An important objective was
to assist closer EU cooperation with the members of the AC, and support efforts
by the Commission (and Italy) to become permanent observers of the Arctic
Council (Council of the European Union 2009: 4). This approach had already been
rebuffed by Canada at the April meeting of the Arctic Council, with the EU’s
consideration of a ban on sealskin
exports from Canada being the main reason (Phillips 2009).
The March 2010 EP debate on Arctic issues
showed that that area had become integrated into the EU’s institutional
structure: Baroness Ashton, the Vice-President of the Commission and High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy made a statement on the
EU’s Arctic Policy that stressed the environmental importance of the region. In
seeking fair treatment in transport and natural resources, while maintaining
environmental safeguards, the role of the three EU members of the AC was
mentioned. On Arctic governance, the emphasis was again on implementation of
existing agreements, the importance of the AC and of UNCLOS. The EP’s proposal
for an Arctic treaty drawing on the experience of the Antarctic treaty was
rejected because of the differences between the two areas (European Parliament
2010). The Commission was to report back on developments by June 2011: the
Arctic is now well and truly on the EU’s agenda.
What has the EU
to offer to Arctic Regulation?
The European Union has a presence in the Arctic by virtue of Swedish and Finnish membership and, vicariously for Greenland, Denmark. However, none of these states (if Greenland is excluded) is an Arctic coastal state, somewhat diminishing the influence that the EU can hope to have in the region. Furthermore the Commission has not achieved permanent observer status on the Arctic Council. What it can contribute to Arctic regulation is therefore going to be limited, not least because it will be overshadowed by the A5 states.
Nevertheless, the EU has shown an interest in the Arctic region and it has interests there. These can be classified in terms of the working of existing EU policies and in the external relations of the EU. Sometimes there is an overlap between the two, for example in the EU’s dealings with indigenous peoples and its treatment of sealskin exports.
Key existing policies of relevance to the Arctic region are environmental matters, energy, shipping and research. Here the EU can claim to have regulatory systems in place within its own area, which it might hope to be spread more generally. Extending regulatory activity quite often means working at the international level to reach agreement with the Arctic states and other interested parties.
On environmental matters, there is a range of regulatory instruments to which the EU subscribes and there are EU-wide environmental policies that cover the Arctic regions of Finland and Sweden. The latter includes directives such as the June 2008 Marine Strategy Framework Directive (European Commission Environment 2010). There is also the EU’s Registration, Evaluation, Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) regulatory regime that is applicable in EU Arctic lands (Council of the European Union 2009: 3). The Council has invited member states to contribute to the protection of biodiversity in the Arctic and to have a systematic approach to use research (see below) to safeguard the environment (ibid.: 2)
In the resources sphere, the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic is to be undertaken in line with strict environmental standards, according to the Council which then invites the Commission and the member states to endorse the Arctic Council’s Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines of 2009 (ibid: 2). This is a recognition of the reality that no EU member’s territory hosts oil and gas exploration, though Greenland and Norway, closely associated with the EU, have Arctic explorations, and EU companies participate in such activities.
In shipping the EU Council acts as a spur to member states in their capacity as flag, port or coastal states, to ‘promote and monitor the full implementation and further implementation of existing rules on navigation, maritime safety and security, vessel routing systems and environmental standards’ in the Arctic (ibid.: 4). Again, it is more likely that the coastal states—non-EU members—will bear the brunt of enforcing regulations here or will pay the price if shipping does not follow regulations. Indeed, a commentator’s report on the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), undertaken by PAME from 2005 to 2009 by over 200 experts, did not once mention the EU though it did refer to a wide range of international organizations, interested parties and Arctic maritime users (Brigham 2010).
Arctic research is conducted in all the Arctic states and in a number of EU member states. The International Polar Year (2007/8) provided an opportunity for closer cooperation within the EU’s Polar Board and an effort was made to bring together the work of Arctic observatories, for example (European Science Foundation 2008). However, there is always the danger that here, as in many aspects of Arctic governance, the EU’s treads on existing toes, in this case the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) that has an established position in the scientific community and a wide range of activities (see IASC 2010). Furthermore much of the science undertaken through IASC and the agencies of the Arctic Council is fed into meetings of the Arctic Council, where it is directly available to the Arctic governments (see for example, Arctic Council 2010). The EU’s scientific effort can contribute to this input, but there is little space for the EU to be part of its regulation in the Arctic region.
External policy refers here to relations with other organizations, Russia, the US and Canada, with the two EEA partners of Norway and Iceland, and with Greenland and more generally with indigenous peoples.
In all the above areas, and others, the EU has to work with individual Arctic states and multilaterally to have any effect. At the multilateral level, the EU has been careful to work through and with the Arctic Council, although it only has an ad hoc observer status at the AC’s meetings. Areas where the regulatory competence of the AC is recognized are those of marine safety and the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, climate change, Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, and in resources with the AC’s Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. Another organization of importance is the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and it was within its framework that the Council wished to advance shipping safety and navigation rules, with the idea of Arctic navigation rules and environmental standards for shipping (European Commission Maritime Affairs 2010a). An area where the EU could make a positive contribution internationally is through its Community Framework Programme for Scientific Research continuing the work of the International Polar Year, and for the European Polar Board to continue to make a contribution to Arctic science without duplicating the work of existing international organizations such as IASC (European Science Foundation 2010).
Russia is the most
important of the EU’s strategic partners in the Arctic region (the other two
being the US and Canada). It is a vital player in Arctic governance and has
currently been willing to pursue its interests through multilateral and
bilateral diplomacy. The EU can do little of meaning in the Arctic region
without at least the tacit consent of Russia. This is partially recognized in
the EU’s Northern Dimension wherein Russia is treated as an equal partner. The
ND’s Partnership for Transport and Logistics (NDPTL) aims at improving land
connections between the EU and North West Russia (European Commission Maritime
Affairs 2010a), thereby possibly feeding into the development of the Northern
Sea Route. Indeed in mid-2010 a secretariat was created for the NDPTL, hosted
in Helsinki by the Nordic Investment Bank (Europa press releases RAPID 2010).
Another area of possible cooperation is in preparedness, prevention and
disaster response where the Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre
could cooperate with Russian authorities, perhaps through the Barents
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) (European Commission Maritime Affairs 2010b).
Aspects of Arctic regulation—such as those involving oil and gas, the
environment, transport, search and rescue—could be candidates for the
four “common spaces” to be developed between the EU and Russia (European
Commission External Action 2010). However, these include areas where the EU
wants to press ‘equal treatment’ with Russian firms while the Russian
government may be less willing to allow outsiders such treatment.
The problem for the EU is that, in the Arctic, Russia has most of the cards and the EU has a weak hand. Russia has membership of the AC and can veto EU permanent observer status. It has Arctic oil and gas and control of the Northern Sea Route. Furthermore, when a European country has something that it wants, it seems that Russia prefers to deal with them on a bilateral basis, as with the Russo-German Nord Stream project. In the case of the Arctic, Russian use of international institutions has been selective, but that can be said of most of the Arctic states. It has indicated that, where appropriate, it will use international law and so far, Russia has stuck to that promise. When dealing with the EU over the Arctic, Russia sees the region as one central to its national interests but for the EU the area is somewhat peripheral. With this imbalance, the Arctic region is unlikely to play a central role in Russo-EU relations.
Relations with the two Arctic EEA states (Norway and Iceland) are already close, with Iceland being an applicant for EU membership. However, the dialogue between Norway and the EU on energy matters in the “High North” has not always been effective with efforts by the Norwegians to interest the EU in the region not resulting in ‘more active political interest on the part of the EU’, with faults perhaps on both sides (Offerdal 2010: 30). There are nevertheless plenty of forums within which the EU and Norway could advance common interests in Arctic regulation—for example, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension Policy and the EEA itself. Certainly, Arctic interests could be part of the reconsideration of Norwegian-EU relations being conducted by both sides from 2010 to 2011.
It should be noted that the only EU state at the meeting of the A5 states, the inner clique of Arctic coastal states had met at Ilulissat in May 2008 and Chelsea, Canada in March 2010, was Denmark which was there by virtue of representing Greenland in its external affairs. Greenland, which is not part of the EU though it has OCT (Overseas Countries and Territories) status, was in the process of becoming more self-governing, even moving towards eventual independence (Nanoq 2009). This will leave the EU without a foot in the door of the Arctic Five meetings. Given EU interest in Arctic environmental and research matters, relations with Greenland are important. A positive move in this respect was the Council’s view that it ‘welcomes that a broader and more structured relationship with Greenland is being developed within the bilateral EU-Greenland Partnership, to further mutual interest and concrete areas of cooperation’ (Council of the European Union 2009: 5).
The above short account shows that the EU
has a range of varied interests and contacts when it comes to the regulation of
the Arctic. However, the EU is not central to Arctic regulation nor is Arctic
regulation a key factor within the EU. The area is geographically and
conceptually on the EU’s periphery. This does not mean to say that the EU has
little interest there or that this interest, especially in regulatory matters,
is not growing. The increased activity by EU institutions seems to suggest
otherwise.
Where to next?
The Commission has
promised a report back on the Arctic by June 2011. However, a number of issues
remain for it to navigate in the Arctic Ocean.
First there is the question of EU presence in the region. Clearly it has an interest in environmental developments, resources and transport in the Arctic and the EU has supported research on these issues. In itself, it has only a minor presence. Denmark, Sweden and Finland provide a basis for EU interests, but the Baltic is perhaps of greater interest to Sweden and Finland, and Danish interest is tied to a non-EU country, Greenland. However, the EU does contain states—Germany, France and the UK in particular—that have an established research presence in the region. The UK also has a security interest in an ocean that provides ice-cover for nuclear submarines. Whether this forms the basis for a strong Union presence has yet to be seen.
Secondly, there are institutional issues. The Commission’s application for permanent observer status in the AC has been unsuccessful. So far Russia has been able to keep quiet because of vocal Canadian opposition. Meanwhile, the Commission is a member of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and can also work on practical issues within other organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). However, the Commission and the Council have taken issue with the European Parliament about the institutional form desirable for the governance of the Arctic region, and have instead chosen the gradualist view that better use has to be made of existing institutions. The EP approach would at least indicate a more engaged EU interest in the Arctic.
Then there are questions about relations with particular Arctic states over Arctic issues. The EU is in dispute with Canada, Iceland, Norway and Denmark about seal-skin exports and whaling issues, with some members of the EP are not willing to back down on these questions. There is also the ambiguous EU relationship with Russia. If and when that improves substantially, the Arctic could become an area of overlapping, though mutual, interest.
What can the EU usefully do in the Arctic
region? Four short points. First, keep a watching brief. The Arctic is on its
way up the international political agenda as are key Arctic issues, such as
climate change and energy resources. Secondly, talk and negotiate with the
Arctic states, especially the non-EU ones. This is essential if the EU is to
have a say in Arctic governance. Thirdly, play to strengths. The EU has a
wealth of Arctic research, it has shipping interested in Arctic routes and a
competence in trade, energy and environmental matters. This is a good basis for
further discussions with Arctic states. Finally, the European Parliament can
assist in what one study has called ‘amplifying Arctic voices’ (Arctic
Governance Project 2010) particularly over Arctic climate matters. To do this
more effectively, it does need to continue in its efforts to reach an
understanding with Arctic indigenous peoples. It may be that the EU, in
bringing something of substance to the Arctic table, will become more welcome
in formulating regulation for the region, even if in a limited number of areas.
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[1] This is the 1992 Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlantic. See www.ospar.org.
[2] The next two sections are based on a paper given by the author to the annual research conference of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), Bruges, 6 September 2010.
[3] This was when a Russian scientist and parliamentarian, Artur Chilingarov, planted a Russian flag at the North Pole. See BBC News (2007).