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Journal articles

Yardstick competition, franchise bidding and firms' incentives to collude

Abstract : Collusion seems to be a pervasive problem when regional monopoly rights are auctioned to private firms. This leads us to study whether firms may collude if the regulator uses yardstick competition to simulate competitive forces, and how this is affected when both schemes are used. Using an infinitely repeated game framework, we find that collusion is sustainable when firms are sufficiently patient under yardstick competition. An additional franchise bidding mechanism can even help firms sustain collusion when they are impatient. When temporary monopoly rights are assigned for sufficiently long periods of time, collusion may not be sustainable even when firms are patient.
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Journal articles
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00479475
Contributor : Freddy Huet Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, April 30, 2010 - 5:38:13 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, January 26, 2022 - 3:10:03 PM

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00479475, version 1

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Chong Eshien, Freddy Huet. Yardstick competition, franchise bidding and firms' incentives to collude. Review of Industrial Organization, Springer US, 2009, 35 (1), pp.149-169. ⟨halshs-00479475⟩

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