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Referenda under Oath

Abstract : Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a design commonly promoted in nonmarket valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that people who sign an oath are as likely to vote for the public good (e.g., wind energy R&D) in a hypothetical referenda as in a real one. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, June 8, 2010 - 4:05:33 PM
Last modification on : Friday, April 29, 2022 - 10:13:01 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, December 1, 2016 - 6:06:39 AM


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  • HAL Id : halshs-00490448, version 1


Nicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stephane Luchini, Jason Shogren. Referenda under Oath. 2010. ⟨halshs-00490448⟩



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