Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision

Ahmet Ozkardas (1) , Agnieszka Rusinowska (1)

1 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne

In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to determine these equilibria.

Mots clés: alternating offers; varying discount rates; subgame perfection; union; firm bargaining

Domaines: Economies et finances

Ahmet Ozkardas, Agnieszka Rusinowska. Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision. 2009. ⟨halshs-00464387⟩