Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Risque juridique et rôle des banques dans le gouvernement des entreprises

Abstract : During the last decade, there was a growing body of case law of lender liability in the United States and France. This doctrine, whose prime goal is to protect investors against opportunism by banks, limits the involvement of banks in the management of commercial firms. This article explores the consequences of this doctrine of lender liability. We ask three questions : what's the « dark side » of relationship banking ? Why do we see such variation across countries concerning lender liability ? Is the lender liability doctrine efficient ?
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [55 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Laurent Vilanova Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Sunday, March 28, 2010 - 5:04:09 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, May 26, 2021 - 12:48:02 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, June 29, 2010 - 8:11:09 PM


Publisher files allowed on an open archive


  • HAL Id : halshs-00467737, version 1


Laurent Vilanova. Risque juridique et rôle des banques dans le gouvernement des entreprises. Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Association FCS, 2002, 5 (4), pp.137-175. ⟨halshs-00467737⟩



Record views


Files downloads