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A "winner" under any voting rule ? An experiment on the single transferable vote

Abstract : In this paper, we expose the results of a voting experiment realised in 2007, during the French Presidential election. This experiment aimed at confronting the Single Transferable vote (SVT) procedure to two criteria : simplicity and the selection of a Condorcet-winner. Building on our electoral sample's preferences, we show that this voting procedure can design a different winner, depending on the vote counting process. With the vote counting process advocated by Hare, the winner is Nicolas Sarkozy, while the Coombs vote counting process has François Bayrou as winner. For these two vote counting processes, the details of the experiment are the same and it is shown that the simplicity criterion is respected. However, with regard to the Condorcet-winner criterion, the Coombs methods is the only one to elect the Condorcet-winner, i.e. François Bayrou.
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Contributor : Lucie Label <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, November 4, 2009 - 10:24:24 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 19, 2021 - 11:08:27 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, June 17, 2010 - 6:00:26 PM


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  • HAL Id : halshs-00429725, version 1



Etienne Farvaque, Hubert Jayet, Lionel Ragot. A "winner" under any voting rule ? An experiment on the single transferable vote. 2009. ⟨halshs-00429725⟩



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