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Liberté morale et causalité selon Ralph Cudworth

Abstract : According to Cudworth, the issue of freedom and necessity on which Hobbes and Bramhall were opposed can be resolved against Hobbesian necessitarianism if a sound theory of practical deliberation is used. The main thesis of this paper is that this theory is dispositional. To be free does not mean to directly and at leisure control one's own volitions, but entails, at a much deeper level than that of the causal “train” (Hobbes's word) of psychological states, trying to develop dispositions that make the soul capable of striving for good. This paper shows that this conception of moral freedom, which is very different from the Lockean conception of freedom and which gains from being compared, rather than opposed, to the Cartesian conception, takes root in Plotinus. The dispositional theory helps circumvent the Humean argument against the authority of reason in moral matters.
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Submitted on : Sunday, November 29, 2009 - 10:19:48 AM
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Laurent Jaffro. Liberté morale et causalité selon Ralph Cudworth. Revue philosophique de Louvain, Peeters Publishers, 2009, 107 (4), pp.647-673. ⟨10.2143/RPL.107.4.2044679⟩. ⟨halshs-00437075⟩



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