Parliamentary Committee Work, Organizational Knowledge
EU Engagement: A Framework for Analysis
Caitríona Carter

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Abstract:

La pratique des parlements nationaux vis-à-vis de l’Union européenne (UE) est devenue un sujet riche de débats. Toutefois, on sait moins sur les effets d’une implication dans l’UE sur les clivages parlementaires. L’explication dominante privilégie une conception formaliste des ‘modes des relations exécutif-législatif’, et ceci pour rendre compte des clivages autour de la veille parlementaire sur l’UE en termes de luttes inter-parti. Dans cette perspective, on accorde aux comités parlementaires soit un rôle passif, soit celui d’une arène neutre où se jouent des jeux inter-partis, et donc que les règles des comités sont définies ailleurs. Or, lorsque ces comités agissent de manière unifiée, la recherche tend trop à renvoyer de telles pratiques à la « boîte noire » des comportements « non-parti ». Ainsi, la recherche a minimisé, voire a perdu, un regard sur les interactions intra-parlementaires. Nous considérons plutôt que de telles pratiques et interactions souffrent d’une sous-théorisation qui, au contraire, mérite un examen plus approfondi. Nous proposons d’avancer dans cette voie en développant un cadre d’analyse pour examiner l’institutionnalisation d’ « organizational knowledge » à travers ses quatre pratiques de « acquisition », « agrégation », « articulation » et « accumulation ». Par cette voie, on développe les moyens pour examiner comment se construit la collectivité des commissions Européennes parlementaires - y compris les effets de cette collectivité sur les luttes intra-parlementaires.

Introduction

Since the initial institutionalization of the European Union (EU) in the late 1950s, there has been considerable uncertainty regarding the role for national and regional parliaments in its daily government. In a political system where national (and regional) parliamentary responsibility for legislation has been delegated to national governments acting as legislators within the EU Council of Ministers, and transferred to the European Parliament (EP), defining a role for themselves has been a consistent challenge for parliamentarians to resolve. How national parliaments have addressed this challenge has been the subject of a rich debate (Auel 2007, Rozenberg & Surel 2003). Within this literature a number of claims are made concerning the way in which actors have made their engagement choices to develop and institutionalise EU scrutiny practice, including the creation of European committees. Scholars either suggest that uncertainty results in opportunity for national parliamentarians to ‘do what they want’ in the resolving of dilemmas (Raunio 2009), or are more impressed by exogenous structural and/or psychological constraining elements shaping actors’ choices (‘given conditions in environment or brains’

Conceptualizing adaptation in these ways, a focus on endogenous intra-parliamentary interactions in shaping engagement choices has been minimized or, in many cases, lost. Indeed, a central element missing from this literature – and one to which this paper is addressed – is the consideration of parliaments as institutionalized organisations, and parliamentary committees as institutionalized arenas, which structure the social interactions of those actors who inhabit them (members and officials). More specifically, we suggest that the absence of analysis which conceptualises parliaments and committees through sociological-institutionalist frameworks has had four critical conceptual consequences for studies of parliamentary adaptation to the EU. 

First, parliamentary European committees are often assigned passive roles and studied as neutral arenas for party political game-playing, the rules of which are understood to be developed elsewhere. Second, when parliaments or European committees are seen to act in a unitary way, this type of engagement is often relegated to the under-theorized black box of the ‘non-party mode’. Third, committees are frequently implicitly viewed as consisting of only parliamentarians, whereby a committee’s administration including significantly the work of parliamentary officials is largely under-researched. Fourth, not only are the rules and norms guiding social interactions within committees largely not considered, but the effects of cross-parliamentary and intra-committee practices on actor competitions are too frequently over-looked.

To begin to address these gaps in the research, in this paper we set out an approach for studying European committees as inter-dependent, yet autonomous, actors within parliamentary organizations. To do this, we propose examining ‘whether’ and ‘how’ through engaging in European committee work a) actors’ subjective interpretations of their professional role become shared or rendered inter-subjective and b) the effects that the institutionalization of a sense of collectiveness within committees has on actor competitions in general and on party political competitions in particular. We contend that this can be studied by examining key choices made by committees over what they consider to be ‘appropriate’ ways of engaging in EU affairs, on the one hand, and how knowledge about their ‘appropriateness’ is built, on the other. European committees often hold specific roles within parliaments, namely to determine ‘effective’ engagement in the government of the EU. We claim that one way for capturing these processes is to study the institutionalization of organizational knowledge within European committees. More precisely, we hypothesize that:

- through the building of organizational knowledge, Members’ interests can be articulated, re-cast and made to co-exist with that of others;  
- these processes are conducted through social interactions both within European committees as well as through inter-committee exchanges;  
- European committees’ institutionalized rules, ideational elements and discourses often structure actor competitions around what is, and what is not, considered possible in the development of parliamentary practice.

To explore these hypotheses further, the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we set out in more detail first, why this way of studying of European committees is merited and second, why it should take as its focus the work of European committees in the institutionalization of organizational knowledge. In Section 2, we set out our research design and propose an analytical grid to investigate the different organizational knowledge practices undertaken by European committees. This is done by conceptualizing the institutionalization of organizational knowledge
as four distinct practices which can and should become the object of empirical research. These are the (i) the acquisition of organizational knowledge; (ii) its aggregation; (iii) its articulation; (iv) its accumulation. In each case, we propose how the study of each practice can reveal both the building of a sense of committee unity – or ‘committee cohesion’ (Arter 2003) – and the effects of this on actor competitions in general and party political competitions in particular. To be clear, this section remains at a programmatic level – empirical research still requires to be carried out to test the validity of our hypotheses. Nonetheless, for each practice, we illustrate our claims by providing examples of the European committee work of the House of Commons in Westminster and the Scottish Parliament in Holyrood. These examples are drawn both from past research projects (Carter 2001; Carter and McLeod 2005; Carter 2009), but also from an initial examination of documentary material in the preparation of this paper. In so doing, we aim to bolster our hypotheses and map the research terrain for the application of this analytical grid in future research.

In proceeding in this way, we wish to emphasise that ultimately this paper consists of a preliminary set of proposals for studying the work of European committees. Throughout the aim is to build on work (re-)examining parliamentary institutional and committee roles more generally (Kerrouche 2006, Arter 2003) and engage with workshop themes on the role of committees structuring parliamentary interactions – in this case through the institutionalization of practices in the government of the EU.

1. Studying European committees as collective actors: the role of organizational knowledge

1.1 Why European Committees

Throughout the history of the institutionalization of the government of the EU, uncertainties have been evoked concerning the role for both national and regional parliaments in its regulation and policy-making processes. To begin with, whether and how national parliaments should engage in EU decision-making was not a question demanding an ‘EU’ response, but rather was framed as a ‘problem’ for individual parliaments to resolve unilaterally. Indeed, it was only in the 1990s that this issue was politicized by national parliamentarians as a ‘collective’ European concern and subsequently placed on the European Convention agenda leading to Treaty reform. Provisions within the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon (still to come into force) are the outcome of these debates and grant national parliaments a formal power to review European Commission legislative proposals in the light of subsidiarity and express their opinions over the case for EU regulatory action.

These collective mobilizations notwithstanding, for the most part uncertainties over national (and regional) parliaments’ ‘appropriate’ role within EU decision-making have been mediated and resolved within individual national and regional parliamentary chambers. In so doing, a common response across EU domestic parliaments has nevertheless been the setting up of European committees for the handling of EU affairs. Moreover, as is well documented in the literature (Bengston 2003; Norton 1996), even though trajectories towards the creation of European committees differ as between national parliaments, as do their instruments or rules, nonetheless European committees have become the central means for handling EU business within domestic parliaments.

Research on how national and regional parliaments engage in the government of the EU must therefore include within its design an approach to the study of European committees. Yet, to date, scholarly ontological and epistemological debates on frameworks for studying European
committees are largely absent in the literature on parliamentary adaptation to the EU. Rather, the study of European committees has tended to be dominated by a scholarship whose ontology of parliaments is predominantly generated within rationalist and/or functionalist frameworks. The domination of these kinds of approaches is reflective of a central trend in studies of parliaments more generally, wherein leading scholars have argued that ‘[the] assumption is that [committees] have been colonised and are animated by cohesive or disciplined political parties’ (Arter 2003: 74). This in turn has generated a core and largely unquestioned line of scholarship whereby European committees are studied as neutral instrumental settings for party political game-playing, the rules of which are developed elsewhere (Auel and Benz 2005; Damgaard and Jensen 2005). Indeed, although there exists within the literature a number of studies which compare both histories and practices of European committees, for the most part these remain at the level of comparison of functions (e.g. Bengston 2003). And, whilst scholars tend to agree on generalities – e.g. over the comparative sequencing of European committee institutionalization (Norton 1996; Bengston 2003; Auel 2005) – they do so in the absence of any attempt to problematise the concept of the ‘committee’ to theorise its internal interactions and practices. Where scholars do acknowledge moments when parliamentarians ‘act as a whole... usually through their European affairs committee’ (Holzhacker 2007 145), this type of behaviour is merely described as ‘parliament’ working ‘as an institution, in a non-party mode’ (Holzhacker 2007: 145), but cannot be further explained by those scholars largely due to the absence of research into this very question. Finally, when scholars have attempted to go further and un-pack parliaments to explore their constituent institutions, they often fail to apply the same degree of analytical rigour and provide equivalent empirical complexity for the study of practices of national European committees compared with those of other committees, e.g. EP committees (see, for example, Neunreither 2005). In short, for the most part, within the literature on adaptation to the EU, European committees remain largely under-problematised and understudied arenas. More research is thus required to understand the rules and norms which shape the social interactions that take place first, within them and second, between them and other parliamentary committees over the handling of EU business.

1.2 Why Organizational Knowledge

In 2003, David Arter claimed that for decades parliamentary research had been conducted within frameworks which gave priority to parliamentary party groups as ‘pre-eminent actors’ within parliaments (Arter 2003: 73). This in turn had resulted in the paradoxical situation that although ‘committee cohesion – or effective collective working – [was] a necessary, if not sufficient condition of overall legislative cohesion’ scholars knew ‘little about the workings of committees’ (Arter 2003: 73, 87). Since the making of that statement, more and varied work has been published on the inner workings of parliamentary committees in general and which seeks to unpack them in organisational terms (inter alia Khmelko et al 2007; Arter 2006; Benedetto 2005; Roederer-Rynning 2003). The hypothesis (implicitly) raised by these works - namely that committees’ institutionalized practices can produce independent causal and transformative effects on their members’ behaviour - is one also grasped and studied in a wide-ranging literature on European Council committees, Council of ministers working groups and European Commission committees (see inter alia Checkel 2001; Trondal 2001; Egeberg 2004; Fouilleux et al 2005). For example, the starting point of Checkel’s work on social processes of interaction within committees is the finding that ‘committee deliberations, despite the contention over various issues, were more than a zero-sum diplomatic bargaining game among actors with fixed interests’ (Checkel 2001: 11).
Within these debates, two central lines of inquiry can be discerned. The first is the consideration of how committees work to secure cohesion and collectiveness. The second is the examination of how tensions between committee cohesion, on the one hand, and party cohesion, on the other hand, are mediated. For example, with regard to the former, rather than proceeding from an assumption of division within committees caused by party political affiliations, Arter proposes starting research from a reverse position, namely ‘a presumption of a significant degree of unity rather than division in committees’ (Arter 2003: 73). From this perspective, key lines of inquiry centre upon both studying committees when they undertake unanimous courses of action and the conditions under which political party rules penetrate committee cohesion (Arter 2003). By comparison for Checkel, operating from within a constructivist frame, no initial assumption is made over unity or division. Rather research must capture the mechanisms through which the building of collectiveness is brought about. For him, it is not the quantity of contact between members of a committee which is significant, but the quality of that contact. Within his work, a central argument is that quality can be demonstrated through examinations of the ‘social processes of interaction’ of actors and in particular how key actors use strategies of ‘argumentative persuasion’ to bring about change in group preferences (Checkel 2001). Egeberg also takes as his focus the role of argument and persuasion in re-shaping actor preferences, but integrates the study of these strategies into examinations of the organizational context and its effects on actors’ behaviour (Egeberg 2004).

How ‘committee cohesion’ interacts with other types of affiliation of members is also addressed by these studies. For example, in Arter’s comparative study of committee initiatives in Scotland, Sweden and Iceland he found that MPs could simultaneously hold loyalties to both their party and their committee – yet how this loyalty was mediated required further investigation. Of course, political parties can discipline their members in ways which committees cannot. The onus for research therefore is ‘to consider alternate ways in which committees engender compliance, other than through coercion’ (Arter 2003: 78). Checkel’s work too has emphasized the importance of ‘argumentative persuasion’ as ‘social process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion’ (Checkel 2001: 3). In both studies, it is acknowledged that more work is required on these interactions and how committees retain loyalties upon competition with other demands on actors’ affinities.

In our study of European committees of the UK House of Commons (HC) and the Scottish Parliament (SP), we seek to engage with these debates. If we define ‘cohesion [as] a property or attribute of a committee that has to do with it working effectively together, as a unit, in the performance of its tasks’ (Arter 2003: 74), then one of the ways in which committees can be studied as producing cohesion is through their institutionalization of organizational knowledge. Public organizations such as parliaments have ‘knowledge needs’ (Van Buuren 2007: 509). They require both organizational knowledge as well as substantive public policy or regulatory knowledge. In this context, knowledge is defined as a ‘constantly changing flow of interpretations constructed through social interaction and reflection’ (Van Buuren 2007: 509). Organizational knowledge is the ‘way in which an organization keeps an eye on its environment [and] develops knowledge about it’ (Van Buuren 2007: 510). It consists of ‘sets of constructed meanings, accumulated over time, and which create a political reality about what is and what is not possible’ in the conduct of parliamentary EU engagement, including its effectiveness (adapted from Kauppi 2008: 8). From this perspective, each type of European committee

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1 In this paper, our interest is on the institutionalization of intra-organizational rather than substantive public policy knowledge, although we contend that the framework we propose in Section 2 could equally be applied for studying the institutionalization of the latter.
practice – for example, ex ante scrutiny of national ministers’ policy positions to be defended in the EU council of ministers – is thus understood to ‘constitute a condensed form of knowledge’ about parliamentary control (adapted from Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007). Organizational knowledge including beliefs, know-how and tool-kits (Swidler 1986) and/or a ‘set of practical algorithms for dealing with specific situations’ (Muller 1995). In the case of parliaments, organizational knowledge pertains inter alia to social representations of
- local and EU-wide executive-legislative relations;
- moral values of parliamentary control and ministerial responsibility;
- representative functions of parliaments;
- the EU as polity;
- ‘effectiveness’ of techniques and strategies for handling EU business.

In the case of European committees, studying the institutionalization of organizational knowledge is particularly pertinent given the uncertainties surrounding the ‘appropriate’ role for domestic parliaments in the government of the EU. Indeed, both the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) in the HC and the European and External Relations Committee (EERC) in the SP have general remits to consider and report on EU documents, including reporting upon issues which arise from EU documents (HC Standing Order 143; SP Standing Order, Rule 6.8). Whereas European committees cannot initiate legislation, they constantly take decisions over how to develop their own institutions (norms and rules), but also how to affect change in others’ practices – e.g. their government’s, European council of ministers’ – in order to render their own practices more ‘effective’. These provide opportunities for committees to take unanimous courses of action. To substantiate this claim further, we highlight previous research findings which suggest that, in the UK experience at least, there is evidence of European committees behaving as unitary actors and as ‘players’ in their own right in the construction not only of their own role, but of how others should conduct their business. During parliamentary reform processes, proposals for change were frequently captured by European committee discourses, the latter often defining the terms of broader parliamentary debates and what was, and what was not, possible in the re-institutionalisation of practice. For example, research into the role of the ESC revealed the existence of consistent committee discourses over engagement choices which spanned European committees operating under both Conservative and Labour governments (Carter 2001). Similarly research examining the impact of devolution on UK-EU parliamentary adaptation found that social constructions over what was considered legitimate practice in the EERC did not always diverge along party lines with governing party members wanting to ‘protect’ rather than ‘oppose’ the government (Carter 2009). However, in neither of these cases were these processes studied in a systematic way. Instead we generated suggestive evidence of collective committee voices, the causes and effects of which merit closer investigation.

We contend that this work of European committees provides a rich terrain for the study of the conditions under which European committees emerge as autonomous, yet inter-dependent, actors, shaping both their immediate organizational environment but also the broader EU polity within which they engage. In making these claims, and also drawing upon Fouilleux et al’s study of EU council of ministers’ working groups (2005: 610), we hypothesize that European committees do not just simply ‘carry out’ remits which they are delegated by parliament. Rather, through their daily organizational practices, they contribute to (re-)problematizing their role, including the stabilization of inter-subjective representations of actors who inhabit them over the

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2 EU documents includes all EU published acts, e.g. European Commission consultation papers; integrated impact assessments; European Commission Green and White Papers; European Commission proposed legislation; draft Treaty provisions and so on.

3 As they have elsewhere, see Holzhacker, 2005.
‘appropriate’ role for the committee in the handling of EU affairs. In other words, committees are understood to produce organizational knowledge. Studying how organizational knowledge is built up within European committees thus provides us with one means of investigating whether, how, and with what effects, actors’ subjective interpretations of their professional role become shared or rendered inter-subjective through on-going social interactions concerning the meaning of their organization’s and committee’s role in the government of the EU.

Finally, we wish to emphasize that the institutionalization of organizational knowledge is not here being conceptualized as an instrumental exercise to enable the committee to perform its tasks in a purely functionalist way. First, as argued by Boswell, usages of knowledge also pertain to the legitimacy of public organizations: ‘by being seen to draw on expert knowledge, an organisation can enhance its legitimacy and bolster its claim to resources or jurisdiction over particular policy areas’ (Boswell 2008: 472). Second, the building of organizational knowledge has constitutive effects, institutionalizing ‘shared’ cognitive frames capable of producing senses of collectiveness amongst committee members. For, as Surel has argued:

‘one of the principal ‘functions’ of a cognitive and normative frame shared by a certain number of actors is effectively to develop a ‘collective consciousness’ in them; in other words, a subjective sense of belonging producing a specific identity’ (Surel 2000: 500).

In stabilizing certain cognitive frames as dominant ones, the institutionalisation of organizational knowledge can be seen to foster compliance of members and officials, who increasingly share similar ways of interpreting their parliamentary world and how ‘best’ to resolve on-going contingencies posed therein. Third, through examining actor struggles over the institutionalization of organizational knowledge, including actor interactions around the formation of collective decisions over knowledge choices, we are also able to critically study European committees as ‘site[s] of power’ (Grémion 1976). Studying European committee work to produce and disseminate organizational knowledge thus also enables research to capture actor competitions. For example, is there evidence of alliance or coalition-building around particular interpretations of how committees should work? Or, what role do particular positions within committees – such as the appointment of rapporteurs (Benedetto 2005) – play in the building of committee consensus during committee inquiries into their scrutiny of European business? Through examining knowledge practices, research is thereby also able to identify the extent to which these actor competitions are structured along party political lines versus other types of division within committees – for example, ideational divisions over the social construction of the EU as a polity; ideational divisions over the moral values of government accountability. Ideas informing organizational knowledge can thus also be seen to be sources of power and conflict within committees, the resolution of which may bring about a re-alignment of values and a re-ordering of hierarchies within committees, thus altering relations between members.

In summary, we hypothesise that around the institutionalization of organizational knowledge actors engage in social interactions and practices which today needs to become the object of empirical inquiry. Studying these will enable research not only to capture ‘whether’ and ‘how’ European committees produce a sense of collectiveness amongst the actors which inhabit them, but also the effects these processes subsequently have on actor competitions both within committees and more broadly across parliaments.
2. Studying the institutionalisation of organisational knowledge: Setting a framework for research

2.1 Disassembling organizational knowledge

In this second section of the paper, we set out a framework for comparing the institutionalization of organizational knowledge in two parliamentary settings – the House of Commons at Westminster and the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood – and the work of two European committees - the ESC (HC) and the EERC (SP). As we suggest above, in the institutionalisation of their organisational knowledge, actors are in a constant process of interaction concerning the meaning of their committee’s role, and thereby constantly re-interpreting their own professional reality as part of the committee – whether as member or official. In his paper identifying core social mechanisms studied in both institutionalist and social constructivist research agendas, Trondal proposes two organizational dimensions for examining ‘how different organizational settings may affect actors’ identities and role perceptions.... (i) organizational principles, and (ii) the intensity of interaction within organizations’ (2001: 10). Research design should therefore enable us to capture both of these dimensions.

To meet this objective and study the institutionalization of organizational knowledge in a systematic way, we propose disassembling it into four distinct practices: (i) the acquisition of organizational knowledge; (ii) its aggregation; (iii) its articulation; (iv) its accumulation.

We contend that within each of these practices, concrete decisions require to be made around which actors will interact and which need to become the object of empirical inquiry. Moreover, we contend that each of these knowledge processes potentially produces social interactions which foster ‘committee cohesion’ (Arter 2003). Studying each of these sets of practices thus allows us to investigate first, the extent to which this is indeed the outcome of these interactions and second, whether actor struggles are mediated within party political competitions or whether other types of competitions between actors are in evidence.

In examining these practices, we understand that the building of collectiveness will sometimes be self-motivating and self-aware – European committees will take initiatives to expressly acquire, aggregate, articulate and accumulate organizational knowledge. At other times, European committees might rather be in a position of reacting to other reform processes underway elsewhere, for example launched by other committees within parliament, and for the purpose of which they are required to reflect upon their own organizational role. Or, they might simply be engaged in processes of implementing their own rules and seek to evoke organizational knowledge to legitimize their action. Consequently, we do not regard the institutionalization of organizational knowledge as a ‘one-off’ process, but rather as on-going. Of course, there might be moments of change when a collective choice is made to conduct EU scrutiny in a new way,
and we can study organizational knowledge practices around that choice to examine their causality in bringing about this transformation of approach. But, mostly there will be periods of stabilization when institutions already adopted by current or previous European committees are consolidated. In these instances, therefore, we can examine causal mechanisms of organizational knowledge practices in producing continuities of engagement.

Through keeping our primary focus on practices, we hypothesize further that our research will keep to the fore inter-committee interactions as well as interactions within single European committees. These will include, for example, interactions with procedures' committees or modernisation committees within parliaments; interactions with government departments; interactions with European committees from other national parliaments; interactions with European Parliament committees and so on.

Finally, throughout our study of actors’ interactions in the acquisition, aggregation, articulation and accumulation of organizational knowledge, we intend to examine not only those amongst committee members and parliamentarians, but also and critically the engagement of committee staff – clerks and other officials who service the committees, as well as interactions with parliamentary research staff. The ESC, for example, is one of most intensively staffed committees in the HC (16 officials), yet very little research has been done on the work of these officials in the administration of European committees and the effects of this work on building committee cohesion.

### 2.2 Studying practices of ‘acquisition’, ‘aggregation’, ‘articulation’ and ‘accumulation’

Before setting out the scope of our four practices in more detail, a couple of observations can be made by way of providing a general context for the lines of inquiry to be pursued. First, the ESC has existed since 1974 and was established to coincide with UK membership of the EU. By comparison, the EERC was set up in 1999 with the creation of the SP following political devolution to Scotland. Partly because of this, some elements of the organization of the ESC’s work have been institutionalized to the point of being considered ‘natural’ and are not subject to persistent re-evaluation by its members/officials. This stands by contrast to the work of the EERC which, over the first three sessions of the Scottish parliament, has been consistently directed towards establishing an ‘appropriate’ role for itself and for parliament in general regarding the scrutiny of EU affairs. The EERC has published a number of reports, for example, which are both self-instigated and address this question directly.

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to draw the conclusion from these differences that the HC’s approach has been cast in stone – or settled long ago - and that since then there has consequently been little on-going institutionalization of organizational knowledge at the centre to be examined. On the contrary, even when producing continuity in practice, processes of institutionalization are on-going ones whereby dominant frames and beliefs are consistently mobilised by actors within their daily scrutiny work (Schneiberg 2007). Additionally, in the HC’s recent experience, there have been critical domestic and EU reform projects which have required responses from the ESC concerning its organizational role and the way in which the HC more generally handles EU business. These are the setting up of the HC ‘modernisation strategy’ (1997-2005); EU Inter-Governmental Conferences leading to the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997-1997); and the ‘Future of Europe’ and ‘European Convention’ debates launched by the European Council (2001-2004). Both European committees, therefore, provide research with ample opportunity for studying social interactions over organizational knowledge including the seeking and stabilizing of committee agreement over ‘appropriate’ ways of engaging
in the light of changing political processes – whether they be devolution, modernisation or European polity-building.

Second, research in this area is further helped by another common feature of both committees’ work, namely, the production of textual documentation. Both committees engage in this textual way, with extensive usage of, for example, written legacy papers, reports following committee inquiries, reports of weekly meetings when the ESC conducts its sift of EU documents and so forth. Not only does this way of engaging provide us with an extensive range of documents in which social science can and should analyse committee discourses, but also this means that there will have been extensive and on-going social interactions amongst officials, between officials and members, and amongst members around the writing, production and dissemination of these materials.

Third, and in the case of EERC in Scotland, we are further aided in our inquiry by the fact that this committee meets in public and publishes a public records of its proceedings available on its website. By contrast, the ESC meets in private and a large proportion of its interactions are on the basis of confidential in-house paper written by its officials. However, recently some elements of the sift have been conducted in public, and discussions recorded. For both committees, however, the research project will not be successful without conducting extensive interviews of both Members and critically officials.

Finally, in the rest of this section we seek where possible to illustrate our choice of variables by drawing upon examples from a range of sources - from research conducted within previous research projects; from documentary analysis of both official committee documents and reports; from analysis of evidence sessions; and finally from some (limited) observation of the EERC in practice. Examples where they are provided are thus intended to illustrate the validity of examining each of these practices. They are not intended to demonstrate our claims.

a. Acquisition

Organizational knowledge must be acquired. The first set of practices which we propose examining therefore are those pertaining to its acquisition. There exist different mechanisms through which knowledge is acquired and which are used by both European committees in the HC and the SP. For example, knowledge is acquired through committee inquiries into scrutiny practices. Inquiries include the gathering of evidence through the questioning of a range of actors (Ministers, government staff, stakeholders, academics); the use of rapporteurs (EERC); the deployment of the parliament’s research base through the requesting of briefing papers. All of these practices give rise to opportunities for social interactions which can be examined. Additionally, knowledge can and has been acquired by both the ESC and the EERC through visits to other parliaments. Both committees also acquire knowledge from their parliamentary offices in Brussels. Finally, NGOs can and do provide knowledge to committees in ad hoc ways and through their own initiatives.

There thus exists a wide range of mechanisms through which organizational knowledge can and has been acquired by European committees. Critically, this acquisition of knowledge is not random. Rather, the self-identification of Members as parliamentarians, guided by their subjective interpretations of parliament’s underlying norms and principles, is critical in determining which sources are constructed as ‘relevant’ ones in the acquiring of organizational knowledge and ‘who’ to ask to provide evidence. For example, in the ESC inter-subjective understandings of the HC norm of ministerial accountability both legitimized the decision to
impose a ‘scrutiny reserve’ on government Ministers and underpin requests made by the ESC to Ministers for specific types of information when they breach this rule (ESC 2002a). Or, for example, the EERC inherited certain expectations concerning ‘how’ it should conduct its business (Carter 2009), including the expectation that it would respect and seek to operationalize the principle of power-sharing: ‘Committees were to provide the essential linkage between the people and the elected politicians... premised upon perceived failure of political parties to provide this’ (Arter 2006). In seeking to interpret this principle, for a period of time towards the end of the first session of the SP, the EERC included within its sift system a number of committee-identified representatives of ‘civil society’ who could provide information on documents of ‘importance to Scotland’. Indeed, the on-going work of the EERC to enact this principle has resulted in its always seeking evidence from stakeholders during the course of committee inquiries into how both parliament and government should work in their engagement with EU decision-making.

How Members interpret their role and self-identify as parliamentarians is also relevant in their choices over whom to visit in order to learn ‘best’ practice. Choices over which other parliaments are perceived most likely to have ‘institutional fit’ - and therefore whose practices are capable of being transferred - are fundamentally linked to how actors are interpreting their own parliament’s norms and codes. For example, the EERC has sought to learn practice from a range of other regional parliaments; the ESC seeks to learn and exchange practice within the collective EU network of European committees, COSAC. Who European committee representatives exchange with and why would be a key question for research.

It is not only actor interpretations of the norms and moral values of their parliament which are significant in acquisition of organizational knowledge, but also their understandings of the EU as a polity. How actors socially construct the type of polity institutionalized through EU regulation - single polity, multi-level governance, inter-governmental regime - will also determine ‘where’ they look for knowledge. For example, we can detect a shift in both ESC and EERC framings where recently they have increasingly sought to acquire information from MEPs and the European Commission. We hypothesize that this is premised upon a changing attitude towards executive-legislative relations which are increasingly understood as not being contained within a single organizational setting and a recognition of a government of the EU. However, more research is required to investigate this claim.

Studying the acquisition of knowledge will, we anticipate, enable research not only to identify which knowledge sources are perceived ‘critical’ ones, but why. More precisely, in pursuing this line of inquiry, we hypothesize that research will reveal both diversity and unity over this very question. Is there evidence of collective framing of norms and values and therefore agreement over where to look for knowledge. Or, is there rather diversity – and if so what kinds of cleavages are revealed? Party Political? Government and opposition? Other?

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4 A good example of this can be found in the changing engagement of the European committee in the National Assembly for Wales. There, during the first session of the Assembly (1999 – 2003) and when the committee was self-identifying as an executive committee supporting the government, it expressly ruled out transfer of practice from Scotland due to lack of institutional fit. Political change within the Assembly during the end of the first session resulted in the European committee transforming its role and institutionalizing instead as a parliamentary committee, scrutinizing the government. During this transformation, Members’ re-defined their self-identity and at that point (2003) transferred practice from the EERC in the SP. What counted as institutional fit was thus fundamentally predicated on Members’ interpretations of their role and in the broader context of the Assembly as a whole.
b. **Aggregation**

Members will not always agree on interpretations of norms and how to secure ‘effective’ scrutiny of EU business. In new parliaments, such as the SP, there are initial periods of ‘unsettledness’ during which inherited norms will be evoked and interpreted and social representations of Members aligned. But, also in stabilized settings, new sessions of parliaments will potentially introduce new Members to European committees and may also include change in Convenerships or Chairs. Further, in both cases, transforming political processes also potentially provide actors with alternate ideas which can be mobilized as resources to argue for change in the way committees and parliaments handled EU business.

Studying aggregation is therefore critical for research to grasp ‘processes of interaction and deliberation to enable actors to reach joint approaches when frames diverge’ (Van Buuren 2007). There are a number of different mechanisms through which this might be brought about and which can and should be the object of study. For example, aggregation can happen through collective committee ‘learning’ or ‘reflexivity’ (Kauppi 2008), for example, during the course of conducting a parliamentary inquiry. Aggregation might also be brought about through pro-active ‘political work’ (Jullien and Smith 2008) of actors or groups of actors through the advancement of arguments to politicize or de-politicize issues and institutionalize ‘certain’ ideas over others – for example, that parliaments should adopt modes of operation respecting transparency. Additionally, actors might deploy strategies of repetition to bring about cognitive change in organizational framing of issues faced (Lopez-Santana 2006), and/or use ‘persuasive argumentation’ (Checkel 2001). For example, in the case of the EERC, during the course of the first session we have evidence first, of collective committee ‘learning’ during the course of conducting an inquiry into ‘good governance’ (EERC 2002); and second, of political work undertaken by an inter-party group of Members and officials to drive collective EERC views across the Scottish parliament and mainstream EU issues (Carter and McLeod 2005).

Studying practices of aggregation are therefore critical to capture whether and how ‘collectiveness’ is institutionalized within European committees. In stating this, we note that aggregation can be of different orders. For example, there might be an aggregation of ideas, or an ideational alignment of social representations of actors whereby subjective understandings are rendered inter-subjective. But, there also might an aggregation of a different order, namely the aggregation of views in the preparation, discussion and agreement of contents of committee reports (weekly, yearly, inquiry) and letters. Clearly these are connected – divergence over the latter might stem from disagreement over the former. Finally, more is (perhaps) known about these processes with respect to the EERC than the ESC. This is because the EERC meets in public and it is possible for the researcher to trace lines of argumentation advanced by Members and elicit how these were made to ‘join up’ around key decisions. Less is known about how the ESC aggregates its organizational knowledge, although conventional wisdom is that the ESC largely operates through consensus. These are largely under-studied processes however. Nevertheless, documentary analysis can indicate critical points when interests may have been required to be aggregated – and also are suggestive of a collectiveness over the outcomes of those processes. For example, the ESC records votes of Members in its reports where voting has taken place (ESC 2002b).

c. **Articulation**
Once acquired and aggregated, organizational knowledge requires to be articulated. Both the ESC and the EERC use multiple channels for the articulation of organizational knowledge. Articulation takes both oral and written forms – the latter being the dominant way of communicating collective committee views.

There are a number of different aspects of political usages of organizational knowledge which a study of articulation practices will elucidate. This is because collective articulation potentially serves different purposes. For example, committees might undertake inquiries with the express purpose of articulating knowledge about how either they, or other committees within parliament, should make changes to way in which they conduct their scrutiny of EU business (HC 2002b). For example, during the modernisation review of the HC, the ESC came to a collective position on how to improve the effectiveness of EU Standing committees and whether and how to involve Departmental Select Committees (DSCs) in the conduct of scrutiny business. This position was defended by the ESC in different types of written documentation (e.g. in its inquiry report; memorandum for the modernisation committee; in its yearly work report) and articulated by both its Chair and senior Clerk in their evidence to the modernisation committee. Many uses of the word ‘we’ were deployed to indicate a unanimous course of action. Here, therefore, we have evidence of the ESC attempting to steer a particular intra-parliamentary discussion on the best way forward and through the articulation of a single voice. Further this was in a context where there was extensive disagreement amongst Members of the HC over these very issues. Ultimately this strategy had success in that it was the ESC’s solution, as distinct from other solutions advanced for example by Chairs of DSCs, that eventually became the recommendation of the modernisation committee concerning changing the way business should be handled.

Articulation also includes the making of recommendations for change in the way governments handle choices emerging from their engagement in EU decision-making. For example, in its report on the transposition of EU legislation, the EERC set out a number of recommendations explicitly directed towards the Scottish government – many of which have been responded to (EERC 2008). Collective articulation is also directed towards enforcement of already agreed practice – for example, in the enforcement of agreements entered into with their governments and which the committee perceives to have been breached. For example, the ESC can and does call Ministers in for questioning when they are seen to have breached the scrutiny reserve mechanism. At these moments, Members of the committee remind the government of its procedural responsibilities and re-articulate organizational knowledge in so doing.

In examining different purposes of articulation, we can identify ‘who’ the committee has targeted as a key audience for its organizational knowledge. In this sense, we can capture usages of the articulation of organizational knowledge to legitimize the collective voice. For example, Boswell argues that organizations use knowledge to secure legitimacy ‘in the sense of meeting societal expectations about appropriate structures, practices, rhetoric or output’ (Boswell 2008). Studying who is the target for collective knowledge will thus inform research about committee constructions of the ‘appropriate’ audience and whose expectations they are seeking to meet in this instance. For example, through public enforcement of rules – i.e. Ministerial questioning – committees might be simultaneously legitimizing their control functions vis a vis government and their representative functions vis a vis electors.

Through engagement in practices of articulation, therefore, collectiveness is both potentially fostered and legitimized. There are many examples of this occurring in both the ESC and the EERC which can illustrate these points. For example, the oral questioning of ministers provides opportunities for collective articulation of organizational practice. This can be illustrated from
examination of the transcript of the ESC questioning of the then Minister for the Environment in 2002, in which a genuine sense of a committee whose concerns are collective can be detected. For example, Members from all political parties represented on the committee, and from both government and opposition parties, make explicit references to their collective view as a committee. There are references to a ‘carefully prepared scrutiny report’ by the ESC to uphold their justification for questioning the Minister; there are references to ‘the rules of Parliament’; ‘that is why we are so concerned about this’; reference to the ‘disrespect of parliamentary procedures; ‘as a Committee, we are delegated responsibility by Parliament to scrutinise’; ‘I hope you appreciate how seriously we, on this Committee, really do take scrutiny’ (quotations from different Members on the ESC). In this instance at least, we have suggestive evidence of Members reminding the Minister that he is present in an institutionalized arena in which there are rules and codes which he must observe. And, although Members of his own party do this perhaps more gently than the opposition do (through use of first name terms, for example), nonetheless the committee is of one voice concerning the rules it is applying.

Articulation thus potentially institutionalizes the collectiveness of the committee as one ‘voice’ and simultaneously legitimizes its cohesion.

d. Accumulation

Organizational knowledge is accumulated by European committees. Practices of accumulation are significant ones too in the institutionalisation of committee cohesion. Accumulation is potentially important for both institutional change and continuity. In times of continuity, accumulation of knowledge can produce a continuous ‘committee’ discourse which spans successive European committees – for example, the continuous monitoring by the ESC of Ministers’ and departments’ breaches of the scrutiny reserve in a ‘black book’, including the keeping of data on departments’ lack of compliance with rules (Hood evidence to the modernisation committee, HC 465: answer to Q3). But, accumulation also can provide a memory of unsuccessful proposals or ‘paths not taken’; ‘fragments of alternative systems’; ‘legacies of constitutional struggles’(Schneiberg 2007: 48). More significantly, as Schneiberg argues further ‘where those legacies acquire sufficient weight, they can serve as resources for the subsequent elaboration of alternative forms or logics’ (2007: 48). In other words, accumulation can connect to political change. For example, ESC views on the rules of procedures in the EU Council of Ministers remained unaltered since 1996, and had been articulated without success by successive committees under different governments (and Chairs and clerks) at various points since that time. Yet, in 2002, they were evoked once again by the ESC during the European Convention process and this time with success. Throughout, the ESC bolstered the legitimacy of its position through references to its longevity.

Organizational knowledge can be accumulated in different ways. For example, through individuals’ who hold ‘knowledge histories’ (individual Members, Chairs, clerks, officials). In this way, accumulation is achieved through continuity of membership and the ability of actors to evoke past experiences and collective views. On this point, we note a key difference between the EERC and ESC, whereby there is the very high turnover of Members in the EERC compared to the ESC (e.g. ESC had one Member as Chair of the committee for 17 years). However, accumulation is not only achieved through individuals’ memories. More significantly it is brought about through the amassing of written documentation which institutionalizes a set of interpretations which span committees and remain consistent even when individuals change. Both European committees produce extensive written documentation in order expressly to accumulate knowledge – these include yearly reports which synthesise the committee’s activities
in any given year (ESC) and legacy papers written at the end of one session of parliament and directed at the incoming committees (EERC). Committees also deploy techniques of accumulation – for example, recommendations to incoming committees (EERC 2007), evoking precedence and so forth.

Accumulation practices thus potentially institutionalize ‘collectiveness’ over time. Studying the extent to which their outputs are subsequently deployed by Members and officials as sources for the acquisition of knowledge will enable us to consider their long-term effect – and takes us full circle in the institutionalization of organizational knowledge cycle.

**Summary**

In summary, we seek to study the institutionalization of organizational knowledge around four distinct practices of acquisition, aggregation, articulation and accumulation. In the case of each practice, the aim is to identify key competitions and/or divisions within committees; whether and how they are resolved in the fostering of collectiveness; and the conditions under which competitions along party lines penetrate each practice. Further, although each of these practices will be studied separately for analytical purposes, clearly they interact. So, whereas the first step of the research is to investigate them individually, in the restitution of findings they require to be brought back together.

**3. Conclusions**

In this paper, we have argued that the time has come for the systematic study of the work of European committees and through the development of analytical frameworks whose ontology and epistemology is grounded in a political sociology of institutions. We contend that there is a rich literature which has examined the work of both parliamentary and other types of committees and which is informed by general social science theories of sociological institutionalism, social constructivism and organizational theory. However, for the most part, the literature on parliamentary adaptation to the EU has failed to connect with these ‘political sociological’ approaches – either by not applying them, or by not contesting them. As a result, the history of how and why national and regional parliaments have adapted to their role in the government of the EU is a partisan one, informed predominantly from within rationalist and functionalist theories and research frameworks.

This paper advocates taking hold of this challenge and to this end proposes an alternate way of studying parliamentary adaptation through a sociological institutionalist framework. To do this, we advocate the critical examination of the role of European committees in the institutionalization of organizational knowledge. Through investigating the mechanisms and social interactions through which this types of institutionalization is brought about, we contend that research can capture both how committee collectiveness is fostered and the effects this subsequently has had on actor competitions. Through disassembling organizational knowledge into four practices which can and should be the object of research, we hypothesize that through their work to acquire, aggregate, articulate and accumulate knowledge, European committees will stabilize as autonomous yet inter-dependent actors. However, European committees are not to be studied merely as functional ‘users’ of knowledge: rather they must be conceptualized as producers of knowledge. Through acquisition, aggregation, articulation and accumulation, we hypothesize that European committees can and do re-interpret parliamentary norms, re-align actors’ perceptions of their interests, make them co-exist with others’, and shape future engagement of both other committees, their governments and the organization of parliament as
a whole. For all these reasons, we question the extent to which competitions along party political lines are the dominant ones shaping organizational knowledge choices and anticipate that the application of our framework will go some way to providing answers to this question.

Finally a core line of inquiry advanced by this approach is to examine the administration of European committees in the preparation of meetings, scrutinising of EU documents, drafting of reports, sifting of documents, drafting of questions and so on. We argue that the role of staff and officials in the institutionalization of parliamentary adaptation to the EU has been largely under-researched and that examining it around practices of organizational knowledge provides one fruitful avenue for addressing this omission.

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