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Europeanisation

Social Actors
and the Transfer of Models in EU-27

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and
Imogen Sudbery

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Cover: Street demonstration, Prague, 21. 7. 2009
Photo Martin Mádl.

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The political communication of social movements: an empirical analysis of ATTAC associations claims-making over European integration

Mathieu Petithomme

Introduction: analysing the Europeanisation of social movements

The term Europeanisation is used to describe the evolving behaviour and responses of social actors to the increasing impact of European integration (Ladrech, 1994: 167-85; Andeweg, 1995: 58-78). Europeanisation is a “top-down” process through which domestic actors adapt to the regulating framework of the EU, but it also leads to “bottom-up” dynamics shaping European-level developments (Radaelli, 2000). Social movements, taken as groups of individuals which share a unit of strategic action, might mobilize either against the institutionalisation of the EU system of governance or in reaction to the penetration of European norms at the domestic level (Börzel, 1999: 573-96; Mair, 2004: 337-348). Groups may mobilise against EU-level policy initiatives or “the European polity target” in itself. A type of “emergent mobilisations” against Europe can be promoted from below in reaction to but also in anticipation of European policy initiatives (Cadiou et al., 2007). The multiple levels of governance fostered by European integration broaden the structure of opportunities of social movements by opening new supranational and transnational arenas for mobilisation. Created to promote the regulation of financial markets, Attac associations could be considered as paradigmatic movements trying to politicise European integration (Imig & Tarrow, 2000: 73-93; Della Porta, 2003). Attac has constantly included European debates in its policy statements, while trying to promote “Euro-protests” against the Bolkenstein directive or the European Constitution. Attac has tried to “re-frame” an alternative European integration project around an “anti-
Europeanisation identity” (Gamson, 1992). The consensual pro-European stance of European social-democratic parties has opened new possibilities for the alternative left to politicise European issues. Agreeing that a united-Europe and a European polity is necessary, the association contests several European policies, especially the dominance of a “Europe of free-marketers” characterised by a model of “embedded liberalism” to the detriment of social justice and the defence of European welfare states (Scharpf, 1997: 18-36; Taibo 2007: 131). Contesting European integration without an (openly) anti-capitalist discourse and opposition in principle to the EU fosters Attac’s “federative power”, which benefits from the decline of Communist parties and the ambiguities of the “Third Way” promoted by the mainstream left (Burnham, 2001: 127-49; Ancelovici, 2004: 45-59). This article uses the methodology of political-claims analysis to understand the main issues, addressees, the type and the nature of claims developed by Attac associations. How do Attac associations frame European integration in their acts of political communication? The first section briefly presents the methodology, the second section retraces the main empirical findings related to the substantive issues and the addressees of Europeanised claims, while the third and the fourth sections focus on the forms and the nature of claims.

Claims-making analysis and the europeanisation of social movements

In order to mobilize support around their causes, social movements have an interest in creating communicative spaces where social problems are framed and constructed while political alternatives are defined. Political claims-making analysis is an established approach for examining the public dimension of politics (Koopmans & Statham, 1999: 203-04; Koopmans et al., 2005). By making claims, social actors strategically attempt to make their political demands appear at the forefront of the public debate.
Following Statham, “an instance of political claims-making is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of intentional and public acts which articulate political demands, decisions, implementations, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors in a policy field” (Statham & Geddes, 2006: 252). Not all collective actors mobilise political demands in the medias and national public spheres, because some of them lack the material resources to do so, while others believe their interests to be sufficiently represented by political elites and mainstream parties to make mobilisation unnecessary (Baisnée, 2007: 493-503). Not all acts of claims-making reach the public domain, since social actors need both visibility and resonance for their claims to engender a broader public debate, and a potential social mobilisation. Claims-making analysis is grounded on the strategic actions of claim-makers, leading us to “map” the trends in political communication and explain why some discursive frames are dominant over others. The claims-making coding strategy considers the reported claim as the primary unit of analysis. Hence, I have coded all the claims dealing with European integration and which had an addressee, made by each of the four Attac associations in France, Switzerland, Italy and Spain in their internal policy documents and press communication articles. A sample composed of 155 policy and public communication documents elaborated between 2004 and 2008 has been constructed on the basis of all the data available when the analysis was performed (nov-dec. 2008) on the respective websites of the four associations: 53 for Attac France, 30 for Attac Switzerland, 38 for Attac Italy and 34 for Attac Spain (see appendix B). Overall 1276 acts of claims-making dealing with European integration have been included into the analysis. Adapting
the typologies designed by Statham & Gray (2005: 61-81) and Koopmans & Erbe (2004: 97-118) each claim has been broken down into six major elements (see appendix A)1.

(1) **Social actor making claim** (who makes the claim?)
(2) **Addressee of claim** (at whom is the claim directed?)
(3) **Substantive issue of claim** (what is the claim about?)
(4) **Opinion of claim** (what is the opinion associated with the claim?)
(5) **Form of claim** (in which direction is the claim made?)
(6) **Nature of claim** (is the claim related to policy, political or polity elements?)

Firstly, each act of claims-making has been coded to define the **social actor making the claim**, which refers to which of the four national Attac associations (Attac France, Switzerland, Italy or Spain) is formulating claims over European integration. Secondly, the **addressee of the claim** is the specific actor at whom the claim is directed, for instance, the European Commission or the national government. The **substantive issue of the claim** refers to the main theme which is addressed in the claim. The **opinion**

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1 The first category regarding the **social actor making claim** has been used to distinguish Attac France, Attac Italy, Attac Switzerland or Attac Spain. The second category focuses on the **addressees** of the claims. Fifteen different types of actors have been delineated, seven Europeans and eight nationals. Given that I was interested in apprehending which type of actor constitutes the main addressee, the claims which had no addressee but only formulated judgments on European integration were not selected. The empirical results tell us which type of addressee dominates the political communication. Third, the **substantive issue** considers the subject matter associated with the claim. At the beginning, an extensive codification of all types of issues was performed, which was later aggregated and simplified to define eight final categories referring to the main issues. The **valence** of each claim was obtained by defining for each claim, whether it presents European integration positively, negatively or if it does not formulate any judgment.
of the claim characterises the opinion associated with Europe for each claim, in three positions ranging from -1 and 0 to +1. A score of -1 is attributed to a negative claim against the European polity, policies or politics. In contrast, a score of +1 corresponds to favorable acts of claims-making, while a score of 0 indicates neutral or ambivalent discursive positions. The final position is reached by aggregating the mean from the position scores of all claims of a specific type. The form of claim refers to its general direction which can involve five possibilities².

Top-down vertical claims-making from the EU to the national level: Claims elaborated by European political actors and

² The form of claim refers to the direction of the claim and implies five possibilities. (a) Top-down vertical claims-making from the EU to the national level, for example, “John Monks, secrétaire général de la Confédération européenne des syndicats, reconnaît que le vote du 29 mai 2005 a changé le paysage européen, déclarant que ‘les gouvernements européens doivent maintenant répondre à cette crise de légitimité’” (Attac France, “Après le vote du Parlement européen, se mobiliser plus que jamais”, 15/02/2006); (b) Bottom-up vertical claims-making from the national to the EU level: “il faut clairement indiquer à Bruxelles que le système actuel du livret A constitue un service public inaliénable et échappe aux règles communautaires de libre concurrence” (Attac France, “Vers une refondation de l’Union européenne”, 30/04/2007); (c) Horizontal claims-making by foreign actors from EU member states on domestic actors: “La chancelière allemande considère que la France devrait respecter le Pacte de stabilité et les règles européennes” (Attac France, “Les chemins tortueux de l’orthodoxie économique”, 28/12/2007); (d) Horizontal claims-making by national actors on other EU member states: “Les organisations suisses solidaires de la campagne pour un non progressiste en France manifestent leur soutien” (Attac Switzerland, “Les militant-es d’Attac Suisse rejoignent les équipes de volontaires internationaux pour un non de gauche contre le Traité constitutionnel en France”, 14/04/2005); (e) Internal national claims-making over Europe: “En este sentido la política de Zapatero, de acuerdo con las normas europeas, de reducir un 30 % la creación de empleo público es profundamente errónea y va en sentido opuesto al que debería hacer” (Attac Spain, “Medidas económicas y fiscales para resolver la crisis”, 15/08/2008).
addressed to national institutions or actors on issues of European integration.

(a) **Bottom-up vertical claims-making from the national to the EU level:** Claims formulated by national actors which call on supranational institutions or actors to respond to demands over Europe.

(b) **Horizontal claims-making by foreign actors from EU member states on domestic actors:** Claims defined by social actors from other EU member states and directed to national actors to demand responses over European issues.

(c) **Horizontal claims-making by national actors on other EU member states:** National actors formulate demands on European issues on actors from other EU member states.

(d) **‘Internal’ national claims-making over Europe:** National actors mobilise demands over European issue without directing them towards the European level.

This coding strategy grasps the *vertical component* of Europeanisation with two opposite landmarks, the domestic *penetration* of European norms (a), and the *institutionalisation* of the EU institutional system (b) (Mair, 2004: 340). Considered on its *horizontal component*, (c) and (d), it depicts a Europe of member states whose polities and politics are becoming interwoven with one another, creating new spaces of political communication (Zürn, 2000: 187). The last type of claims-making (e) characterises processes of “nationalisation” of European debates within the national political space. Finally, an original typology distinguishing between three distinct *natures of claims-making* has been defined. While the *form of claims* refers to their *general direction*, the *nature of claims* relates to the *general content* of the considered declarations. In other words, while the *form of claims* provides us an information on the *patterns of interactions* which dominate political communication (who is addressing claims, towards whom?), the *nature of claims* gives us additional
ideas on *the types of demands* which are formulated (what type of European debate is considered?)\(^3\). When dealing with European integration, the nature of the claims-making formulated by social actors could be distinguished in three types:

(1) **Claims-making related to European policies**: These claims elaborate on or criticise the content of specific public policy proposals at the EU level.

(2) **Claims-making linked with the European political scene**: This type of claims-making deals with the ways European politics is daily organised and the behavior of defined political actors.

(3) **Claims-making associated to the European polity in itself**: The content of this last type of claims-making is related to the opportunities, benefits and costs of EU-institutional and polity developments.

\(^3\) The nature of claims could be distinguished in three types: (1) **Claims-making related to European policies**, for example “A partir del rechazo al Tratado Constitucional Europeo, los ATTACs de Europa ofrecen alternativas a las políticas ultraliberales de Bruselas” (Attac España, “La respuesta más simple”, 16/09/2006); (2) **Claims-making linked with the European political scene**: “La rédaction et l’adoption de ce Traité à la va-vite et en catimini par les gouvernements et sa ratification par voie parlementaire le privent de toute légitimité pour les citoyens européens” (Attac France, “Le traité de Lisbonne n’est pas la fin de l’Histoire”, 14/03/2008); (3) **Claims-making associated to the European polity in itself**: “Fin dai referendum sul trattato di Maastricht, approvato per un soffio dall’electorato francese e bocciato da quello danese, la prova delle urne ha messo sistematicamente in crisi l’Europa istituzionale. È l’integrazione politica che è da tempo fallita in Europa impedendo quindi di affrontare la globalizzazione” (Attac Italy, “Quell’integrazione fallita in un’economia globalizzata”, 17/06/2008).
The substantive issues and the addressees of Attac’s europeanised claims

To begin with, table 1 provides a detailed analysis of the main substantive issues and their respective shares considered by the four associations. To define more accurately the major issues addressed by Attac associations in their Europeanised political communication, the themes associated with each act of claims-making were not coded following an hypothetical-deductive perspective with reference to pre-defined and “closed” categories, but were elaborated progressively through an inductive method, on the basis of “open” code lists that could be extended by the coder when a new issue appeared in the policy documents. If one codes straight away at a high level of aggregation, possibilities for including alternative means of categorisation through the coding process are lost forever, so it seems more methodologically appropriate to define common aggregate summary variables only at a later stage of the analysis. The empirical results presented below refer to the final categories obtained after previous extensive codifications. Table 1 gives us important results regarding the themes of predilection and the issues Attac associations tend to mobilise in their acts of political communication on European integration.
Table 1

Shares (%) of substantive issues on claims-making (CM) over European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Attac France</th>
<th>Attac Switzerland</th>
<th>Attac Italy</th>
<th>Attac Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Constitution/Treaty of Lisbon</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal Europe/Bolkestein Directive</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Europe/Public Services</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial and economic crisis</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic deficit</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European elites</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrations</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table suggests that for the four national associations, the main issues of concern (for the period 2004-2008) were linked with the European Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon, which represent 30.4% of the matters evoked by Attac France, 32.9% for Attac Switzerland, 33.1% for Attac Italy and 32.6% for Attac Spain. The second common denominator share is linked with what Attac associations consider as a trend towards the reinforcement of a “neoliberal Europe”, a perspective which in their views has been explicitly shown by the adoption of the Bolkestein directive that engendered a tense and unprecedented cycle of political mobilisations in 2005. In spite of slight variations, it is interesting to note that the topics of the European Constitution/Treaty of Lisbon and the reference to a neoliberal Europe/Bolkestein directive are almost equally raised and always amount for more than half of the overall issues considered by each national association. Thus, it could be said that both of these substantive issues tend to constitute “the core” of the political communication of Attac associations towards European integration. National variations appear more clearly on the promotion of a social Europe and the defence of public services on the
one hand, and on the focus on the financial and economic crisis on the other. For Attac France (21.6 %), Attac Italy (20.3 %) and Attac Spain (19.2 %), acts of political communication in favour of a European social model seem to be quite prominent, while they appear much less important for Attac Switzerland (9.4 %). A potential interpretation of these differences might probably be explained by the peculiar socioeconomic model developed in Switzerland in comparison with the rest of continental Europe. Attac associations are also concerned with and develop a critical approach towards the role of European elites in fostering a deficit of democracy. In general, Attac associations promote the critique of an elitist “neoliberal Europe”, an “autocracy from Brussels”, while European institutions are presented as promoters of market deregulations which engender social regressions and welfare state restructurings.

In addition, the second table below gives us supplementary information by showing the main addressees of the formulated claims-making for each of the four Attac associations considered. Following table 2, national actors are addressees of claims-making in 19.9 % of the cases for Attac France, 40.6 % for Attac Switzerland, 35.5 % for Attac Italy and 28 % for Attac Spain. Overall, only a minority of Europeanised claims are addressed towards domestic actors and institutions, which means on the contrary that when “framing” Europe in their political communication, Attac associations primarily direct their claims towards the European level. This result seems to be in contradiction with the “second-order” thesis which defends that European issues remain rather secondary in public discourses at the national level. Indeed, an empirical study of all the campaigns promoted by Attac associations would probably show that national concerns and a domestic agenda remain central for each federation. Yet, contrary to what is generally suggested, when “European” acts of political communication are considered, these claims are not primarily “nationalised”
and addressed to domestic actors. These results are even more significant given that within those domestic actors, the other national federations of Attac associations are quite well represented, accounting for instance for 14.6% of the claims in Switzerland and 11.7% in Italy. The party or party coalition in government usually represents between seven and nine percent of the total amount of claims. Despite slight variations between the cases, the table clearly shows that European actors and institutions constitute the main addressees of the four associations, representing 59.4% of the claims of Attac Switzerland, 64.5% for Attac Italy, 72% for Attac Spain and 80.1% for Attac France.

Table 2

Shares (%) of addressees of claims-making (CM) over European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attac France</th>
<th>Attac Switzerland</th>
<th>Attac Italy</th>
<th>Attac Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Council and Council of Ministers</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member states</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European actors</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All European actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>86.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>59.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>64.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>72.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party in Government</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other National Political Parties</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parliaments</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business and economic associations</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attac movement federations</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society associations</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other national actors</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All national actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All European and national actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we focus on European actors, another interesting finding can be noticed: the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) always constitute the
two more frequent addressees of claims for the four associations. While the European Commission plays the role of addressee for a minimum of 22.4% of the claims for Attac Switzerland and a maximum of 37.9% for Attac Spain, the ECB is considered in 16% of the cases for Attac Switzerland, approximately 19% for Attac Italy and Attac Spain and 25.3% for Attac France. The European Parliament (EP), the European Council and the Council of Ministers are also cited but remain secondary European addressees, while other EU institutions and member states are only considered in exceptional instances. In that sense, it appears from the analysis that the claims formulated by Attac associations are mainly directed towards the executive and technocratic branch of European institutions (the European Commission) on the one hand, and towards the main non-majoritarian institution of the EU (the ECB) on the other. In contrast, the legislative (the EP) and the executive intergovernmental institution (European Council and Council of Ministers) seem to remain secondary. In a way, this finding reinforces the idea that for Attac associations, the European Commission and the ECB are two powerful institutions, whose democratic legitimacy is nevertheless questionable given the absence of popular election and the possibility for citizens to control their decisions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is also a non-elected body and yet few claims are addressed to it. A potential interpretation of this difference might be that the ECJ is not perceived as a powerful policy-making actor, contrary to the Commission and the ECB. Thus, it could be said that when Attac associations formulate claims and organise contestation over European integration, those claims are primordially addressed towards indirectly nominated or non-majoritarian institutions.
The forms of Europeanised claims in Attac’s political communication

Table 3 presents the shares and the positions of the five forms of claims over European integration. First, I found a modest representation of the top-down form (a) characterised by demands from supranational actors on national actors and institutions. This form of claims ranges from a minimum of 5.5% for Attac France, 6.2% for Attac Italy, 7.1% for Attac Switzerland to a maximum of 7.8% for Attac Spain. It follows from the empirical analysis that EU institutions and actors are rarely present as claims-makers in Attac policy documents. Hence, the claims of supranational agents tend to be “hollowed out” by Attac’s federations. European sociopolitical actors cannot play the role of “active” political players in the public communication of Attac’s European federations. Thus, independently of the association considered, through Attac’s policy documents and political communication, the broad public has few opportunities to see the opinions and policy justifications expressed by EU actors themselves. Secondly, even though European institutions are quite marginal as “active” political actors directly involved in public communication and formulating claims, when they do appear in Attac’s internal policy documents, these supranational actors are strong advocates of European integration. Indeed, the positions towards Europe associated with the first type of top-down vertical claims-making (a) are always positive, ranging from a minimum of +0.21 in Italy to a maximum of +0.43 in France. In that sense, it might even be hypothesised that if the direct public communication of the EU is poorly transmitted by Attac’s associations, it is precisely because EU actors and institutions generally formulate pro-European claims, while Attac federations want to mobilise either against the EU or in favor of an alternative type of European political project. This finding is broadly consistent with the general purposes of social movements. Taken as crucial organisations for the quality
of democratic polities, social movements play the role of intermediaries between civil societies and national or supranational institutions. They play a crucial role of balancing state power through bottom-up mobilization, formulating demands over defined political institutions and actors rather than mediating and retransmitting the ideas of those institutions.

Table 3

Shares (%) and positions of forms of claims-making (CM) over European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attac France</th>
<th>Attac Switzerland</th>
<th>Attac Italy</th>
<th>Attac Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Top-down vertical CM by EU</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Bottom-up vertical CM on EU</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Horizontal CM by foreign EU</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Horizontal CM on foreign EU</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) 'Internal' national CM over EU</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with this argument, the empirical analysis also shows that the bottom-up vertical claims-making directed to EU institutions and actors (b) are much more present than their opposite (a). On average, the direct demands formulated by Attac’s associations towards the EU level (b) are seven or eight times more important than its opposite “vertical” form of political communication (a). These bottom-up vertical claims-making directed to the EU level always constitute the principal form of Europeanised claims, representing 49.7% of the total amount of claims for Attac Switzerland, 51.3% for Attac France, 54.8% for Attac Italy and a maximum of 55.3% for Attac Spain. The EU is generally introduced as an addressee of proposals and grievances, rather than playing an “active” role itself by formulating demands. This means that the EU tends to be incorporated principally through the lens of national frames, ideas and interests which are
then “displaced” towards the EU level. While the EU is generally marginalised as an “active” political actor, it reappears indirectly “through the back door” in the form of an addressee of national claims-making. Contrary to the first type of top-down claims-making formulated by EU actors (a), the arguments associated with the bottom-up option (b) are always quite negative, with positions ranging from -0.54 for Attac Switzerland, -0.59 for Attac Spain, -0.67 for Attac Italy to -0.72 for Attac France. In other words, the supranational level is not only considered as an addressee of demands, but it is also seen as a “target” leading EU policy processes to be perceived and “framed” negatively.

Furthermore, I find modest evidence regarding the possibilities of “horizontal Europeanisation” linked with transnational exchanges of communication and references to other EU member states and actors. Horizontal claims-making on issues of European integration elaborated by foreign EU actors (c) represent 8.6 % of the claims-making for Attac France, 13 % for Attac Spain, 14.1 % for Attac Switzerland and 16.6 % for Attac Italy. Inversely, 4.8 % of all the claims of Attac Spain, 5.1 % for Attac Italy, 9.5 % for Attac Switzerland to a maximum of 17.2 % for Attac France can be characterised as horizontal claims-making on foreign EU actors (d). Most of these two types of horizontal acts of claims-making are in fact referring to the activities or the proposals of other Attac associations, but do not reflect so much the discourses and positions of other EU member states or national actors. If transnational links and patterns of political communication seem to exist, they are mainly “confined” to the interactions between the distinct federations of the movement. Attac France is the most prominent association involved in horizontal claims on other foreign EU actors (d), which represent 17.2 % of its acts of claims making, maybe because, as the founding Attac member, it leads and fosters the emulation of other national federations. The inverse trend explains why the
category related to the claims made by foreign actors (c) is generally dominated by the positions of Attac France in the policy documents of Attac Switzerland (14.1 %), Attac Italy (16.6 %) and Attac Spain (13 %).

Finally, the “internal” national claims-making (e) tries to grasp neither the vertical, nor the horizontal dimension of Europeanised political debates, but rather, indicates the degree of “nationalisation” of European issues. This type of claims refers to European integration as a bone of contention between national actors, as a principal focus for organising domestic public communication and political competition. This type of claims accounts for a fifth of the total number of claims for each association, representing 17.4 % for Attac France, 19.6 % for Attac Switzerland, 17.3 % for Attac Italy and 19.1 % for Attac Spain. This form of “internal” national claims over Europe (e) represents the second main type of Europeanised proposals after the bottom-up variant (b). While generally preferring to directly address demands and grievances to European actors, Attac associations also structure their Europeanised political communication through the medium of and in reference to domestic political actors who elaborate distinct argumentative frames on the costs, the benefits and the dilemmas of European integration. Interestingly, as for the second type of claims (b), this last form (e) tends to be associated with negative argumentation for the four associations. Not only do Attac associations address critiques towards the European level but also towards national actors and principally mainstream political parties. European policies or the European polity in itself not only become direct targets of Attac claims, but also constitute tools and privileged instruments for trying to restructure and indirectly reorganise domestic political competition (Bartolini 2005).
Turning to the nature of Europeanised demands, the overall frame of reference associated with the claims directly formulated by Attac associations, I have excluded from the original sample all the claims which were incorporated in the first top-down form (a) and the horizontal claims-making by foreign EU actors (c). The total number of claims studied in this section is slightly lower than before; it has been reduced by 14.1% for Attac France, 21.2% for Attac Switzerland, 22.8% for Attac Italy and 20.8% for Attac Spain. The nature of claims-making leads them to be either connected to the content of European policies (1), to the mechanisms of European politics (2), or to the extension of the European polity (3). Table 4 below presents the nature, the shares and the positions of the Europeanised demands elaborated by the four Attac associations. The table suggests that apart from the case of Attac Switzerland, the three other associations are inclined to “frame European integration” following the same pattern. They are mainly linked with European policies, then to the politics of the EU and finally to the European polity in itself.
Table 4

Nature, shares (%) and positions of Europeanised demands (CM) over European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attac France</th>
<th>Attac Switzerland</th>
<th>Attac Italy</th>
<th>Attac Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) CM on EU policies</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) CM on EU politics</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) CM on EU policy</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Pos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>+0.32</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the Swiss case, the debates over European policies generally constitute the dominant type of claims, representing 47.2% of the overall claims of Attac Spain, 51.3% for Attac Italy and 56.2% for Attac France. This rather consistent finding implies that Attac associations principally frame European integration through the contestation of European policy initiatives such as directives or EU-level regulations. Then, by order of preferences, Attac associations also contest the ways European politics is organised, how voting procedures take place, how European institutions play - or not - their role, and more often, how citizens are - or are not - consulted in the making of European politics. These types of claims range from 30.4% for Attac Italy to 41% for Attac Spain. EU polity-oriented claims are the least represented, which seems to show that Attac associations do not tend to contest EU-institutional developments and the idea of a unified Europe, but rather criticise several current EU policies and the way in which European politics is organised. Nevertheless, when these polity debates are introduced, a positive stance is generally taken. Attac Switzerland follows a slightly different trajectory given that policy, politics and polity-related claims-making are rather equally represented. The specific position of Switzerland outside the European community might explain why Attac Switzerland focuses less on European policy debates, because the country does not need to
adapt its domestic legislation to EU policy initiatives. Attac Switzerland tends to refer more to EU polity debates because the question of how to contest Europe without being a part of it remains a crucial matter of contention for the association. When Attac associations refer to European policies and the ways through which European politics is organised, the judgments connected to this type of claims are always negative. However, there are slight differences in the degree of negativity, ranging from -0.23 for Attac Switzerland to -0.56 for Attac France. Similarly, for the claims dealing with European politics, Attac Switzerland and Attac Italy are the least negative of the four Associations (-0.28), while Attac France remains critical (-0.41). If European policies (social, economic, financial...) or European politics (behaviour of European Commissioners, voting in the European Parliament...) are introduced in the political communication of Attac associations, it is generally through criticisms, grievances and Eurosceptic declarations. In national terms, even though the four associations share a dominant critical rhetoric towards EU policies and politics, Attac Spain and Switzerland formulate less criticisms, Attac Italy presents a median position, while Attac France is the more critical.

In the early 1950s, Kircheimer distinguished three types of political opposition: the “classical opposition” to the policies of the government without denying its legitimacy to govern; the “opposition of principle” to government policies but also to the system of government in general; and the “elimination of opposition” which characterises the exercise of power through a cartel between the government and the opposition (Kircheimer, 1957: 3-29). Robert Dahl also distinguishes between opposition to a government, to an institutional system and to the political personnel (Dahl, 1965: 7-24; Dahl 1966). The classical type of opposition is generally directed against government policies, the opposition of principle is formulated towards an institutional system, while the elimination of opposition occurs when social contestation
is organised against politicians in general, leading to a functional opposition to policies, a systemic opposition to institutions and a personalised opposition towards politicians themselves. These conceptual distinctions are helpful to understand the implications of the type of political communication promoted by Attac associations. Indeed, the empirical analysis suggests that Attac associations are generally opposed to and critical towards European policies and politics, while being favorable to the European polity. Attac associations are not systemically anti-European but rather functionally opposed to European integration: they denounce the imbalance between European market-oriented and social policies, while criticising the isolation of European elites from the demands of national citizens (Mair, 2007: 3; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 1998: 363-88; 2003). This distinction is crucial because it means that in their attempts to politicise Europe and to awaken “the sleeping giant”, Attac associations try to displace the traditional polity debates around pro/anti European positions towards policy and political debates framed in left/right terms (Franklin & Van der Eijk, 2004: 32-50). Through their opposition to the Bolkestein directive, the deregulation of European markets and the limitation of social protection for European workers, Attac associations frame European integration in functional but not in systemic terms, they contest specific policies but not the existence of the European polity in itself. Given the inexistence up to now of a European public sphere, the executive bias of integration, the relative autonomy of EU actors in decision-making and the difficulties for organising transnational social mobilisations, the structure of opportunity offered by the European polity remains quite closed for social movements to give “voice” to their concerns and obtain a broad resonance within society (Hirschman, 1970; Baisnée 2007; Poguntke 2007). In contrast with the national level, the degree of “political contention” that can be promoted by social movements in a “Europeanising polity” is rather limited (Imig & Tarrow,
2000: 73-93). To put it differently, the possibilities for social actors to exercise a classical type of opposition to European policies through extra-parliamentary mobilisations are almost inexistent. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that when the structure of opportunity organising European politics changes, through the introduction of direct democracy via EU referendums for instance, social movements tend to get organised to contest European policies but also to criticise the European system of governance as such. The impossibility until now of exercising continuously a functional opposition towards European policies through active political debates over EU matters within national public spheres has tended to reinforce the cyclical emergence of an opposition of principle, of an increased politicisation of EU-polity debates when the structure of opportunity evolves. The absence of forums for exercising social opposition towards EU policies within the EU system of governance indirectly reinforces the opposition to the EU in itself (Mair, 2006).

**Conclusion**

How then, do Attac associations frame European integration in their acts of political communication? To answer this research question, several tentative conclusions might be drawn from the empirical analysis. Attac associations frame European integration by mobilising a leftist political discourse, criticising the policies and the personnel, the elites of EU institutions. Attac associations denounce a “neoliberal bias” promoted by European integration, which reduces the social rights of workers, promotes market deregulation while pushing social actors into an ever-expanding competition for jobs and resource distribution. They address their claims towards the supranational level, and especially to the European Commission and the ECB, viewed as anti-democratic, non-majoritarian and far away from any potential control of European citizens. Citizens might
certainly participate in European elections and be represented by the members of the European Parliament, but they cannot control the decisions taken by the Commission and the ECB, which leads Attac associations to criticise them on the basis of their weak popular legitimacy. Attac associations are also much quicker to address demands and grievances towards the European level, than to mediate and present directly the claims of European actors to their respective national publics. Hence, if we can identify a pattern of Europeanised communication promoted by Attac associations, it is mainly through the asymmetric displacement of national claims towards the EU level, but not through the transmission of European discourses into national communicative spaces. The nature of the discourse of contestation promoted by Attac associations is mainly related to European policy-making, but not necessarily to the EU polity in itself, showing that if the “sleeping giant” were to be awakened, if a left/right line of competition were to emerge over European politics, social movements might well play a role in this process of politicization of European issues at the national level.
# Appendix A: Codebook for Claims-making Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social actor making claims</th>
<th>Substantive Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attac France</td>
<td>European Constitution/Treaty of Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attac Switzerland</td>
<td>Neoliberal Europe/Bolkestein Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attac Italy</td>
<td>Social Europe/Public Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attac Spain</td>
<td>Financial and economic crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Addressees of claims-making

#### European actors

- European Commission
- European Parliament
- European Council and Council of Ministers
- European Central bank
- European Court of Justice
- EU member states
- Other European actors

#### National actors

- National party government
- Other national political parties
- National parliaments
- Business and economic associations
- Trade Unions
- Attac movement federations
- Civil society associations
- Other national actors

### Substantive Issue

- European Constitution/Treaty of Lisbon
- Neoliberal Europe/Bolkestein Directive
- Social Europe/Public Services
- Financial and economic crisis
- Democratic Deficit
- European Elites
- Migrations
- Others

### Valence

- Positive
- Neutral
- Negative

### Form of claims

- Top-down vertical claims-making from the EU to the national level
- Bottom-up vertical claims-making from the national to the EU level
- Horizontal claims-making by foreign actors from EU member states on domestic actors
- Horizontal claims-making by national actors on other EU member states
- ‘Internal’ national claims-making over Europe

### Nature of claims

- Claims-making on EU policies
- Claims-making on EU politics
- Claims-making on EU polity
Appendix B: Consulted documents

ATTAC FRANCE
1. «Non c’est non !», 22/07/2008.
6. «Quand le peuple est consulté, il répond. Écoutons-le !», 13/06/2008.
34. «10 principes des Attac d’Europe pour un traité démocratique», 30/03/2007.
38. «Notre Europe est possible», 22/03/2007.
42. «Première réaction à la proposition révisée de directive sur les services dans le marché intérieur», 10/04/2006.
44. «Succe$ des mobilisations contre la directive Bolkestein», 16/02/2006.
45. «Après le vote du Parlement européen, se mobiliser plus que jamais», 15/02/2006.
46. «Manifestation européenne contre le projet de directive Bolkestein: J-1 !», 10/02/2006.
47. «La Pologne dans la mobilisation européenne contre le projet de directive Bolkestein», 9/02/2006.
ATTAC SWITZERLAND
4. «Des minutes de silence pour les victimes de la politique de Nestlé en Europe et dans le monde», 22/07/2008.

ATTAC ITALY
34. “Referéndum in Francia: ha vinto l’Europa sociale, battuta d’arresto decisiva per le politiche neoliberiste!”, 30/05/2005.
37. «Per una nuova politica economica europea», 14/04/2005.

ATTAC SPAIN
10. “Los mercados financieros no nos pueden gobernar”, 19/05/2008.
11. “Tratar igual a los desiguales es la mayor de las injusticias”, 03/05/2008.
17. “La directiva de la vergüenza frenada, ¿por mucho tiempo?”, 31/05/2007.
33. “Por una alianza hacia otra Europa”, 22/04/2005.
References


