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## **Environmental NGOs in the raising debate of climate change**

Amy Dahan Dalmedico and Christophe Buffet

The first mention of the Non-governmental organisations appears in the Article 71 of the United Nations Charter in 1945<sup>1</sup>, but the terms do not refer to any definition. UN Economic and Social Council updated NGO status in 1996<sup>2</sup>, especially to take into account the emergence of a large number of national and regional organisations, but just drew a general profile for an NGO to obtain a consultative status.

NGOs have been thus flourishing and their weight grew on humanitarian, health, human rights or environmental issues while remaining an elusive object in international laws. Numerous authors strove to classify NGOs into typologies, either by:

- attitude towards governments, with “confrontational, complimentary or collaborative” relationships (Najam, 1996);
- strategy, with a specific focus on different types of advocacy, from “friendly persuasion” to “electoral politics” and advocacy networks (Fischer, 1998);
- “generations”: the first generation of NGO as concentrating on relief and direct delivery of service and the second generation focused on local self-reliance, while the third went above local level to seek policy change. As for NGOs of the fourth generation, they deal with a social vision (Korten, 1990).

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<sup>1</sup> “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence.”

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/>

Crossing typologies enables to draw a quick overview of a species of NGOs that particularly developed from late 60s and early 70s, the environmental NGOs. From local level where their targets remain specific to their evolution within South-North relations, through their influence on national or international policies, we aim in the first part at underlining the diversity of environmental NGOs that enlightens their role and their interactions within climate change debate at all levels. We will examine then more specifically in the second part of the paper how environmental NGOs interacted within climate change regime within United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, while the issue of climate change was raising since the last 20 years, up to preempting debates about sustainable development.

### ***Environmental NGOs: a diverse ecosystem***

#### *Local and national level with specific targets*

Many movements start at a local level, in reaction to projects that they identify as a threat for themselves. Local leaders or groups emerge among civil society to dispute the project and put pressure on local politicians. Depending on the location and the type of project, those leaders and groups appear to be very miscellaneous, from scientists to tribe leaders or farmers representatives. Those differences in terms of social origins and contexts have then an impact on the type of actions the NGO will adopt. G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Nobel point out that in Philippines, “university faculty and students set up research centers or technical assistance programs; middle-class activists contact sympathetic journalists to get articles published in the *Philippine Daily inquirer* or *Manila Chronicles*; poor people resort to direct action, such as blockading roads to stop timber trucks” (Silliman, et al., 1998).

The project of a construction of an incineration plant for toxic wastes at Illigan, Philippines, in 1987 provides an example of a mobilisation led by a university: so as to convince the City Council to reconsider its vote in favor of the project, IIT faculty formed “a core group of professionals who went on to lecture in schools, talk to civic groups, do regular briefings on local radio public affairs programs, and attract the attention of national officials and media.” (Silliman, et al., 1998). The mobilisation proved to be successful, especially because elections were close in time. For fear they might not be reelected, the City Council finally reconsidered the project. The “electoral politics” strategy can also consist in working through the opposition when the executive branch of a government ignores or refuses to deal with NGO: in Nepal, for example, an environmental organisation called LEADERS used opposition parties to get environmental issues on the agenda for public discussion of a new constitution (Fischer, 1998).

Attracting media’s attention to raise public discussions is far from being a type of action reserved to university and middle-class activists. Poor people direct actions turn out not to limit to physical commitments such as “blockading roads or stop timber trucks” but can also take the form of long marches. Julie Fischer quotes the example of over 1,200 indigenous people from the Amazon region in Bolivia, who “marched 750 kilometers to La Paz in 1990 under conditions of heat and humidity to challenge timber and mining concessions” (Fischer, 1998). Their number and their physical performance enticed national media, which made impossible for national politicians to ignore them. President Jaime Paz Zamora and some of his ministers took the opportunity of this media frenzy to welcome the group when they arrived in La Paz, and immediately issued decrees that prevented logging on certain tribal lands, restored land to indigenous groups, and marked out several indigenous territories.

These two examples also underline an aspect of local protests: they generally do not correspond to a vision of nature as a value in itself, but to “task-forces” whose first aim is to preserve conditions of living of populations that would be affected by exploitation of nature. This can lead to issues related to identity: in the case of the indigenous people of the Amazon region, the extensions of timber and mining concessions lead to the destruction of their traditional environment, which forces them to migrate to cities. One of their demands during their march was then a respect of their “land and dignity”.

NGOs strategies can also consist in putting confrontation aside with political actors so as to support government bodies to enforce the law, or provide them with valuable expertise. In Illigan, two politicians of the City Council were rumored to have personal financial interest in the toxic waste incineration project. It happens on the contrary that NGOs and civil society can support “well-oriented” politicians of government body. In Cayaga de Oro, Philippines, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) lacked resources to enforce the existing environmental laws concerning protected areas. DENR Regional director, Mr Geollegue, asked then in 1992 to a local NGO, the Center for Alternative Rural Technology (CART), to be involved in monitoring protected areas. Both DENR and CART trained and organised farmers and fishers to report illegal logging. As a consequence DENR had sufficient data at its disposal to intervene and enforce the law by conducting confiscations, injunctions, and suites. The NGO was thus in a position of partner of the local government body, providing it with a precious “off-budget” staff organised as a micro-network. The lack of resources was compensated by the volunteer involvement of the population, and DENR power was thus reinforced with the participation of the NGO.

NGOs and government collaboration can also go further: in order to rise up public debates and properly lobby on

politicians, NGOs came to develop keen expertise on particular environmental issues. This expertise turns out to be useful for governments, either to understand better an issue or to implement a national plan, all the more so since NGOs *raison d'être* is the defense of a common good. For example, the local Committee for the Defense of the Environment of Durango, Mexico, which had been protesting against river pollution in the late 1970s, “had become so powerful and knowledgeable about pollution that the committee was made accountable for the dispersal of federal funds for river cleanup” (Fischer, 1998).

NGOs can also fit themselves into government plans when the central government has difficulties in implementing its policy at a local level. It appears difficult for Chinese central government to monitor from Beijing the proper implementation of its policies in remote provinces, where local officials can be subjects to corruption. In spite of some restrictions towards NGOs (such as strict rules for registrations), the central government sometimes rely on some of them for specific local issues and appreciate their support. Mr. Liang, founder of Friends of Nature NGO in China, developed trustful relationships with high official and unofficial standing in government circles. He used these links to convey environmentalist's concerns at high levels on the one hand, and to criticise local officials on the other hand, all the more so since he can enjoy a relative freedom of speech compared to officials restrictions. In 1998, the provincial head for Environmental Protection Bureau (which is a unit of Department of Justice) presented a positive overview of his actions against deforestation in Hainan. Mr. Liang did not hesitate to challenge his statement, which was appreciated by the representative of State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), a unit of Ministry of Environmental Protection), since “due to his official capacity, he could not so directly contradict the word of a local official, especially in a public meeting” (Economy,

2005). Mr. Liang was even awarded of the Giant Panda by Central government.

NGOs means of actions remain limited, in spite of their development, compared to state or major economic actors, hence an asymmetrical fight. The willingness of NGOs fight the state, while becoming permanently involved in the process of change through the state, has been described by a leader of WALHI, an NGO network in Indonesia, as “acupuncture” or “placing a needle into the sensitive points of a sick system” (Fischer, 1998). From local issues, NGOs also learnt to scale-up their actions and place the needle to change policies at the national and the international scale.

#### *National and international policy recommendations*

Relationships between NGOs and officials are intricate: the former strive to influence decisions through public mobilisation, while the latter try to make NGOs fit into their own agenda. Decision path often reflect an attempt to balance both interests – so as economical issues. The real influence of NGOs is therefore uneasy to establish empirically but even those opposed to NGO participations acknowledge their influence and impact on policy making and implementation.

Lobbying on policy has been a long-time strategy adopted since the beginning by environmental associations: Sierra Club, created in 1892 in the USA, aimed from the start at influencing policies. Sierra Club founder John Muir and President Theodore Roosevelt visit to Yosemite in 1903 led to the creation of the second National Park in 1905 after Yellowstone. The same year, U.S. environmental association National Audubon Society (NAS) was set up to protect birds and establish sanctuaries for wild life. They also benefited from the support of Theodore Roosevelt.

NAS active lobby participated in the decision to adopt the Federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act (1918) between USA and Canada (belonging to Great Britain at that time). They also succeeded in being involved in a National Wildlife Refuge system and purchased land for that matter.

Sierra Club and National Audubon Society, along with other environmental associations such as Wilderness Society and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) widened their membership base in the late 60s and the early 70s, which enabled them to increase their leverage power. Barbara J. Bramble and Gareth Porter identify then their role as “pivotal in lobbying for the adoption of the major US framework legislation on pollution control and management of public lands” (Bramble, et al., 1992), as clean air and water acts (1970 and 1972), toxic and solid waste disposal, forest management and mining control.

Their growing influence on “domestic” policy and the internationalisation of their structures logically led environmental NGOs to deal more and more with international law from the 70s. The 1972 Stockholm conference on the human environment witnessed the innovation of the “parallel conference” involving NGOs and set the first rules about transboundary pollution. A year later, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) adopted by 80 countries was actually first drafted by IUCN, which gathers local and international NGOs, States and government agencies<sup>3</sup>. In terms of strategy, this step meant that NGOs developed a well-recognised expertise both on environmental and legal issues, which enabled them to propose a “ready-made” policy to be adopted at international level. A little less than 20 years later, UNCED Earth Summit in Rio

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml>



witnessed an impressive inflation on the number of NGOs: 20,000 of them contributed to the debates, reflecting their involvement on the international scale. They also contributed to the establishment of intergovernmental institutions dealing with environmental issues such as Global Environmental Facility, Commission on Sustainable Development, etc. (Breitmeier, et al., 1998)

The 80s saw an evolution of NGOs strategies: they tackle economic issues and actors such as multinational firms and institutions marked with the influence of Milton Friedman's neoliberal policy, implemented and promoted in particular by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Deregulations, privatisations, multiplication of transnational corporations and their growing investments in Less Developed Countries led NGOs to tackle the economic actors with the same confrontational/complimentary/collaborative strategies they had already applied to governments.

The World Bank set off as soon as 1984 an autonomous NGO working group to provide Human rights and environment inputs to the Bank's projects, but kept on the idea that environmental stance would shrink worldwide demand for its capital and service until being affected by "Narmada" and "Arun" effects in the 90s. For fear of major social movements that resisted to the project of a dam in India's Narmada river valley, or the protests that were about to raise against Arun 3 dam project in Nepal, the World Bank decided to integrate environment assessments in its process in 1995. However, Bank's new green agenda in partnership with scientists and NGOs carrying out evaluations suffered from biases underlined by Michael Goldman: not only the conditions of assessments proved to be inappropriate according to scientific criteria, but the NGOs had also to face cruel dilemma. UICN, the World conservation Union, was thus incited to support World Bank's project of Nam Theun dam in Lao in exchange of a "\$60 million contract with

funders to design and run a series of National Biodiversity Conservation Areas that would enclose more than 15 percent of the nation's territory." (Goldman, 2004). This example illustrates the risks for NGOs to be "embedded" with economic actors when they try to cooperate closely. Some of them estimate that these experiences of collaborations proposed by financial institutions or transnational corporates mainly aim at cooping their critics by bringing them inside. They prefer then to remain "outside" to keep their capacity of critics and a full credibility. Since they are supposed to pursue a goal benefiting to everybody, they cannot afford being accused of developing their own activities at the expense of the populations they are assumed to defend! NGOs first asset is their image, which must convey an unquestionable trust both to keep on fundraising, to be credible towards other stakeholders (population, media, politicians...) but also to keep on enticing volunteers to participate in their actions. The balance between confrontation and collaboration remains thus a sensitive issue.

Multinational corporate are also extremely sensitive to their image, on which they capitalise to recruit consumers and shareholders in the North, so that they can appear as "economic giants with feet of clay" (Doucin, 2007). This sensitivity provides a new angle of action for the environmental NGOs who benefit from an international network. For example, due to international NGO mobilisations, Monsanto had to withdraw its "Terminator" seed, Mitsubishi was pushed to modify its salt extraction plant project in the UNESCO protected lagoon of San Ignacio (Mexico), Shell gave up the idea of sinking its Brent Spar platform in the North Sea... Moreover, NGOs reached a new step towards economic actors by producing "soft law" and developing certification and ethical rating. The Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres), which gathers investors, public pension trustees, foundations, labor unions, and environmental, religious, and public interest groups, issued the Global Reporting

Initiative, which is now considered as the international standard for corporate reporting on environmental, social and economic performance. For its part, Transnationale<sup>4</sup> scrutinises 13,000 companies to evaluate their social responsibility with many criteria, among them environmental impacts.

NGOs own responsibility towards environment may also be questioned. National Audubon Society was criticised in 1995 for opposing oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska while benefiting from revenues from gas exploitation in its own 26,000 acres Paul J. Rainey Sanctuary in Louisiana. NAS position appeared then to be hypocritical. However, Pamela Snyder and Jane S. Shaw, from Property and Environment Research Center defended NAS in an article published in the Wall Street Journal<sup>5</sup>. They indeed considered that oil exploitation conducted in Paul J. Rainey Sanctuary did not jeopardise the protection of wild life: the refuge keeps on protecting 100,000 migrating snow geese, so as ducks, wading birds, deer, shrimp, crab, fish. In the mean time, gas exploitation provided NAS with \$25 million since the 1950s, which could be reinvested by the non-profit association for conservancy and lobbying on environment. Moreover, Pamela Snyder and Jane S. Shaw estimate that Paul J. Rainey Sanctuary provides an example of the “best combination of environmental protection and revenue generation”. Their conclusion is then that NAS and the other environmental groups should have the opportunity to bid on government oil and gas leases: they would ensure to duplicate Paul J. Rainey Sanctuary’s example of balance between profit earning and the respect of the environment.

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.transnationale.org/>

<sup>5</sup> PC Oil Drilling in a Wildlife Refuge, Pamela Snyder and Jane S. Shaw, Wall Street Journal, September 7, 1995, <http://www.perc.org/articles/article167.php>

*Internationalisation and evolution of “North and South” interactions*

A few environmental NGOs have become international: WWF has office in over 90 countries, Greenpeace is present in 41 countries, Friends of the Earths comprises 5,000 local groups, and UICN gathers 831 NGOs from more than 180 countries... In addition to NGOs focused on environment, many other international NGOs confront environmental issues through their own domain of expertise – whether it is human rights, sustainable development, women, legal aid... They all expanded either by creating local offices and/or participating in coalitions or networks. “As the environmental movement has developed internationally, NGOs have formed alliances across national boundaries, increasingly involving NGO colleagues from the Third World” (Kingsbury, 1992).

A direct form of support concern grants, which can be critical not only for the activity of local NGOs or to untie them from a dependency to local funds, but even for their existence. In China, the minimum funding requirement is equivalent to \$25,000 for an NGO to be registered. Action for Green can be then approved in 1999 thanks to the financial support of international NGO Global Greengrants.

International NGOs advocacy can also be complementary to local NGOs to tackle issues involving local and international stakeholders, which is particularly the case with huge projects funded by the World Bank or foreign governments. Oxfam and the Environment Defense Fund actively lobbied on the World Bank and the Japanese government to withdraw from their commitment to fund the project of dams in Narmada, while keeping a close coordination with local pressure put by Narmada Bachao Andola and Save Narmada movement (Chandhoke, 2002). Conversely, presence on local theater with different

contexts provides International NGOs with concrete cases that feed their advocacy.

Following the pattern defined by Korten (1990), International NGOs back their local counterparts to achieve “self-reliance” (second generation) and go beyond the local scale. International NGO act as catalysts for southern movements to scale up: U.S. World Neighbors NGO and Oxfam sponsored “Campesino a Campesino”, a program of Nicaraguan UNAG (National Farmers and Ranchers Union) for a tour around Mexico. Nicaraguan and Mexican farmers met during a series of gatherings designed to exchange their experiences of sustainable development, innovations, techniques to limit soil degradation, etc. Actually, these regional gatherings went far beyond usual development trainings since the farmers-to-farmers structure of trainings led the *campesinos* to “cultivate their collective wisdom by sharing seeds, techniques, information, songs, poems and many, many stories” (Holt-Giménez, 2006). UNAG program stir up reflections among farmers about sustainable agriculture, less dependent from pesticides and extensive techniques, and reinforce their identity. They live then their involvement as a resistance against experts of international institutions and their development models, as a preservation of their identity as much as a preservation of their land. Both UNAG and the supportive international NGOs take thus part in the 4<sup>th</sup> generation of NGOs described by Korten: they “look beyond changes in specific policies to energise a critical mass of independent, decentralised initiative in support of a social vision”.

The next step for Southern NGOs was, logically, to keep on enlarging their scope. Via Campesina was created during UNAG Congress in Nicaragua in 1992, as a coordination of farmers from Central America, North America and Europe. Today, Via Campesina is comprised of 148 organisations from 69 countries all around the world. The fact that Via Campesina was created in

Nicaragua and not in the West is quite symbolic and underlines that some southern NGOs wish now to be partners with northern NGOs on an equal footing. They also followed a pattern of development through networks and coalitions of hundreds of groups, some of which started or are based in the South, but with members worldwide. For instance, Environmental Liaison Center International is based in Nairobi, Third World Network has offices in Penang and Montevideo, and World Rainforest Movement is present both in London and Penang.

Nonetheless, in spite of their common interest, differences between Northern and Southern NGOs appeared. The 1997 Conference of the Parties to the 'Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species' (CITES) revealed that Southern NGOs, although in favor of measures for the protection of elephants or rhinoceroses, had a preference for protection measures that take into account the needs of developing countries and the living conditions of their populations where, e.g., newly increasing herds of elephants have already led to crop failures and the destruction of farmland (Breitmeier, et al., 1998).

Many different shapes of environmental NGOs have emerged on the international scene, closely related to their origins (social backgrounds, political context, etc.) and their strategy (local actions, advocacy, cooperation or confrontation with governments and economical actors, etc.). Interdependences within this ecosystem lead to an amazing capacity of adaptation to different contexts. Moreover, their development through networks and coalitions mixing Northern and Southern NGOs has led to a heterogeneous ecosystem, which has taken a large place within environmental debates at the international scale. More specifically, what are the different aspects of NGOs' interactions within the climate regime negotiated under the patronage of UNFCCC?

### *Environmental NGOs in the climate change regime*

NGOs begun progressively to invest climate change negotiations during the 90s. Two features have to be underlined in this matter:

- 1) the singular alliance between scientists and NGO's during the 1990's when a broad consensus on the importance of the climate risk did not still exist.
- 2) then, the rise of the adaptation issue and the complex relationships since 2003-2004, between expertise bodies (IPCC, SBSTA), the NGO's and developing countries.

In the climate regime, it is now common knowledge that one highly original non-governmental body, the IPCC, has a determining role in climate change expertise to the extent that it constitutes an ideal-type for other international projects. The whole framework was provided by the politicians: we do not intend to go back over its creation in 1988, the UN institutional framework in which it was created, its structure consisting of three groups, the cumbersome process under which its reports are drafted<sup>6</sup>, nor the report ratification process, as this has all been adequately covered before (Dahan & Guillemot, 2006).

What is less well know is the extent to which the IPCC had to fight to preserve its scientific legitimacy while taking account of a certain number of geopolitical imperatives, especially the preoccupations of Southern countries. It had to earn the respect of the politicians. The mission

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<sup>6</sup> All chapters of the reports have to be reread and edited twice: once by scientific peers and then by peers and governments. Final reports have to be accepted in a full plenary session and must be accompanied by technical summaries and "summaries for decision-makers". They have to be accepted line-by-line.

entrusted by the politicians to the scientists was a traditional (sometimes referred to as a 'linear') expertise paradigm<sup>7</sup>: "first agree among yourselves so that we the politicians can then act". Scientists often like this radical separation between science and political action as it helps safeguard their autonomy. But the linear model never actually works like this and cannot handle the "joint-construction" processes involving scientists and politicians, particularly those relating to climate change over the past twenty years (Dahan, 2008a).

In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) laid the groundwork for the creation of another subsidiary scientific and technical evaluation body, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), which was effectively created in 1995. The SBSTA is also an expert body (thus proving that this term can cover a wide range of different meanings) but it has a specific mission: providing governments with explicit advice. It was to become the body that dealt with political disagreements *stricto sensu* concerning scientific expertise and provided a forum to discuss this. What is credible scientific knowledge? What is legitimate policy? How is policy-relevant knowledge used to define global policy? Aside from the related conflicts, the creation of the SBSTA marked the opening of the spectrum between science and politics and redefined roles (Dahan, 2007).

The debates that took place within the SBSTA during the late 1990s illustrate the challenges inherent in any effort

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<sup>7</sup> There is a vast literature on the « linear model », particularly, Roqueplo (1997) on the science/expertise relationship, and Forman (History and Technology, 2007) on science/technology.



to harness science to public policy and they crystallised mainly around three issues<sup>8</sup>:

- question of contingencies: the contingency-based argument (climate change events) frequently comes up against the assertion of the universal validity of scientific declarations or their consequences,
- issues of trust or credibility: how to guarantee the validity of certain assertions and trust in expert findings,
- moral issues: science always favours certain fields of thought and certain interpretations of nature which cannot be taken for granted and may not be shared by all countries.

In all these debates, the environmental NGOs, through their analyses, journals, through also the relationships they built with developing countries, made increasing the consciousness of climate risk among the governments of developing countries and policy and decision makers.

Three different means have been used to validate scientific findings and advance the debate:

- the political standards of democratic participation,
- the consensus rule for reinforcing the credibility of scientific expertise - here especially, it is essential to open up the debate to include all governments,

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<sup>8</sup> We draw here on the analysis of Clark Miller (2001b) who studied these issues in detail during the early years of the SBSTA.

- the participation of all NGOs, which confers a broader range of diagnostic assessments with a certain moral credit.

Thus, the credibility of scientific thought is not treated as a solely internal scientific matter but appears closely linked to institutions and political standards. The issue is not one of informing governments of current scientific truths but of developing a shared understanding of global environmental risks (Miller, 2001b). This really does constitute a highly political process and a more specific understanding of the global environmental governance process requires a more in-depth analysis of how certain ideas acquire consensual status, credibility and authority. In this sense, NGOs contribute without any doubt to forge a *shared vision* of the issue by translating scientific truths into a language understandable by both governments and populations who elect them.

Moral credit of NGOs is also essential to the ethical dimension of climate change: as UNDP reports on Human Rights underlines, “future generations will pass a harsh judgment on a generation that looked at the evidence on climate change, understood the consequences and then continued on a path that consigned millions of the world’s most vulnerable people to poverty and exposed future generations to the risk of ecological disaster”. NGOs are precisely located at the articulation of scientific forecast and issues of social justice, equity and human rights across countries and generations. They are of course far from being unique trustee of ethics but they benefit from a special position to be credible on ethical issues. However, as mentioned in first part, they need to pay attention not to spoil their initial fragile credit, not to appear as business or lobby among others and to keep representing a form of “global conscience” in the eyes of public.

Since 1995, NGOs are present and very active in the defense of environmental causes at all the COP. From less than 200 at COP1, the number of admitted NGOs raised to more than 900 at COP13 in Poznan in 2008, reflecting their increasing involvement within the negotiation process. They benefit from a status of observer allowing them to actively participate with various latitude, the official restriction being an intervention only on “matters of direct concern to the body or the agency they represent” (Rule 7), but the actual restriction depending more on the body and the approach of the presiding officer. However, it turns out that their interventions remain limited in number because of a self-restriction: “it is still unusual for there to be more than half a dozen NGO interventions per two-week negotiating session. To some extent, this reflects the recognition on the part of many NGOs that delivering a statement in plenary is not necessarily the most effective way of getting their message across” (Yamin, et al., 2004). Since 2005, NGOs can also submit documents presenting their positions or requests, those documents being then published on the UNFCCC website<sup>9</sup>. Since then, more than 170 documents have been submitted on all subjects, from the first contribution by CAN asking for financial and logistical support from the Parties to Southern NGOs for them to participate in the Conferences, to the recommendations made by Friends of the Earth to better take into account the rights of indigenous people within REDD process.

However, the main strategy of NGOs to lean on the debates is focused outside the formal process of plenary sessions. They carefully follow all working groups of negotiators and publish daily different small journals like the “Earth Negotiations Bulletin” published (in English and in French) by the International Institute of

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<sup>9</sup> [http://unfccc.int/parties\\_observers/ngo/submissions/items/3689.php](http://unfccc.int/parties_observers/ngo/submissions/items/3689.php)

Sustainable Development (IISD), like Eco published also in two languages by the Climate Action Network and like TWN published by Third World Network. These daily journals relate all what is told or what could happen in the main places of negotiations. They also select, among the huge amount of side events during the COP, those they wish emphasise or denounce and they propose their analyses on the principal contents and stakes which could appear. They also organise their own side-events to present their analysis, such as “Green jobs strategies” (Sierra Club), “Critical analysis of REDD” (Friends of the Earth), or “2°C: requirements, costs, differentiation and equity” (WWF) (Dahan & *al*, 2009). NGOs thus contribute to strongly shape the public opinion in the COP’s. Reciprocally, decision-makers can take the heat about some crucial keys for the negotiations. So NGOs make a relay between national and international mobilisations, they are like translators tools between civil society and policy or decision makers. On all scientific debates, NGOs developed a true and lasting alliance with the IPCC leaders.

NGOs expertise also participate to the efforts to find solutions, especially through partnerships: at the COP of Poznan, we noticed the increasing importance of partnerships between Developing countries, big NGOs and academic research institutes on either environmental studies or on development studies, and often on both. Let us mention IISD, IIED, Stockholm Environmental Institute, Institute of Development Studies of the University of Sussex etc. These partnerships are now able to elaborate new propositions for the negotiators: on financial mechanisms of compensation, on forest management issues or even new architectures for the process itself as this appeared during the “Climate and Development Days”, at the middle of the Conference (Dahan & *al*, 2009). Greenpeace presented its global (R)evolution energetic Scenario which aims to stabilise carbon emissions in 2050, at a concentration of 450 ppm per

millions, and is supposed to launch a big debate on future climate policies and the possibilities of renewable energies. So NGOs don't hesitate to enter in important and serious theoretical researches and modeling practices to compete with intergovernmental agencies like International Energy Agency. Even if their two scenarios of stabilisation at 450 differ on some points (in particular the phasing out of nuclear energy in Greenpeace scenario), they converge on the idea that a true "revolution" in energy consumption is necessary for these results etc and this gives always a higher value to statements which originated in a priori very far positions. Such a proposal is also crucial for NGO community not to be locked into a Cassandra's role that can be counter-productive.

### *Adaptation, development and sustainability*

It was really Delhi in 2002, – at the first Conference of Parties at which the United States announced they would not be signing the Kyoto Protocol— that marked the emergence of the theme of adaptation. Thence, a *de facto* consensus emerged between the United States, which wished to play for time, and the Southern countries, who saw this issue as a potential source of additional funding that would neither constrain their development nor require any discussion of what would happen after 2012 (Dahan, 2007).

Adaptation appears as a *leitmotif* in the constant challenge to the methodology underpinning the framework of the climate change regime over the past fifteen years, particularly by considering 1990 as the base (base year for Kyoto, benchmark for additional environmentally friendly development mechanisms). Critics claim that a meteorological physics-based approach cannot be used to define the future of the planet from a socio-economic perspective. Similarly, the base year must incorporate a

historical legacy of political, economic and social conditions. And the NGOs emphasised the historical responsibility of the North. The heads of the IPCC took up enthusiastically the new priority of adaptation by linking it to reduction and the fourth assessment report (published in 2007) focused much more on analyzing vulnerabilities and adaptation and included far more concrete examples.

IPCC also decided to broaden the scope of the evaluation of existing research to include case studies and grey literature from developing countries as the heads of the IPCC claim that local know-how concerning adaptation is not in codified academic form and has not been widely published in international reviews. This decision is loaded with political significance. It gave the opportunity to some experiences conducted locally with NGOs to be assessed and taken in account in the Report. The aim is still to show that adaptation measures – taken here to be linked to reducing emissions - do not have to be a drain on an economy: they can also provide a boon. Highlighting adaptation points up the role of the IPCC second group and allows less developed and less industrialised countries to integrate the assessment process more effectively.

Up to now, adaptation has had pretty bad press. It has not been ‘politically correct’ as it is equated with acceptance of climate change. To a certain extent it has become unavoidable given the time already lost in terms of the action and irreversibility of the CO<sub>2</sub> concentration process. Adaptation may be analysed from a number of different perspectives. For developing countries, which are the most vulnerable to climate extreme events and disasters, adaptation is closely related to development and should permit financial transfers and technological transfers from North to South.

The Bali Conference (2007) has highlighted above all that the key issue for any climate negotiations has to be

development - for both developing and developed countries:

- One unavoidable question has been raised: To what extent can our society provide decent living conditions for its populations while reducing GHG emissions? Is it possible here? Is it possible in developing countries?
- Then a second question emerges: what pace of development is compatible with stabilising the Earth's climate? This in turn brings us back to the issue of reducing emissions by 50% by 2050. Developing countries may accept to be part of this discussion if they are given guarantees concerning their pace of development.

It is actually climate change (CC) that has become the "*driving force*" for the whole area of development (sustainable or not). This means that all other environmental questions, all issues of North-South development or equity issues which previously fell under the question of sustainable development are now viewed through the prism of the CC regime and subjected to the pace of its geopolitical dynamic (Dahan & al, 2009).

The rise of adaptation and development issues leads to new interactions between environmental and development NGOs, which have had for a long time parallel and largely unmixed histories and practices, but both rose as essential parts of governance during the last thirty years. This encounter gave birth to the so-called "Up in smoke" coalition in 2003, at the initiative of IIED and the New Economics Coalition, joined by numerous development NGOs (Oxfam, CARE, Tearfund, Christian Aid, ActionAid...) and environmental NGOs (WWF, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth...). Its central message is that "solving poverty and tackling climate change are intimately linked and equally vital". The growing

consequences of CC on most vulnerable populations, underlined by the 4<sup>th</sup> report of IPCC, also questions some humanitarian NGOs. Many of them however still have not taken the issue into account at its adequate level, hence the call of Madeleen Helmer (Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Center), Sarah La Trobe (Tearfund), et Silvia Llosa (UN ISDR) in 2008 to urge Humanitarian NGOs to participate to Poznan workshops<sup>10</sup>. It is still surprising however that major humanitarian NGOs such as MSF (Doctors without Borders) have not taken CC into account in their strategy. It will be then quite interesting to further study in the next years how CC issues, more and more perceived in terms of solidarity (both geographical towards most vulnerable populations and historical toward future generations), drive the encounter between humanitarian, development and environmental NGOs.

During the 28<sup>th</sup> session of the IPCC held in Budapest last April, the participants noticed a shift from the ‘hard’ science on the existence and causes of climate change to the increasing urgency to obtain information on regional impacts, adaptation and mitigations options [...], a shift from more theoretical concerns to concrete needs”<sup>11</sup>. However, in the scientific construction of the problem of climate change, the local-global link is a particularly thorny issue. The demand for regional predictions, the notions of the speed of change or amplitude of extremes, etc., raise the certain/uncertain frontier that we know to be difficult to deal with where there are links to the political process. NGOs are also located at the articulation between local and global: on one side they need scientific

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<sup>10</sup> “Why humanitarian agencies should engage climate change negotiations”, Madeleen Helmer, Sarah La Trobe, et Silvia Llosa <http://www.unisdr.org/eng/risk-reduction/climate-change/docs/Why-humanitarian-agencies-should-engage-cc-negotiations.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, 2008, p. 9.



information about regional impacts are essential to ensure programmes' sustainability, on the other side they can record immediate effects noted at a local level and relay them at the international level for advocacy.

The governance of the process under the United Nations' patronage is very complicated with a lot of working groups, several meetings etc. Since it is so difficult to actively participate and intervene in the negotiations process for the Least developed Countries (LDC), they need the support of the NGOs. Saleemul Huq -one bengali leader of the group of Least Developed Countries- strongly argues in favor of a total convergence of interests between these LDC and NGOs. He wrote: "The negotiation process is like a big passenger ship with every one discussing which direction the ship should go. At the same time, a small number of delegates from a few countries recognised for their skills are invited to the ship's bridge to decide which way to steer it. If an LDC and its lead negotiator fail to be invited on to the bridge, no amount of ministerial speeches will make any difference."

### *Concluding remarks*

The carbon issue of climate change provides an indicator that has the enormous advantage of being a comparative and universally applicable classification tool: the "climate-friendliness" of a production activity or a technology is gauged in terms of whether it emits less carbon for the same output. So, on a global level, CC has increased the 'technical complexity' of sustainable development, which was previously couched in broader, more multi-cultural and woollier terms. It now comprises the core of the whole domain, a dramatic development that tends to exclude other aspects – particularly social ones – to an increasing extent. In the international climate arena of the COPs, the priorities are technical proficiency, energy

efficiency and green technologies. From a cultural perspective, the domain is characterised by the care taken to avoiding any ideological connotations and by a highly pragmatic approach that looks to the market on the one hand (especially the carbon market), and whole range of related regulatory and legal provisions on the other. Technology transfer and the adjoining compensation mechanisms appear to limit the creative imagination. From this point of view, NGOs do not seem in rupture with this approach (except the case of “Friends of the Earth International”, whose positioning is different). From a certain point of view, we can notice that the big NGOs like Greenpeace, or WWF didn’t grasp the opportunity of scenarios issues to extend the political debate about climate change to broader questions of a crisis of society or more a crisis of fossil fuel-based capitalism. It should be stressed that the extent of the climate wake-up call and the seriousness of the ecological crisis that it reveals have not triggered any in-depth review of the existing social contract in developing countries in either the public opinion, the political process or in the intellectual or academic sphere of the social sciences. There has been little debate over forms of growth, finite resources (apart from petrol), adjustments required to consumption patterns in developing countries, or the various scenarios and their underlying visions of the world. There are enormous gaps in the debate over the future of urban life in the broad sense (North and South), which have obviously a historical and strategic significance (Dahan, 2008b).

The increasing complexity of debate organisation and the multiplication of abstruse legal texts led to an invisible hierarchy that divides all-comers from a narrow circle of experts. The latter share a common set of landmarks, built along the years with several participations to COPs, that enable them to find their way in the numerous sub-group meetings, references and UN jargon and thus to discern shades and stakes (Dahan, & al., 2009). NGOs

representatives participate in this “epistemic meta-community”, which could partly explain their lack of a more radical approach that questions the very bases of development models and their tendency to operate within “respectable politics” (Gough, et al., 2001). However, Southern movements like Via Campesina mentioned in the first part have been built on identity issues and a form of resistance towards Northern model of development. The emergence of Southern NGOs on the international scene could involve more radical discussions, so as the development NGOs, who have used for years to advocate improvement in international solidarity and social justice. Greenpeace’s global (R)evolution energetic Scenario appears then both as an important step to propose alternative solutions and a limited vision that lack integrative dimensions linking territory and lifestyle issues. In some aspects, IPCC 4<sup>th</sup> report can then paradoxically appear as more radical than NGOs proposals.

For years, Western development appeared worldwide as a sign of modernity. In spite of local adaptations, patterns of development remained relatively similar, reflecting “the hegemonic position of the West has enabled it to erase the specificity of its experience and to theorise it as the only way towards universal progress, with itself as pioneer and guide” (Bessis, 2001). Development is nonetheless now deeply questioned, being inextricably linked to meeting the challenge of climate change. It cannot be reduced to an engineering science problem (proprietary or green technologies) or an economic conundrum (carbon market, taxes, incentives) even though solutions are needed in both areas. A combination of technical innovation and social lifestyle innovation (dwellings, territories) needs to be linked to a philosophical project based on worldwide equity to share a “common global good” and take into account the multidimensional aspects of human being. NGOs have a role to play through four functions they strive to fulfill: to exert pressures as representative of civil society; to act as translators and

bridge between different worlds; to advise and support Least Developed Countries; to open debates wide through their own expertise, as laboratories for new ideas to open the field of possibilities. So far, the latter perspective has been the less elaborated. In other words, the canvas is still, to a great extent, to be woven.

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