Les illusions de la réponse occidentale à l'islamisme
Résumé
Rising to the challenges that the 9/11 attacks have hurled in the face of the western world would require a twofold - both attentive and at the same time prudential - examination, on the one hand, of the political agenda of the “aggressors”, and, on the other, of that of the camp of the “aggressed”. It was important to ascertain what motives may, “through our enemies' eyes ”, have possibly legitimized such violence. One should also attempt to determine whether all those, American superpower, European middle-weight powers, overprotected Hebrew State or Arab authoritarian regimes, who parade on the salutary right-hand of the domination ratio, had anything to answer for in the upstaging of such a spectacular triumph of the logic of confrontation. But on the political level, neither the lucid scrutiny of the aggressor's motivations nor any realistic introspection into the possible share in responsibility of the camp of the victims of aggression however seem to have truly happened.
The “ democracies' response” was mainly first to rush head down into the shortcuts of massive recourse to military, security-obsessed hard power. Parallel to the language of power, a communication strategy has been deployed around two main axes. The first concerned the simple legitimisation of a recourse to the devastating and indiscriminate effects of gigantic bombs, the so-called Daisy cutters, used in Afghanistan. The second was deployed at the same time within a more subtle cultural and educational register. It has been aimed up to this very day at promoting in the “Greater Middle East” - an audacious conceptual innovation on the part of the American administration, bracketing the part of the Muslim world comprised between Morocco and Afghanistan - for “modernizing openings”, predicated as both political and cultural, concerning which a priori everyone involved should have had every possible reason to rejoice. An attentive examination of the process introduced by Washington and in the main endorsed by Europe was however very soon to display its limits: here again, it was the most pernicious unilateralism which was to prevail. It was the Other, and only the Other, who needed to heed the clarion-call for change, leaving the imbalance of the distribution of the world's resources safely shielded against any critical scrutiny.
The “ democracies' response” was mainly first to rush head down into the shortcuts of massive recourse to military, security-obsessed hard power. Parallel to the language of power, a communication strategy has been deployed around two main axes. The first concerned the simple legitimisation of a recourse to the devastating and indiscriminate effects of gigantic bombs, the so-called Daisy cutters, used in Afghanistan. The second was deployed at the same time within a more subtle cultural and educational register. It has been aimed up to this very day at promoting in the “Greater Middle East” - an audacious conceptual innovation on the part of the American administration, bracketing the part of the Muslim world comprised between Morocco and Afghanistan - for “modernizing openings”, predicated as both political and cultural, concerning which a priori everyone involved should have had every possible reason to rejoice. An attentive examination of the process introduced by Washington and in the main endorsed by Europe was however very soon to display its limits: here again, it was the most pernicious unilateralism which was to prevail. It was the Other, and only the Other, who needed to heed the clarion-call for change, leaving the imbalance of the distribution of the world's resources safely shielded against any critical scrutiny.
La réponse aux défis que les attentats du 11 septembre ont posés au monde occidental exigeait un double examen attentif et prudent de l'agenda politique des « agresseurs » d'une part, de celui du camp des « agressés » également, d'autre part. Il importait de savoir quels motifs avaient, « à travers les yeux de nos ennemis », légitimé une pareille violence. Il convenait également de savoir si tous ceux, superpuissance américaine, moyennes puissances européennes, État hébreu surprotégé ou régimes autoritaires arabes, qui évoluent du bon côté du rapport de domination, avaient quelque chose à voir dans ce triomphe spectaculaire de la logique de la confrontation. Mais à l'échelon politique, ni l'examen lucide des motivations de l'agresseur, ni l'introspection réaliste de la part possible de responsabilité du camp des agressés n'ont pourtant réellement eu lieu. La « réponse des démocraties » a d'abord emprunté, pour l'essentiel, les raccourcis d'un recours massif au hard power militaire et sécuritaire. Parallèlement au langage de la force, une stratégie de communication s'est déployée autour de deux grands axes. Le premier procédait de la simple légitimation du recours aux effets dévastateurs et indiscriminés des bombes géantes dites Daisy cutters, utilisées en Afghanistan. Le second s'est déployé parallèlement sur un registre culturel et éducatif plus subtil. Il vise jusqu'à ce jour à promouvoir dans le « Grand Moyen-Orient » - une audacieuse innovation conceptuelle de l'administration américaine pour désigner la partie du monde musulman comprise entre le Maroc et l'Afghanistan - des « ouvertures modernisatrices » à la fois politiques et culturelles dont a priori chacun ne peut que se féliciter. L'examen attentif de la démarche initiée par Washington et cautionnée pour l'essentiel par l'Europe révèle pourtant très vite ses limites : là encore, c'est l'unilatéralisme le plus pernicieux qui prévaut. C'est l'Autre, et seulement lui, qui est invité à changer, laissant le déséquilibre de la répartition mondiale des ressources à l'abri de toute réflexion critique.
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