The Future of Integrated Family Policy The Long-term Prospects: 2025/30
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Introduction

Clearly, in most of the OECD countries the responsible authorities have recognized, more or less explicitly, the fundamental role families play in upholding social cohesion. An enormous amount of literature has already been dedicated to cross-national comparison of family policies or to policy approaches that specifically target families (see list of references in Annex). The interactions between financial support to families, childcare policies, women’s employment patterns and fertility levels have also been widely documented.

The main goal of this scoping paper is, therefore, to identify key trends and current changes that will challenge policy makers. It will also explore what will be at stake in family-related issues in the near future along with further investigations into the tensions and dilemmas policy stakeholders are likely to encounter. To achieve this goal, I will draw on a review of the most recent literature¹ and on the results of my own research.

The paper is structured as follows. Section one will briefly investigate whether there is a trend towards convergence in family policies and will partly answer the following questions. How, and to what extent, are some ‘family policies’ integrated and well structured? Why are others fragmented and poorly coordinated? In section two, the impact of more or less integrated government policies will be assessed (through the lens of fertility outcomes, poverty, mothers’ participation in the workforce, or gender equality). Upcoming issues and challenges will then be identified and described. Consensus and disagreements among “experts” over those issues will also be reviewed. To conclude, we will try to assess the odds of the adoption of a more integrated and coordinated approach in family policies. For a more in-depth treatment, three countries would make excellent candidates: Germany, France, and Sweden.

I. Policy approaches that specifically target families: a growing convergence…..

¹ Given the vast literature in the fields investigated in this paper, I restricted this review to the recently published documentation.
Factors that have triggered some convergence: similarities between OECD countries

- An overall increase in mothers’ labour force participation rates (the so-called “Quiet Revolution”, Goldin, 2006) that has marked the demise of the male-breadwinner model: reforms to enhance work/life balance have gained momentum in many Western European countries since the 1990s. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands (with a large share of women working part-time, however) were already by 2007 well above the Lisbon target (68 percent or more) while in Spain, Italy, and the former socialist countries this target has not yet been met.

- Increase in levels of female educational attainment: this has gone hand in hand with changes in value systems and preference shifts. Women of childbearing age now seek to be financially independent and to protect themselves against any risks linked to economic uncertainty and marriage instability.

- Decline in fertility rates: below replacement levels (except in the US, France, Ireland, and Norway) in most advanced industrialised countries, hence the average family size has become smaller (Chart 5, p.14).

- Rise in the median age at which men and women first get married and have children.

- Disconnection between marriage and parenting and the development of cohabitation, (both of which have gradually spread across all social groups): this mirrors the phenomenon of “family de-institutionalisation”.

- Increasing importance of gender equality issues on the policy agenda: promoting or at least paying lip service to the equal sharing of domestic and family responsibilities between partners in order to ensure women’s access to professional life.

- Changes, albeit slowly, in the attitudes and behaviour of young fathers.

- The process of “social learning”\(^2\): widespread across OECD countries with the Nordic countries as “ideal models”.

- Growing concern about social cohesion: this goes in tandem with controversies over the role that families can play.

- The role of European legislation: the politics of work/family life balance are backed by EU legislation (Orloff, 2006, Häusermann and Palier, 2008) (see, for instance, the Directive on Parental Leave). The Lisbon target of achieving a female employment rate of 60 percent by 2010 also plays a significant role in creating incentives to develop work/family programmes.

Yet countries differ in their policy responses to those changes and country differences persist in the timing, pace and direction of those changes (Hantrais, 2004, Hantrais, 2007). For instance, France and Sweden demonstrate

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\(^2\) Which Peter Hall (1993, p. 278) defines “as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy changes are the result of such a process”. 

high rates of birth outside of marriage whereas in Southern Europe, Germany, and Austria, although they are increasing, these rates remain comparatively low.

**In social policy for families and children, fragmented approaches remain mostly the rule…**

Few countries have adopted an explicit and comprehensive family policy. Instead, most countries have an amalgam of programmes, policies, and laws that are targeted at families with children (Thévenon, 2008). They may also exhibit similar objectives but with different priorities which include but are not limited to: promoting women’s employment, fighting poverty, enhancing gender equality, and targeting population groups at risk.

A large consensus has been reached, however, about how to define the “family”: it is the presence of children and no longer marriage that defines “family” whether in same-sex or traditional households. As far as child benefits and family or childcare allowances are concerned eligibility criteria are largely “neutral” in regard to the status of the parents (i.e., married or cohabiting).

**…and strong disparities persist: the European patchwork**

The following points are important to take into consideration:

- To gain a better understanding of disparities between countries the institutional setting; historical background; and value systems or cultural norms should also be taken into account. As pointed out by de Henau et al. (2006) “the major element determining the conception and design of policies remains the set of prevailing cultural values, social ideas and historical legacies”.

- Though they share common trends in demographic and social development, OECD countries differ substantially in the timing and degree to which these developments occurred and are still occurring. They also differ in their explicit or implicit focus on family-related issues.

- They diverge in their emphasis on social investment in those (children) who promise “returns” (Esping-Andersen, 2002).

Nonetheless all member countries of the EU as well as other OECD countries (e.g., Quebec in Canada and Japan) have developed programmes for providing financial support to families but levels of spending in this domain also differ considerably between countries (Charts 1, 2, 3 in annex). The remarkable generosity of the Nordic countries, for example, contrasts sharply with the modest contributions made by countries in the Southern bloc of member states: Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain (Fagnani, Math, 2008, Thévenon, 2006, Bradshaw, 2006b).

When it comes to expressing family/children expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Chart 2, p.8), Denmark tops the table at 3.9 per cent while the Netherlands and the UK (both allocating less than 2 per cent of GDP) bring up the rear (Fagnani, Math, 2008). Nordic countries also top the table in the category of benefits in kind: from 1.5 per cent of GDP in Sweden to over 2 per cent in Denmark. These benefits in kind are governed by the principle of universality which provides families with access to services regardless of income.

Some countries give priority to the fight against poverty: irrespective of the size of the family, the UK is by far the most generous in terms of providing assistance to low earnings families among the EU member countries.
Austria, however, is far and away the most generous country when it comes to cash provision to families. Bringing up the rear at the opposite end of the spectrum is the Netherlands.

**Family Policies in France, Germany and Sweden: a more in-depth treatment**

France and Germany are part of the cluster of countries whose welfare regimes are qualified ‘conservative-corporative’ (sometimes also termed ‘Christian democratic’, ‘Continental’, ‘Corporatist’ or ‘Bismarckian’, Arts, Gelissen, 2002). They are each marked by high levels of spending and of payroll tax financing. Both also provide unemployment benefits which depend mainly on former contributions and status. As far as the main social insurance programmes are concerned (i.e., pension, health care and disability), both welfare states are consistent with this description.

Family policies, in particular, have much in common. Both are linked in several ways to employment policy, and both are explicit, clearly-defined and generous in terms of cash benefits. In Germany the appointment of a Minister and in France of a Junior minister responsible for family issues demonstrates the importance given to this issue. France strongly differs, however, from Germany with regard to childcare policy and public support to working mothers.

Sweden is classified as a member of the ‘social democratic’ cluster. Family policy places particular emphasis on public social services which are by any definition extensive when compared to other countries (except the other Nordic countries). The issue of gender equality is high on their policy agenda and they provide crucial support for women’s participation in the labour force.

**France: a hybrid system characterized by ambivalence and inconsistency**

- **Who are the stakeholders? Who decides? Theoretically the social partners, in reality the government**

France’s policy for families is ‘explicit’ insofar as it is overseen by institutions and the subject of official reports produced annually. The ‘family’ as such is legally recognised as an institution that plays an important role in the maintenance of social cohesion. A special branch of the social security administration is devoted to family policy of which the principal administration is carried out by the CNAF (the National Family Allowance Fund) which covers 92 per cent of all recipient families. As representatives on the Executive Board of CNAF it is theoretically the social partners’ responsibility i.e. representatives of trade unions and employers along with the family associations (represented by the ‘Union Nationale des Associations Familiales’, UNAF), to periodically examine the orientations in the social protection sphere for intervention in family policy. Indeed, the president of the Executive Board is traditionally a member of the tiny CFTC (‘Christian Trade union’). In practice decisions have been made by the government, whether approved or not by the Executive Board of the CNAF, in the last decades.

Where parental leave policies are concerned the government is also a key actor in the decision making process. ‘Family laws’ are drafted and ratified through legislative organs and an agreement, known as the ‘Convention d’objectifs et de gestion’, (COG), is made for a four year period between the CNAF and the State. Additionally, spending by the CNAF is tightly controlled by the Ministry of Finance and the ‘Cour des comptes’ (Court of accounts). Another body, the ‘Haut Conseil de la Population et de la Famille’, established in 1985, is a committee restricted to a purely advisory role which produces reports and provides recommendations to the government on family issues and demography. Finally, the ‘Conférence de la Famille’ is a meeting held annually since 1994 and provides a platform for exchange between the government, family associations, and
various social partners. It generally serves as a platform for the government to announce new measures. According to new plans, this conference is set to be replaced in the future by a permanent council on the family (‘Haut Conseil de la Famille’).

The UNAF is a powerful lobby which gathers together several family associations or federations. This very influential actor has exerted a strong influence on family policy since the establishment of Social Security in 1945 and is mainly funded by a percentage of the total amount of family benefits. Despite a certain ideological diversity inside the UNAF they have always promoted ‘familialism’ and, on the whole, emphasized the stay-at-home option for mothers having a child aged less than three.

Employer groups, primarily MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France) which represents large enterprises but also ‘CGPME’ (small to medium-sized companies), have never much focused on family issues and have demonstrated little enthusiasm toward parental leave schemes. This comes as no surprise when we take into consideration that it is mainly the social contributions paid by employers which fund family benefits, an anathema to management in this age of cost cutting and efficiency. When decision was taken in 2002, for instance, to extend paid statutory paternity leave from three days up to two weeks it was strongly opposed by MEDEF who complained that the plan was “unfunded” (i.e. they were concerned that this leave would be funded out of contributions levied on pay.)

Because of France’s traditionally low rate of union membership (only 6% of the overall workforce rising to 10% in the public sector) and high degree of fragmentation, unions have been neither able nor strongly willing to demonstrate any real influence on the outcomes of periodic reforms to family policies.

Despite the fact that 123 CAFs (Local Family Allowance Funds) play a pivotal role in the policies providing support and services in kind to families in numerous areas, a large number of administrative departments, stakeholders and social partners (like the family associations) are involved in these areas. For instance, in childcare provision for pre-schoolers, care responsibilities are shared between the state (CNAF, Ministry in charge of social policies, Ministry of Education, local authorities) and social partners (mainly the UNAF). Unlike the UK, enterprises, non-profit/voluntary organisations, and the market still play only a minor role in comparison to the state. Currently however, for-profit providers are increasingly being considered as real partners in policy development and service delivery in France. These services are, nevertheless, poorly coordinated. The most recent report of the National Audit Office (Cour des Comptes) released in July 2008 therefore recommended to “reinforce the coherence of their respective intervention”.

- Cash benefits and benefits in kind

The French system of transfers has its roots in a long-established natalist tradition which continues to favour large families. The taxation system (Quotient familial) still favours married couples where only one of the spouses is in paid work. This is at odds with the objective of promoting gender equality on the labour market and indicative of the ambiguous gender assumptions underpinning the French welfare state. Recent analysis shows the growing hold that employment policies have had on family policy since the beginning of the eighties (Fagnani, 2007, Fine-Davis and al., 2004). Contrary to Germany, France has failed to make its parental leave policies more egalitarian in their approach and remains a laggard country. Indeed, French family policy has not said ‘farewell to maternalism’ (Orloff, 2006):

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3 Family Associations receive a sum equal to 0.04% of the total amount of family benefits allocated by CNAF.
In stark contrast with Sweden (see further), French family policy pursues multiple and heterogeneous goals: fighting against poverty, tackling social inequality, encouraging parents to create employment (by subsidizing childcare arrangements), helping parents in ‘combining’ family and working life, etc. The visibility of family policy has often been lost in the multiplicity of allowances and benefits (27 in all, regulated by 15,000 eligibility clauses).

Despite these shortcomings, France remains a successful country insofar as fertility levels and mothers’ employment rates are concerned. A complex bundle of factors helps to explain this phenomenon:

- France has a well-established and long-standing early childhood system dating back to the end of the 19th century. This helps to explain why crèches and nursery schools enjoy such widespread popular support.

- The existence of a large and family-friendly public sector where the job is for life and where women, who are overrepresented, are provided with various perks which include, but are not limited to, flexible schedules and generous sick leave for children. About 25 per cent of employed women in France are working in the public sector (of which they make up 55 per cent).

- Public expenditures towards the development of child care arrangements and parental leaves have dramatically increased over the last three decades. Despite the overall background of cost containment, the system of public crèches has suffered no funding cutbacks.

- Family policies and cultural norms have interacted: early socialisation of young children is socially valued and French women don’t feel obliged to choose between maternity and a job.

**Germany: a paradigmatic shift but still a segmented approach**

In Germany, family policy is under the supervision of “Bundesministerium für Familie,Senioren, Frauen und Jugend”, (BmFSFJ). The Federal Constitutional Court plays a key part in the development of family policy. It can insist that the Government adopt measures likely to have a decisive impact on public finance, such as, for example, an increase in child benefits (Kindergeld).

According to the principle of subsidiarity (the idea that social services should be provided for at the lowest possible level in the community, public authorities playing a role only in the event that churches and families are unable to do so) the family was long considered as the best environment for raising a pre-school age child. Only if the mother or members of the family were in difficulty should a child be under the care of a public authority. Thus for a long time the public authorities confined themselves to a supervisory role, with denominational organisations playing a central role in the caring sector and religiously based voluntary associations being assigned substantial responsibility in the administration of social services, a situation dating back to first half of the 19th Century.

Pre-school childcare (for children aged between 3 and 6) provision has improved significantly since the progressive implementation of the 1996 law that put local councils under the obligation of offering places in kindergartens to all children in this age range. The Länder were held responsible for giving grants to local councils to enable them to fulfil this duty.

Decisions on the different responsibilities are in effect made by the State and local councils according to constitutional law: the former defines the key orientations, but leaves responsibility for dealing with the
consequences to the latter. To this end, local councils have to work in co-operation with voluntary-sector providers, most often the Churches. In 2005 an additional law came into force (‘Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz’) which stipulates that 20 per cent of children under 3 be provided with places. When it comes to children below the age of 3, West Germany is actually near the bottom end of the EU, with a quota below 5 per cent.

Since the end of the nineties far-reaching changes in family policy have, however, been introduced. Legislators have increasingly distanced themselves from the traditional model of the male as ‘sole breadwinner’ and recently introduced radical changes in the domain of parental leave and child care provision (Fagnani, Math, 2007, Klammer, Letablier, 2007). Indeed, concern over the low birth rate, and the political will to attract qualified women into the labour market have refocused attention on family policy in recent years (see Chart ).

Germany has made significant strides forward through the recent adoption of new regulations on parental leave, which share many similarities to those found in Sweden. Since 2007, parents who interrupt their employment to care for a newborn baby get a parental leave benefit replacing 67 per cent of their net income from work (up to a ceiling E 1,800 per month) for up to 14 months (two months of which are reserved to the father). This new tax-financed scheme can be interpreted as a significant reorientation in German family policy. The benefits provided during parental leave therefore no longer target poor parents but rather seek to compensate working parents for a temporary loss of income. One of the aims was to give well-educated women incentives to have children, since a growing number of them remain childless in Germany and also to provide incentives for mothers to return faster than before to the labour market (in particular those who are highly qualified).

Despite these changes the taxation system (as in France) still favours married couples where only one of the spouses is in paid work which is inconsistent with the goal of encouraging qualified mothers to go back to employment after the one-year parental leave. Moreover, due to the high rate of West German mothers working only part-time, many women in (Western) Germany only contribute a small share to household incomes and still depend economically on their male partners. In addition, child care norms remain rather traditional: in 2002, 55.8 per cent of West Germans surveyed agreed with the view that ‘a pre-school age child is likely to suffer if his/her mother goes out to work’ compared to 32.7 per cent of East Germans and 42.4 per cent of French respondents.

It is noteworthy that from 1995 onwards there has been a dramatic increase in family targeted social protection spending and cash benefits in Germany whereas in France this percentage has decreased (Chart 3, p.9). This huge increase has had no impact whatsoever on fertility level.

**Sweden: a coherent and integrated approach, a successful regime**

It has been largely documented that the welfare policies of the Nordic regimes aim to ensure full employment of all adults by means of activation, work-care infrastructure, and public sector employment. The high level of these activation policies provides the means for the large scope of tax-financed welfare (Kvist, 2003, Häusermann and Palier, 2008). Research has shown, however, that the national schemes developed by Nordic countries to support parents of young children differ from each other in several important aspects (Eydal, 2005, Leira, Saraceno, 2008).

In stark contrast to France, the Swedish family policy is very coherent: The principle of universality underpins the system of family allowances and horizontal distribution is applied: “child benefits” are neither income-
related nor means-tested. The parental leave scheme is insurance-based and paid at 80 per cent of the former salary for one year (with a father-quota).

The main objectives of this policy are promoting gender equality both in the family and in the workplace; ensuring child’s welfare; and providing people with the opportunities and financial means to have the number of children they desire. State support for an extensive childcare programme is aimed straightforwardly at supporting working parents and hence at improving gender equality.

As far as the tax regime is concerned, the presence of children plays no role in how income tax is calculated. The tax regime was created with the sole objective of vertical redistribution. Taxes are assessed on an individual basis with the result that the partner earning least, usually the woman, is not penalised for this fact (unlike France and Germany).

Hoem (2005) has claimed that it is in fact the whole political culture of Sweden, as opposed to specific policies, that makes the country more friendly toward promoting the needs of families, children, and women. Indeed, the Swedish family policy proves to be effective in terms of its impact on fertility behaviour (1.85 in 2007, see Chart in annex and Table), gender equality and mothers’ participation in the labour market. Moreover, as demonstrated by Coats and Lehki (2008) “if the EU 15 countries are analysed on the basis of their welfare state regimes it becomes clear that the Nordic model generates superior performance on the dimensions of both job security and job quality”.

II. Taking Stock: the Impact of Family-related Social Policies

Family policies are encapsulated by a wider set of social policies. Frontiers between different social policy areas are not always clear-cut and it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the outcomes of the various sets of measures implemented. With this in mind we must consider the impact, whether direct or indirect, of policies on fertility and women’s employment patterns, in particular for those having children. To accomplish this we have the benefit of an enormous body of research which allows us to document the clear association between high fertility rates and mothers’ participation on the labour market.

Women and part-time jobs: wide divergence between countries

Some countries place strong emphasis on part-time work as a means to better combine paid work and “unpaid work”. In this way the Netherlands is classified, according to Welfare states typologies, as belonging to the cluster of countries qualified as representing the “one and a half breadwinner model” together with Germany (Tables 3 and 4, p. 13) and the UK. More specifically, the Netherlands is rather atypical in regards to the patterns of female participation in the labour market. According to Eurostat, in 2006, this country exhibited the highest share in the EU of female employees working part-time (74 per cent) of which 57 percent worked less than 20 hours. The volume and concentration of part-time work among mothers in the Netherlands distinguishes this country from any other.

Nevertheless, Ireland, Italy (where the proportion of women working part-time has historically been very low), Spain, Germany, Austria and Korea all witnessed a dramatic increase in the share of women working part-time.

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5 The proportion of employed mothers (with children under 12) who worked part-time in 2005, varied from 78 percent in the Netherlands (with 18 percent working under 15 hours a week), 61 percent in Germany (with 27 percent working under 15 hours a week), 59 percent in the UK and 52 percent in Austria.
from 1990 to 2005\(^6\). In Japan, from 1986 to 1996, part-time employment\(^7\) accounted for 93 per cent of the growth in women’s employment and was widely spread among married women with children (Gottfried, 2008) (Table 7, p.19 and table 8, p. 20).

In France, the norm for employed mothers is still to work full-time although part-time jobs have been increasing over the last three decades due to a regulation favourable to their development (Afsa and Buffeteau, 2006). It has been largely documented, however, that while policies regulating working time can help to free up parental care-giving time, they also have some potentially problematic consequences (i.e., an associated rise in nonstandard-hour scheduling and the possibility of negative effects on gender equality).

**Childcare provisions: still patchy in most of the OECD countries**

Where children are concerned, marked differences emerge on how caring responsibility should be divided between State, market, voluntary associations and family. Childcare policies are deeply embedded in a set of cultural values and norms. Indeed, Castles (2003, p. 225) concluded in his article on below replacement fertility in 21 OECD countries that “the only aspects of family-friendly public policy associated with fertility outcomes are formal child-care provision and the proportion of women reporting that they work flexi-time, both of them variables measuring aspects of the policy environment cutting across the public/private divide”.

Against the background of an increase in female employment, the development of public child care provision is a key trend. For instance in the UK Lewis and Campbell (2007) indicated that the statutory duty “to ensure that childcare needs are met” was to be imposed by the British government from 2008. The government has increased the number of care spaces available for 3 and 4-year-olds and has incrementally increased the available free hours and weeks of early education. The eventual target is twenty hours a week for 38 weeks per year and by 2010 fifteen hours are to be provided. Future pledges include 12,000 part-time nursery slots for disadvantaged two-year-olds and universal care for three to fourteen-year-olds from 8am to 6pm by a target date of 2010. The Working Tax Credit also supports childcare costs. The government’s efforts at childcare provision have, however, encountered problems with fragmentation and instability of services, especially in poor areas (Lewis and Campbell 2007). The ‘Sure Start’ program has also encountered some difficulties (DJI, 2008).

In the UK as in the Netherlands, it should be pointed out that under-3s attend childcare almost exclusively on a part-time basis. Both countries are prime examples of a number of others where a high proportion of childcare facilities operate on restricted hours (less than 30 hours a week). This phenomenon is no doubt a reflection that a high proportion of mothers in these countries work almost exclusively part-time.

**Throwing out the baby with the bath-water? Shortcomings of Parental leave schemes**

Much of the empirical research conducted has assessed these schemes from a very critical stance. From the perspective of gender equality on the labour market, they can be viewed as something of “a poisoned chalice” when put into actual practice. The long duration of parental leave must be considered against the background of widespread research which has shown returning to employment is more difficult after extended absences and has a strong impact on career prospects (Fagnani, 2000).

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\(^7\) In Japan, a part-time worker is considered anyone whose weekly hours fall below those of regular workers in the same establishment.
Encouraging mothers to stop working for a long period of time (more than one year) might entail numerous side-effects. Bearing in mind that recipients are almost exclusively women (except in Nordic countries where the take-up rate among fathers is more substantial than elsewhere) research conducted in this field demonstrates that parental leave schemes:

- maintain or reinforce the traditional gender division within the family: the mother who stops working (or reduces her working hours) feels less justified in asking for her husband’s help

- contribute to the maintenance of gender discrimination in the labour market by establishing asymmetrical professional trajectories within couples, and wage differentials between men and women. When mothers resume their job after an interruption of three years, they are likely to suffer occupational downgrading.

- contribute to reinforcing employers’ prejudices towards female workers: i.e. that they would be less committed to their work and less willing to pursue a career. Many employers may be (and are) reluctant to hire young women because they anticipate future absences from work.

It is illustrative that, in Britain, there are currently controversies in this policy field because the government plans to enhance maternity rights. Interestingly enough, the Tory equality spokeswoman, Theresa May, said: “The government's plan to give mothers a year off work whilst still only giving the father two weeks of leave reinforces an outdated stereotype that it is women who do the caring and men who go to work. …there is a real danger that a huge disparity in maternity and paternity leave could have a negative effect on women's employment.”

Assessing the family policy impact: the need for a comprehensive and systemic approach

Due to data limitations, as Gauthier (2007) pointed out, studies seldom include a comprehensive measure of the total support provided by government to families. It makes little sense to conduct cross-national comparisons on a scheme by scheme basis or to assess the impact of parental leave schemes in isolation. It is more relevant to look at the overall organisation and then place it in its respective institutional, historical and cultural context. Moreover, family policies can overlap with other policy initiatives (employment policies for instance). Therefore it is not always possible to disentangle their respective outcomes.

Indeed, what accounts for the variations between countries are the whole range of measures and services provided to parents and the cultural environment (that interacts with family policy) in which these take place. In other words, women’s choices and preferences relating to the appropriate balance between work and maternity are hugely constrained by the values that society defines as appropriate to their situation (Table 1, p.11). Modernisation of child rearing norms is therefore necessary if they are to be brought into alignment with reforms whose aim is to support the “working mother” model. To better capture the impact of policies on fertility and women’s labour force participation, it is important to see whether the premises of the family policy are actually in tune with the normative attitudes of women and men towards maternal employment and childcare arrangements outside of the home.

From this perspective, it is not surprising that over the last three decades, relatively high female employment and fertility rates have gone together. This is most apparent in Nordic countries and France where state support for working mothers is well developed and where early socialisation of young children is highly valued.

How family policies and labour market structures matter?
Clearly, birth rate acts as a variable of adjustment. For instance, a dearth of formal childcare provision (of both good quality and affordable) and lack of state support, will likely push women to reduce the number of children they have in order to stay in employment. This is especially so if childrearing norms imply that mothers with young children should stay at home to look after their child (see the case of Germany). McDonald (2000) makes a similar point in arguing that gender inequalities are responsible for countries’ low level of fertility. This confirms that female labour force participation should be examined as an intermediate mechanism in the process linking policies and fertility (Gauthier, 2007, Sleebos, 2003, Castles, 2003).

As far as fertility outcomes are concerned, cash benefits are usually found to have a very small impact on fertility unless they are coupled with benefits in kind (as is the case of France). The reality is that family policies do not only serve, through the taxation system, benefits, and childcare provision, to encourage or, conversely, to thwart the employment of mothers. These policies are themselves the expression of the dominant value systems, as well as a reflection of the cultural context that plays a role in creating a more or less guilt-inducing environment for mothers who wish to work.

**Interactions between transfer systems, social inequalities and poverty rates**

Research has shown that financial support to families plays an undeniable role in reducing the proportion of children growing up in poor households (Bradshaw, 2006). A look at child poverty rates (see table in annex) however exposes the UK as the worst performer by a considerable margin, in this area. This would seem to fly in the face of the fact that it is one of the most generous countries when it comes to providing financial support for the working poor. It also makes clear that the goal of increasing social justice while decreasing child poverty depends on providing more than simple cash benefits, complimentary systems of support are needed. The Nordic countries, where social inequality is less marked and child poverty is virtually non-existent, provide a perfect illustration of this point (see table 3). Financial support is relatively modest but benefits in kind such as community facilities and services are considerable. Additionally, they offer a coherent, generous and supportive set of provisions to dual-earner families, and this goes hand in hand with high employment rates for mothers with children.

**Austria: an outlier**

As for the total level of the family package (Fagnani, Math, 2008, Thévenon, 2008), Austria stands head and shoulders above other countries. Nevertheless, despite significant financial support to families, levels of fertility remain low resembling those of Germany and the southern European countries: Total Fertility Rates have fluctuated between 1.50 in 1993 and 1.41 in 2006 (see Table in annex). State policies that favour the work/family balance remain modest, particularly in the domain of public child care provision. Despite recent efforts to improve this situation, they pale in comparison to the vast array of measures which make up family policies in France and the Nordic countries. Also, in stark contrast to the Nordic countries, Austria performs rather poorly in terms of social inequalities and its poverty rate for children (Table in annex). These observations, along with those made of the UK, seem to confirm arguments in favour of promoting measures that place greater emphasis on benefits in kind over simple cash benefits (see the current controversies in Germany between the CDU and the SPD about this issue).

**III. Identification of upcoming issues and the repercussions of changes**

There is much ongoing academic controversy concerning the actual sources of the following changes:
A growing diversity of family forms and living arrangements, despite large differences along geographical divides, is moving hand in hand with an increase in the complexity of regulation and legislation in policy fields. Frontiers between various forms of partnership are blurring. For instance, in the Netherlands and Germany, the importance of marriage as well as residence (sharing a home) for what constitutes “a family” has been successively weakened.

An increase in the number of people, particularly mothers, living sequentially or periodically with different partners which follows the trend toward “living together apart” (non-co-resident).

A reduction in unpaid family care labour (“care provider pillar”).

An enduring asymmetry in family involvement regardless of female educational attainment. This phenomenon is partly attributable to the fact that, across Europe (except in the Nordic countries), most of the family-friendly measures (despite being theoretically gender-neutral) target mothers more or less implicitly. Concomitantly childcare, both within the family and in the public sphere, remains a woman’s prerogative.

A growing divide between women with a high level of educational achievement and the less educated. The presence of children has a more pronounced (much less in Nordic countries than elsewhere in the EU) effect on the employment of women with low education than those with higher levels.


The development of precarious jobs (Table 6. p. 18, tables 7 and 8, p. 19 and p.20): While fixed-term contracts are often the main form of precarious employment, other forms are developing across Europe and in Asian countries – in particular temporary agency work and involuntary part-time work – partly shaped by policies and employment-related (de)regulations. In some countries (Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Spain, for instance), these forms of employment are widely spread among women, in particular married women and lone mothers (see tables in annex). In Japan, nonstandard employment accounts for one-quarter of the total workforce, but more than half of women’s total employment (Gottfried, 2008, Gottfried, 2003). Additionally, as Gottfried pointed out, “the definition of part-time employment is not simply a matter of working fewer hours than a full-time worker, but is clearly linked to an inferior employment”.

When young women face daunting obstacles to consistent attachment to the labour force (and yet more to a career characterized by earnings growth and genuine economic security) the consequences are clear: they are more likely to postpone childbearing to a later age and this might partly explain the particularly low fertility levels of some OECD countries (in Japan, South Korea, Germany, Spain, respectively 1.27, 1.20, 1.3 and 1.36 by 2006, see table ).

Young people (aged under 25)

As Leah Vosko (2006, p. 3) demonstrated “Precarious employment encompasses forms of work involving limited social benefits…job insecurity, low wages, and high risks of ill-health”.

In Japan, nonstandard includes part-time, day labour, agency temporary and direct-hire temporary employment not configured around an organizationally based career-track (a standard feature of the Japanese employment model) (for a parallel analysis of the Korean situation, see Peng and Mahon, 2008). Neither years of service nor employment experience accumulate to place nonstandard employees in line for in-house promotion, on-the- job training, or age-graded wage increases (Gottfried, 2008).
- In France they are the 'babylosers' - a term coined by sociologist Louis Chauvel, a sociologist at the National Foundation for Political Science - to contrast them with 'babyboomers'. According to him, for the first time in recent history a generation of French citizens aged between 20 and 40 can expect a lower standard of living than the previous one.

- Intensification of (paid) work will be placing new demands on workers: it has made (and will make in the near future) work/care arrangements even more difficult for young couples. This has a strong impact on the perceptions of work/life balance. In an international survey\(^{10}\), respondents were asked to answer the following question: “All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job”. In 1994, 51 per cent of women in the UK did not agree with this statement, in 2002 this percentage decreased to 46 per cent. In the US, the decline was even more marked: in 1994, 51 per cent thought that family life does not suffer when the woman has a full-time job compared to 38 per cent in 2002.

**What will be at stake? The repercussions of some economic, social and cultural changes**

The implications of economic, social and cultural changes for family-related policies are manifold:

- **Dealing with conflicting interests within the family**

France is an emblematic country as far as this issue is concerned. Fighting unemployment and promoting gender equality on the labour market has been given greater priority on the policy agenda. Successive governments and advisory boards of family allowance funds have placed strong emphasis on the promotion of childcare opening hours that are more in tune with the needs of working parents alongside the development of so-called ‘flexible’ child care arrangements. In order to accommodate flexibility in the workplace and in particular the development of non-standard work schedules, there has been, over the last decade, an increase in the number of childcare services (public or privately run but publicly subsidized) operating until late in the evening or 24 hours a day and 7 days a week to enable working parents to meet their professional needs (Fagnani, 2008a).

Against this background, French family policy is being forced to cope with conflicting interests within the family: on one hand, promoting children’s welfare, ensuring that their biological rhythms are respected and allowing them to spend time with their parents while on the other providing women with the opportunities to adapt to the realities of the workplace, and to the demands of employers, so that they can keep their job or build a career. The clear conflict inherent in this arrangement means policy makers often draw a veil over the fact that the effects of the organizational changes in the workplace on family life and the children’s well-being could prove to be at odds with the principles on which French family policy is founded.

- **Difficult trade-offs, hard choices: establishing a new hierarchy of objectives**

Against the background of cost containment and, in some countries, even of Welfare retrenchment, policymakers have to deal with a number of dilemmas and trade-offs and are confronted with difficulties in establishing a new hierarchy of priorities.

- **Employers might be encouraged to hire people without children: a new discrimination**

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\(^{10}\) Source: ‘International Social Science Programme on Family and Changing Gender Roles’, 2002 Survey.
In a context of an increase in the take-up rate of family-friendly measures among fathers, there is a real risk that employers may start discriminating against all parents, regardless of gender.

- **An increasing burden on young parents**

Against the background of dramatic changes in the labour market and the evolution of new management principles one issue that has pushed its way to the forefront of the policy agenda is the pressure of increased demands on time (closely associated with the rise of the culture of long working hours). In his cross-national comparative study (including the US and Japan), Garhammer (2007) argued that time related pressure and increased overwork have led to a deterioration in quality of life, a broad concept combining both subjective and objective indicators. Hence young dual-earner parents when bearing in mind the tensions and difficulties linked to the management of everyday life, and the possible detrimental effects this could have on the welfare of the family, might postpone childbirth or reduce their number of offspring.

- **The enduring gender asymmetry in family involvement**

This represents a real challenge to policy makers who want to promote mothers’ employment as well as enhance, and not pay mere lip service to, gender equality. Moreover there is one time honoured obstacle that needs to be overcome when tackling the issue of gender equality: the powerful tendency to marry within ones own social group (marital homogamy). This means that in such cases power-relationships between partners are more balanced and that gender division of care work and household tasks will depend much more on female partner’s preference set.

**IV. The long-term prospects of an integrative approach to family policy to 2025/30.**

**Identifying “sticking points” and “tipping points”**

- How to tackle the issue of overstretched long-term care needs for the frail elderly and the “oldest old" populations: taking into account the significant reforms in the pension schemes of most of the OECD countries over the last years, how will families and the women in particular (who will be retiring at a later age than the former generations to offset the impact of pension reforms on their income) deal with the problem of dependence? This issue is particularly salient in countries like Japan where restrictive immigration policies would seem to reflect a reluctance to rely on immigrants to take care of vulnerable or dependent sections of the population.

- New migration patterns? To alleviate the strain placed on families caring for elderly dependants, could old people be encouraged to move to countries where labour costs relative to carers are much lower than in European or North American Countries? The current development of remote health monitoring could be an additional incentive.

- Implications for long-term care policy: will intergenerational transfers take on a new life with the state playing the main role in providing care for elderly? Or, will the state be rolling back and rely more heavily on solidarity within the family as a cost containment measure?

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11 According to Eurostat, the number of people aged 80 years or over is projected to almost triple from 21.8 million in 2008 to 61.4 million in 2060 (Source: Statistics in focus, 2008, n°72).
- Space/time constraints have been neglected issues. Urban segregation, specialisation of urban spaces, remote and poorly equipped neighbourhoods, and urban sprawl (the so-called “rurbanisation”) have resulted in an increase in commuting times which make it more difficult than ever to balance work and family life.

- Childcare policies might be in a predicament if there is a macroeconomic downturn. In Sweden for instance, the economic crisis of the 1990s resulted in a fiscal crises that led to severe cuts in childcare spending. The outcome was an increase in child-staff ratios and larger group sizes. (Nyberg, 2004). In France, against the background of cost containment, policy-makers are trying to reduce the costs in childcare policies, a trend which could prove to be detrimental to the quality of care in public childcare provision. Recently, a report (written by the MP Michele Tabarot) to the French prime Minister (July 2008) made the following proposals: permission for registered childminders to look after 4 children instead of 3 and a regulation made more flexible in regard to the skills of the staff in crèches. Concomitantly childcare policies are increasingly under pressure of the market (Fagnani, 2008)

- The fact that the EC’s guidelines and recommendations are not enforced in member states and do not involve any sanctioning mechanisms contributes little to driving countries towards more convergence.

- Despite its attractiveness and efficiency, the Nordic-style model is often viewed as too costly considering the current economic context. This puts a brake on the “race to the top” scenario.

We can, however, identify some move towards a more unified approach - involving more than one policy area or department especially in childcare policies and gender equality programmes.

The future of family policies: piecemeal measures or paradigmatic shifts?

Taking into account all the important changes that have been taking place over the last decade, an overall redesign of family policies is at stake. “Family mainstreaming” should also come to the forefront with the integration of the family perspective into every stage of the policy process (design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). It should not be concerned with children only, but with the relationships between them and the parents.

In Germany, for instance, current developments hint at a broader concept of social policy for the future German welfare state. The Family Ministry is increasingly assuming new roles: from benefit provider to regulator, motivator and moderator. At the same time other social actors, in particular companies, are being integrated in fields such as childcare and reconciliation policy.

Towards a more coordinated and integrated approach? Some clues

In the UK, France, Germany, and some other countries like the Netherlands and Luxembourg\(^\text{12}\), there is currently a move towards broader holistic approaches to policymaking at various levels of government. Across the globe, even Australia is on the verge of losing its status as one of the remaining two OECD countries without a paid maternity/paternity/parental leave scheme.

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\(^{12}\) For deeper information about these two countries, see: Deutsches Jugend Institut, (2008), *Die Entwicklung integrierter familienunterstützender Dienstleistungszentren. Expertisen aus Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Luxembourgh und den Niederlanden*, Münich.
In the UK, long languishing at the bottom of European league tables in most aspects of family policy such as provision of parental leave or child care, the policies pursued by the Blair government have made a significant improvement in the work/family balance, particularly in child care provision while enhancing partnership with the “community” (Lewis and Campbell, 2007). For instance, the “core offer” of integrated services in Sure Start Children’s Centres consists of: integrated early years education and childcare, family support and learning, outreach to isolated and vulnerable families, information and advice, links to Job Centre Plus, and Adult learning and leisure. Implementation and coordination is the responsibility of local authorities in partnership with local providers. Government expenditure has increased and all three and four-year-olds have access to some free provision. T. Smith qualified these early years services as “a quiet revolution” (Smith, 2007).

In Germany, in addition to the significant changes in the traditional fields of family policy, an additional trend has become visible: since the second period of the Red–Green government, much emphasis has been put on the involvement of other actors in the development of a family-friendly society. This hints at a new mix in this field of the Bismarckian welfare state.

The launching of the new initiative ‘Alliance for the Family’ in 2003 is an example of the new policy orientation, bringing together a broad range of measures and activities intended to enhance the work/life balance. The project – initiated by the BmFSFJ in cooperation with the Bertelsmann Foundation – aims to coordinate the activities of different actors, such as employers’ associations and trade unions, local governments, companies, etc. The main goal, as laid down in a consensus paper, is the development of a ‘sustainable family policy’ based on the three (normative) assumptions that: one, German society needed a higher fertility rate; two, the economy needed qualified workers and a higher labour market participation of women; and three, children needed (better) education and guidance in their early years.

Activities include the regular exchange of experiences between actors at different levels. Representatives of the institutions and associations involved built a ‘competence group for balance’ to work towards a consensus between vested interest groups. A scientific committee is responsible for the supervision of the process.

One project under the remit of the Alliance for the Family, by which the new approach can be illustrated, is the initiative ‘Local Alliances for Family’. Following the assumption that the local context is essential for families’ living conditions and well-being, the initiative ‘Local Alliances for Family’ was launched by the BMFSFJ in 2003. The aim was to initiate local round tables, or alliances, of the relevant local actors capable of helping to improve the context for family life in the municipalities. Such networks could include the local administration, the town council, companies, representatives of employers’ associations and trade unions, churches, third sector initiatives, families and other actors. The number of Local Alliances for Family rapidly increased and reached 364 in January 2007 (Klammer, Letablier, 2007).

The Ministry has installed a service office to support municipalities running a “Local Alliance for Family”. The focus is on different aspects of family life and work/life balance, according to the needs and resources identified in their local contexts. The topics treated cover a wide range which includes the organization of public care for children and the elderly; scheduling of flexible working time arrangements; creating family-friendly opening hours for the administration; and modifying timetables for public transport. A wide array of services and help is offered, with a focus on counselling and workshops on the spot.

The services offered are in line with the principle of subsidiarity, the idea being to assist engaged partners to elaborate their own, locally feasible strategies. Another aim of the service office is to bring different local alliances together for an exchange of ideas and experiences. The whole project is scientifically supervised and assessed by a research institute, the German Institute for Youth (DJI).
Multi generational Centres: an Action Programme of the Federal Government (BmFSFJ)

The programme’s overall goal is to build a new mix of public services, involving non-profit organizations, the private sector and volunteers (the motto is “Starke Leistung für jedes Alter”)\(^\text{13}\).

Besides providing old and young people with opportunities to connect to each other (meals are provided, as are meeting rooms and childcare services) and to enhance intergenerational solidarity, the programme also serves to reinforce relationships and connections. Employed people are able to mix with people outside formal employment; professionals rub shoulders with volunteers; and otherwise fragmented service providers in the community have a convenient point of reference.

In France, there is also a trend towards a more holistic approach to family support

In regard to policies aiming at providing support to families, the current trend is to adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach by encouraging the multiple institutions involved in this area to collaborate and thereby to bridge families, schools and communities. The objective is to reinforce social cohesion, to tackle the issue of social inequalities, to ensure the well-being of children, and to guarantee equal opportunities to children.

Increasingly, priority education policy, in particular, is being linked to urban development policies. As part of the politique de la ville, mayors of big cities have signed seven-year contracts with the national government to improve the living conditions of families and foster social integration in disadvantaged urban areas (see also Annex). Schools which fall within the boundaries of a Zone d’éducation prioritaire (ZEP) (Priority Education Zone) will be granted the status of Pôle d’excellence scolaire (Centre of Academic Excellence) by the Ministry of Education when they are able form partnerships with cultural, educational and other local institutions.

The relationship between parents and educational institutions has also received attention and the former are more and more considered as “partners” rather than users “users”. Institutional programmes to improve this relationship have been developed over the last two decades. Collective involvement by parents in the school system is seen as a way of encouraging a more “civic” approach. However this policy is a potential minefield as parents are encroaching into an area that is implicitly the domain of professionals.

For this trend toward a more integrated approach in family matters to continue however policymakers will have to cope with certain hurdles along the way, all of which have the potential to sap the will of the actors involved:

- Childcare policies are currently being driven more by labour market pressure and mothers’ rights to paid work than couched in terms of the ‘best interests’ of the child (Fagnani, 2008).

- In family support services, responsibilities are all too often dissipated which leads to a lack of accountability for actions taken; no one is held responsible for the mismatch between supply and demand of childcare. Social inequality and spatial disparities also remain large and continue to hinder access to formal childcare.

\(^\text{13}\) For more information: Annemarie Gerzer Sass, Serviceagentur Mehrgenerationenhaeuser
Annemarie-gerzer@mehrgenerationenhaeuser.de
- Despite huge public spending in socio-economically disadvantaged areas they are continually plagued by high unemployment which compounds the difficulties faced by policymakers and makes the full realization of national goals of ‘social inclusion’ (a typical French concept) troublesome.

- In work/life balance policies, the enduring centrality of the mother and mothering in raising children is at odds with the policies addressing the gender equality issue both in the family and in the labour market.

In the Nordic countries that exhibit a more integrated approach, there is a clear political will to further develop the already high level measures designed to support parents with children. As the Swedish Minister for Health and Social Affairs recently stated “The Government wants to increase families’ freedom of choice by reducing national political control. A modern family policy must recognise that families are different, have different needs and wishes, and are of equal worth.”

In Sweden a gender equality bonus has been applicable since 1 July 2008 for children born after that date. The motivation for the bonus is a desire to improve the conditions for gender equality in both parental leave and participation in working life and is intended as an incentive for parents to share parental leave as evenly as possible between themselves. It will be calculated on the basis of how a child’s parents divide parental leave and the number of days taken. Parents who share parental leave equally by each taking an equal number of days will receive the maximum bonus on condition that one partner works while the other takes leave. Parents who have joint custody of a child are also entitled to the gender equality bonus.

The new child-raising allowance, also applicable from July 2008, is intended to give parents the opportunity to spend more time with their children by facilitating a smoother transition between parental leave and work. Parents of children over the age of one but under the age of three are eligible. Actual availability will depend on the decision made at the municipal level of the families involved on whether to implement this benefit or not.

Making the case for going beyond: a plea for a more holistic and integrated approach

In most OECD countries public authorities have acknowledged, more or less explicitly, that the future wealth of any society is its children. States as well as other social actors have recognized that children represent a common good and that responsibility for their well being is far from being a strictly private affair. Indeed, investing in children might be a long term profitable strategy for society as a whole.

But guaranteeing the well being of the children as well as ensuring each has the opportunity to reach his or her full potential requires a multidimensional and systematic approach which extends beyond the simple provision of cash benefits, generous as they are, and branches out to include, limits on non-standard work schedules and access to adequate housing.

Indirectly Castles (2003, p. 226) also argues in favour of a more integrated approach by concluding that: “fertility outcomes are a function not only of policies directly aimed at permitting women to combine work and maternity, but also of education and labour market policies that enhance the probability of women finding employment and staying in employment irrespective of their fertility behaviour”.

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14 See http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/10/63/28/d2968502.pdf
15 Strazdins and al. (2006) have demonstrated that non-standard work schedules have detrimental effects on children’s well-being and on the quality of interactions within the family.
Conclusion

Gauthier (2002) who examined the degree of cross-national convergence from 1970 to 1999 showed that family policies in 22 industrialized countries have been characterized by an increase in state support for working parents, and by a modest increase in cash support for families. Because these common trends had different levels of magnitude across countries, she concluded that divergence had consequently increased.

Since then, the pace of changes has, however, sped up as countries in the EU have been particularly responsive to the increases in female labour force participation. Family policies have been adjusted to account for the new demographic and economic realities, but whether these adjustments have reduced the gap between OECD countries remains to be seen. Hence the way to convergence is likely to be chaotic. Cross-national differences in the adoption of family-friendly public policy are still so large that it will take some time before a real and long-lasting convergence takes place.

Nonetheless, as far as Germany, France and Sweden are concerned, there is undeniably a convergence (Germany and France are trying to catch up with Sweden, see in annex, p. 23 extract from an interview with Professor H. Bertram).

But taking into account the controversies about this issue of convergence, commenting on the future of family policies and their potential degree of cross-national convergence, especially these days, remains an act either of faith or recklessness!\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\) In a similar vein, Lutz (2006) concludes, after an exhaustive review of contrasting fertility theories that neither an upturn nor the continuation of current low levels can be predicted confidently.
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ANNEX

Chart 1 - State expenditure on benefits in kind in % of GDP: Comparison between SESPROS (Eurostat) and SOCX (OCDE) data


Sources: ESSPROS (Eurostat) – in March 2008, many of these 2005 data were still mentioned as provisional or estimated values
Chart 3 - Family targeted social protection spending and cash benefits in Germany and France (in % of GDP): Evolution 1990-2005

Source: Eurostat (ESSPROS)
Chart 4: % of people living with a partner according to sex and age in France (1982-2030)

Extract from: Alain Jacquot, Insee Première n°1106, octobre 2006
Table 1: % of respondents answering: "totally agree" to several statements concerning 'child rearing': selected countries (2006)

**Women : Age group 15-39**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>WEST GERMANY</th>
<th>EAST GERMANY</th>
<th>SWEDEN</th>
<th>AUSTRIA</th>
<th>DENMARK</th>
<th>NETHERLANDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A pre-school child is more likely to suffer if his/her mother works</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideally, the woman should stay at home to look after the children</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All in all family life suffers when the woman has a full time job</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Family-targeted protection spending (Expenditure in Billion Euros and as a % of GDP) in France – 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Montant des dépenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retraites (avantages liés aux enfants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestations familiales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dont accueil jeune enfant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autres (allocations familiales surtout)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscalité (avantages familiaux)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parts enfants quotient familial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autres avantages liés aux enfants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parts conjoints quotient familial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minima sociaux (suppléments enfant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aides au logement (supplément enfants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dont action sociale CAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dont action sociale communes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dont action sociale départements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enseignement pré-élémentaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total des dépenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% PIB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hors parts conjoints quotient familial</td>
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<tr>
<td>en % du PIB</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Data provided by Antoine Math

Table 3: Activity rates of women aged 25-49 according to the number of children aged under 15 (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, 2007

Table 4: Employment rates of women aged 25-49 with or without children aged under 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without children</th>
<th>With children</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>-17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, LFS 2006
Chart 5: Fertility rates in Germany, France and Sweden: Evolution 1950-2003

(Source: Eurostat)
Chart 6: ECEC services in comparison to other family transfers in Germany - Total: 184,439 million Euros
(Source: DJI, 2008)

- Tax related: 42,090 Mio € (23%)
- Cash Transfers: 25,278 Mio €
- Social Security related: 25,079 Mio € (14%)
- Public Funding ECEC services: 10,223 Mio € (6%)
- Other Services: 8,096 Mio € (4%)
- Marriage related: 7,673 Mio € (39%)
Table 5: Childcare arrangements for children aged under 3 in FRANCE (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of children under 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective childcare facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>327 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten and Nursery schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>184 600*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered childminders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>535 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanny at home (publicly subsidized)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37 300*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 085 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>46.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked after by parents (with paid parental leave or not) or other people (relatives, friends..)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 253 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL number of children 0-3 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 339 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimations
Chart 7: Percentage of employees working more than 48 hours a week

Source: David Coats with Rohit Lehki, 2008, *How much ‘good work’ is there in the UK and Europe?* The Work Foundation
Table 6: Increase in the number of “Mini-jobs” and in the total of standard jobs in Germany: 2002-2007
(in Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mini-jobs</strong></td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>6,492</td>
<td>7,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard jobs</strong></td>
<td>27,261</td>
<td>26,178</td>
<td>27,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2008
http://www.sozialpolitik-aktuell.de/grafik_aktuell.shtml
Table 7: Employment Trends by gender over time in Japan (Source: Gottfried, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour Force Participation</strong>&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Labour Force Participation by Age 1975 (2005)**<sup>2</sup> |            |            |
| 20-24                  | 76.5 (68.6)| 66.2 (69.8)|
| 25-29                  | 97.2(93.6) | 42.6 (74.9)|
| 30-34                  | 98.1(96.4) | 43.9 (62.7)|
| 35-39                  | 98.1 (97.0)| 54.9 (63.0)|
| 55-59                  | 92.2 (93.6)| 48.8 (60.0)|
| 65+                    | 44.4 (29.4)| 15.3 (12.7)|

| **Part-time Employment Rate**<sup>3</sup> |            |            |
| 1980                    | 5.2        | 19.3       |
| 1990                    | 7.5        | 27.9       |
| 2005                    | 12.3       | 40.6       |

| **Part-Time Employment by Age**<sup>4</sup> |            |            |
| 55-59                   | 4.2        | 42.5       |
| 60-64                   | 31.6       | 56.6       |
| 65-69                   | 47.9       | 61.3       |

| **Temporary Employment as a percentage of total employment**<sup>5</sup> |            |
| 1983                    | 5.3        |
| 1994                    | 5.4        |
| 2000                    | 7.7        |
|                         | 19.5       |

Source: Japanese Working Life Profile (2007: 34). These figures cover short-hours part-time employment defined according to the threshold of 35 hours or less, excluding full-time part-timers.
Data for 2004, JWLP (2007: 26)
Table 8: Gendered Patterns of Employment in Japan (Source: Gottfried, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women’s Share of Part-Time Employment&lt;sup&gt;vi&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part-time Employment as a Proportion of Women’s employment&lt;sup&gt;vii&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother’s Employment&lt;sup&gt;viii&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Married 0-4 years (5-9 years)</th>
<th>% Full-Time Housewives</th>
<th>% Working Full-Time</th>
<th>% Working Part-time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(60.0)</td>
<td>(15.0)</td>
<td>(25.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| % Lone Mother’s Working Full-time<sup>ix</sup> | 84.9 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td><strong>2.08</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.64 (2004)</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Countries are classed by levels of social inequality: from those with the lowest levels to those with the greatest.

** Source: World Bank. 2006. *World Development Indicators 2006*. Washington, D.C. The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income diverges from equality, with 1 being the extreme value when a single individual has all the income.

*** Source: OECD, 2007

**** Source: EUROSTAT, 2008
Table 10: INTEGRATING FRAMEWORK OF MOTHERS’ EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS AND
DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH WORKING PARENTS
Trade-offs in regard to the number of children and duration of working hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Employment Patterns</th>
<th>How to Combine Work and Unpaid Work: Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>Long part-time or full-time jobs. Short parental leave (one year)</td>
<td>Extensive use of Public schemes supporting Working parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>Egalitarian model</td>
<td>(Subsidised child-care arrangements, paid parental leave, flexible working hours…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Long part-time or full-time jobs. Long parental leave (3 years) for less qualified or low paid</td>
<td>Extensive use of Public schemes supporting Working parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“working mother”</td>
<td>(Subsidised child-care arrangements, paid parental leave, flexible working hours…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Short part-time jobs (as long as children are under school-age)</td>
<td>Reduction of Working time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kin/Voluntary/Market for child-care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td></td>
<td>Family-friendly Flexibility at the Workplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>Full-time jobs. Long working hours for both partners</td>
<td>Reduction of the number of children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kin/Market for child-care</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Extract from an interview with Hans Bertram published in TAZ on August 15, 2008

http://www.taz.de/1/politik/deutschland/artikel/1/bei-maennern-brauchen-wir-harte-massnahmen/

- "Wir brauchen härtere Maßnahmen"

Wenn sie in die Zukunft blicken, vielleicht 30 Jahre, zu welcher Familienform wir uns entwickeln werden? Wie wird die Familie der Zukunft gestrickt sein?


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3 Source: Japanese Working Life Profile (2007: 34). These figures cover short-hours part-time employment defined according to the threshold of 35 hours or less, excluding full-time part-timers.