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The European Defense and Security Policy: an emerging policy for conflict management for the European Union?

A challenge between Europeanization and national interests

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Abstract

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU: the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do these tools work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80’s constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems to be a hopeful way of developing a European crisis management policy putting into light the assets of the EU in this area.

1 Our communication is based on our PhD dissertation in progress, which deals with the building of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) from the beginning of the 1990’s, and more precisely from the French-British turn in Saint-Malo in December 1998, and then its Europeanization at the Cologne Summit in June 1999. These decisions launched the development of a European capacity of defense “when NATO as a whole is not engaged”. We particularly focus on the French-German military cooperation trying to identify the social and political processes and networks underlying the building of a “Europe of Defense” since the 1990’s. Our enquiry field is mostly based on qualitative interviews (over 120) in Paris, Berlin and Brussels with French and German officers, diplomats and political actors dealing daily with this subject. Our general analytical claim is to investigate the potentials of an policy analysis in terms of historical sociology in the study of such sectors of the European integration, and to show that it enables us to understand and explain a lot of the challenges and blockades encountered by the European Defense Policy. More precisely, we address here the question of ESDP as an emerging policy for conflict management for the European Union and a challenge between Europeanization, even “Brusselsization” and national strategies.
The European Union has long been – and still is for some authors (Maull, 2005; Whitman, 2006)- associated with the image of a civilian or normative power. Back to the 1970’s, the IR theory witnessed a debate opposing two trends regarding this subject: the analysts who view the EC-and then EU- as a civilian power (Duchêne, 1973) versus the ones that view the EC-EU as a potential superpower (Galtung, 1973). These two trends underlie two different positions on the role of the European Union in the world and in international affairs. François Duchêne, leader of the « civilian power » analysts, used to analyze the European Community as a civilian power characterized by the use of a \textit{soft power} (in opposition to military \textit{hard power}) anchored in its civilian tools on the benefit of a community of states which have mutually given up the use of military violence among them, and which encourage other states to do as well (this is the idea of normativity) (Duchêne, 1973). Duchêne focuses on the idea that a European foreign policy should aim at promoting democracy, human rights and peaceful cooperation. The authors thinking in terms of civilian power (Maull, 1990 & 2000; Smith, 2005; Linklater, 2005) actually draw their analytical inspiration from the German model of foreign policy using mostly economical levers to address some critical international issues as environmental threats and favoring a free and open trade (Smith, 2005). The notion of civilian power also draws on the idea of “security community” issue by Karl Deutsch in the 1950’s (Deusch, 1953): in the frame of a security community the member states do not consider physical power –and by the way military power- as a legitimate means to solve violence and political problems anymore. On the contrary these states rely on mutual communication processes (cybernetic model) between social elites as well as between populations. Karl Deutsch took the example of the role of the European integration process in promoting mutual trust between the French and German populations after WWII. Moreover in Duchêne’s view, nuclear deterrence has \textit{de facto} emptied out military power in Europe and thus given a real added-value to civilian frames of influence and action: the leitmotiv is to invest the economic and political channels to make the EC a normative and civilian power (Duchêne, 1973: 43). Other authors recently took advantage of historical sociology –and more precisely Elias’s \textit{Civilizing Process} (1975)- to analyze European integration as an equivalent civilizing process reeving to the devlopment of self-constraint and its diffusion (Linklater, 2005). Robert Kagan also points out new civilizing missions for the EU, rooted in the discovery of perpetual peace by the Europeans (Kagan, 2004). On the other hand, a second analytical trend used to analyze the EC as a putative superpower (Galtung, 1973). And if some authors still considered Europe as a civilian power in 1998 regarding its incapacity to act militarily in the Balkans (Whitman, 1998; Hill, 1998), the evolution of the EU since the end of
the Cold War seems to prove him right, the EU developing from 1999 on a common defense policy (ESDP) backed on proper European military and non-military tools. We agree with Karen Smith to analyze the raise of ESDP as the end of the civilian power Europe (Smith, 2005).

Thus, my paper aims at developing a reflection on the ESDP as a tool for the EU in its external relations and on the international scene. In the globalized world the EU is increasingly facing the question of security, mostly outside its borders. But where does ESDP come from and what are its aims ? To what extent does ESDP constitute a Europeanized or “Brusselsized” social configuration and enables us to speak of a European crisis management policy in the making ? What are the problems and blockades encountered ? We will rely on this set of questions to propose an analyses divided into three parts. Whereas the most part of the literature on CFSP and ESDP relies on integration theories (mostly intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, functionalism) or IR, we chose to rely on policy analysis with a special historical sociological focus. We tend to analyze ESDP as a specific social configuration in the making, which enables to interplay between the macro level of member states and the micro level of the agents (officers, diplomats, politicians). Such an analytical approach is not yet very developed (Buchet de Neuilly, 2005; Mérand, 2003, 2005) but still shows good potentialities to analyze European integration more thinly (Christiansen, Jorgensen, Wiener, 1999; Georgakakis, 2004; Guiraudon, 2000, 2006). I thus partly rely on social constructivists tools as discourse analysis but my use of these tools is quite instrumental. This special configuration involves socializing processes and weighs on the former social practices of the actors involved, but also interacts with the existing security and defense national configurations, what can explain some of the difficulties of ESDP’s development.

The first part of the paper will examine the genesis of ESDP and try to put into light what makes EU’s specificity in crisis management regarding this genesis. The second will focus on the functioning of the European crisis management in the making as a social configuration implying socializing processes and new practices. The third part of the paper will

**ESDP as a European way of exiting the Cold War and acting in the world**

The end of the Cold War raised the global question of European and world security in a challenged international context. New threats, new forms of conflictuality (most of the

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2 Sociological approaches are particularly useful to understand European integration because it helps the analysts look into something which is more then the EU structures: that is a European “sociality”.

D. Deschaux-Beaume, Panel III.4
conflicts are today intra-state conflicts (Evans, 1994: 3; Hassner, 2000: 15)) imply new answers to the evolving security dilemma. Security today doesn’t only concern the military aspects of conflicts but also economic, cultural and social aspects. Thus the old instruments created in a time of bipolar confrontation, as the North Atlantic Alliance, are not so appropriate to deal with this new form of insecurity and instability in the world. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990’s opened a policy window (Kingdon, 2003) for the EU to quit its status of “economic giant but political dwarf” so as to work at becoming a global player, implying a real foreign policy on the long run. As Knud Jorgensen points it, this lead to another world implying another task for Europe’s armed forces (Jorgensen, 1997: 3).

Lessons-learned from the Balkans: surfing on NATO new frame of reference to enable European action

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO engaged in a strategic reform aiming at two main objectives: enlargement to the Eastern European countries (London Declaration, July 6th 1990) and a new strategic concept (Rome Declaration, November 8th 1990) based on a global security approach and backed by rapid reaction forces composed of multinational military rapidly deployable units. Thus the setting up of the Eurocorps and Euroforces between 1992 and 1996 participate in this global reform context regarding military action in Europe: from now on the governments and military high leaders have started focusing on crisis management in an international system characterized by the coexistence of often competing intergovernmental organizations and new risks linked with political instability in lots of regions in the world. The Petersberg Tasks launched at the WEU summit in summer 1992 also played an important role in the genesis of ESDP as a potential conflict management tool for Europe: there was historically no European multilateral crisis management. Most of European states have conducted rescue tasks individually -against hunger in Africa for instance- or under ad hoc coalitions – evacuation tasks (Jorgensen, 1997). Thus- as we will show it later- crisis management in the EU is necessarily strongly dependent on national traditions and practices in this specific area (Jorgensen, 1997: 140). The Petersberg Tasks include three types of missions:

1 This notion has been elaborated by J. Hertz and means that when a state reinforces its security, he will automatically concern other states because of the anarchic and competitive structure of international scene.
2 This aim is particularly materialized in the French term « Europe-puissance », which belongs to the global representation of the EU as a real power in the world as it shows in French political discourses on the question.
3 The document can be consulted on NATO website: http://www.nato.int/docu/fonda/b900706a.htm
4 When we employ the term « Europe », is mostly in the sense of the European Union, and not so much in the geographical dimension of the word.

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humanitarian missions; peacekeeping missions; peace enforcement and even armed intervention. The Petersberg Tasks also focus on multilateralism with NATO and the UN. These Tasks provide the EU with a spectrum of action, as they have been included in the Amsterdam Treaty and are now part of the ESDP framework.

**Policy window and advocacy coalitions in the setting up of ESDP**

This global reflection on security and crisis management in Europe engaged within NATO reform combined with the Balkans crisis to make the European governments aware of how badly equipped they were to cope with the new emerging security challenges. The Yugoslav crisis then the Balkans wars in the 1990’s showed European dependence towards Washington concerning military conflict management (Petiteville, 2006: 71). As Richard Holbrooke, the US Dayton negotiator, noted, Europeans had been “sleeping through the night” (Jørgensen, 1997: 4). This opened a policy window for small circles of actors at the top of the states foreign policy administrations, mostly French-German at first, acting as a transnational advocacy coalition (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, 1997; 1999), then relying on the Blair administration in 1998-1999 after the British political changeover which lead the Labor party to power in Britain in spring 1997. This advocacy coalition put the question of constructing military instruments for the EU on the European political agenda. Here the use of policy analysis with a more sociological eye enables us to better understand the role of some leading policy actors in France, Germany and Britain. The idea that European foreign policy needs military instruments is not so old: the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 had put defense matters aside from the European integration process over forty years (Duke, 2000). And the competition with NATO on this issue was cleared at the Alliance Summit in Copenhagen in July 1991: for the first time, NATO –which included Washington- recognized that the European Community was legitimate to develop a European defense identity by admitting that the Twelve are inclined to make necessary decisions so as to express both a common foreign and security policy and a military role for Europe (Maury, 1996 : 169). Thus NATO also admitted in Rome in November 1991 that such a process was part of the Alliance’s renovation (Guilhaudis, 1997: 73). There was then a political opportunity for the Europeans to raise the issue of a European instrument for conflict management. Therefore at Maastricht, under a strong French-German impulsion based on the political entrepreneurship (Kingdon, 2003)
showed by Mitterrand and Kohl\(^7\), the European member states issued an entire part of the Treaty dedicated to the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V), including “the definition in the long run of a common defense policy, which could lead, on a suitable time, to a common defense.” (Maastricht Treaty, article J.4-1). This opened the way for these coalized French-German-British actors to launch the European Security and Defense Policy later, at the Cologne summit in June 1999. Yet, the chosen formulation –voluntarily vague and conditional- shows how controversial the subject of European defense and security was and still is among the European member states: if France, strongly supported by Germany, had initiated the debate, there where numbers of states accepting it on the principle but in the NATO framework (Britain, Netherlands, Portugal). Some states even refused fundamentally any military competence for the EU out off exclusive dedication to NATO (Denmark) or out off neutrality (Ireland). Thus, the articles of the Maastricht Treaty about European Foreign Policy are a compromise in-between: CFSP should respect the commitments resulting from the Washington Treaty for some states and stay compatible with the defense and security policy conducted in the NATO framework. In the beginning of the 1990’s, European defense as envisaged into two possible frames, linked by a third organization: the Western European Union. Thus the WEU was both considered as the European pillar of NATO and the military arm of the EU after the Maastricht ICG.

Britain crossed the “European Defense Rubicon” at Saint-Malo in December 1998: over night, a declaration was written by the close counselors of the French and British Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Head of state and Prime Minister. For the first time, The British have accepted the principle of a European defense capacity autonomous from NATO and the United States. The document mentioned the need for “credible military forces” for the EU, so as to enable the European Community to act in case of international crisis “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” (Saint-Malo joint Declaration, in Rutten, 2001: 11)\(^8\). This lead in June 1999 at Cologne to the quick Europeanization of the Saint-Malo agreement and the launching of the European Security and Defense Policy (Gnesotto, 2004: 46). Thus the EU’s nature changed: it was an exclusively civilian power, and with ESDP, the EU has now a potentiality to become a global player: the EU will then have a choice to respond crisis with a plurality of tools, from

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\(^7\) The two heads of state made large use of the practice of common letters sent to the other European partners so as to insufflate the reflection on a European foreign and defense policy in 1990-1991. They were particularly three letters before the European Council in Dublin (April 1990), in November 1990 and in October 1991. This last letter opened the way to the creation of the Eurocorps.

\(^8\) Yet Saint-Malo doesn’t mean a total turnaround on the British side : Tony Blair claimed on May, 10\(^{th}\) 1999 in the Financial Times that NATO remained the cornerstone of any defense capacity and there was no question of a European army.
civilian and normative tools to military management (Manners, 2006). ESDP opened the way to an emerging conflict management tool or the European Union.

**Towards a European conflict management method: is ESDP a “Brusselsized” social configuration?**

ESDP is not, as the Common Agricultural Policy, a top-down methodical approach emanating from the European institutions in Brussels; on the contrary, ESDP is an intergovernmental policy much more based on an inductive process consisting in defining *a have and a can do* before determining *a will* (Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003). ESDP evolves to generate a conflict management tool for the EU according to the *lessons-learned* and feedbacks from the European operations. The novelty of the European Defense Policy when comparing to the former projects is its search for permanence. Indeed organs and procedures for conflict and crisis management have been created on the European level. That’s why we rely on the concept of social configuration here (Elias, 1991)\(^9\), where other authors use Bourdieu’s notion of field (Mérand, 2003; 2006). The European Defense Policy consists in a rationalization process of creating a specific configuration in the frame of the European construction. This specific security configuration owns its own logics, concurrences and induces some emerging socialization processes for its most committed actors (the French, German, British and Belgian politico-military actors, i.e. diplomats, military officers, political leaders).

From 1999 on, the member states committed themselves to develop a large panel of management conflict tools in this specific framework combining civilian and military instruments as well as judicial, political and economical means. Every IGC since Cologne aimed at providing the EU with an autonomous capacity to respond to international crisis where off NATO is not engaged and within the principles of the UN Charta (Chapter VII). The major objectives of ESDP are not to militarize the EU but to solve other’s conflict and help building a “secure Europe in a better world”\(^{10}\) (Solana, in Gnesotto, 2004: 6). This all process leads to enormous changes in the EU: what is at stake since Cologne is to go beyond a rhetorical diplomacy.

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\(^{9}\) Elias defines a social configuration as a concrete situation of interdependence between the individuals or the states (Elias, 1991: 158). The flexibility of the concept enables to use it either at a micro level (individuals, and more precisely here soldiers, diplomats and civilian experts) or at a macro level (states, European system, world system, social structure…).

\(^{10}\) This is the title of the European Security Strategy announced by EU High Representative Solana on the European Council in Brussels on 12th December 2003.
ESDP crisis management tools: a European method in the making

We chose here to analyze ESDP as a conflict management tool for the EU by asking the question of the specificity of European conflict management in the making.

ESDP organs and conflict management procedures

There are three main ESDP organs in Brussels: the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS, which where created at the Nice IGC in 2000 and effectively set up in 2001. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the king pin of ESDP and crisis management in the EU: under authority of the Council, the PSC keeps track of ESDP and endorses the political and strategic control of EU military operations and ESDP missions. The PSC works closely with the EU Military Committee (EUMC), which is the highest military institution in the frame of the EU Council. The EUMC provides military advice to the PSC and directives to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Its role is also to provide military expertise to Javier Solana and monitor EU military operations. Both organs are intergovernmental structures. In addition to them, integrated structures are requested to manage crisis in coordination with the PSC and EUMC: these are mostly the High Representative for CFSP (Javier Solana) helped by a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) and the EUMS backed by the Politico-Military Group. The EUMC’s main function is provide the PSC with strategic planning, early warning and military monitoring. A civil-military cell has more precisely been created within the EUMS in 2005 to insure contingency planning and strategic planning and increase cross-pillar coordination in ESDP. Moreover, the EU took over the WEU military tools as the WEU was merged into the EU framework by the end of 2000. Theses tools consist of a satellite center (Torrejon), and Institute for Security Studies (Paris), which produces expert reports. In addition to these organs a European Armament Agency has been launched in 2004 so as to help the coordination of arm procurements in Europe and a European Security and Defense College working in network originated in 2005, under strong French-German commitment.

11 This cell is part of the Tervuren package, also know as « Chocolate Summit » on April, 29th 2003 between France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg. Britain opposed the idea of creating this cell until November 2003 because this was seen in London as a step forward towards EU autonomy in defense matters. The EU cell offers the core of the emerging EU operation center launched in June 2007. Its status “within the EUMS” is interpreted on a twofold principle:
12 Joint Action 2004.551.CFSP.
These organs generated common conflict and crisis management procedures in Brussels, with a combination of permanent monitoring, a Crisis Management Concept used in time of crisis, and the development of strategic options, evaluations and feedbacks. Concretely, when an operation concept has been agreed between the member states, the main work in terms of European crisis management takes place in the General Secretariat of the EU Council between the EUMS and the GD E VIII (responsible for the military aspects) and/or the GD E IX (responsible for the civilian aspects). The all configuration is based on permanent contacts between the capitals and Brussels via the PSC and Javier Solana and his team. On an internal level in the member states, the Foreign offices are the ones who decide to participate or not in a European military operation or crisis management task, in close coordination with the Defense ministries and sometime the Head of state according to the constitutional rules in force (in France for instance, the President plays a major role regarding military operation decision-making).

But what does ESDP and its crisis management elements changes? Before ESDP, the decision-making process used exclusively bilateral formats in the sector of military cooperation. With ESDP, the decision-making process takes now place between the actors located in the capital and the permanent delegates of the states and the European actors in Brussels, who share a way of negotiating compromises and solution. Just to give an example, the EU autonomous military operation in Congo in summer 2006 was politically assumed by the diplomatic actors of the Political and Security Comity in Brussels, although the troops stay in the hand of the nation-states. We share with Kenneth Glarbo the assumption that “social interaction is emerging as the natural historical product of day-to-day practices of political cooperation. Diplomats and national diplomacies have internalized, in particular, the formal requirements of a Common Security and Foreign Policy” (Glarbo, 1999, 649-650; see also Pouliot, 2006). Thus one can consider ESDP as a crisis management tool in the making on the EU level as ESDP’s organs and procedural practices play as socializing agents for the military, diplomatic and political actors involved, yet much more for those working in Brussels as for those working in the capitals as we will show later in our paper. ESDP tends to normalize, even if still quite incrementally, diplomatic and politico-military practices in Europe.

*European specificity in managing crisis: a large panel of military and no-military means in ESDP*

What is at stake for the EU here is to underline the specificity of European crisis management developed in the framework of ESDP. On the one hand the UN keeps incarnating the Kantian
aspiration at equality among the nations; NATO on the other hand—though reformed in a more political way and enlarged to the Eastern European countries in the late 1990’s—symbolizes much more pragmatism and search for efficiency than equality among nations and political civil society. Thus ESDP’s claims lie in-between these two positions.

The first EU crisis management exercise took place in 2002 and aimed at testing ESDP’s procedures in this area and coordinate the whole spectrum of military and civilian tools. ESDP consists in providing the EU with a global and coherent capacity to prevent and manage crisis on both military and civilian levels. This large combination of instruments derives from EU’s special civilian nature and offers an added value regarding NATO crisis management frame exclusively based on military elements. EU’s crisis management “package” is inspired by a classical lecture of conflicts: pre-conflict phase, conflict and post-conflict (Ramel, in Aligsakis, 2005 : 28). This explains a mix of military and civilian tools at disposal in ESDP’s framework.

Military tools for crisis management in ESDP

Military capacities have quick become a very important aspect of ESDP: at the Helsinki IGC in December 1999 the member states determined a Headline Goal (Helsinki Headline Goal or HHC): by 2003, the EU should be able to deploy 60 000 soldiers within 60 days and sustain them over a year; this EU rapid reaction force should be able to accomplish the whole spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks. ESDP’s operability has be officialized at Laeken in December 2001. The Headline Goal 2010 is even more ambitious: the decision to intervene militarily should be taken at the latest 5 days after the approval of a Crisis Management Concept by the member states and the EU Council, so that the operation could be set up under 10 days. But this doesn’t mean anyway that the EU member states are willing to set up a European army: deploying troops on a crisis theater is still a national sovereign decision. In June 2004, a further military instruments has been created on the basis of the lessons-learned fro operation Artemis in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003: the Battle Groups (or BG)\. These Battle Groups are based on multinationality and are composed of 15000 soldiers, aiming at providing the EU with a concrete rapid reaction capacity so as to respond a urgent crisis or intervene under UN Security Council request. These Battle Groups constitute a proactive process in the frame of ESDP and developed in parallel with NATO Response Force (NRF).

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14 The concept has been launched in June 2004 by a French-British-German initiative and deepened in 2005. The BG are requested to be ready for deployment under 5 to 10 days, stay on the crisis theater at least 3 months and be able to intervene up to 6000 kms away from Brussels. They are backed up with naval and air capabilities. From January 2007, they are 13 BGs registered, among which 2 are permanently in alert for 6 months.
France proposed 12,000 men, Germany 13,500 men and Britain 12,500 men (Petiteville, 2006: 87). Yet the BGs also raise lots of questions regarding the persisting national analyzes and red lines applied to national troop deployments.

Thus EU already lead several military operations: two were conducted under the Berlin Plus mechanism in Macedonia in 2003 (operation *Concordia*) and in Bosnia in 2004-2005 (operation *Althea*). But this mechanism constitutes a critical limitation for some authors, as it seems impossible to imagine that NATO would put its capacities at EU’s disposal if Washington express an opposition (Dumoulin, 2004: 294): thus Berlin Plus is seen as a means from the USA to limit European autonomy in crisis management and strategic planning (Gnesotto, 2004: 26). But the two first really European operations not relying on NATO capacities are the operation *Artemis* in 2003 and the operation *EUFOR Congo* in 2006, both taking place in Democratic Republic of Congo. Artemis functioned under the lead-nation framework (France leading the OHQ and FHQ with the concourse of soldiers from other member states) and was typically a peace enforcement task (Ramel, in Aligisakis, 2005: 34), whereas EUFOR Congo consisted in supervising the first democratic elections held in Congo.

1500 soldiers from 18 European nations (including Turkey) were sent on the ground. EUFOR can be considered as a première on several levels: it is the first military operation entirely planed from Brussels; it marked the return of the *Bundeswehr* in Africa outside a UN mandate. Even if the forces deployed have been nationally been put at EU’s disposal, the PSC was politically responsible for the mission, while the EUMC defined the OHQ’s and FHQ’s mandate.

But the added value of European crisis management method is its capacity to combine the multiple facets of international action (Zorgbibe, 2004: 118). Thus several civilian instruments also back ESDP.

A civilian crisis management concept

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15 Berlin Plus is an agreement derived from the debate on the European Security and Defense Identity in the 1990’s and the notion of European pillar within NATO. It was agreed on 2002 that the EU could have an access to NATO common planning capacities in the case of an operation where NATO is not engaged. Berlin Plus is a compromise agreement named after the NATO Berlin summit of 1996 which inaugurated the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) so as to guarantee the automaticity of access to NATO common capacities for the Europeans in order not to reiterate such an impotent situation as in Bosnia.

16 Joint Action 2003/423/PESC.

17 A UN resolution was adopted on the 25.04.2006, following the request addressed by the UN to the EU on the 27.12.2005. The operation was launched based on the Joint Action 2006/319/PESC on the 27.04.2006.

18 The OHQ was assumed by Germany and located in the *Einsatzführungskommando* in Potsdam under the commandment of General Viereck, while the FHQ in Kinshasa was operated by the French General Damay assisted by the German Admiral Bess.
The member states also decided to develop the civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas defined by the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection (Nowak, 2006: 19-23). These civilian tools correspond to the historically civilian nature of the EU\textsuperscript{19}. The specific capabilities in these four fields could be used in the context of EU-led autonomous missions, or in the context of operations conducted by lead-agencies, such as the UN. The member states should have committed themselves to be capable of carrying out any police operation, from advisory, assistance and training tasks to substituting to local police forces by providing up to 5000 police officers by 2003, of whom up to 1 400 can be deployed in under 30 days. They have also undertaken to provide 200 experts in the area of the rule of law, and up to 2000 experts potentially deployable on the ground to help rebuild an administrative network, set up education systems, etc. The Ministerial Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference held on 19 November 2002 confirmed that the concrete targets in the four priority areas had been reached and even exceeded through Member States' voluntary commitments (Bagayoko, Kovacs, 2007). The police area is right now the most developed, aiming at extending the military tool in the post-conflict phase\textsuperscript{20}(Bagayoko, Kovacs, 2007: 169). Police missions as the operation Proxima in Macedonia or the EU Military Police Mission (EUMP) in Bosnia give flesh to these capacities.

\textit{EU operations and the European Security Strategy: a way of implementing the European integrated and holistic method of conflict management and socializing the actors}

According to these whole spectrum of civilian and military capacities set up in the framework of ESDP and implemented through more and more EU operations, one can assert that ESDP effectively constitutes an emerging policy for conflict management for the European Union. The military operations contribute to give reality to the EU as a global international actor (Howorth, 2005: 192), even if these operation are still modest and mostly focused on soft security (Hill & Smith, 2005: 402) These operations and moreover the global frame of ESDP’s organs, tools and procedures impulses a socializing process for the diplomatic and politico-military actors from the member states in Brussels: one can speak of an emerging

\textsuperscript{19} German foreign minister W. Steinmeier called the EU a « Zivilmacht mit Zähnen », i.e. a civilian power with teeth. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, « Zivilmacht mit Zähnen », Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8/02/2007.

\textsuperscript{20} See the European Police Action Plan adopted at the European Summit in Gothenburg in June 2001 (Rutten, 2002: 66-72).

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“Brusselsization” process (Bagayoko-Penone, 2005; 2006). One can understand this socializing process as a convergence trend towards some common elements in among the member states concerning crisis management, as one can also observe it in areas such as arms export controls in Europe (Bauer, Remacle, 2004). Even if the first referent remains national for the officers particularly, the practice of the ESDP configuration in Brussels joints another kind of socialization for the soldiers: the socializing effect of European operations of crisis management (Pajon, 2003) as multinationality lies at the heart of European crisis management approach. This kind of socializing processes enable the emergence of an embryonic European strategic culture incarnated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) issued by Solana on December 12th 2003 and entitled “A secure Europe in a better world”: the ESS proposes an holistic, multilateral and integrated approach for EU crisis management, thus responding to the ad hoc or à la carte American multilateralism under Bush administration (Biscop, 2008). This document has become a reference in the European discourse on security and a cognitive tool identifying global EU objectives in the long run and the corresponding set of tools the EU has at its disposal to solve the upcoming regional crisis. The focus on multilateralism and integration expresses the EU’s world view and how the EU sees itself in international relations (Jorgensen, 2006). This integrated approach plays as a joker for the EU on the international scene as it combines unilateral, bilateral and multilateral strategies in EU’s foreign policy with a differentiated approach depending on the sector: European crisis management can be military help, trade, economic sanctions, administrative and legal advice, etc. But building a real capacity of crisis management and conflict resolution in the EU also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states. What role do various foreign policy strategies of EU member states play in shaping the content of ESDP? What are the driving forces of different approaches? If socializing processes helps us understand the development of a European Defense configuration, the concept is also interesting to clarify the still quite diverging interpretations of the European Defense project by the different states, both on macro and micro level.

**A Europeanized way of managing crisis?**

**Between coherence problems and national reflexes**

ESDP and the European crisis management instruments keep evolving through compromises between the various foreign policy and military traditions of the member states that confront in Brussels in the EU intergovernmental organs as the Council or the EU Military
Comity, the EU Military Staff and the Political and Security Comity. These organs play a role of interface between Brussels and the capitals in the incremental elaboration of a European foreign and security policy. And yet one can not say that European security interests have replaced national interests: it is more of an incremental process through which members states adjust some marginal parts of their foreign policies but keep a high hand on the deep core of these policies. What they delegate to the ESDP’s organs in Brussels is soft security and not hard security: defense policies and troops deployment are still fundamentally national. The nation-state is an “obstinate” actor (Hoffman, 1966). As Sven Biscop notes: “If the member states deploy their troops, there still is no consensus on the deployment under the EU flag in the crisis management area.” (Biscop, 2008: 35)\(^21\).

**A recurrent coherence and leadership problem**

First of all, European crisis management approach via ESDP still suffers from important lacks and coherence problems (Bagayoko, Kovacs, 2007; Hacker, 2007). The absence of cross-pillar synergy appears to be of particular importance as it shows in the speech that we obtained by the actors –both military and diplomatic actors in Brussels- which we interviewed between 2005 and 2007 (over 120 interviews. ESDP still stays very fragmented: the dialogue between the Council and the Commission is far from evident and this lies mostly in the lack of a unique authority in the area of European foreign policy. ESDP’s structural framework even tends to encourage some administrative rivalries in crisis management on a European level: until ESDP was effectively launched between 1999 and 2001, the EU had no crisis management and strategic culture at all; Thus the organs we presented earlier and which are the core of European crisis management mechanisms within ESDP –the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS- had largely been derived from the existing NATO model of organization and illustrate a *stock and pipe* approach which favors a relative airtightness between military and civilians: the political directors of the foreign ministries are used to the experimented NATO model and have imported it into the EU without questioning its validity for an exclusively civilian organization. The UN model with a General Secretariat exercising its authority on every dimensions of UN action may have probably best suited EU’s nature\(^22\). Just an example here will make are words clearer: the EUMC for instance tends to consider itself not as a forum to exchange pieces of advice about multinational military actions among the member states, but much more as a

\(^{21}\) Our translation.

\(^{22}\) Interview in the GD E VIII, General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels, 15/11/2005.

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organ in confrontation with a political organ, the PSC: this illustrates a typical logic of struggle between institutional territories (more generally for CFSP, see Buchet de Neuilly, 1999; 2002; 2005a; 2005b) as it exists in the functioning of “comitology” in the first pillar policies. One can even speak of “symbolic struggles” between the different kind of actors (Deschaux-Beaume, 2007; Mérand, 2008). The division of labor in ESDP doesn’t allow real coordination between the Council and the Commission, which are both responsible for the coherence of EU’s external action and relations. This problem is more and more acute regarding the growing commitments of the EU in conflict management and rebuilding. The former constitutional Treaty proposed to fusion the functions of the EU Commissioner with those of the EU High Representative into a unique external action service (Nowak, 2006: 139), but the Lisbon Treaty is not as ambitious: it still proposes a new European service for external action, but no more fusion. The only consistent link between the first and second pillar up to date is the link existing between ESDP and the Development General Direction of the Commission: ESDP aims at intervening in some regions where the European Commission uses its financial “carrot” (financing of peace keeping in Darfur for instance). Yet, some efforts have been made by the member states to enhance coherence in European crisis management: a first step in that direction consists in the nomination of two Commission representatives within the civil-military cell, core of the future European OHQ in Brussels. What is innovating in this effort is that these two representatives are not under the authority of GD Relex; but this of the EUMS. Another tool has been created to help develop cross-pillar coherence: a civil-military coordination concept (CMCO) exists since 2003 and was generated by the PSC, the EUMS and the politico-military group so as to coordinate the European actors involved in crisis management procedures. This concept aims both at increasing cross-pillar coordination as well as coherence within the second pillar (CFSP) (Bagayoko, Kovacs, 2007: 181). Coherence also means a need for synergy with other international organizations as NATO or the UN. Therefore the British European Presidency developed in 2005 a project entitled “Comprehensive Planning” so as to better use the civil-military cell. There still are lots of doubts concerning these adjustments.

Behind this question of synergy between the Council and Commission, the question raised by ESDP and a European way of managing conflict is the one of the democratic control over

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23 rationalités
24 The Lisbon Treaty proposes the nomination of an EU High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy who would also be vice-president of the Commission. This should enhance the coherence and visibility of EU external action if the Treaty is ratified and enforced.
25 Interview, EUMS, Brussels, 8/12/2005.
European Defense Policy (Sinott, 1995; Wagner, 2004, 2005 et 2006; Wessels, 2002): as long as ESDP stays outside the control of the European Parliament, it can not be closer coordinated with the Commission action which is accountable before the European Parliament. The opposition between the most supranational or “pro-Commission” states as Germany and the most intergovernmentalist or “pro-Council” states as France and Britain does not help to solve the problem.

Another important question meeting the lack of coherence is financing ESDP’s operation. Civil crisis management operations are financed by the CFSP budget (102,6 millions Euros in 2006), which is part of the Community budget run by the Commission. But the use of this budget line has to be decided by the Council because CFSP –from which ESDP is the militarized dimension- is ruled by the intergovernmental principle. Military operations cannot be financed by any line of Community budget. There the principle is the same as within NATO: costs lie where they fall. Only a part of the costs involved by EU military operations are pooled; since 2004 the ATHENA mechanism consists in a common financing of the common costs of EU military operations under the rule of unanimity among the member states: this offers a case by case possibility of handbrake for the states not wanting to take part in some operations. Thus one does not pay for an operation one does not want to launch.

This global lack of synergy also put into the light a lack of leadership in the EU in the foreign policy area: it is quite clear here that the theoretic concept of Europeanization is of limited use to analyze ESDP (Irondelle, 2008). The French-German partnership is therefore particularly interesting in security and defense matters, as the French-German friendship has long been considered as the cornerstone of the whole process of European integration. The two countries try to provide a directional leadership in the EU, but are still characterized by diverging conceptions of crisis management, foreign policy and the international role of the EU. Thus the American leadership goes on dominating de facto in the management of international conflicts. This leads us to a second aspect of the interplay between Brussels and the member states in the area of crisis management and moreover within ESDP.

**A tension between European crisis management and national security analyzes**

Even if one can underline some trends to “Brusselsization” in the social practices of the soldiers and diplomats involved in ESDP as we said it earlier with the term of socializing process, there still are very pregnant national security interests analyzes. The development of a
European way of managing crisis in the 21st century combines with former trend inherited from the transformation of the armies since the 1970’s accelerated by the end if the Cold War. Defense budget have globally declined in the European countries who want to benefit from the “peace dividends”. The structure of these budget has also evolved in favor of means to accomplish the Petersberg Tasks. Almost every European country (except Germany) has now a professional army and mass conventional armies have been replaced by professionalized, deployable armies (Buffotot, 2005; Boëne, 2003). Military education also evolved in order to better fit the new officers generation with the imperatives of multinationality and European crisis management (Boëne, Haddad, Nogues, 2001; Vennesson, 2000; 2002).

Building a European crisis management approach also incrementally shapes the decision-making processes. It is true that the PSC took a decisive step in the European crisis management decision-making: as a consensus maker between the Twenty-Seven, the PSC induces some incremental changes in the national decision-making processes. Before its creation all the negotiations in this specific area took place bilaterally or multilaterally between the capitals with a strong impulse of the embassies, whereas today the action moves to Brussels where more and more crisis are directly managed among the members of the permanent representations of the states. ESDP and the emergence of a European way of crisis management involves a changing power logic: the PSC counselors have a double task of assisting the national representative by the PSC and negotiate in the first rank within the working groups (about CFSP generally, see Buchet de Neuilly, 2006). Soldiers, diplomats and civil counselors that we interviewed admit shaping instructions because they can best assess their room to maneuver as they know better the positions of the other national delegations on the Brussels ground as the agents working in the national ministries. One can use the image of *double-edge diplomacy* (Putnam, Evans, Jacobson, 1993), even if this “Brusselsization” remains still incremental: the Europeanization phenomenon keeps evolving quite marginally in the defense sector. Defense remains a strong attribute of state sovereignty, and as some authors note, ESDP will long remain intergovernmental (Wagner, 2003): European “crisis management policy is best understood as a fast co-ordination game in which member states react to international crises under tight time pressure. From this perspective, agreements are self-enforcing and strong institutions are not required.” (Wagner, 2003: 576) Others prefer to speak of transgovernmentalism so as to integrate both the centrality of intergovernmental practices leaving an important room for national analyzes of security interests and the development of

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26 Most of the interviews we lead between fall 2005 and winter 2007 by French and German soldiers and diplomats in Brussels, Paris and Berlin tend to converge on this point.
socializing processes in Brussels which weigh on the actors practices and involve incremental changes (Hill & Wallace, 1996: 12; Wallace & Wallace, 2006: 351; Winn, 1997). We’re more convinced by this kind of approach, even if in our view the added-value of our policy analysis in terms of historical sociology offers a way of linking even closer both macro and micro levels, that is both levels of structure and actor. We are closer to an analysis in terms of role as Lisbeth Aggestam proposes: a state foreign policy is actually strongly influenced by its national conception of its international role and this conception has been interiorized by its diplomatic and politico-military actors (Aggestam 2004 ; 2006).The role constitute a link between the actor and the structure putting into light both organizational factors and internationality (we prefer the concept of national habitus (Elias, 1991; Devin, 1995) or socialization) in foreign policy decision-making. We won’t develop further this reflection here as the space for our purpose is limited.

What we want to point out here is that one can not say that European security interests have replaced national interests: it is more of an incremental process through which members states adjust some marginal parts of their foreign policies but keep a high hand on the deep core of these policies. There a historical sociological lens combined with historical institutionalism helps us understanding the difficulties encountered by ESDP and the path dependency phenomenon in the states’ analysis of their security interests. The member states tend to act collectively in crisis management when their interests are congruent, what favors more a case by case action and underlines the still very reactive nature of ESDP as the Political Foreign Cooperation already was in the 1970’s-1980’s: “The crisis over, most government hesitate to make additional commitment to achieve the solidarity for which they call” (Winn, 1997: 125).

Our comparative study on French and Germans diplomats, soldiers and civil counselors daily involved in ESDP (backed by others comparative studies involving Britain (Aggestam, 2004 ; Mérand, 2005) show that even if these actors are conscious to be part of a same security community, they still keep having strong national red lines and confer slightly different signification to ESDP and a European crisis management way, which underlines a divergence of conception of EU’s role in the world. There is a strong dependence to the foreign policy path and conceptions developed earlier (Pierson, 1997; 2004). To illustrate our French-German case study, schematically, the European Defense Policy represents a means of counter-weighing the American unilateralism in the French diplomats and officers’ representation. It is a opportunity of creating a European leadership pole in security matters and thus bring the EU integration process further towards a global political entity with leadership potentialities in the long run. What is at stake is not so much to compete with the Atlantic Alliance than to reach a real
autonomy for European crisis management policy, so as to enable EU to intervene in the world as a global actor, mostly when American interests do not incite the Americans to act (as in the Balkans in the 1990’s). That is why the French actors push forward in favor a the creation of European planning and military structures. ESDP seen by the German diplomats, officers and political leaders seems more seen as a way of regaining a status of normality for Germany and enable the Federal Republic to assume its international engagements in security matters. But every single discourse –both official and informal- underlines the vital necessity to stay clearly in good standing and terms with NATO. Enforcing a European crisis management policy would enable the Europeans to become attractive in the eyes of the American partner and to show Washington their reliability. For Britain, a European crisis management policy and moreover ESDP is seen as a good way to exert a leadership in he EU in an area not risking to strong integration, which is also a means of bringing closer Washington and NATO in a division of labor concerning conflict management in the world.

But one of the most diverging questions between Europeans is the question of the relationship between EU and NATO, and the question of military operations. French politico-military actors tend to advocate a strict differentiation between the EU and NATO, arguing that NATO is a strictly military organization, whereas German and British actors tend to be much more in favor of a more political dimension of the Alliance and a division of labor between the EU and NATO. Concerning EU military operations, the French actors tend to be very pushing for these operations, whereas the German actors show still reluctance for operations other than humanitarian or peace support. The big difference between them is the question of the use of force. “ESDP is a shay focal point that brigs together different political representations of the role of a state in international security” (Mérand, 2006, 136). A good example for this is the EUFOR operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in summer 2006: to focus only on the French-German case, the interpretations on what to do regarding the Congo case diverged for a while because of the pregnant weight of national traditions of conflict management and security interests. Similarly, the European states have lived strong discord over the Iraq conflict in 2003. This also raises the question of how European operations and crisis management are nationally legitimated in front of the national public opinion (Jorgensen, 1997: 8). Thus one can note that the actors and states involved in ESDP still tend to consider it as a strategic game on a more or less self-interested way: the socializing processes differ from state to state. And the strategic use of European crisis management (for instance in Africa for France) is enabled by the lack of clear European strategic objectives: the ESS is a good step towards such a
definition but is still to vague and leave the states a room of interpreting the text in their own view (Aggestam, 2006; Biscop, 2008).

**Concluding remarks**

As we shown in this paper, the EU is since several years developing a European Defense Policy (ESDP) which mostly aims at managing others’ crisis. This European crisis management policy offers a first step towards the emergence of a European strategic culture, as the ESS illustrate this trend even if this document remains most symbolic (it was published after the discord over Iraq among the European states: Wallace, 2006: 451). The ESS offers a very global frame enabling the member states to draw from it only the elements which enter into congruence with their own interests, both on a macro level and on a micro organizational level (diplomatic versus military ethos: Deschaux-Beaume, 2006; Mérand, 2008). ESDP and its European crisis management aspect raises several important questions as the relationship between EU and NATO; the lack of cross pillar-coherence; the persisting national analysis of foreign policy and security interests; the organizational and symbolic struggles among the organs and plurality of actors involved. Thus European crisis management is today more a reactive mechanism than a real proactive policy: EU has not yet demonstrated its ability to answer rapidly and efficiently a international exogenous shock (Charillon, 2002). This addresses the more general question of this conference about the EU in international affairs. The EU aims at becoming a global player in a globalized world challenged by the still very pregnant foreign and defense policies of its member states. Some authors have defined four criteria to recognize the status of international actor: an effective legal recognition of his status by other states, a legal authority able to act internationally, a relative autonomous decision-making and a coherent set of management of its external relations. This criteria are ideal-types which the EU of course does not fulfill right now but tendentially takes as long term objectives. The EU has not until lately traditionally been an international actor with well-defined interests (Lucarelli, 1997) and this helps understanding the still important blockades ESDP and the European crisis management method encounters. Socialization also plays a major role in defining states and actors preferences in foreign policy: one tends to follow –of course with incremental adjustments- the path adopted earlier because of the increasing returns it generates. Thus Washington still plays a major role in international conflict management. But whatever difficulties ESDP encounters in making EU an international actor able to answer crisis, it incarnates the historical finality of European integration: the search for stability and
peace. By developing its own way, the EU “serves peace which serves the [international] institutions” (Devin, 2005 : 21). As Washington uses force massively to solve conflicts, the European method in the making is much more one of an indirect approach aiming at limiting violence (Venesson, 2005: 545). This all quest for international identity raises theoretical challenges for the social scientists, which encourages us to cross the disciplinary borders to adopt an approach mixing IR theory, policy analysis and political science.

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