Explaining community participation in the field of security: social and territorial differentiations between and within neighbourhoods in France and Italy

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Explaining community participation in the field of security: social and territorial differentiations between and within neighbourhoods in France and Italy

First Draft – Please do not quote
Introduction

This paper aims at dealing with community participation in the field of security in France and Italy, thanks to a comparison between two case studies: the “Projet Grenoble Sud” (“South Grenoble Project”) in Grenoble (France, see map 1) and the “Progetto Città Sicure” (“Safe City Project”) in Modena (Italy, see map 2).\footnote{This contribution is based on my PhD research in progress about local security policies in both countries focussing on four cities (Lyons and Grenoble in France; Bologna and Modena in Italy).} It must be precised that in this paper, we understand “community participation” in a very extensive way, in order to deal with the diversity of meanings in both countries. In Grenoble, official discourses tend to speak of “participation des habitants” (inhabitants participation) and “quartier” (neighbourhood), whereas in Modena, they focus on “coinvolgimento dei cittadini” (citizens’ involvement) and “comunità” (community). The community participation model in Modena lies in a neighbourhood watch structure, which was the municipal answer to the spontaneous citizens’ mobilizations on security problems that occurred in the mid-nineties, in the national context of political party crisis and rising of immigration flow. On the opposite, the community participation pattern in Grenoble results from a top down process, driven by the local government who led a consultative process that enabled people to make proposals to improve security in their neighbourhoods, and then to maintain control over the effective implementation of the retained proposals. This mode of community participation can be qualified as “program-building and implementation-controlling”.

The word “community” is not used in France but in Italy, it can be associated with shared moral values, where social and civic obligations are learned and self-reliance, mutual aid and volunteering are practised, i.e where social capital is quite diffused. We define “social capital” as the component of political culture that corresponds to trust, reciprocity and the amount of resources that allows collective action (Almagisti and Messina, 2005). So, it corresponds to some elements that belong to the two “political subcultures” defined by Trigilia (1981; 1986), i.e. the Red one (rooted in Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marches) and the White one (rooted in Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige). The definition of neighbourhood is also problematic, both in terms of spatial scale and of its varying psychological and social significance for residents (Kearns and Parkinson, 2001). Therefore, we understand neighbourhood in a restricted way, as the
geographically delimited territory where the local community lives, which can be considered as a source of social identity (see Trigilia, 1981; 1986). This contribution mainly seeks to investigate the relationship between the Physical and the Social and the influence of these variables on community participation in the field of security.

The relationship between the physical and social dimensions of neighbourhoods has been studied first by the Chicago school. Shaw and McKay presented in 1942 their concept of “social disorganisation”, pointing out that there was a statistical correlation between some social variables (school failure rates, high juvenile delinquency rates, high crime rates) and the physical decay of some areas. A comparison of these rates over a long period revealed a great regularity (that is to say whereas the local population has changed), which made the two researchers think that the crime rate depended on the social organisation of these areas. Deprivation, social heterogeneity and residential instability were not however direct causes for crime: there was an intermediate variable, “social disorganisation”, i.e. the inability of residents to live together, to cooperate, because of the absence of formal and informal strong relations. The ethnic heterogeneity obstructed the building of a common value system, while deprivation and residential instability depressed a process of identification with the neighbourhood. The lack of relations, then, limited informal social control and therefore favoured crime (Shaw and McKay, 1969).

Many ulterior studies were based on the Chicago School’s analysis, such as Jacobs’s strong criticism of urban planning strategies of functional areas, which destroyed social diversity in big cities and then favoured crime (1962), Wilson and Kelling’s famous Broken Windows theory (1982) or Skogan’s analysis of the spiral of decay in some American neighbourhoods (1990). The Chicago School’s model still seems valid, and some contemporaneous researchers have built their researches on its findings, such as Roché, for instance, who also used “Second” Chicago School’s analyses (Becker and Goffman).

Roché (2000) clearly expressed the retraction mechanism generated by the feeling of insecurity and noticed that one of the most important aspects of security today lies in the residential cohabitation between lower and middle classes (Roché, 2002: 120-121), especially in decaying neighbourhoods. Indeed, he proposed a renewed analysis of the Broken Windows theory for France, using several quantitative researches he had carried out in Grenoble (1990), Saint-Etienne (1995), Romans and Paris (1998). He pointed out that disorders had an influence on citizens’ feeling of insecurity and trust towards institutions. He included this element into an explanatory model of citizens’ adaptation behaviour in sensitive
neighbourhoods, based on the idea that the diffusion of disorders incited the most sensitive people to incivilities to exit by moving. Since only a small proportion had managed to, those who couldn’t leave felt frustrated, but at the same time, sought to make the institutions (housing, police, municipality, etc.) pay attention to their situation. The trust towards institutions then started decreasing. This « disorders triangle », combining frequent incivilities, a threat generating retraction and a low level of trust towards institutions, could then favour the development of crime.

The dynamics of retraction described by Roché is quite interesting since it implicitly underlines the responsibility of institutions, which didn’t pay attention to what could be called the « security demand » expressed by the local population. The two security projects developed in Grenoble and Modena, and partly based on community participation, aim at answering to this security demand, which is however expressed in a different way in both cities, as I’ll show it. Whereas the impoverishment dynamic that hit French “grands ensembles” was partly due to the middle class’ strategy of “exit” (Hirschman, 1970), it seems that in Modena, and more generally speaking in big urban centres –especially in Northern Italy- the local population chose “voice”. Lots of researchers support the idea that, in France, “sensitive” neighbourhoods are now unable to mobilize. What is called “mixité sociale” (“social mixing”) -i.e. the melting pot degree of inhabitants with different socio-economic status- henceforth depends on middle classes, whose departure generates impoverishment phenomenon in suburbs. Some French researchers had already noticed, in a premonitory analysis, that “social mixing” was a myth, since making people physically live together did not mean making them socially live together (Chamboredon and Lemaire, 1970).

Besides, in Modena, the local population was really co-involved in the policy-making process and participated actively in the co-production of security. Indeed, some citizens were involved in an informal neighbourhood watch structure (Poletti, 2002; 2005). In Grenoble, and more generally in France, citizens’ mobilizations on security topics are usually quite rare and, as far as community participation is concerned, it is often uneasy to implement because of the effective reluctance of elected officials and civil servants, in spite of the official discourse. The community participation pattern in Grenoble can be qualified as “program-building and implementation-controlling” but it is far from the neighbourhood watch model.

To explore these two main differences (the mobilization differential and the co-involvement differential), I first present the main social and physical characteristics of the two
neighbourhoods studied, that is to say Villeneuve-VO in Grenoble and Crocetta in Modena. In the following sections, I then present the different sets of hypothesis I had to make in order to investigate the two community participation patterns. So, in the second section, I examine the influence of classical variables, such as socio-economic status, neighbourhoods’ physical aspects and residents’ feeling of insecurity to explain the mobilization differential. In the third section, I explore the diffusion of institutional mediation channels in the two neighbourhoods. Lastly, in the fourth section, I try to point out the influence of historical factors on the definition of the problem.

I. Some elements to understand why Villeneuve-VO and Crocetta were targeted by municipal security policies

As a small introduction, we have to give a few data about Grenoble and Modena (see maps 3 and 6). Grenoble is a medium city with above 160,000 inhabitants, located in the middle of a 400,000 inhabitant urban area, in the heart of the French Alps. The city is located in a glacier valley, surrounded by three mountains (Chartreuse, Belledonne and Vercors). Grenoble, host to the Winter Olympics in 1968, has known a fast economic development since this period. The main industrial activities are now engineering, electronics, electrical engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals (approximately 43,200 jobs); but also paper, metallurgy, construction materials, textile, food products, plastics, industrial and consumer equipment (approximately 32,850 jobs). The presence of a large number of research laboratories in Grenoble is a key feature of the economic background of Isère. Indeed, there are approximately 50,000 students in the urban area and 18,200 people work in research in the city, making it the leading centre in France, outside Paris, for public and private research. So, Grenoble is an attractive city for students and high-qualified professions, especially foreigners. However, in 1999, the unemployment rate was 16%, that is to say higher that the national average (see table 1).

As far as Modena is concerned, there are approximately 180,000 inhabitants, which make it the second largest city in Emilia-Romagna. This region, which belongs to the “Third Italy” (see for instance Bagnasco, 1991; Caciagli, 1988; 1995; Trigilia, 1981; 2001), is one of
the richest ones. The city has been marked by a strong industrial development since the fifties (metallurgy, car industry such as Ferrari and Bugatti, food industry, textile and ceramics), which engendered a growth of the local population, fed by inter-regional immigration flux of labour forces. The city started growing, even absorbing small close localities, such as San Lazzaro or Madonnina. However, Modena started losing inhabitants in 1980 (6000 approximately until 1995) partly because of the industry crisis and the rise of the tertiary sector. But the city managed to resist the economic crisis: small-scale industries gathered to create consortiums in definite sectors such as ceramics, textile or food industry. Moreover, the proportion of managers, intellectual professions and employees is higher than the Italian average whereas the proportion of workers and unskilled manual workers is lower. Lastly, it must be underlined that in 2004, the unemployment rate was only 2.6% (see table 2).

Table 1: Unemployment rate, average income and professional groups’ employment rate in Grenoble

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grenoble</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (1999)</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income (1999)</td>
<td>16,480 €</td>
<td>20,363 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>farmers</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans, shopkeepers and managers</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executives and intellectual professions</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate professions</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual workers</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Insee, 1999.

Table 2: Unemployment rate, average income and professional groups’ employment rate in Modena

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Modena</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (2004)</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income</td>
<td>22,198 €</td>
<td>14,939 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and directors</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual, scientific professions and of elevated specialization</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate professions (technical)</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The “spiral of decay”: how Villeneuve-VO and Crocetta have reacted to global dynamics

Villeneuve-VO as a “sensitive” neighbourhood in Grenoble

As far as Grenoble’s “sensitive” neighbourhoods are concerned, they are mainly located in the South of the city (see maps 3 and 4): these are Mistral, Teisseire, Abbaye-Jouhaux, Villeneuve and Village Olympique (VO). This presentation particularly focuses on Villeneuve and VO since they are affected by the municipal “Projet Grenoble Sud”, whose main objective is the integration of Villeneuve-VO to the rest of the city, in particular thanks to urban renewal.

Village Olympique (VO) is a 6,000-inhabitant neighbourhood. It was built in 1965 in the South of Grenoble, in order to accommodate those taking part in the Olympic Winter Games organized in 1968. Then, these flats became council flats. Next to VO, there is Villeneuve, an 11,000 inhabitant pedestrian district, with a large central park (11 hectares). Villeneuve can be divided into two parts (see map 5): the Eastern part, “Baladins-Géants”, and the Western part, “Arlequin”. It was built at the beginning of the seventies, as a ZUP (Zones à Urbaniser par Priorité, Priority Urbanisation Zone)2 (Boyer, 2000: 33). It symbolized the social project carried out by the French “municipal socialism” (Frappat, 1979) under the local government of the leftist Mayor Hubert Dubedout. The local population participated in designing the neighbourhood, which has urban specificities that correspond to the social

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2 ZUP were created in 1958 by the Government who ordered the model of blocks in width.
project of living together ("vivre ensemble") (Joly, 1995). The project planned to mix different social classes by mixing in the same block council flats and private ones.

Table 3: Family heads' professional groups in Villeneuve and Grenoble in the seventies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional group (%)</th>
<th>Arlequin (entire neighbourhood) 1973</th>
<th>Arlequin (social housing)</th>
<th>Village Olympique</th>
<th>Grenoble 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>liberal professions and upper management</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle management</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employees and shopkeepers</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manual workers and relative workers to services</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inactive / students / pensioners families</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inhabitants</td>
<td>100 (1657)</td>
<td>100 (953)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Joly (1995: 111, table 2).

Table 3 shows that at the beginning of the seventies, there were, for instance, more family heads that belonged to liberal professions and upper management in "Arlequin" than in the whole city. The proportion of middle executives was nearly twice higher in Arlequin than in Grenoble, and it was the same in VO, which concentrated also a higher proportion of employees and shopkeepers. Even social housing in Arlequin was characterised by the same proportion of middle executives, employees and shopkeepers, and workers as in the whole city. The main architectural characteristic in Villeneuve lies in the "coursives", that is to say long corridors that lead into approximately thirty flats by floor (instead of two, three or four apartments in usual blocks). The general shape of the blocks is quite circular, around the central park (see map 5 and the following photos) and the district is a residential and pedestrian one. Today, Villeneuve and VO are considered as one and represent the most populated district in Grenoble. There are approximately 6,600 flats, 4,200 of them are located in Villeneuve and 50% of these 4,200 flats are council ones. 25% of the council flats are located in Baladin-Géants and 75% in Arlequin.

According to the 1999 national census, 40 different nationalities lived in these two neighbourhoods, representing 15% of the district inhabitants (the average is approximately 10% in the whole city). 57% of the residents were under the age of 34. Crime has increased by 22% from 1999 to 2003, whereas it has only increased by 1.4% in the police district of Grenoble (that is to say Grenoble plus five smaller close cities) over the same period. In 2003, this district concentrated half of all urban violence that had occurred in the police district (Direction prévention-sécurité, 2004). The urban configuration of Villeneuve prevents the
police from controlling since it's a pedestrian area, with few car accesses, lots of closed car parks, and long "coursives" that allow people to circulate on foot between blocks (see map 5).

Villeneuve-VO is concerned by different projects, national as well as local, regarding employment, urban renewal, education and crime prevention. It was classified as a ZUS (Zone Urbaine Sensible, Sensitive Urban Zone) and more particularly a ZRU (Zone de Redynamisation Urbaine, Urban Re-vitalization Zone) in 1996 by the national urban renewal plan, together with Teisseire-Abbaye-Jouhaux and Mistral. In 2004, it was also classified as a ZFU. Moreover, the Municipality has been carrying out since 2003 a "Villeneuve-VO crime prevention project", which concerns four sub-districts (Villeneuve, VO, Grand Place (the biggest shop centre in Grenoble) and Vigny-Musset). This project is currently both local and national since, while the municipality was about to implement a crime prevention project dedicated to this district, the Home Minister decided in 2003 to include Villeneuve-VO in its crime prevention program which aimed at testing new crime prevention methods in 24 districts with high crime or urban violence rates. The "Villeneuve-VO crime prevention project" represents one aspect of the whole "South Grenoble" project and is therefore partly based on residents' proposals.

Modena's Crocetta as an old industrial dismissed area

Modena's Circumscription 2 is composed of three sub-districts: San Lazzaro, Modena Est (entirely built in the sixties) and Crocetta, that is to say 46,883 inhabitants. More precisely, in 1996 (the year before the Crocetta residents' mobilization), there were 14,286

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3 These sensitive urban zones (751 currently in France) are characterized by the presence of large housing estates and of neighbourhoods of dilapidated buildings and by a lack of balance between housing and employment. The selection of these ZUS was made on the basis of qualitative criteria housing estates", "lack of housing/employment balance and of a joint analysis by the State and elected representatives. They include ZRU and ZFU (Zones Franches Urbaines, Urban Free Zones). ZRU are the sensitive urban zones that are faced with special difficulties, which can be assessed by their location within the urban area, their economic and commercial characteristics, and an integrated index. This index is calculated in accordance with a 1996 decree and takes into account the total population of the neighbourhood, the unemployment rate, the proportion of young people under the age of 25, the proportion of people who left school without obtaining a certificate, and the tax potential of the commune. ZFU are created in neighbourhoods with more than 10,000 inhabitants that are extremely disadvantaged according to the criteria used to determine urban re-dynamization zones. Factors likely to facilitate the establishment of enterprises and the development of economic activities are taken into account in ZRU and ZFU: exemption from professional taxes, taxes on benefits, transfer taxes for purchase of a business, and lowering of social security contributions (in the ZFU: exemption from personal social security payments for health/maternity for craftspeople and commercial businesses). This measure of tax exemption and exemptions from social security contributions is designed to strengthen economic activity in the targeted areas.

4 In 2003, the Government decided to add 41 new ZFU to the 44 ones that had been targeted in 1996.
residents in the neighbourhood called Crocetta. This neighbourhood was quite young compared to the rest of the circumscription and the rest of the city, since the percentage of children under the age of 13 was quite important and that of residents over 65 quite small (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 129-130).

Crocetta became, during the fifties and the sixties, an industrial district, with lots of factories—especially along the railway—such as foundries, steelworks, the Fiat area, etc. Moreover, since the Third Italy industrial model was based on production decentralization, lots of small factories appeared next to these big industrial complexes. Therefore, all these factories attracted immigrant workers coming from Southern Italy. As a consequence, this area concentrated social housing blocks, especially large ones, built to put up a large number of workers and families.

More recently, the expansion of Modena was supported by the development of the tertiary sector. Lots of factories left the Crocetta industrial area, which lost its main function and remained with a lot of dismissed areas, which started declining. In 2000, the Municipality started an urban renewal project entitled “Qualità urbana, sicurezza, controllo sociale del territorio” (“Urban quality, security and social control of the territory), that regarded the Northern part of the city, especially dismissed areas along the railway and abandoned buildings, such as old foundries, rapes or the livestock market (see maps 7a/ and b/). It is not worthwhile recalling that Modena lost 6,000 inhabitants between 1980 and 1995. The decline and feeling of abandonment was particularly obvious along the railway, where the biggest buildings were concentrated. As a consequence, these abandoned places, marked by physical disorders, seem to have followed the dynamic described by Skogan (1990) about American neighbourhoods. Moreover, Crocetta was qualified as “l’Altra Modena”, that is to say the “the Other Modena” (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 145), or “Città del Nord” (“City of the North”) (Bottigelli and Cardia, 2003). This element illustrates the physical gap between this neighbourhood, located North of the railway and the railroad, and the rest of the city from which it is geographically separated. For instance, there are only three railway bridges and they are built for vehicles and not really for pedestrians. As a consequence, the spiral of physical decay that regarded specifically this dismissed industrial area finally generated social disorders, since some poor migrants started living there and drug dealing started developing. Chiodi clearly showed that drug dealing and use, one the one hand, and immigration, on the other hand, were the two main problems perceived by the Crocetta’s residents (1997-1998:

It must be precised that, until 1994, there were 7 circoscrizioni (circumscriptions) in Modena. Crocetta was the sixth one and Modena est - San Lazzaro the fifth one.
Besides, a private residential estate -located in a hot spot in Circumscription 2- has been targeted since 2004 by a specific urban regeneration project (*contratto di quartiere II*, Neighbourhood Contract II)*⁶*, since it had been marked by security problems due to illegal immigrants concentration, prostitution and drug dealing.

Actually, Modena’s population started growing after 1995: the net migration increased more quickly than the loss of inhabitants. In 1993, 13,000 legal foreign immigrants lived in the Province of Modena; which made it the Italian province with the highest rate of immigrants. In 1996, circumscription 2 was not more concerned with immigration than the rest of the city (immigrants represented 2.75% of the whole district’s population) but it must be underlined that it had been marked by a strong past immigration flow from Southern Italy (South and Islands) (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 140-141). However, immigration flow has continued in this district, as in the whole city. In 2004, there were 8.9% of foreign residents in Modena, 9.2% in Circumscription 2 but 18.1% in the historical centre (which is twice smaller as the other districts in terms of population).

To conclude this short presentation of Villeneuve-VO and Crocetta, we can say that they appear to be quite different in terms of population and functions: the former is a recent residential and pedestrian area whereas the latter is an industrial dismissed area, mainly characterized by physical decay. Nevertheless, it seems that their specific urban configuration make them both separated from the rest of the city. If Chiodi, mentioning Chombart de Lauwe (1952b), claims that Crocetta can be defined as a “geographic sector”, that is to say a piece of territory delimited by physical elements that prevent the neighbourhood from communicating with outside, I support that the same diagnosis can be applied to Villeneuve and VO. Chombart de Lauwe clearly explained how the geographic distribution of blocks around central squares partly lead to make residents live in a separated way from other neighbourhoods (Chombart de Lauwe, 1952a: 63). In these two particular neighbourhoods, community participation took two different ways: bottom up in Crocetta, since residents mobilized to protest against drug dealing, but top down in Villeneuve-VO, where the Municipality lead a consultative process to implement their security and crime prevention project.

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⁶ In 1997, the national Government started financing urban regeneration projects thanks to “Neighbourhood Contracts”. Neighbourhood Contracts II belong to the second national urban regeneration policy (which chiefly target residential public housing estates) and are mainly financed by the Italian Minister of Public Works.
Community participation models in both neighbourhoods: a bottom up logic VS a top down one?

Answering inhabitants in Modena: spontaneous mobilisations of citizens’ committees

Before presenting the Modena case, it must be underlined that citizens’ committees have appeared in urban areas especially in Northern and Central Italy since the beginning of the nineties. Lots of researchers have studied this phenomenon (see Consorzio A.A.S.TER., 1997 for Milan; Sebastiani, 2001 for Bologna; Selmini, 1997 for Emilia-Romagna). Donatella Della Porta supervised then some national research in six cities: Turin, Milan, Bologna, Florence, Palermo and Catania (see for instance Allasino et al., 2003 for Turin; Della Porta, 2004a for final results; Della Porta and Andretta, 2001; 2002; Della Porta and Mosca, 2002; Lewanski and Mosca, 2003 for Bologna). It must be added that students also did research on that topic (Belluati, 1998; Petrillo, 2000; Poletti, 2002). Lastly, it is important to notice that some of these studies have shown to what extent protestations were correlated to the topic of immigration (Della Porta, 2000), mentioning violent conflicts between residents and migrants (Allasino et al., 2000; Belluati, 1998; Petrillo, 2000). It means that what happened in Modena was not an isolated case in Italy.

Modena has been suffering from security problems since the nineties, as the annual polls about the feeling of insecurity that the Municipality have carried out since 1996 show it. Actually, in December 1995, the local government launched the project called « Modena Città Sicura », based on a scientific committee who was in charge of doing research on criminality. Knowledge on this topic improved but the situation worsened, until the 1997 violent outburst. Actually, the feeling of insecurity in Modena started decreasing in 1999 (Comune di Modena, 2003).

The first citizens’ committee in Modena was born in 1992 to fight against prostitution (Comitato Fiera). Then, other committees emerged, especially to protest against drug dealing (Comitato San Cataldo, Comitato Sacca, Comitato Terranova), but not especially in the Circumscription 2. Annual polls about the feeling of insecurity had also underlined that drugs, prostitution and immigration were the three main elements considered as risky by the local population (Comune di Modena, 2003: 18).

On June 1997, the citizens’ committee coordination organized in Crocetta a torchlight procession that gathered 2000 people, who walked through all the hot spots of the
neighbourhood. At the same period, one of the citizens’ committees promoted a petition calling for law enforcement towards illegal immigration (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 189-191). Between June and September, this petition was signed by 18,476 people, that is to say more than 10% of the whole population of Modena. The local government and the Region Emilia-Romagna were asked to support the proposal and they brought it to Parliament in February 1998, therefore giving birth to the immigration law called « Turco-Napoli". This law was far more restrictive as regarded illegal immigrants and delinquent foreigners. In particular, it created CPT (“Centri di Permanenza Temporanea”, Temporaneous-Stay Centers) for delinquent foreigners. Actually, one of the problems pointed out by citizens' committees was the lack of holding back structures for illegal immigrant who had committed crime and had to be sent back to their country: their were let free until their expulsion. After the law was passed, citizens’ committees asked for and obtained the building of one of the CPT for delinquent foreigners. It is all the more interesting to notice since only eight centres were built in Italy, and only in regional capitals (Modena is only a provincial capital).

Moreover, during the summer 1997, some Crocetta’s social housing residents started foot patrolling by night to prevent street pushers from acting. At the end of August, some of them committed violence against some immigrant drug dealers. It's interesting to bear in mind that in 1991, a poll had already revealed that 75% of the inhabitants claimed that criminality had increased in Modena because of immigrants (Franchini and Guidi, 1991). Local newspapers spoke of a genuine “drug dealers hunt”, lead by residents armed with bars and sticks. Chiodi’s interviews with some residents (for her study on immigration and insecurity in Crocetta) confirmed that some episodes of violence had really occurred (1997-1998: 190). These violent events immediately generated a reaction from local authorities and the day after, a police unity was sent in Crocetta. A month later, the situation had improved.

In this context, the Mayor had to cope with the citizens’ protest and chose to show voluntarism, suggesting a partnership between the State and the local government in the field of security and signing in 1998 the first “protocollo d’intesa” (“agreement protocol”) regarding urban security. Moreover, some committee members were invited to CPOSP (Comitato Provinciale per l’Ordine e la Sicurezza Pubblica, Provincial Committee for Order and Public security) meetings by the Prefect, in order to expose their problems to public authorities. The Mayor also gave a boost to a real local security policy. One of the aspects of

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7 The prefect is the head of the national bureaucracies operating at the level of the province in Italy.
this policy lied in community participation, since an “informal neighbourhood watch structure” was implemented by the Municipality (Poletti, 2005). Actually, some committee members voluntarily kept a close eye on their neighbourhood, particularly on specific hot spots in the city, and completed forms, putting down as much information as possible about potential suspects. Forms were then passed on to those in charge, who picked out the most useful information for the Police. These “sentinelles” (Poletti, 2002) were chiefly recruited among shopkeepers and old pensioners and kept constant contacts with the Municipal Police, but also the Prefect and the Questore (Police Superintendent). Moreover, the Municipal Police’s way to work was completely reorganized according to a community policing orientation. In 1995, the Municipality had already launched the project « Vigile di quartiere » (Neighbourhood policemen): municipal police agents had to reassure the local population by foot patrolling. In 1999, some specific paths were defined in neighbourhoods in order to strengthen contacts between these municipal police agents and some local actors such as Circumscriptions’ chairmen, volunteers, associations, and citizens. Since 2001, some « agenti di quartiere » (neighbourhood agents) have been monitoring the territory according to the guidelines of the problem-solving approach, since they have to look at problems in a proactive way and then to solve them (by making other municipal services intervene for instance). Their method of work is based on five stages: defining problems; finding solutions; involving inhabitants, who are in charge of calling attention to soft crimes or suspect events and then help finding solutions; short-term assessment with inhabitants; long-term assessment (Rondinone, 2004: 116-117).

Involving inhabitants in Grenoble: the top down process of the “Projet Grenoble Sud”

This kind of community participation results from a top down process, driven by the local government who lead a consultative process that enabled people to make proposals to improve the quality of life in their district, and then to maintain control over the effective implementation of the retained proposals. This mode of community participation can be qualified as “program-building and implementation-controlling”, since residents participate in the definition of the municipal project by making proposals, but they also check the implementation of the plan. However, this mode of participation is only consultative since the Municipality is not constrained by the residents’ orientations.

Four districts are concerned by the “Projet Grenoble Sud” -Villeneuve, VO, Vigny-Musset and Malherbe- that is to say more than 52,000 inhabitants, but the main objective lies
in the integration of Villeneuve to the rest of the city, in particular thanks to urban renewal. The project was launched in 2003 and implied community participation through processes of dialogue with residents. It means, on the one hand, that different kinds of meetings with residents were organized by the local government and, on the other hand, that some volunteers participated in the reflection about the future of their own district, making proposals to improve their quality of life. Indeed, there were two public information meetings in April and June 2004; five meetings, from November 2003 to June 2004, with the two CCS ("Conseils Consultatifs de Secteurs", Neighbourhood Consultative Councils)\(^8\) concerned by the urban renewal project; and eight information meetings and discussion meetings in June-July 2004.

The dialogue process was carried out through five stages. From June to July 2003, 550 people were contacted by the Municipality and 120 of them accepted to be interviewed. A 40 minute film was made to introduce public meetings. Then, in September 2003, 1200 people participated in three public meetings; 200 of them were registered as volunteers to participate in workshops. Four topics were chosen for these workshops: “security”, “young people”, “urban development and planning”, “living together” (“vivre ensemble”). In October 2003, 140 residents participated in two sessions and made 269 real proposals. From September to October, municipal officials and services worked on these proposals and 74 were picked up. They mainly regarded five themes: urban cleanliness, crime prevention and victim support, health, education and employment, urban opening-up. Lastly, in November 2003, during a public meeting, the Mayor claimed to support the creation of an "observatoire des engagements" ("commitment observatory"), that is to say that some residents would get voluntarily involved in the assessment of the local government action. 50 residents are still currently supervising the project implementation. In 2004, they wrote a 47 page report, putting down their assessment of the project implementation, making criticisms and proposals to improve the project.

The “South Grenoble” consultative process has obviously met with classical difficulties as regards this kind of participative project, such as the lack of participation of young people, for instance. Besides, it must be pointed out that 1,200 people participated in that is to say hardly more than 2% of the local residents concerned by the project. Security is

\(^8\) CCS were created in 2002 in all big cities after the law on “Démocratie de proximité” generalizing “neighbourhood committees” was passed. They are consultative structures composed of inhabitants, and co-chaired by a deputy mayor and a resident. There are six CCS in Grenoble, corresponding to the six administrative sectors defined by the Municipality. The CCS 6 is composed of Villeneuve, VO, Malherbe and Vigny-Musset.
a key issue in the “South Grenoble” project because we can notice a growing concentration of deprived people in this area. So what is at stake in this district is to maintain “social mixity”, and security is one of the basic conditions of success.

Indeed, it can be said that the two municipal logics of community involvement seem to be quite unalike. Whereas in Grenoble, the consultative process has been precisely defined by the Municipality, citizens seem to have imposed their preoccupation to the local government in Modena. How this difference can be explained? Why inhabitants mobilized in Modena, forcing the Municipality to become responsible for security problems, and not in Grenoble, where the Municipality led on their own a consultative process? The three following sections try to bring some answers.

2. First set of hypothesis: socio-economic status, physical aspects and feeling of insecurity as key explanatory factors for mobilizations

Before going further, it is necessary to examine if there were or not “events of protest” in Villeneuve-VO as regarded security topics. A review of the local press (i.e. Le Dauphiné Libéré, the single local newspaper in Grenoble) over a fifteen year period (1991-2005) only revealed 12 events of protest (such as petitions or marches). For instance, on January 1998, between 150 and 200 residents gathered to protest against violence after the Arlequin’s barber had been attacked. The local newspaper also mentioned in April 1998 that a citizens’ committee entitled “La délinquance, ça suffit” (“Crime, that’s enough!”) was born to help residents reporting complaints to the Police. So collective action seems less diffused than in Modena, where, as mentioned earlier, there were strong mobilizations in 1997 in Crocetta, but also in 1998-1999, when shopkeeper federations led striking press campaigns for law enforcement and allied to citizens’ committees to protest. Some events of protest regarding security also occurred in other Italian cities, as Della Porta’s research on citizens’

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9 I use the same definition of “events of protest” as did for instance Allasino et al. (2003), i.e. all the action forms used by citizens’ groups.
10 Le Dauphiné Libéré. 11.01.98.
11 Le Dauphiné Libéré. 15.04.98.

Several sets of hypotheses can be then mobilized to explain this mobilization differential. The first one is that there is no social demand for security in Villeneuve-VO. It is not very likely since the Municipality has built a crime prevention project for this area in particular and since, as I’ll show it in the first section, the feeling of insecurity is higher in this area than in the rest of the city.

The second hypothesis is that the number of events of protest is as high in Villeneuve-VO as in Crocetta—or at least that there are some collective actions in Villeneuve- but the media threshold is higher. It would mean that it is more difficult for events of protest to cross the local media threshold in Grenoble than in Modena. The lack of local press pluralism in France in general could be an explanatory element: it could set bounds to security media coverage, since security has always been a critical topic. I think that this element is quite true since some researchers have shown that media represent a strong constraint for public authorities, who seek to avoid leaks of information or public criticisms as far as security policies are concerned (Gatto and Thoenig, 1993; Thoenig, 1994). It can be hypothesized that, since the Mayor is henceforth involved in the security co-production, he has to conform to these discretion rules. Moreover, as it’s in the Mayor and the (single) local newspaper’s interest to avoid conflicts, it is not impossible that the local specific configuration in Grenoble prevents the local newspaper from giving media coverage to some events of protest.

However, as the urban violence events that occurred in last November in France showed it, the local newspaper in Grenoble can’t avoid mentioning so important events. As a consequence, it can be imagined that, if there were very important citizens’ mobilizations and protests, they would be covered by local media.

So this point brings me to my third hypothesis: the number of events of protest is really lower in Grenoble than in Modena and this differential has to be explored. Is the security demand really lower in Grenoble? I claim that the top down community involvement process is the Municipality’s answer to the local security demand in Villeneuve-VO. So, in the next section, I examine the security demand levels in both areas, to determine if there is an existing demand. If we consider collective action as a form of expression of the local security demand, it could be first hypothesized that it is stronger in Crocetta than in Villeneuve, which could explain why residents mobilized in Crocetta and not in Villeneuve. To check this hypothesis, I compare in the next section the results of some polls about the feeling of insecurity, carried out in both neighbourhoods.
Feeling of insecurity in both neighbourhoods

In Modena, an annual poll has been carried out since 1996 to assess the feeling of insecurity in the four districts\(^\text{12}\). In 1996, 28.7\% of the Circumscription 2 considered crime as a quite or very serious problem in their residence area (the average was 24.8\% in Modena), but in 1997, they were 42\%, whereas the average was 28.7\% in the whole city. So, Crocetta’s inhabitants clearly felt more unsafe than their neighbours, all the more as the percentage of inhabitants considering their own city as quite or very unsafe decreased between 1996 and 1997, from 55.1\% to 43.7\%. Moreover, the general opinion about the neighbourhood radically changed in 1997: whereas in 1996, 45.8\% of the inhabitants considered the centre as the most unsafe neighbourhood in the city (and only 17.3\% for Crocetta-San Lazzaro), in 1997, 44\% mentioned Crocetta-San Lazzaro and only 26.3\% the centre. Besides, 49.5\% of the Circumscription 2’s residents considered crime as a more serious problem in their residence district than in other ones, whereas the city average was 31.2\% (Roversi, 1997: 79, table 7). A specific area, Sacca, located in the Circumscription 2, was considered as particularly unsafe, since in 1997, 85.4\% of those who considered Crocetta-San Lazzaro as the most unsafe neighbourhood mentioned this specific area (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 92). Drug dealing and use were the two main phenomena that generated preoccupation among residents, reaching the first rank of preoccupations. The last element to notice is that the people interviewed considered drug addicts, gypsies and immigrants as those who committed crime in their district (Roversi, 1997: 95).

In Villeneuve, the feeling of insecurity is also higher than in the rest of the city. In 2005, 31.3\% of the local residents claimed to feel insecure in their own district; they were 20.4\% in Grenoble (CERDAP-PACTE, 2005: 8). The academic poll made in 2005 clearly showed that the Villeneuve-VO residents felt more concerned by physical and verbal violence than the rest of the population, but the victimization rate was not higher than in the rest of the city. Moreover, some municipal officials have pointed out that the fact that some notorious delinquents live in the neighbourhood, which frightens some residents and prevents them from reporting them to the police, or even consulting public authorities such as housing authorities or the Municipality. So, individual and collective actions are all the more uneasy

\(^{12}\) All the following data come from the 1997 report Lo stato della sicurezza a Modena.
as local residents are often afraid of reprisals in Villeneuve-VO\textsuperscript{13} whereas Chiodi’s research (1997-1998) or Poletti’s one (2002) on citizens’ committees in Modena didn’t mention this element.

These few data bring me to conclude that the feeling of safety seems relatively diffused in Villeneuve-VO and in Crocetta compared to the rest of the city in both cases. It means that a social security demand –defined as the expression of the feeling of insecurity (Roché, 1998b)- also exists in Villeneuve-VO. Obviously, this conclusion is far from being new: the Municipality would have probably not built a crime prevention project focussed on this district if there would have not been a security demand.

In the next section, I examine the socio-economic characteristics of the two neighbourhoods in Grenoble and Modena to assess if they can help to explain the mobilization differential. As far as “social capital” is concerned, I do not discuss the different meanings of the notion, since other researchers have already done it (Almagisti and Messina, 2005; Bagnasco et al., 2001; Gatti et al., 2002) and consider it as a component of political culture. I lack statistical data to assess the level of social capital in both neighbourhoods for the moment, so I only use levels of political participation to draw a first idea. In addition, it would have also been interesting to check the level of trust towards institutions in both neighbourhoods in order to check Roché’s hypothesis about the retraction phenomenon. Even if I am not able to present the same indicators in both cities, those that are available in each of them allow me to say that Crocetta seems more socially homogeneous and economically wealthy than Villeneuve.

\textit{Crocetta as a more economically and socially homogeneous neighbourhood than Villeneuve}

Some researchers have noticed that the Durkheimian thesis about the social integration function of crime is still true, but depends on inhabitants’ socio-economic status, since advantaged classes can mobilize more easily (Barbagli, 1999: 23-24; Della Porta, 2004b; Roché, 1998b: 138-142; 2000). A correlation can often be found between socio-economic status, which partly defines vulnerability, and feeling of insecurity (Roché, 1998a). Choffel

\textsuperscript{13} Interview with two municipal crime prevention office’s members. November 2004.
(1996), worked on the 1995 Insee poll about insecurity and revealed that people who lived in districts concerned by urban policies were those with the highest feeling of insecurity: only 66% of these residents felt secure whereas they were 80.7% in the whole urban area and 86.2% in France. In Italy, Barbagli (1998b) also pointed out that people who felt unsafe more often belonged to deprived classes, such as workers, unemployed people or low qualified people. For instance, Roché (2000) underlined that in Romans, 20% of the owner-occupiers alerted the municipality about disorders, whereas the city average was 11%. He also found that in Saint-Etienne, among all the employed, less than 5% of the workers mentioned that they had complained to the Municipality, whereas 10% of intermediate professions had.

Table 4 clearly shows that the average income in Crocetta (21,971 euros 2002) is as high as in the rest of the city (22,198 euros 2002).

**Table 4: Average income in Modena’s circumscriptions (euros 2002)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circumscription</th>
<th>Euros 2002</th>
<th>Italy = 100</th>
<th>Northern East = 100</th>
<th>Modena = 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modena</td>
<td>22,198</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Centro storico</td>
<td>21,521</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Crocetta</td>
<td>21,971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Buon Pastore</td>
<td>22,796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 San Faustino</td>
<td>21,886</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>20,414</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern East</td>
<td>18,593</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14,939</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Baldini and Silvestri (2003).

**Graph 1: Family heads’ professional groups in Villeneuve and Grenoble (Insee, 1999)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Artisans, shopkeepers and managers</th>
<th>Executives and intellectual professions</th>
<th>Intermediate professions</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Manual workers</th>
<th>Pensioners</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Villeneuve</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenoble</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Filou et al. (2003: 22)

On the opposite, Villeneuve-VO appears as more economically deprived than the rest of the city. Indeed, whereas, the average unemployment rate was 16% in Grenoble in 2001, it was about 24% in Villeneuve -reaching 34% in “Arlequin”- and 27.8% in VO. Moreover, the crime prevention and security office has underlined that a growing concentration of deprived people could be noticed in this area, even in private residential estates. Indeed, more and more private residential owners tend to rent their apartments (Filou et al., 2003). Nevertheless, if the rate of workers is twice higher than in Grenoble, there the percentage of managerial professions and intermediate professions is slightly lower than in the entire city (see graph 1), but with a lot of disparities as regards residential estates. It means that “social mixity”, even if quickly decreasing, still seems to exist in Villeneuve-VO.

It must be recalled that Modena belongs to the Region Emilia-Romagna, i.e. the most “civic” region in Italy according to Putnam’s famous study (1993). Even if this study’s results have been put into perspective (Barbagli and Colombo, 2004), it can’t be denied that rates of political and social participation remain higher in this region than the Italian average (Barbagli and Colombo, 2004: 25-56). As I have already mentioned, I only examine political participation rates in this section since I lack other comparative statistical data.

Political participation rates in Modena remain very high. It was 87.9% for the 1995 municipal election and 79.1% for the 1999 municipal election. In 2001, it reached 90.0% for the legislative election. Even for the last abrogative referendum, in June 2005, the participation rate reached 46.2% in Modena, whereas the Italian average was only 25.9%.

Even if I lack statistical data over a long period, I have tried to examine the political participation rate to different elections to determine if Villeneuve-VO was less “civic” than other neighbourhoods (see tables 5). Indeed, except Baladins, whose participation rate is often close to the city average (even if slightly lower), Arlequin and VO are often clearly under the city average (and so are Mistral and Teisseire-Abbaye, the two other sensitive
neighbourhoods classified as ZUS). Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that during the 2002 presidential election, which saw the National Front candidate present at the second ballot, it is in these neighbourhoods that the participation rate increased most. So, if these neighbourhoods are slightly less “civic” than others, they are not the “worst”.

Tables 5: Political participation rates in Grenoble

Table 5a - Municipal elections 2001 – participation rate in neighbourhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st ballot (%)</th>
<th>2nd ballot (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grenoble</td>
<td>53.06</td>
<td>56.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clémenceau</td>
<td>52.77</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vieux temple</td>
<td>57.57</td>
<td>59.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Île Verte</td>
<td>56.98</td>
<td>60.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Laurent</td>
<td>59.18</td>
<td>64.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbaye</td>
<td>51.02</td>
<td>56.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taillefer</td>
<td>46.83</td>
<td>51.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teisseire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jardin de ville</td>
<td>55.64</td>
<td>59.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlioz</td>
<td>57.71</td>
<td>59.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porte de France</td>
<td>52.03</td>
<td>58.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoche</td>
<td>53.29</td>
<td>57.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capuches</td>
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<td>58.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malherbe</td>
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<td>Baladins</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alphonse Daudet</td>
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<td>53.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidib Brahimi</td>
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<td>Jean Jaurès</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Houille Blanche</td>
<td>55.70</td>
<td>59.68</td>
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</table>
Table 5b - Legislative elections in 2002 – participation rate in neighbourhoods

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<th>1st ballot (%)</th>
<th>2nd ballot (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clémenceau</td>
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<td>Ile Verte</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capuche</td>
<td>66.85</td>
<td>62.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>circumscription</th>
<th>1st ballot (%)</th>
<th>2nd ballot (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malherbe</td>
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<td>60.35</td>
</tr>
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<td>Baladins</td>
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<td>56.74</td>
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<td>Sidi Brahim</td>
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<td>63.59</td>
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Table 5c - Presidential election 2002 – participation rate in neighbourhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
<th>1st ballot (%)</th>
<th>2nd ballot (%)</th>
<th>mobilization between the two ballots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grenoble</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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As a conclusion, we can say that the socio-economic status of Villeneuve-VO’s residents seems less homogeneous than in Crocetta. This element can partly explain why collective action seems far less frequent in the former. Moreover, the particular neighbourhoods’ physical configuration can have an influence on residents’ collective action abilities. Indeed, I have already mentioned that both neighbourhoods are quite separated from the rest of the city. Villeneuve, in particular, is a circular pedestrian area, with only four car
accesses, and Crocetta is geographically excluded because of the railway and the railroad. The urban configuration of these two neighbourhoods is quite different, and so are the consequences on crime and disorders and therefore on the residents' abilities to act collectively.

**Neighbourhoods' urban configuration as an additive factor**

In both neighbourhoods, the problem mainly lies in the control of the territory. Crocetta, as an industrial dismissed area, suffers from the decay of old factories and buildings, occupied by new visible delinquents, stigmatized by the local residents. Indeed, some Crocetta's residents evoked the need to re-conquest their neighbourhood against street pushers and underlined that they were partly responsible for the situation since they had not reacted before because of fear (Chiodi, 1997-1998: 236-245). In France, the current Home Minister -following some studies made by “security experts” and policemen (see for instance Bauer and Raufer, 1998; Bousquet, 1998; Bui-Trong, 1998)- claims that one of the most diffused phenomena in French “sensitive” neighbourhoods is probably the “économie souterraine” (black economy), often based on drug trafficking. The Home Minister decided in 2002 to create specific inter-force police groups (GIR, Groupes d'Intervention Régionaux, Intervention Regional Groups) in charge of fighting against the black economy and all forms of organized criminality anchored in those deprived neighbourhoods that are henceforth controlled by local small groups of delinquents. Villeneuve is also concerned by drug problems: in 2000, the murder of a sixteen-year-old resident by two friends of his strikingly put light on the situation. So, it can be said that drug dealing was a common problematic for Crocetta and Villeneuve. But the Villeneuve’s urban configuration has favoured the territory’s appropriation by some delinquents, especially because of the lack of car accesses, which has prevented the police from coming in this neighbourhood. Besides, the circular form of the blocks and the “coursives” allow delinquents to disappear easily when the Police arrive and all the more quickly as they are often warned by other residents of the Police’s arrival. To sum up, the intervention of the police was physically possible in Crocetta, but more uneasy in Villeneuve. These physical elements must be underlined since, as Roché explained, the more people are faced with disorders, the less they trust the police (2000). If the police can’t intervene, they aren’t able to stop the decay process that Roché has called the “disorders

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14 Interview with the Municipal Police Manager and the Villeneuve-VO Unit Chief. January 2006.
triangle”. On the opposite, it can be hypothesized that in Crocetta, the police intervention has interrupted this vicious circle.

So, in this section, I have tried to show that in both neighbourhoods, even if there was a social security demand, citizens’ mobilizations were more uneasy in Villeneuve-VO since it was a more economically and socially heterogeneous neighbourhood than Crocetta. And it is known that the feeling of insecurity can help people to join forces, but only advantaged classes. Moreover, the urban characteristics strongly influenced the deviants and delinquents’ abilities to control the territory, since they partly determined the police abilities to intervene. This element had some consequences on the local residents’ feeling of insecurity and abilities to consult public authorities. So, these factors help to understand the mobilization differential between the two neighbourhoods in France and Italy. Nevertheless, if these elements can help to understand why citizens’ mobilizations are quite uneasy in Villeneuve-VO, they don’t tell us how the local security demand is expressed. As a consequence, other hypotheses are needed.

3. Second set of hypothesis: political culture and institutional mediation channels

In this section, I suggest the idea that the local security demand is more institutionally channelled in Grenoble than in Modena. The first hypothesis I have made is that the security demand was expressed by voting, i.e. that the vote for the National Front was quite diffused in Villeneuve-VO. The analysis of the last municipal elections in Grenoble lead me to confirm this hypothesis since -as I’ll show it in the first paragraph- the vote for the National Front in Villeneuve-Vo was lower than the city average. Moreover, as far as security media coverage is concerned, the 2001 municipal election in Grenoble seems to be a case in point, since security appeared as an invisible electoral stake: neither candidates nor newspapers talked much about it. It’s necessary to recall that Le Dauphiné Libéré has never related many events of protest in Grenoble, as already mentioned, whereas in Modena, the Mayor was placed under a strong media pressure. Nevertheless, over the last fifteen years, it has often reported local meetings during which security problems were tackled (districts committees meetings,
shopkeepers meetings, information meetings organized by the Municipality, etc.). Indeed, the high number of associations rooted in Villeneuve-VO has already been mentioned. There are also a lot of historical local democracy structures in the city, which probably play a role in channelling the security demand, as they do in Marseille, for instance (Le Naour, 2005). On the opposite, in her study about immigration and insecurity in Crocetta, Chiodi (1997-1998: 237-245) reported some inhabitants’ interviews in which they said they had felt abandoned by the local authorities, who had only reacted once the violent events had occurred.

So, these indications lead me to support the idea that the local security demand is more channelled by the municipality in Grenoble than in Modena. Local and national political and historical events can be considered as key explanatory factors. The political history of Grenoble –and the municipal Socialism’s heritage– can help understanding why such local democracy structures are rooted in the city, whereas in Modena -and more generally speaking, in Italy- the political party local structures, that used to play this mediation role, disappeared with the national political crisis that caused the end of the First Republic. In Italy, Mayors suddenly had to cope with demands they were not used to deal with, especially after the 1993 electoral reform that set out their direct election by citizens, whereas in France, where their territorial legitimacy was older, as well as their mediation function, they had their own mediation channels.

First hypothesis: Expressing security demand by voting for far-right political parties

The vote for extremist political parties could be an alternative way of asking for security. In France, the National Front has used security (and immigration) topics as electoral issues for 25 years (Mayer, 2002). Moreover, thanks to empirical data, Roché (2000) pointed out that National Front supporters felt more sensitive than others to voluntarily burnt cars and as sensitive as right wing supporters as regards the moral condemnation of thefts for instance. However, the proportion of National Front supporters who had reported drug problems in their neighbourhood was the same as that of left wing supporters. Roché checked that the statistical relations he had found between fear of crime and presence of disorders were independent on age, gender and political orientation. As far as our topic is concerned, it can be deduced that people vote for National Front to express preoccupations towards security.

So, it can be hypothesized that, as the security demand is expressed by mobilizations in Crocetta, the vote for right extremist parties is quite low; whereas in Villeneuve-VO -where it can be admitted that a large part of inhabitants have voted with their feet, leaving the
district- the local residents could vote for the National Front to express protest. Indeed, in Modena, during the 1995 municipal election, the Northern League candidate only won 3.4% of the votes (and the list 3.5%). In 1999, he won 2.9% and the list 2.9% too. In Circumscription 2, in 1995 and in 1999, there was no Northern League list for the circumscription election. However, it is not worthwhile underlining that in 1999, in the First Circumscription (historical centre), the centre-right wing won 11 polling stations out of 20 and a centre-right chairman was elected by the circumscription council. It can be thought that the Mayor considered this element as a serious electoral warning, even if he was elected at the first ballot and that DS (*Democratici di Sinistra, Left Democrats*), with more than 40% of the votes, undoubtedly became the first political party in the municipal council.

As far as Grenoble is concerned, let’s have a look on the 2001 municipal election and the 2002 presidential one. In 2001, the National Front list won 7.2% of the vote at the first ballot (8.21% in 1995). The National Front only won 5.08% in Arlequin, 6.09% in Baladins and 7.70% in VO, but more than the average in Mistral (11.14%) or Teisseire (9.06%) for instance. It’s interesting to point out that in 1995, the political party won 10.5% in VO, which could mean that the security demand expressed by vote decreased between 1995 and 2001 in VO, even if the vote for the National Front is always slightly over the average.

It is unnecessary to recall that the 2002 presidential election was a strong shock in France since the National Front candidate managed to enter the second ballot. At the first ballot, Jean-Marie Le Pen won 12.48% of the votes in Grenoble, but only 8.22% in Baladins, 7.77% in Arlequin and 12.67% in VO, that is to say that the vote for the National Front in these neighbourhoods was below or the same as the city average. Moreover, at the second ballot, he was definitely under the city average (12.15%), since he won 8.12% in Baladins, 8.29% in Arlequin and 10.95% in VO.

The presentation of these electoral results in both neighbourhoods clearly shows that far-right political parties don’t catch more votes in these areas than in the rest of the city. More precisely, these neighbourhoods seem reluctant to vote for far-right political parties. So, it means that the security demand in Villeneuve-VO is expressed in a different way from far-right vote and mobilization. A second hypothesis is therefore needed.

What is interesting to notice is that crime didn’t seem to be an electoral stake in Grenoble - unlike numerous other French cities- as illustrated by the small number of press articles dealing with that topic. However, a pre-electoral poll, carried out in February 2001 in
Grenoble, revealed that security was the main stake for voters (30%), immediately followed by employment (27%). It suggests that, even if security didn’t seem much publicized in local media, it was a real stake. It has just been said that the National Front didn’t win many votes in Villeneuve-VO in 2001. Indeed, the neighbourhood has always tended to vote more left than right. In 2001, the left wing Mayor obtained 82% of the votes in Arlequin (Villeneuve), 80.6% in Baladins (Villeneuve), and 67.6% in VO, whereas he was re-elected with only 51% of the votes (for more details see Martin, 2002). Indeed, the Mayor only won with an 850-vote gap, so the 1166 votes he won in Arlequin and the 1151 ones in Baladins had a great importance: it can be said that the left wing Mayor was re-elected partly thanks to the massive support of Villeneuve’s voters.

These two elements lead me to draw two hypotheses. First, the absence of security media coverage –whereas it was an effective electoral stake- could mean that the strong institutional channelling of security problems in Grenoble makes citizens’ mobilization unnecessary. It’s interesting to bear in mind that in Modena, the publicization of the was one of the main strategies chosen by citizens’ committees, who organized press conferences and campaigns. Second, since Villeneuve-VO voters strongly supported the left wing Mayor and helped making him being re-elected, it can be supposed that the municipal crime prevention project was in fact the Mayor’s answer to his electorate’s security demand. How did the Mayor hear this security demand?

Second hypothesis: Municipal channelling of the local security demand

Municipal Socialism’s legacy in Grenoble and local democracy structures

Grenoble was as important for the French municipal Socialism in France as Bologna was for the Italian Communist Party. Indeed, the whole city has been the symbol of the participatory democratic project for twenty years.

Grenoble was already famous in terms of local democracy structures, since the first UQ (Union de Quartiers, Neighbourhoods Union) –that is to say districts committees- was born there in 1921. In 1961, there were 21 “UQ” in the city, so that a UQ co-ordination committee was created, to co-ordinate them. More generally speaking, there was an increase of associations in Grenoble during the sixties, which was due to the strong demographic growth, partly based on a strong dynamic of immigration. Indeed, from 1954 to 1962, the city population increased by 37%, from 116,400 to 159,329 inhabitants (Joly, 1995: 28) and its
sociological composition changed a lot with the arrival of upper executives - engineers and intellectual professions in particular- and middle executives.

The GAM (*Groupe d'Action Municipale, Municipal Action Group*) emerged in Grenoble 1964 on the UQ basis (Bachmann and Le Guennec, 1997). It was, at the beginning, a local and apolitical inhabitants’ mobilization against urban discomfort (Joly, 1995: 31). The origins of the movement lie in the protest of a young engineer, Hubert Dubedout, who complained about the problems of water provision in his bathroom and then created the GAM in 1965. More generally speaking, the GAM appeared in dynamic French cities, such as Grenoble, which were in expansion from an economic and demographic point of view. They were composed of quite young and wealthy people, especially upper and middle executives, liberal professions and intermediary professions (Bachmann and Le Guennec, 1997: 298; Joly, 1995: 27-28) and embodied what would be called today “civil society”.

In 1965, for the municipal election, the GAM allied with the two Socialist Parties (PSU, *Parti Socialiste Unifié, Unified Socialist Party* and SFIO, *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, French Section of the Socialist International*) and their candidate, Hubert Dubedout was elected. This new alliance was called “New Left” because it was the first time that a leftist coalition could conquer a municipality without the Communist Party’s support. The GAM’s conception of democracy - which was a bottom up one, based on a problem-solving approach, and considering the neighbourhood as the first scale of intervention- helped to shape the municipal project (Duby, 1985: 594). This political project was a global one, and it connected the social and the physical by territorializing municipal interventions. Indeed, the sixties and the seventies were marked by the development of housing and public facilities, carried out in all neighbourhoods. Indeed, there are lots of cultural and social facilities in Villeneuve-VO. More precisely, in the sixth sector (Villeneuve, VO and Vigny-Musset), there are 20 elementary schools, 4 public high schools, 4 academic institutes, 3 social centres, 4 libraries, 3 cultural centres, 8 sports facilities, 13 social and cultural centres for children and teenagers, etc. There are also 150 associations in all fields.\(^\text{15}\)

The socialist experience of the sixties and seventies allows to understand better why local democracy structures are so rooted in the city. Even if GAM have disappeared, local associations such as UQ have remained active since this period. Moreover, other local

\(^{15}\text{http://www.grenoble.fr/isp/site/Portal.jsp?page_id=357}\)
democracy structures were created, such as neighbourhood councils or, more recently, CCS. Indeed, currently, according to one elected official, the Municipality is supported by a network composed of 250-300 people, ¼ of whom are inhabitants, who often belong to associations, UQ, house renters associations, etc. According to the deputy mayor in charge of urban policy, the rest of the network is composed of professionals such as social street workers, teachers, social housing administrators, etc. (Motte, 2003: 318). So it can be considered that the local government can use this well-rooted network to channel citizens’ demands in general and the security one in particular.

*Traditional mediation channel in France and in Italy: Mayors VS political parties?*

I tend to support the analysis made by Della Porta and Andretta (2001; 2002), that are based on Pizzorno’s one about political party crisis (Pizzorno, 1996). As they noticed:

“If the phenomenon of citizens’ committees can, as we have hypothesized, be understood within a more general process of the restructuring of political representation - evidenced mainly by the decline of the parties’ capacity for social and territorial rootedness, the loss of their hold on civil society and the weakening of their capacity to bring together demands and influence decision-making processes - then the birth of citizens’ committees should obviously coincide neatly with the emergence of these elements of crisis in the political system. […] the phase in which committees started to organize more often coincided with the years of the political crisis in Italy that has been defined in successive stages as ‘the crisis of the First Republic’.” (Della Porta and Andretta, 2002: 250)

The traditional political party crisis could explain the diffusion of citizens’ committees representing very small pieces of districts: the decline of territorialized party structures and the lack of alternative forms of mediation prevent committees from being co-ordinated, and consequently their demands remain fragmented. Italian municipalities henceforth tend to play the channelling role that political parties used to play in the past. The point is that in France, the Mayor has been in the front line for a longer time since he has an older territorial legitimacy (due to direct universal suffrage) compared to the Italian Mayor. In Grenoble,

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16 CCS were created in 2002. They were proposed by the left wing candidate during the 2001 municipal election and then provided for by the 2002 law about “proximity democracy” that encouraged the development of local structures of participation (they were created in all big French cities and differently untitled). CCS are composed of 50 people (belonging to associations or not), nominated by the Municipal Council. They are co-chaired by a CCS member, elected by all the others and the Municipal official in charge of the district. It must be recalled that Grenoble is divided into 6 districts and Villeneuve-VO and Vigny-Musset belong to the sixth one. CCS are assemblies dedicated to making proposals to the Municipality as regards different domains such as town planning, housing, public transport, etc. Each CCS has a 10,000 € functioning budget and is technically supported by the municipal administration.
since local democracy structures have always existed, it can be hypothesized that individual or collective security demands have always been collected by them and channelled towards the Municipality. Therefore, Modena’s project can also be understood as a way of institutionalisation of the citizens’ movement. Poletti (2005) pointed out that what he called “institutional committee” – “a group characterized by permanent duration, that takes shape after a perceived emergency but tries to solve it through constant relationships with institutions”- was the most diffused type in Modena. That kind of committee is the most involved in the local policy-making process. Besides, he added that this kind of community participation had increased proximity between citizens and the local government. For instance, a local “observatory” was created in Circumscription 2, under the supervision of the Circumscription chairman. Shopkeepers and active residents participate in these periodical meetings (three or four times a year) aimed at gathering information on some problematic issues, especially in the area surrounding the residential estate targeted by the Neighbourhood Contract II. The association “Non da soli” (“Not alone”) represents another example of institutionalisation, since it was created in 1996 by some members of the comitato Modena Est. The association, which provides material and psychological support for victims, is financed by the Municipality.

It can be then hypothesized that citizens’ committees could become one of the new mediation channels local governments need in Italy. Obviously, effective representation problems do exist. Poletti (2002; 2005) put it clearly about citizens’ committees in Modena, as other researchers had already done before, underlining the exclusive character of community safety practices, since they are often based on an active minority’s participation (see for instance Crawford, 1995; Gilling, 1997; 2001; Skogan, 1990).

It is now useful to try to generalize our conclusions to test their pertinence. As I have already mentioned, citizens’ committees emerged in different urban centres in Central and Northern Italy, and not only in Modena or in Emilia-Romagna, whereas this kind of mobilizations, based on security topics are quite rare in France. Does it mean that all local governments in France channel social demands as the City of Grenoble does? Is the sensitive neighbourhoods’ urban and social configuration the only explanation for the quasi absence of community participation in France? Some authors such as Crawford (1995), Gilling (1997) or Skogan (1990) underlined how much it was uneasy to make community participate in “sensitive neighbourhoods”, characterized by low levels of trust and high feelings of insecurity. As Gilling noticed:

31
« In particular, high crime communities remain fundamentally divided, so that there is no basis for reconciliation between victim and offender, even when these are one and the same person. There is also little basis for collective informal social control, and thus the point at which this meets with formal control agencies remains vague and ill-defined, especially as these latter are hardly bound together in a consensual mould. » (Gilling, 1997: 200)

But it could be argued that not only deprived neighbourhoods are concerned by security problems and that middle classes could mobilize. The few examples of collective actions regarding security that have occurred in France bring me to formulate another hypothesis: collective actions regarding security are framed as anti-democratic and therefore rejected by the population and the politicians. This particular French framing could be due to a historical trauma, which dates from WWII.

4. Fourth set of hypotheses: historical collective traumas as key explanatory factors

The process of (re)building (local) identities -based on the exclusion of “out-groups” (Elias and Scotson, 1965), i.e. immigrants- that was observed in Modena (Chiodi, 1997-1998), but also in Bologna (Sebastiani, 2001), was made impossible in France because of the way two major historical traumas -i.e. the Vichy period and the Algerian War- generated deep cleavages in the French society and influenced the political class’ ideas. The memory of militia and denunciation still casts a shadow on mobilizations about security in France, and prevents the officials from involving citizens in the governance of security. The Algeria War generated a deep political taboo about integration strategies for the second generation of immigrants and their involvement into crime, whereas it was one of the dimensions of the security issue that had to be tackled. On the opposite, the Italian way of defining the security issue is tightly related to immigration, as illustrated by press articles and political debates. Some constructivist analysis tended to underline that foreign immigrants in Italy were the new excluded citizens (Dal Lago, 1999; Palidda, 2000; Tosi, 2003), especially with the lack of national policy of integration for these new migrants. In France, beyond the Republican model of integration, successive national policies have avoided to tackle the problem of integration for the youth born of immigrants since the eighties. The French model of “social
prevention” and then the urban policy called “politique de la ville” were both based on a social un-differentiation between delinquents and young people, both targeted in “sensitive” neighbourhoods, only defined on a territorial basis.

**Fascism VS Democracy: the French “Vichy syndrome”**

A recent example can be mentioned to illustrate this idea of a “Vichy syndrome”. In December 2003, in Douai (a Northern city governed by the right wing), the police superintendent proposed to coordinate some “citoyens-relais”, that is to say sentinels in charge of reporting crime and disorders committed in their neighbourhood. The municipal council unanimously rejected the proposal,¹⁷ which means that there was a political consensus on that topic. This example is quite interesting since the proposal made by this superintendent clearly looks like what happened in Modena (see Poletti, 2002). The municipal council evoked the protection of democracy to justify their decision.

The Vichy period gave birth to the French Militia, i.e. some French people tracking down Jewish people but also other French people, especially thanks to denunciation. Since this historical event, collective action in the field of security has often been associated with denunciation and militia, so that there is a strong consensus in the population, in particular among civil servants and officials, that security must be provided by professionals in charge (Donzelot et al, 2003; Donzelot and Wyvekens, 2004; Roché, 1998b: 115-151). If one looks at the evolution of public opinion concerning crime, the support given to any further collaboration between the public and the police is very low. To the question “what should be done to improve public safety?”, if harsher sentences grew up from 33 % from June 1990 to 47.8 % in January 1998, collaborate with police and gendarmes remained stable and even slightly decreased, from 20.7 to 19 % (Poll Credoc-IHESI, 1990-1998, quoted in De Maillard, 2006). It must be precised that, in spite of the Vichy trauma, some individual denouncements still happen, as the Municipal Police Manager in Grenoble pointed out.¹⁸ It means that “collective denouncement” is avoided but that “individual denouncement” still happens.

Besides, Donzelot and Wyvekens (2004: 184) have pointed out that the civil servants that are involved in security policies (Prefect, Public Prosecutor) have a hierarchical

¹⁸ Interview with the Municipal police Manager in Grenoble, January 2006. During this interview, he showed me some photos he had received from residents. If one photo clearly showed a man with a gun walking through the central park in Villeneuve, another one only showed two young people talking. The latter was sent by a resident who asked the Municipal police manager if these two young people were delinquents or not.
legitimacy but not a territorial one, unlike local officials such as the Mayor. Therefore, the diffusion of community policing practices—which come from a criticism of the traditional police model (Crawford, 1997: 46) and implies civil servants accountability to the local population—has been obstructed in France. It is true that the watchword “proximity” means bringing institutions and deprived districts’ residents nearer, in order to fight against their feeling of neglect (Donzelot et al., 2002), but three kinds of criticism are often made by professionals: the public is not enough skilled; their participation may be said as being illegitimate; they may endanger themselves (Roché, 2002). It seems obvious that these criticisms prevent civil servants and professionals from co-involving the local population in the security co-production.

On the opposite, the neighbourhood watch structure implemented in Modena can be considered as the strategy implemented by the local authorities, i.e. relying on the auto-organisation of civil society by reactivating informal social mechanisms of control. As De Maillard (2006) has noticed, Garland (2001: 124) has argued that the US and the UK would have been characterised by a process of responsibilization of private actors (citizens, the community, individuals, private firms) by trying to help them use their competences. According to some local representatives, the same principle guided the municipal policy in Modena.

It was all the more easy to implement as citizens’ committees don’t seem to be suspected of antidemocratic attitudes. It is all the more interesting to wonder why as Italy has also been marked by a Fascist government and then a civil war between Democrats and Fascists. The study of the sociological characteristics of committees’ members can help to understand this peculiarity. Among the numerous researches carried out on citizens’ committees that have been mentioned earlier, some common elements seem to emerge as regard their members’ sociological characteristics: strong territorial identity (old residents, often owners); anterior leftist associative experiences in some cases; leaders with high education levels; inter-classes composition; high standard of living. As Melossi sums it up:

“Citizens’ committees have appeared especially in those areas undergoing deep change in terms of urban renewal and socio-economic development, as research done in Emilia-Romagna (Selmini, 1997), Milan (A.A.S.T.E.R. 1997), Turin (IRES, 1995) and Genoa (Petrillo, 1995) has shown. Especially in traditional working class areas of the North, the community organizations active ‘against’ crime often draw their members from retired workers, former trade unionists and other persons already familiar with social and political participation, often also former Leftists.” (Melossi, 2003: 384)
Indeed, it is important to recall that Modena has continuously been governed by left party coalitions since the end of the Second World War and belongs to the Italian “Red subculture” (Caciagli, 1995), i.e. the Communist one. The Region Emilia-Romagna was a place of Resistance against the fascist government during WWII, so that its support to democracy can’t be denied. Melossi pointed it out well when he quoted “one of the leaders of a committee in Modena, who had been active in the anti-Fascist Resistance” (2003: 384), originally quoted by Selmini (1997: 82). According to Melossi, these citizens seem to mobilize to defend the “democratic order” some of them have helped to build. This analysis seems therefore quite close to Roché’s one about incivilities as a threat, not to “public order”, but to “order in public (spaces)” (Roché, 2002: 131):

“The discourse is not so much about crime but seems to be about disorder and incivilities. The rules of the democratic order are those built during and after the Second World War, starting with the anti-Fascist Resistance:

*We built this town. I remember we – some friends of mine and I – drained a marsh and made a road nearby. . . And we worked for nothing. We wanted to do something for our town, and many of us had this spirit. after the Second World War, when the towns were destroyed. . . And now, what we have done is despised.* (Selmini, 1997: 83)

*We want the town to come back to the period of the great Mayors after the Resistance period. . . We made a lot of sacrifices for the community to reconstruct the towns . . . and now . . .* (Selmini, 1997: 83)

A feeling of nostalgia pervades the stories told by these leaders: nostalgia for one’s town, as it once was for a sense of community, especially of political community, which seems to have disappeared – in an area where traditionally left-wing organizations used to be very strong. A feeling of nostalgia for the hegemonic role these citizens once played in the political and social life of their city, and also regret for local institutions, that used to be ‘their’ institutions, but which are now perceived as more and more distant from the citizens.” (Melossi, 2003: 84)

So, this historical peculiarity can help understanding why citizens who protest on security topics in these regions can’t be suspected of Fascism (Della Porta and Mosca, 2002), since anti-Fascism is one of the main characteristics of the “Red subculture” (Caciagli, 1995). In France, on the opposite, the threat of Fascism and militia has always been used to criticize this kind of initiatives. As a consequence, collective mobilizations on security topics are quite rare, and often occur to protest against violence, but not to ask for more security.
Security, immigration and integration: French political taboos and Italian definition of problems

What is striking in Modena is the meaning of the citizens’ mobilizations. It is useful to bear in mind that citizens’ committees promoted a petition to ask for law enforcement as regarded illegal immigrants who committed crime. One aspect of the security issue in general lies in the statistical relations between crime and immigration. If the question of immigrants’ deviance has been tackled by researchers since the thirties in the USA (see for instance the culture conflict theory elaborated by Sellin, 1938), it has been studied later in France (for a brief state of the art in France, see Mucchielli, 2003) and in Italy, where the first rigorous quantitative research dates from 1998 (Barbagli, 1998a; 2002). As Mucchielli noticed:

“In France as in most western countries, the immigrant is strongly associated with delinquency in collective representations and in media and political discourses concerning « insecurity ». This association can be decomposed into two distinct concerns: the delinquency of foreigners and the delinquency of French youth born of immigrant.” (Mucchielli, 2003)

The main difficulty is that there are no statistical data bases about ethnic origins -because they are considered as opposed to this conception of citizenship- and therefore there is a deep lack of academic studies and researches on the topic. Nobody tackled the issue in the political sphere before the rise of a political party, the National Front, which won votes in the eighties thanks to the immigration and crime stakes. Roché (1994) had already noticed that the fear of the far-right wing had obstructed the emergence of a calm and real debate on integration strategies for French youth born of immigrants. This relation has been dealt with an ideological way for a long time: on the one hand, accusations made by the far-right wing, and then the right wing; and, on the other hand, the left wing anti-racism movements. Over the nineties, the cleavage has been partly blurred up (Mucchielli and Robert, 2002), especially with the political turn made by the Socialist Party and the Jospin Government (1997-2002) on security topics, and more particularly juvenile delinquency. Some discourses admitting that there was an overrepresentation of youth born of African immigrants among juvenile delinquents started emerging (Mucchielli, 2003).

19 For instance, Christian Delorme, the “curé des Minguettes” -i.e. the priest who attended the first events of urban violence in 1981 in Lyons’s banlieue and played an active role in the collective actions lead by youth born of immigrants in the eighties- noticed, during the parliamentary inquiry about juvenile delinquency, that: “In France we don’t manage to say certain things, sometimes for nice reasons. It is the same for the over-delinquency of youth born of immigrants which has been denied for a long time, in order not to stigmatize. We
Thanks to a self-reported crime study carried out in 1999, Roché was the first researcher to point out that there was a genuine overrepresentation of French youth born of immigrants among juvenile delinquents (Roché, 2001). Indeed, approximately 40% of the French prisoners have their father who was born in a foreign country, and among them, 25% in Northern Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) (Cassan et al., 2000). Roché underlined that the youth born of immigrants concentrated some factors associated with juvenile delinquency, i.e. lower parents supervision, more frequent residence’s location in social housing area (out of the centre), lower income and graduate levels of the parents, more frequent school-leaving (Roché, 2001: 221).

The study on juvenile delinquents in Isère, carried out by Roché and Dagnaud (2003) over a fifteen-year period, provided the same results. 66.5% of the court cases studied had their father who was born in a foreign country, 49.8% of them in North Africa (and 33.3% of them in Algeria). The analysis of immigration flows in Isère allowed to conclude that the large proportion of youth born of immigrants didn’t result from a particular concentration of North Africa immigrants in this department. More generally speaking, it is necessary to recall that in France, half of the immigrants come from a European country. According to the two researchers, in 1999, 63% of the North African family heads in Isère were Algerian, but in the judiciary statistics, the proportion of young people born in Algeria compared to those born in the whole North Africa was higher.

In Italy, Barbagli has underlined that the lack of integration for new immigrants could help them falling into crime (Barbagli, 1998a). And some observers have underlined to what extent the French model of integration had failed. As Crawford pointed out:

“Increasingly, some French commentators have become more willing to recognize that the model of integration is in crisis (Wieviorka, 1997). And yet, at the level of politics, there remains ambivalence. On the one hand, Universalist strategies fail to accommodate the diverse cultural and plural social make-up of modern France. On the other, the politics of targeting particular areas is criticized for turning its back on the republican ideal and simultaneously encouraging a process of ghettoization. In consequence, there is a hesitant movement between universalist discourse and differentialist practice, in which the politics of insecurity has become increasingly racialized.” (Crawford, 2002: 228)

have waited that the reality of neighbourhoods, police stations, courts, prisons set the evidence of this over-representation to admit it publicly. However, politicians don’t know how to speak of it.” (Délinquance des mineurs: la République en quête de respect, report to President of the Senate. June 2002, quoted by Dagnaud and Roché, 2003: 15-16).
These tensions between ideal and reality do illustrate the political taboo that has characterized the issue in France for twenty-five years. Besides, the refusal to use the word “community” in France is another symptom. It is a republican symbolic that remains strong in the public discourses: any reference to communities is most of the time reduced to its ethnic dimension and is seen as undermining the collective basis and the unity of the French society. “Communities” (or any religious or cultural specificity) must remain in the private sphere. It is of course hypocrisy: designating some priority areas is a way dealing with specific ethnic populations, denying the existence of ethnic minorities in public discourses doesn’t prevent from practical arrangements with their leaders. It is therefore easy to understand why, from a French point of view, the Italian way of defining the security problem as tightly linked to immigration is quite striking, especially in Modena where citizens’ committees promoted the petition that gave birth to the Turco-Napolitano law.

First of all, Italy is a more recent immigration country. On the opposite, the country has been marked by emigration for years, but also by strong internal migrations, especially from the poor and agrarian South to the rich and industrialized North. This element is quite important to notice, because it means that first extra-European Community migrants only arrived at the beginning of the nineties, so that it can be thought that integration problems regarding the youth born of immigrants haven’t happened yet. Nevertheless, the internal migration flow within the country has familiarized some Italians with the immigration phenomenon: Northern and Central Italians who lived in areas marked by a lack of workers have known the massive arrival of Southern workers. Indeed, migration flows in Italy have always had a strong economic dimension. Today, immigration fluxes are partly indispensable for the Italian economy. Some sectors are quasi exclusively provided for by new migrants, such as agrarian works, low qualified industrial jobs, manufactures or in house services for people (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004: 77).

Second, the overrepresentation of foreign people among delinquents has been proved in Italy (Barbagli, 1998a; 2002) and the debate on security has always been tightly connected to that on immigration. For instance, the Home Minister (Napolitano, 1997) claimed in 1997 that:

«Foreign criminality in Italia was fed by the increasing number of non European immigrants coming from developing countries, who remained in Italia over the legal period, in a desperate search of solutions to their elementary problems of survival. » quoted by (quoted by Barbagli. 1998a: 8)
In this context, it is interesting to examine public opinion about immigration. On the one hand, there is a strong trend among public opinion to consider immigration as a source of crime. This trend has been rising since the end of the nineties, especially in Northern Italy, among old pensioners, and in big cities, i.e. over 100,000 inhabitants (Bordignon and Diamanti, 2001). On the other hand, Chiodi’s analysis about immigration and insecurity in Crocetta has clearly pointed out that there were several categories of immigrants according to the committees’ leaders that she had interviewed, which can be summed up as the “wrong” ones, who had come to Italy to traffic and commit crime, such as street pushers, often associated with North-Africa immigrants; and the “right” ones, who had come to work, such as Black people (Chiodi, 1997-1998). Melossi and Selmini have underlined to what extent these immigrants were perceived as threatening the existing democratic order:

“The attention of these “communitarian groups” focuses in particular on crime and deviance among recent immigrants groups and their visibility in the everyday life of the neighbourhood. At the core of the problem there no longer seems to be simply a threat to one’s property or personal safety, but rather a generalised risk for the whole society, for an idea of order -of democratic order […]” (Melossi and Selmini, 2000: 159)

The local way of defining the security and immigration problem in (Northern) Italy seems to be based on a strict differentiation between delinquents and the rest of the population, even if it can lead to focussing on immigrants and distinguishing between « right » and « wrong » immigrants. The criterion of legality - that is to say helping new legal migrants to integrate, even if there is no national integration policy for immigrants20 - has been promoted as the main principle that guided policies in Modena21, but also in Bologna22. So, it can be argued that a strong local identity has made easier the definition of an “outgroup”, all the more as it is composed of “visible” people. In Villeneuve-VO, according to a municipal official, one of the main problems in this neighbourhood is that the police have now to cope with “crime hard cores”, i.e. hyperactive delinquents who are responsible for a large part of crime, who live there23. Indeed, Roché’s study on juvenile delinquents in Isère – based on the analysis of judiciary archives from 1985 to 2000- pointed out that 53% of the offenders who

20 This way of framing the issue obviously recalls the “culture of legality” that has been promoted for years in Southern Italy to fight against mafias. “Culture of legality” is still a part of a lot of projects developed by the PON (Programma Operativo Nazionale, National Operative Program), i.e. a national security plan for the South aimed at encouraging the economic development.
21 Interview with the former Mayor of Modena. June 2005.
22 Interview with the former Mayor of Modena and the Mayor of Bologna. June 2005.
23 Interview with the director of the security and crime prevention municipal department. January 2006.
lived in Grenoble (29.5% of the cases studied) lived in Teisseire, Villeneuve or Mistral (Dagnaud and Roché, 2003: 21). So, it could be hypothesized that this element makes citizens’ mobilizations more uneasy in some neighbourhoods, all the more as the local identity is weaker.

Moreover, even if the “banlieue” phenomenon seems undoubtedly less diffused in Italy than in France, it is undeniable that the French experience seems to play a rejection role among civil servants and elected officials. Italian newspapers, but more generally newspapers in the whole world, strongly stigmatized the last November urban riots. It could even be hypothesized that there is a sort of learning effect for recent immigration countries, whose officials seem to take the issue into consideration. For instance, a statistical study for the City of Bologna, entitled “periferie urbane e ghetti: gli immigrati a Bologna, 2001-2006” and supervised by M. Barbagli, clearly underlined that there was no significant statistical correlation between areas where new migrants lived and the unemployment rate, which meant that immigrants didn’t live in the economically weakest areas.

In France, the Republican model of integration has obstructed any social differentiation, and since the eighties, successive Governments have been promoting a blind territorial differentiation that has condemned “sensitive” neighbourhoods’ residents to be stigmatized as if they were delinquents. The Home Minister’s declaration about “scum”, before urban violence started, and the deep polemic it caused, do illustrates this idea. On the one hand, the Home Minister claimed that “youth people” didn’t mean “delinquents” and that some “scum” ruined the whole neighbourhood’s life; on the other hand, his detractors underlined that there were not only delinquents in these neighbourhoods, and young people born of immigrants who lived there felt insulted.

The last urban violence events in France allowed the emergence of renewed discourses about integration and citizens’ involvement. Some citizens got involved in foot patrolling under the supervision of the Mayor in several cities, without being accused of Fascism.24 On the opposite, the defence of democratic order was evoked to justify these mobilizations. It can’t be denied that this element is quite new in the French political landscape and would have to be analyzed if the trend was confirmed. As far as the immigration issue is concerned,

24 See for instance the case of Asnières, located close to Paris, where the mayor organized patrols composed of citizens (in fact mainly workers employed by the municipality and political activists). Without being armed, there were charged of missions of surveillance and dialogue with youngsters. This operation limited in time and scale had mainly a media objective (see Libération, 11.11.2005) and citizens patrols were not supervised by the Police (see Le Monde.fr: AFP, 11.08.2005).
it seems to be tackled more frankly in the Italian political debate, but without any national measure regarding immigrants’ immigration, in spite of political discourses. On the one hand, the French model of territorial differentiation, through territorial affirmative action, can be criticized; on the other hand, the social differentiation on which local communities are based can make immigrants’ integration harder. We can hope that a third way could emerge between the two, and the legality criterion, experimented at the local level in Italy and hardly outlined at the national level in France, could be the first step toward a well-balanced model.

**Conclusion**

Starting from the analysis of two participative projects in Modena and Grenoble, I have tried to explain the key explanatory factors of community participation in the field of security, even if some components are still hypotheses and lack pieces of evidence.

The main idea is that in front of security problems, one has three main adaptation strategies: exit, voice or loyalty (Hirschman, 1970). Citizens who could afford it have left the neighbourhood that has started declining; those who couldn’t leave by lack of economic capital retracted (Roché, 2002). This is what has often happened in some French neighbourhoods, where middle classes have left (Bachmann and Le Guennec, 1997). But why have other citizens chosen voice? Roché has pointed out that fear of crime depends on crime rates, but the way it is expressed by citizens depends on their personal exposition to crime, and their vulnerability (Roché, 1998a). I would add that the way they express a security demand partly depends on their political culture. I think that a specific political culture, based on a strong territorial identity can explain why some residents have refused to leave. There are some pieces of evidence in Northern Italy, where some components of the Red political subculture - i.e. localism, a diffused network of associations ideologically oriented and a deep feeling of territorial membership (Trigilia, 1981; 1986) - can explain the citizens’ committees phenomenon. Since voice is allowed by the existence of diffused social capital, it can be thought that in Villeneuve, some citizens -those who have been living in the neighbourhood since the beginning, and who belong to local networks of associations- have also chosen voice, i.e. to express a security demand as defined by Roché (1998b). But, as in Villeneuve there were rooted local mediation channels (Motte, 2003), their security demand was
institutionally channeled, whereas in Modena and more generally in Northern Italy, the political party crisis has dismantled the existing mediation channels. The political party crisis could therefore explain the emergence of citizens’ committees, especially in regions where civic traditions were deeply rooted, such as in Emilia-Romagna (Putnam et al., 1993). The way some citizens’ committees have been institutionalized in Modena could confirm this idea: the local government is creating its own mediation channels, especially thanks to circumscriptions. It can be imagined that in Villeneuve-VO, the local government has implemented a “taken under control” consultative process to cope with the “voice” expressed by the deeply rooted citizens, i.e. taking them into consideration while preventing the emergence of collective protest, since we have seen that in France, officials are reluctant to admit citizens’ involvement in the co-production of security (Roché, 2002), party because of what we have called the “Vichy syndrome”. Lastly, as regards the meaning of mobilizations in Italy, we think that the strong territorial identities that exist –as components of political subcultures– have favoured the protest against a well-defined out-group (Chiodi, 1997-1998), i.e. illegal immigrants who commit crime. Della Porta has underlined to what extent the citizens’ committees phenomenon can be considered as the expression as a growing preoccupation towards immigration in the nineties (2004b). In Modena, the strong territorial differentiation between residents and new immigrants has made easier a social differentiation based on the legality criterion. In France, the Republican model of integration has made this kind of social differentiation uneasy, all the more as the immigration and security issues have only been tackled by a far-right political party. It would therefore be interesting to investigate the meaning of the security demand as expressed in Grenoble to understand how citizens define security problems in their neighbourhood.
Glossary

CCS: *Conseils Consultatifs de Secteurs*, Neighbourhood Consultative Councils

CPOSP: *Comitato Provinciale per l’Ordine e la Sicurezza Pubblica*, Provincial Committee for Order and Public Security

CPT: *Centro di Permanenza Temporanea*, Temporaneous-Stay Center

DS: *Democratici di Sinistra*, Left Democrats

GAM: *Groupe d’Action Municipale*, Municipal Action Group

GIR: *Groupes d’Intervention Régionaux*, Intervention Regional Groups

PON: *Programma Operativo Nazionale*, National Operative Program

PSU: *Parti Socialiste Unifié*, Unified Socialist Party

SFIO: *Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière*, French Section of the Socialist International

UQ: *Union de Quartiers*, Neighbourhoods Union

ZRU: *Zone de Redynamisation Urbaine*, Urban Re-vitalization Zone

ZUP: *Zones à Urbaniser par Priorité*, Priority Urbanisation Zone

ZUS: *Zone Urbaine Sensible*, Sensitive Urban Zone

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