

**ON THE INTEREST OF INTRODUCING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS IN THE  
FRENCH URBAN TRANSPORT: A PROPOSAL FOR AN EUROPEAN  
BENCHMARKING ANALYSIS**

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In Europe, interesting European experiences in the field of production of indicators in order to measure the performance (as efficiency) of the public transport exist. This paper analyses five European cases : England, France, Norway, Sweden, and Italy. Those countries have more or less recent institutional changes : the criteria of performance seems to be more and more taken into account in those institutional changes, in particular because of the competition (but not only). Different actors in each country intervene to give more importance to the performance and its measure : the local authorities and the operators thanks to contractual mechanisms and performance incentives for instance. Local and national initiatives will be mentioned in the production of performance indicators. It will perhaps give some possible scenarios in the field of performance indicators for the French public transport case.

## **1. Introduction**

- **Context and issue**

The urban transport is one of the emblematic local sector that knows a double evolution in the European area. On the one hand, in some European countries, the decentralisation reinforced the local regulation of the public services with a “*competition for the market*”, by legitimating the role of the local communities (becoming authorities of transport). The reflections on the measuring instruments of the performance fall under this quite precise context of the process of decentralisation. In this context, it is to reconsider the local public management tools and specifically the statistical data that the local communities will have to appropriate themselves. In the other hand, the liberalisation, by the introduction of a European regulation with a “*competition by the market*” (tendering Contracts), comes to upset the technical, lawful and economic conditions under which the local service is organised.

This evolution and the complexity of the contractual organisation comes to redefine contours of the regulation of the public utility of the urban transport. Indeed, to the existing questions of competition and the contractual methods, comes to be grafted the performance and its measurement. Consequently, integrate the performance in the regulation of the sector becomes a necessity (we will understand by the regulation term the whole of the interventions of the authorities aiming at founding competition in a sector where it exists more or less according to countries and to reconcile the exercise of competition with the “missions of general interest”).

This regulation by the performance must be introduced with new performance mechanisms in the public transport in France. It is about to promote competition, and take care that the objectives raising traditionally of the general interest can be achieved by measuring the effectiveness of the service in its contractual and competing environment.

Complex dimension in the public services, the performance of a service can be declined in different economic configurations according to countries, but the idea will be retained that the research and the measure of the efficiency of the public utility is an important and necessary stage. By mobilising this economic criterion, we are able to show better the maturity and the capacity of the local authority in the management of his urban network. So, the comparative analysis will require to carry out a decomposition by level of actors and not simply wondering about the only definition of the economic criteria of measurement mobilised. We will show how some countries as Sweden are able to exceed the only unilateral performance of market and production (technical and financial) of the operator and the service (from the physical point of view). In fact, some countries succeed in the measurement of a trilateral performance where the local authority and the users must be implied as much as the operator of transport and to have instruments of the performance of the service.

- **Method**

By establishing a monographic analysis by comparing in the space the measurement of the urban transport performance by means of the use of indicators (France, England, Italy, Norway and Sweden), the aim of the paper is double. First, show why and how, according to the recent evolutions in the European urban transport, the dimension of the performance, in the regulation of the sector, is taken into account in the different European areas. Secondly, it is about to compare the different European areas on the compromise performance-competition, the introduction of indicators as instruments of measurement.

In the Scandinavian countries, it would be necessary to be interested in what is done in Sweden and in Norway. In Sweden, the performance indicators are divided by various cities and networks to ensure benchmarking and of collective stimulation for better performances. With the Swedish Customer Barometer, a barometer of satisfaction, it makes it possible to make all kinds of comparisons between the urban transport areas. Also, it is the subject of monthly reports and ratios on Internet. The practice of performance evaluation in urban public transport in Norway is recently developed. The recent introduction of a collection of statistical data could make evolve the situation. England represents the Anglo Saxon model. In England, national authorities promote the principle of

*value for money*, that is to say the social utility of the public money and the role of the user in the processes of performance measurement. Deregulated sector, independent authorities are in charge of the measurement of the performance (the Audit Commission). In Italy, it is about for the moment of a institutional reorganisation and beginning of entry in the competition which will change certainly concerning the measurement of the performance.

This reflection allowed us take some conclusions for the French urban transport. That is to say, the research of a new instrumentation by introducing indicators of performance. But for France, the interest of the foreign experiments appears balanced. On one side, the variety of the foreign models multiplies the scenarios of which it can be inspired. On other side, the intensity of the legal and cultural differences encourages with prudence in the transpositions. In France, the Ministry of Transport often proposes more or less strong control for the local authorities. Whatever is the degree and the methods of intervention of the public power, it was done with a major objective : the constitution of a transport system covering the territories and answering to missions of public utility of continuity, adaptability and equality.

The final objective of this study is to achieve a typology of the practices of evaluation, but, also to be able to draw up difference models of regulation by the performance of urban public transport and to see what could be transferred to the French model. The choice of the countries is justified by the following points : some countries as Italy or France are a typical example of communal management, other countries as England are typical example of national and privatised management for public transport and its measurement of performance.

- **Plan**

First, we will analyse the institutional framework. It will be about, on the one hand, to show how the criteria of performance is taken into account in the Laws in each country; on the other hand, the model of public/private intervention in the transport in England, Norway, Sweden, Italy and France will be analysed.

Then, the different models of regulation/performance/competition is presented. The objective is to present the different models existing in the European public areas where, to measure the performance of public transport, performance indicators are used.

## **2. The institutional framework: from the legislative evolution to the model of intervention in the transport in England, Norway, Sweden, Italy and France**

Before considering the performance indicators, our reflection will initially carry on a brief study of the various reforms in the different public transport countries and the model of public/private intervention. With legislative changes, two processes upset the organisation of public transport. First, the decentralisation legitimates the role of the local authorities. Then, the deregulation transforms the conditions in which the local transport is organised. This context, double, is not neutral regarding the performance mechanisms.

### ***A. The institutional framework: evolutions in favour of the performance in the public transport?***

- **The public transport authority reform in Sweden**

The public transport authority reform was decided by Parliament in **1978**. Before the reform, the need to improve co-ordination of public transport is pronounced. The resolution Parliament in 1978 called for each County to form an authority having responsibility for local and regional road public transport<sup>1</sup>, the starting point of the reform was mainly that the traffic policy goals concerning a satisfactory service level in different parts of the countries could not be met without a well built up public transport. In this parliament reform, decisions concerning network of services, timetables, vehicle comfort were very important. Decisions concerning such standard performance factors should not be made through national directives but instead be based on considerations on a regional and local level.

#### **Note 1: The Swedish public transport evolution**

- **The Public Transport Authority reform in 1978** : Each region was to establish a PTA
- A resolution adopted in 1985 concerning procurement under competition in Sweden near to the “*controlled competition*” that the European Union recently has drawn up in order to improve the attractiveness of public transport.
- **The 1988 Transport policy decision**. Transport authorities became responsible for County rail services. Government contribution towards operational costs during ten years. Government grants for investments in public transport infrastructure etc.
- In 1989, the public transport authorities became responsible for all local and regional scheduled transport (public transport by bus, train and boat). The **possibility for procurement via competitive tendering was established**.

Deregulation in 1989 have contributed to enabling the transport authorities to pan traffic in a better way than before and to co-ordinate these transports with bus services.

- **England: the Best Value Plan**

Best Value is government policy in the United Kingdom affecting the provision of public services in England and Wales<sup>2</sup>. Best Value was introduced in the **1999** Local Government Act by the UK Labour Government, and its provisions came into force in April 2000. The aim was to improve local services in terms of both cost and quality: “*A Best Value authority must make arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness* (LGA 1999, section 3<sup>3</sup>).”

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<sup>1</sup> During the 1990s, the organisation of public transportation in Sweden has changed drastically. In the early 1990s, all regional County councils were compelled by the State to set up regional transport authorities. The regional transport authorities are responsible for the supply of regional and local passenger transport services. Various market mechanisms have been used to an increasing extent in the system for public transportation in Sweden. During the 1990s, a growing part of the passenger transportation has been put up for tender on the open market. Private companies run almost all public passenger transportation by now.

<sup>2</sup> In Wales, Best Value is known as the Wales Programme for Improvement.

<sup>3</sup> LGA 1999 Local Government Act 1999 available at: <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1999/19990027.htm>

The notion of Best Value prior to implementation was enshrined within one key consultation document: Modernising Local Government - Improving local services through best value (DETR, 1998<sup>4</sup>). This set out four defining elements of Best Value in several services as public transport<sup>5</sup>:

- The first was the duty to secure economic, efficient and effective transport services continuously (the '3 Es'<sup>6</sup>);
- The second required service reviews within which the authority must demonstrate that in the fulfilment of their duties under Best Value they have: compared their service provision with that of other private and public providers; consulted with local business and community; considered competition in provision; and challenged the reasons for, and methods of, provision (the '4 Cs');
- The third defining element introduced a regime of audit and measurement of performance, with the broad expectation that, year-on-year, **costs would reduce and quality would increase**. Performance would be monitored locally through Best Value Performance Reviews (BVPRs), partly through adherence to locally and statutorily determined Best Value performance indicators (BVPIs), and disseminated annually through Performance Plans (BVPPs);
- The fourth defining element of Best Value outlined the consequence of performance: Government intervention in cases of Best Value failure, and reward in cases of success.

Best value Plan was introduced after the deregulation in the sector started in 1979<sup>7</sup>.

- **The Italian public transport reform: between Regionalization and liberalisation**

In Italy, the public transport is going through a radical transformation since the 1999's. With the new **decrees 422/97 and 400/99**, the reform of the sector has considerably progressed. With the first decree, the process of "concession" is abolished. With the second decree, the reform is particularly based on the creation on strong local public organs. They will be in charge of the management and the **control of the local public transport**. And then, the reform will reorganise the management of services by access to the market in a competitive way<sup>8</sup>. Thus, the decree make mandatory to invitation to tender from December, 31<sup>st</sup>, 2003. The aim is to **increase the effectiveness of the operators, the quality of service and to reduce the costs of management and exploitation**.

These new legal arrangement systematised the process of separation between the functions of the companies and those of the local public authorities. On this basis, the great new arrangement and the fundamental principles introduced by the legislative decree 422 are as follows:

**Note 2: The public transport in Italy: towards new principles**

- Privatisation of transport companies: legal transformation of municipalized companies in joint stock companies (at December, 31<sup>st</sup>, 2003)
- Regionalization of competencies: the legal and financial competencies of the sector are transferred from the State to the regions.
- Establishment of the "service contract": setting up of contract-based links between the company and the public authority responsible of public transport
- Implementing of a "controlled deregulation": the concession of public service can done only by tendering.

<sup>4</sup> Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998), *Modernising local government: Improving local services through best value*, London, DETR

<sup>5</sup> G. Boyne, (1999), *Processes, Performance and Best Value in Local Government, Managing Local Services: From CCT to Best Value*, (Editor Boyne, G) Frank Cass, London

<sup>6</sup> Department For Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR), (2004), *Use of local Performance Indicators in the Best Value Regime, Final Report*, 46 pages.

<sup>7</sup> David Bayliss, (march 1999), *Buses in Great Britain : privatisation, deregulation and competition*, 31 pages.

<sup>8</sup> ASSTRA, ANAV, (marzo 2005), *Rapporto sul trasporto pubblico locale, situazione attuale e prospettive evolutive, Benchmark europeo e linee guida per lo sviluppo del TPL italiano*, 90 pages.

- **The French public transport: between efficiency, competition and transparency?**

In France, the public transport system is based on controlled competition and Contracts between a public authority and operators<sup>9</sup>. In both systems, there is a clear distinction between the organisation of services and the operations.

**Note 3: The two fundamental principles in the French public transport**

- The organisation of public transport services inside the urban area is a public local monopoly. The public transport authority (“*Autorité Organisatrice*”) in charge of this skill is a municipality, or a group of municipalities
- Services could be either contracted out or directly operated by a publicly owned institution. About more than 90% of urban public transport services are contracted out to passenger transport companies. These companies are mainly private one (most of them belong to one of the three national transport groups), but there are also semi-public ones<sup>10</sup> (“*société d’économie mixte*”).

Then, the Law “**Loi d’Orientation des Transports Intérieurs**”, of December 30, 1982 is the fundamental law of organisation of the public services of transport. It affirmed a right to transport having to make it possible to move "under reasonable conditions of access, quality and price as well as costs for the community". The LOTI also clarified the relations between local authorities and operators (when the community has recourse there) by imposing the contract between the two parts.

This law framework frames and fixes the context in which transport is organised and carried out. Regarding the performance, the **article 14** allows to fix to the local authorities and the operators an **economic requirement of effectiveness**. The local authorities, whereas they are in charge of the organisation of the sector, they have not always the possibility to control the performance both of the service, the contract and the operator.

Lastly, the **research of the best cost for the authority** and this principle of agreement prepared the ground for the application in 1993 of the law known as “**Sapin Law**”. The 1993 “**Sapin**” legislation set the new guidelines to local transport authorities. Local transport authorities assemblies are to decide on the principle and characteristics of all delegation of public services. They vote on the choice of the operator to whom they delegate and on the contents of the delegation Contracts. The decision to delegate and the type of delegation are political choices that are reflected in the type of delegation Contracts. Quality (comfort, reliability, information), cost (productivity, maintenance), fares (social, unemployed, handicapped), level of service (frequency, capacity) : a combination of these criteria form part of the delegation Contracts

- **Norwegian Public Transport: in favour of tendering?**

Historically, Norwegian public transport services have been subject to substantial public regulation. In 1991, transport legislation changes : from 1994, County councils are also allowed to use competitive tendering as an alternative to negotiations. But despite the opportunity to use tendering, it has up to now only been initiated on a limited part of transport services in Norway. Many local authorities are still unsure whether they should introduce competitive tendering or not. One of the alternatives (part 3) consists in using “long term performance based Contracts<sup>11</sup>” : the counties commit themselves not to use tendering in the contract period if the operators manage to reduce production costs.

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<sup>9</sup> In the capital area (Paris Ile de France), the public transport is based on a system of “*exclusive rights*” protecting the operator from competition from new entrants.

<sup>10</sup> The majority of the capital belongs to local community.

<sup>11</sup> Terje Mathisen, Gisle Solvoll, (1999), *Competitive tendering and structural changes in the bus industry : the Norwegian Case*, Graduate School of Business, 12 pages.

## ***B. Public/private intervention and performance: which actors intervene?***

The urban public transport sector knows several changes creating a considerable impact on its organisation. In this context, it is neither easy to have a clear vision of the respective missions and role of the principal actors of the sector nor to understand the distribution of the responsibilities and competencies. This interrogation lies to the organisation of the sector. According to a study<sup>12</sup>, the companies and the local authorities are considered as the main forces in the organisation of the sector. Nevertheless, their nature and role vary in accordance with the different countries. The question of performance is important for the local authorities. Their target is to develop urban public transport and improve their quality. It is about also to reduce costs. It is up to the local authorities to specify the policy of public transport. But they are not always possible to exerting a control on the quality of the service.

- **The role of the government**

The role of **Swedish government** is mainly to secure that basic transport needs are satisfied and that good conditions for co-ordination and development of public transport are created<sup>13</sup>.

The **British public transport sector** is accompanied by a strong control of the central Government on the efficient policies followed by the British local communities (while public transport is deregulated). The Ministry for Transport (Department For Transport) is in charge of the one of an important mission : an encouragement with the improvement of transport (Transport Plan for 2010)<sup>14</sup>. In Norway, the Norwegian Ministry for Transport has not really a role concerning the of evaluation and measurement of the public transport performance. Recently, on his own initiative, the Ministry for Transport calls for the Institute of Transport Economics to produce statistical data (part 3).

- **The public transport authorities<sup>15</sup> and the operators: which responsibility in the field of the performance?**

The triad of transport authorities, private transportation companies and **customers** are thus the parties involved in the public transportation system in Sweden (HAGLUND, 2001) but also in England (**part 3**).

Public Transport in Sweden is characterised by County-wise co-ordination under a Public Transport Authority (“PTA”), which is politically and financially responsible for all local and regional public transport within the County.

An important characteristic of public transport in **France** is that there is a clear distinction between the respective role of local Governments and operators.

- **Specifics actors in the field of the performance**

- \* **The Swedish Public Transport Association and the role of “consulting” agencies**

The Swedish Public Transport Association (SLTF) is the trade organisation of local and regional public transport in Sweden. The overall aim of SLTF is to strengthen the competitive power of public transport in order to attract more people to use it<sup>16</sup>.

Moreover, to facilitate the comparison of the performance between the authorities of transport

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<sup>12</sup> Coen Volp, Cécile Sadoux, (mars 2005), *A market in motion*, Union Internationale des Transports Publics, 58 pages.

<sup>13</sup> As part of this work, the government has appointed a parliamentary chosen committee, the public transport delegation Government: the task of the delegation is to identify, analyse and describe problems and opportunities of public transport, formulate objectives and visions and to propose changes in the organisation, regulatory framework that are important for the development of public transport all from a consumer and overall point of view. The delegation constitute a forum for the co-operation between the government and others actors.

<sup>14</sup> The definition, the supervision and the setting of the strategy related to the urban transport and the planning of the future needs and expenditure form part of the two important missions of the Ministry of Transport.

<sup>15</sup> Isotope, (2000), Improved structure and organisation for urban transport operations of passengers in Europe, Transport Research Fourth Framework Programme Urban Transport, pages 16 to 43.

<sup>16</sup> Derived goals are to convey a positive image of public transport, to increase safety and security in public transport, to improve accessibility to public transport for disabled people and to make public transport more environmentally friendly.

and operators, a co-operation between the Swedish Association of Public Transport and “consulting agencies” is born: within of the Swedish Barometer of public transports (part 3), the Swedish Association of public transports joined with the agency Ipsos Eureka. The role of consulting agencies is typical of the Swedish transport system.

**\* The British Audit Commission**

The **Audit<sup>17</sup> Commission** is a public organisation independent in charge of the good allowance of the financial resources in various fields of the local government (housing, health, justice, transport, ...) , being presented in the form of a force of proposal for the improvement and performance of the public services as in France with the role of the “*Cour des Comptes*”. It is in charge of impel the principle of “**value for money**” thanks to the device of “*best value indicator performance*” with the support of the Department for Transport (part 3).

**\* The Association of Transport Authorities and the Union of Public and Rail Transport in France**

In France, the performance of the public transport is defend by the Association of Transport Authorities (GART) and the Union of the Public and Rail Transport (UTPF). Within the GART, there is discussions about how to get a better involvement of the operators so that they try to reduce costs. Particularly, the GART and the UTPF product statistical ratios stemmed from a national data base<sup>18</sup>.

**\* The Norwegian Institute of Transport Economics (TOI)**

In Norway, institutes for transport research have a more important function in the field of the measurement of the public transport than the national actors<sup>19</sup>. For example, the Institute of Transport Economics have the initiative to produce<sup>20</sup> indicators reflected the quality and the supply of public transport<sup>21</sup>. Moreover, the Institute initiate new Contracts based on the performance as a constraint of the competition (**part 3**).

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<sup>17</sup> <http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/>

<sup>18</sup> The Centre d’Etudes sur les Transports, l’Urbanisme et les Constructions Publiques plays also a expertise role in the field of public transport (cf. **part 3**).

<sup>19</sup> We can hold up as examples ECON ([www.econ.no](http://www.econ.no)), MOREFORSKNING ([www.moreforsk.no](http://www.moreforsk.no)).

<sup>20</sup> TOI is the national institute for transport research and development in Norway, established in 1958. The main objectives of the Institute are to carry out applied research on issues related to transport and to promote the application of research results by advising authorities, the transport industry and the public at large. Its sphere of activity includes most current issues in road, rail, sea, and air transport, as well as urban transport and environmental issues. Key areas of activity are transport economics, public transport, institutional development and reform, transport and economic and social development, travel behaviour surveys, transport models, road safety research, and transport environmental studies.

<sup>21</sup> Thierry Gouin, (CERTU), Yves Mathieu (Missions Publiques), (21 juin 2005), *Les indicateurs de performance dans les transports publics, Comparaison des approches françaises et étrangères*, 16 pages.



### **3. A regulation by the performance in the public transport: where we are, where do we go in Europe?**

The objective of this third part is to describe the performance mechanisms existing in the different European countries. It will be about to conclude on the following element : is there specifics mechanisms to French public transport first, then, is it possible to learn from others experiences in Norway, England, Italy and Sweden? In this respects, a policy of setting up contract-based links between local authorities and operators allows clear repartition of responsibilities and missions of control and measurement. The operators seems to be incited in a financial and quality performance. De facto, the Contracts clarity, the transparency and the contractual liability of each party are, in the experiences described below, essential. It allows to improve the efficiency of the public service and the quality of the service.

#### ***A. The model of regulation in the public transport: between Contracts, competition, performance and incentives***

The current issue consists in creating a “*equitable and efficient contractual formula*”<sup>22</sup> which take into account of specificity’s and complementarities of the respective contributions of the actors in the performance of the public utility of transport which can be measured in term of satisfaction of the users, the efficiency of the costs and it through defined indicators.

##### **A. Sweden**

###### ***1. The development of public transport: a model from monopoly to competition***

The most common form of supplying public transport services to customers is through procurement. Over **95% of all local and regional public transport services in Sweden are procured under competition** by the public transport authorities. The possibility to procure traffic under competition has proven to be decisive factor for a positive development. Greater advantages than before were achieved through the reform by using contractors and competition : the contractor system could thus be further developed to the benefit of both the contractors and the authorities. Procurement has not only led to reduced traffic costs but also to fulfilment of other important public goals such as public transport with better environmental qualities, improved road safety and better accessibility for the disabled.

###### ***2. The performance of the public transport: its translation in the procedures of competitive tendering***

Trials involving **financial incentives** are being carried out connected to **how satisfied customers are with the service offered by the contractor**<sup>23</sup>. If a contractor succeeds in increasing the share of satisfied customers, he will receive a bonus. **The financial constraints are at the origin of the implementation of incentive devices**<sup>24</sup>. Negative effect of the procurement system used up to now: the traffic operator does not have a financial interest of his own to contribute to good public transport service. This is related to the fact that most traffic Contracts are drawn up as “gross Contracts”<sup>25</sup> which means that all of the traffic revenues go to the transport authority and thus not to

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<sup>22</sup> EMTA, (23 novembre 2000), *Contracts : a tool for public transport authorities*, proceedings, workshop, 99 pages.

<sup>23</sup> EMTA, (23 novembre 2000), *Contracts : a tool for public transport authorities*, proceedings, workshop, 99 pages.

<sup>24</sup> It is the financial constraints that represent the main challenge in supplying attractive public transport services in the future. In order to convince more people to use public transport it is imperative to offer even higher quality, more reliable and more customer-oriented services. The Contracts with the operators are constantly developed as more incentive systems are added. In this way the operators will be encouraged to take over more responsibilities. And finally, the number of passengers they transport should also have a certain effect on the financial compensation paid by the public transport authorities (PTA).

<sup>25</sup> The Contracts between regional transport authorities and operators are in most cases of the gross contract type: the operator run the buses and gets remunerated with a gross sum of money per year. All revenues from traffics go to the transport authority. The planning of schedules, connections and marketing is carried out by the transport authority. In a few cases, net Contracts have been tried : the operator is paid on a net basis and takes the

the contractor. The Swedish Public Transport Association (SLTF) have therefore initiated a development project with the aim of **trying to draw up agreements that will create an interest on the part of the contractor to increase the number of travellers**<sup>26</sup>. This can be done through net Contracts where a certain share of the revenues will be paid out of the contractor. The more the travelling increases, the higher the contribution of the contractor will become. Net Contracts are presently in use in five cities<sup>27</sup>.

## **B. Norway**

### *1. The performance Contracts: a "threat to competition" model*

Currently, approximately **2 to 3% of the transport is operated on Contracts obtained after a competitive procedure** : it is a "**limited competition" regime**<sup>28</sup>. Except for the capital area of Oslo, all public transport is operated on net cost Contracts where the County authorities approve the fares and the level of service<sup>29</sup>. From 1991, the public transport are introduced competitive tendering. When the regional level (the counties) took over the full responsibility for local public transport in 1986, it was clear for the most innovative of the County councils that there was a lack of control in the sector. After a potential competitive pressure established in 1991, some counties negotiated new Contracts with the operators (**part 3, b**). Strict conditions of efficiency agreements are defined in these new Contracts. If the conditions of efficiency are fulfilled, the service would be put out on competitive tender. It must be in favour of reducing costs in the Norwegian bus industry<sup>30</sup>.

### *2. Incentives in performance Contracts: the case of Oslo*

**Incentives to efficiency in public transport services** in terms of fares, level of service and capacity per revenue kilometre form also part of the objective of introducing new performance Contracts in Norwegian public transport. Launched in 1999 between the municipality of Oslo and Oslo Public Transport, this new model of contract can provide incentives to develop more efficient market and cost. It is a competitive pressure contract as an alternative to competitive tendering<sup>31</sup>.

The city Council has attached particular importance to measures instituted covering period of high traffic density/rush hours based on the following criteria : increased frequencies during rush hours, increased capacity (place kilometres), start up costs, increased total number of passengers.

**A level of incentives and maximum payments in 1999 was defined** : a bonus of NOK 1000 is obtained for every additional departure in rush hours, NOK 0,5 per extra place kilometres, and NOK 4 per extra passenger. A further NOK 1,5 million has been allocated to extended marketing/start up costs. The largest proportion of the bonus is related to total journeys (56%), while increased frequency and seating capacity are each apportioned a 20% bonus.

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revenues from the passengers directly. In those cases, a major part of the planning and marketing is organised by the operator. There has been a general interest in developing contract into net Contracts but so far few have tried.

<sup>26</sup> SLTF (Public Transport Swedish Association), (mars 2002), *Public Transport in Sweden : co-ordination and competition*, 33 pages.

<sup>27</sup> Helsingborg, Sundsvall, Östersund, Boden, Varberg.

<sup>28</sup> Isotope, (2000), *Improved structure and organisation for urban transport operations of passengers in Europe*, Transport Research, Fourth Framework Programme Urban Transport, page 18.

<sup>29</sup> Bard Norheim, (23 November 2000), *Quality Contracts and quality monitoring in Oslo*, Institute of Transport Economics, EMTA, pages 77 to 80.

<sup>30</sup> Kjell Werner Johansen, (2005), *Contractual form and performance in the Norwegian Bus Industry 1986-1996*, 6<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport, 12 pages.

<sup>31</sup> The Institute of Transport Economics proposed in 1998 this new contract in Oslo based on the quality monitoring system and performance dependent of subsidies. In shorts terms, if the company fails to keep the quality level within defined borders, the contract will be cancelled and opened for tendering. The contract was introduced in 1999. Thus, **efficiency agreements** have dominated the contract form in Norway: in these Contracts, specific cost cutting or subsidy reductions have been agreed as a condition for the routes not to be tendered.

**Table 1: Performance objectives and maximum limits for payments in 1999 in Oslo<sup>32</sup>**

Performance objectives	Incentives level	Maximum limits	Proportion (%)
Rush hours departures	NOK 1000 per departure	NOK 7 500 000	20
Place kilometres	NOK 0,5 per place kilometre	NOK 7 500 000	20
Passengers	NOK 4 per passenger	NOK 20 800 000	56
Start up costs		NOK 1 500 000	4
Sum		NOK 37 300 000	100

### **C. England**

#### *1. A model of “public service, competition and deregulation”*

The **1984 Transportation Act** in United Kingdom seems to be for each side either the worst or the best model of the deregulation and competition<sup>33</sup> (**table 2**). Outside London, bus services have been deregulated. There is no overall public planning authority, though quality partnerships have been established between dominant local operators and local Governments units.

**Table 2: London and outside : the impact of the deregulation between 1986 and 2000<sup>34</sup>**

	London (competitively tendered)	Outside London (deregulated)
Totals costs	- 30%	- 41.8%
Service kilometres	30.8%	26.7%
Change in cost per service kilometres	46.2%	- 54.0%
Government support per passenger	£ 0.009	£ 0.087
Fares as a % of costs	97.8%	86.1%
Passengers	10.0%	- 33.9%

Since the middle of the 1980s, the British Government goes into a far reaching reform of privatisation of public transport. The model competitive tendering is essentially based on the laws of the market considering the elimination of the deficits of exploitation as a central objective. The competition is then seen as the only means to create a system of more effective transport: where the costs and the prices decrease, where the service is better, in quantitative and qualitative terms (increase of the frequencies), and thus an increase of the users.

#### *2. Towards a generalisation of deregulation*

For the local actors, the generalisation of the public transport deregulation means the search of performance of local services. First, this process allows new operators obtain access permission to the public transport market. Then, additional measures appear in order to break with the monopoly position. Thus, the model of British public transport bases on two main characteristics: a deregulated system, a compulsory system of tendering.

### **D. Italy: The new model of the “Contract of service”**

The new statutory legislation in Italy separate regulatory functions to provisions of services. This new legislation requires public calls for tender, making it even more necessary to use the contractual process. Consequently, resorting to “*contract of service*” is the new rule since 2003 between the local authorities and the operators<sup>35</sup>. During those last years, the contract of service become one of the main instruments of regulation of the local public utilities in Italy. The local authority has the “contract of service” as an instrument of control, and evaluation of contractual

<sup>32</sup> Association of European Metropolitan Transport Authorities (EMTA), (November 2000), *Contracts : a tool for public transport authorities*, Proceeding, workshop, page 84.

<sup>33</sup> It distinguishes between the two different market contexts in which privatisation took place: economic deregulation outside London and regulated competitive procurement within the capital.

<sup>34</sup> Bayliss, (march 1999), *Buses in Great Britain. Privatisation, Deregulation and Competition*, 31 pages

<sup>35</sup> Public Transport International, *Dossier Spécial : Italie*, Union Internationale des Transports Publics, pages 8-44.

nature. Indeed, the “contract of service” is placed in the centre of the system of regulation: in his form and contents, he allows to report the performance of the service returned to the user<sup>36</sup>. Two forms of typologies of controls can be found in the contract of service: a control relating to the public utility (independently of the legal statute of the company called to provide the service), control relating to the achievement of the quantitative and qualitative objectives laid down by the contract. Within Rome, it is the first typology which prevailed, inasmuch it corresponds to the legislative requirements of concrete separation between the functions of management and the functions of orientation and control.

## **E. France**

### *1. The model of “delegation of public utility”*

Contracts have been used for a long time in France where local authorities have the choice of operating the transport system themselves or contracting the service to outside operators. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, there has been a strong trend toward delegation of greater risk and responsibility to the private contractors. Delegation would be called “privatisation” but it is slightly different: “*The French public service inspires the defenders of the welfare state and the local authorities*<sup>37</sup>”.

In **urban public transport**, competition does not have the same degree than in England or Sweden. It better look like to the degree of competition in Norway (about 3%). It is one of the French “delegation of public utility” exception. Indeed, in France, the transport market is not opened to foreign operators. This is the emblematic situation of French urban transport : closed for the inside competition, while opened and aggressive in the outside competition.

### *2. A generalisation of incentives process towards the performance of operators?*

In France, it exist four type of Contracts. The type of incentive is, in general, linked to the share of risks between the operators and the local authorities<sup>38</sup>.

- the **management contract** (“*gérance*”)

The industrial risk and the commercial risk are on public authority’s side. The operator makes expensive or collects revenues on behalf the public transport authority. It receive a fee depending on the size of the network operated and on the quality of its management.

- the **gross cost contract** (“*contribution à contribution forfaitaire*”)

The industrial risk is for the operator and the commercial risk is for the public transport authority. The company receives a fixed price for operating the given network/ it collects fare revenues on behalf of public transport authorities. The public transport authorities receives fare revenue as a receipt and pays a fixed amount of money to the operating company. A variant of this contract exist : gross gross contract **with revenue incentive**.

- the **guaranteed revenue contract** (“*régie intéressée*”)

the public transport company is supposed to operate at risk but the public transport authority guarantees a minimum level of fare receipts. The industrial risk is for the operating company and the commercial risk is shared between the operator and the local authority.

- the **net cost contract** (“*gestion à prix forfaitaire*”)

The operator operates at risk but the fare level is not enough to cover operating costs. The public transport authority allocates a fixed amount of subsidy to complete fare revenues. In this contract, the authority must regularly monitor performance of the operator based on cost efficiency and quality of service really provided.

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<sup>36</sup> During the implementation of a contract of service, a **joint committee** is established. This last one consists of local authority representatives, the company representatives; the functions of presidency are confided to one person independent from the parties (local authority, company). The president exercises a function of “monitoring” and control regarding the parameters and to the quantitative and qualitative objectives mentioned in the contract of service.

<sup>37</sup> Cox Wendell and Brice Duthion, (1997), *Competition in public transport : International State of the Art*, the 5<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Competition and ownership in Passengers Transport, Leeds.

<sup>38</sup> EMTA, (23 novembre 2000), *Contracts : a tool for public transport authorities*, proceedings, workshop, pages 9-10.

Thus, additional incentives for the realisation of special objectives can be added in all type of contract. For example, payments can be related to the perceived quality of the service by customers. The incentives can influence allocative and productive efficiency.

**B. How to measure the performance of public transport: European experiences and conclusion for the French public transport**

• **The Swedish Public Transport Barometer**

The public authorities current priority concerns quality of service which is given due prominence in the Contracts. As the changes in the market has evolved the role of the customers has become more and more important.

Since the late 1970s, measurements of customer satisfaction have been used widely<sup>39</sup>. Since 1989, in Sweden, a large annual studies of customer satisfaction were started on a national level. This initiative has been followed by others countries as Norway. In 1996, the first National Customer Barometer within public transport was carried out : it is a standardised study measuring customer satisfaction in the field of public transportation.

**Table 3: The customer satisfaction Barometer in Sweden in 1996<sup>40</sup>**

Service topics	Customers perceptions of the service
Traffic	Planning of time schedules, routes and time tables
Image	How the company is evaluated in general and the importance of the services
Listening to the consumer	If the company responds to complaints and other customer information
Information	If time tables and ticketing information is accurate and easy understandable
Price	Costs of public transport
Bus stops and terminals	Location and services at stops
Comfort	Safety and comfort in travelling
Personnel	Willingness to serve the customers and ability to answer questions

In 2000, a new **Public Transport Barometer** is introduced with Web interface (**Note 4**). It provides public transport authorities with statistical information needed to strengthen the market and customers assets in order to secure long-term profitability<sup>41</sup>. The study is organised by the Association of Regional Transport Authorities (SLTF)<sup>42</sup>.

**Note 4: The Swedish Public Transport Barometer since 2000**

The Public Transport Barometer is a nation-wide, successful tool for the appraisal of public transport by its passengers. Each year about 30 000 people in all Swedish Regions are asked about their thoughts concerning quality, loyalty and the attractiveness of the public transport compared to the car.

**17 performance indicators with a five-point satisfaction scale are used<sup>43</sup>**. The core of this new approach in measuring perceived service quality is the use of a Web based analysis tool where the public transport authorities log on and make their own queries, evaluations and comparisons. The tracking feature of the Barometer has given the public transport authorities instant market and customer feedback and has opened up the possibility to analyse the effects of market interventions, such as changes in fares, and also to study effects of external factors, such as accidents and system failures.

The open structure of the Barometer, where all public transport authorities can compare themselves to each other, has also triggered benchmarking. Ultimately, the results can be used to implement appropriate measures to improve public transport quality.

For each company, results concerning the quality of the public transport services are compared to other regional operators of public transport. **The regional company that gets the best result over is given a special award.** And, comparisons between the different region were useful.

<sup>39</sup> Richard Oliver, (1996), *Satisfaction : a behavioural perspective on the consumer*, Mac Graw Hill.


<sup>40</sup> Lars Haglund, (2001), *Organisation of markets and marketing in public transportation*, 11 pages.

<sup>41</sup> SLTF, Ipsos Eureka, *The public Transport Barometer: a successful tool for improving quality*, 2 pages, [www.slutf.se](http://www.slutf.se)

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.slutf.se/>

<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, we have not be able to find the performance indicators of the Swedish Public Transport Barometer (because of confidentiality).

Figure 1: The Swedish Public Transport Barometer – the Web interface



The relation between the type of organisation and contract used in the system of transport and the collection and the use of information with indicators was discussed<sup>44</sup> in Sweden. It appears that the use of indicators converts statistical information and the sharing responsibilities between the public authorities and the operators more efficiently, in particular after the application of the public transport Barometer.

- **The Italian Experience : the example of Rome**

*“Public utilities have a strong impact on the feeling of well-being of citizens and play a decisive role as for their evaluation of the activities exercised by the administration”<sup>45</sup>.*

The municipality of Rome experiments since 2003 the **Agency for the local public utilities** asked to control the service of public transport by means of performance indicators. Furthermore, the legislation of the public transport in Italy obliges since 2003 the appeal to competitive tendering for the attribution of the public transport. In this perspective, the contract of service allows on the one hand define contractual relations between the local authority Atac S.p.a<sup>46</sup> and the operator ; on the other hand the contract of service become an instrument of the control of the service.

1. *The organisation of the public transport in Rome*

At the beginning of 1990s, the economic and social situation of public transports in Rome was difficult: a poor service so much qualitative than quantitative point of view, the decrease of the number of travellers in favour of the private transport, and the increase of production costs. In 1994, the local authorities sets itself a target of reorganisation of the public transport in Rome. It is about a distinction

<sup>44</sup> Lars Haglund, (2001), Organisation of markets and marketing in public transportation, 11 pages.

<sup>45</sup> Public Transport International, *Dossier Spécial : Italie*, Union Internationale des Transports Publics, pages 8-44.

<sup>46</sup> Mobility Agency of the County of Rome

between organisation and exploitation of public transports. Indeed, the function of regulation of services is separated from the function of the exploitation of the service. The first function guarantee the satisfaction of the needs of mobility and the respect of budget commitments. The second function appeals to liberalisation through competitive tendering. Two new parties appears in Rome because of this new legislation. **Atac S.p.a** (Agency of the Mobility and transport public authority) and **Trambus** (operator responsible for the management of the public transport) take the place of Atac (public utility responsible for the public transport by bus and tramway). From now on, the process of competition and invitation to tender (decree 400/99) compels the operators a project with the following performance criteria : costs cut, increase in quantity and quality of the service. Those criteria impose transport public operators contractual obligations in terms of performance of the service. Although this new organisation is, the County must take up challenges. First, because of the freeze oh the regional fund for the public transport, the spending coverage cover is partially insured. Then, the vagueness of the different reforms affect the transport public utility<sup>47</sup>.

## 2. The Agency for the local public utilities and the performance indicators

Since few years, the County of Rome introduces a complex system in order to control the local public services. It make it by internal and external control instruments. Especially, concerning the external control, the Council decide to create the Agency for the control and the quality of the local public services. **This Agency has new functions: evaluate the quality and the performance of the local public services. Moreover, the County Council give the Agency of local public services the responsibility of producing performance indicators.** These performance indicators allow basically introduce a measure of the quality and the performance of the public service. And, **the Agency can express a view on the “Contracts of service”. The performance indicators have to control the balance between transport-supply and the respect of contract of service obligation**<sup>48</sup>.

The functions of control and evaluation take on importance for the County Council. This function of control attributed to the Agency is described as “*a function of attribution of the modalities of transport supply describe in the Contracts of service*”<sup>49</sup>. Within the Agency, a service called “**monitorage – quality of local public service**” exists.

**Note 5: Functions of the service “Monitorage – quality of local public services”, Agency of the control of the local public services in Rome**

- Fulfil activities of verification as for transport-supply with statistical surveys
- Obtain documents and useful information by the local operators in charge of the service
- Control the Contract of service
- Plan reports on the financial, social, economical utilities-supply

The activities of control of public utilities are develop in Italy around 3 important chapters:

Since 2003, those different points create a specific activity of control within the Agency concerning the public transport in Rome. 5 main performance indicators are defined (**Table 4**):

- **access to the Station or bus station**
- **the information and attention to users**
- **comfort to waiting**
- **quality of the travel**
- **safety**

<sup>47</sup> Public Transport International, *Dossier Spécial : Italie*, Union Internationale des Transports Publics, pages 8-44.

<sup>48</sup> Federico Colosi, (17 novembre 2004), *Expertise et contrôle : dialogues sans frontière*, Agenzia per il controllo e la qualita dei servizi pubblici del Comune di Roma, 11 pages.

<sup>49</sup> Federico Colosi, (17 novembre 2004), *Expertise et contrôle : dialogues sans frontière*, Agenzia per il controllo e la qualita dei servizi pubblici del Comune di Roma, page 7.



**Table 4: Performance indicators produced in the public transport – Agency of local public utilities of Rome**

First level	Second level	Third level
<b>Access to the station or bus station</b>		
<b>1. External access road:</b>		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Presence of bus stop and terminus</li> <li>- Number of bus lines</li> <li>- Distance between bus stop/terminus and underground station</li> <li>- Access facility between bus and Metro</li> <li>- Presence of free parking</li> <li>- Distance between parking and Metro</li> </ul>
<b>2. Internal access road:</b>		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Distance between the station entry and the platform</li> <li>- Distance between the platform and the station exit</li> <li>- Distance between Metro and Metro</li> <li>- Line change with rail</li> <li>- Distance between Metro lines and rail lines</li> <li>- Presence of elevators, maintenance of elevators,</li> <li>- Access road to escalators, maintenance of escalators</li> </ul>
<b>3. Presence of booking offices:</b>		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Booking office with staff</li> <li>- Efficiency of the booking office staff</li> <li>- Automatic ticket machines</li> <li>- Efficient operation of ticket machines</li> <li>- Available tickets in the automatic machines</li> <li>- Presence of offices</li> <li>- Presence of office hours</li> <li>- Tickets available to offices</li> </ul>
<b>Information and attention to the users</b>		
	<b>1. General information</b>	On the safety On the attention towards users
	<b>2. Information for travel in normal condition</b>	On the road indications, the identification of departure and arrival point, the journeys, timetables, tariffs
	<b>3. Information for travel in disrupted condition</b>	On repayment, claims, suggestions, lost objects
	<b>4. Contacts with customers</b>	Presence of personnel
	<b>5. Personnel</b>	Aspect Attention to customers Attention Competencies
	<b>6. Reception,</b>	Aptitude towards foreigners
	<b>7. Option of booking ticket</b>	Type of booking tickets
<b>Comfort for waiting</b>		
	<b>1. Easy use of travellers structures</b>	Presence of spaces on the platform, escalators to wait on the platform
	<b>2. Seating capacities/space available</b>	On the platform
	<b>3. Environment</b>	Pleasant aspect of space, cleanness, luminosity, atmosphere quality, noise, ..
	<b>4. Additional services</b>	Presence of toilets, Ease of toilets use, Presence of commercial space, Presence of public phone, Other services
<b>Quality of the travel</b>		
	<b>1. Seating capacities/space available</b>	On board
	<b>2. Comfort of the journey</b>	Convenience, Access facility to entry and exit
	<b>3. Travel conditions</b>	Pleasant atmosphere, Cleanness, Luminosity, Atmosphere quality, Noise
<b>Safety of the service</b>		
	<b>1. Preventive fight against crimes</b>	Presence of visible video camera
		Presence of staff security
	<b>2. Prevention of accidents</b>	Appropriate signals

Nevertheless, the vagueness of the reform, the constraints of the local public authorities in the competitive tendering and the fragmentation of the market are the main issues of the regulation of the public transport in Italy. It must benefit from rationalised costs and better quality and performance.

- **The British experience : between the National Citizen Charter and Best Value Performance Indicators in the public transport**

In England, the performance is inherent in the principle of "*value for money*". The local authorities of transport measure the performance of their service of transport so that the State knows if they can profit from public subsidies, and make it possible to know how they allocate the public money.

### *1. The role of the National Charter of the Citizen*

Launched in 1991, the National Charter of the citizen is a program conceived to improve the services of the whole public sector (public transport, postal service or health). The declared objective is "*to adapt better the services to the wishes of their users and to raise the general quality level from it*<sup>50</sup>". The adoption of the Charter of the citizen requires to define the quality of service rendered to the taxpayer, to have an evaluation of their results(profits) done by independent auditors, compare these results with their promises, and compensate the users in case of failure. The initiative of the National Charter of the Citizen caused a series of **specific local charters**. Those local charters establish minimal requirements which the population can expect.

One of the local charters is **the Charter of the citizen for the local administration** (Law on the local administration of 1992). This Law compels the publication of indicators in a local journal. However, the evaluation of the performance is difficult to implement. Then, most of the **local authorities are interested in the public transport users** : is the user satisfied by the transport service ? how to improve the transport service?

### *2. Measuring Best Value in Public Transport*

In order for Councils and Authorities to be measured against Best Value, Performance Indicators, known as **Best Value Performance Indicators** (BVPIs) are introduced. They are a statutory set of 90 indicators developed by Government Departments to measure the performance of local authorities, that is, all local authorities must measure themselves against BVPIs. The data is collected and audited annually by the Audit Commission. There are currently 90 BVPIs which cover many, but not all aspects of services provided by local councils<sup>51</sup>. In order to get a balanced view of performance the BVPIs cover four dimensions of the performance:

- **Strategic Objectives**: why the service exists and what it seeks to achieve
- **Service Delivery Outcomes**: how well the service is being operated in order to achieve the strategic objectives
- **Quality**: the quality of the services delivered, explicitly reflecting users experience of services
- **Fair access**: ease and equality of access to services

The British Government proposes that, on the base of indicators resulting from charters, the Audit Commission publishes boards of classification of local authorities by level of performance<sup>52</sup> for several public utilities<sup>53</sup> among which public transports. Otherwise, the Audit Commission<sup>54</sup> have to

<sup>50</sup> Communes et Régions d'Europe, (1995), *Les indicateurs de performance dans les services publics locaux*, page 174.

<sup>51</sup> Each year Government Departments work with each other to set indicators for the next year. BVPIs are set in line with the financial year (1 April to 31 March).

Many of the BVPIs have been in effect since the start of Best Value in April 2000, but some new indicators have been set, and some existing indicators were revised either to improve their definition or to be aligned with Central Government policy. Where a BVPI has a target attached to it, these targets are reviewed each year, in light of the most recent performance data provide by a local Council.

<sup>53</sup> The others public utilities concerned by Best Value Performance Indicators are: corporate Health, Environment, and Culture.

<sup>54</sup> <http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/performance/>

elaborate a series of performance indicators in the local public transports, the measuring instruments of the level of economy and efficiency of the service which would facilitate the comparisons to the national level between councils. **13 best value performance indicators are produced for public transports (Note 6).**

**Note 6: Best value performance indicators in the British public transport**

- **BVPI 102 : Number of bus passenger journeys<sup>55</sup>** : This best value performance indicator is a national objective defined by Department For Transport, mandatory best value performance indicator. The operator deliver the number of passenger journey.
  - **BVPI 103 : Satisfaction with bus information** : It is a non mandatory best value performance indicator, local performance indicators, calculated through survey procedure<sup>56</sup>. This BVPI allow measuring the customer satisfaction degree concerning information
  - **BVPI 104 : Bus passenger satisfaction** : It is the % of bus users satisfied with local bus services. It is a mandatory best value performance indicator.
  - **Ages of bus fleet** : The Confederation of Passenger Transport has committed its members to a target which aims to achieve and maintain an average age of eight years or less for their vehicles which are mainly used for local bus services during the Ten Year Plan period. Information on the age of the local bus fleet can be obtained from the local bus operators.
  - **Bus reliability** : This indicator is the percentage of scheduled mileage lost because of factors within the operators' control. These include staffing problem (including strike action), mechanical problem, vandalism, assaults and predictable peak time traffic congestion. There is a national target of losing no more than 0,5% of scheduled mileage. This information can be obtained from the local bus operators.
  - **Bus punctuality** : A standard is defined for this non mandatory performance indicator : 95 percent of buses should depart bus stops designated as Timing Points in a window of time between one minute early and five minutes late. This information may be available from the local bus operators.
- A bus punctuality indicator has been introduced as a mandatory indicator for the second of Local Transport Plan (LTP)<sup>57</sup>.
- **Bus kilometres per year** : This non mandatory performance indicator give information on the scheduled service kilometres and the kilometres really run. This information should be available from the local bus operators.
  - **Bus priority lanes (kilometres)** : It is a non mandatory performance indicator. This information will be available from local authority.
  - **Urban Bus challenge schemes** : This non mandatory performance indicator is the number of urban bus challenge schemes that have been implemented. This information is available from local authority.
  - **Rural bus challenge scheme** : This non mandatory performance indicator is the number of rural bus challenge schemes that have been implemented. This information is available from local authority.
  - **Assaults on bus staff** : This non mandatory performance is the number of staff assaulted during the course of a year. This information can be obtained from the local bus operators.
  - **Quality partnerships** : This non mandatory performance indicator is the number of such partnerships which the authority has with local operators. This information will be available from local authority.
  - **Buses with CCTV (closed circuit television)** : This non mandatory performance indicator is available from the local bus operators.

The performance indicators are determined for public transports to report objectives that the authorities of transport settled in the local plan of transport, and more generally to measure the national objectives fixed by the Government and the Department For Transport. The whole Best Value Performance Indicator are collected on a data base<sup>58</sup> belonging to the Department of Transport. Those Best Value Performance Indicator contribute to the transparency of information concerning the performance of the public transport.

- **The Norwegian experience: between performance indicators, monitoring system and performance Contracts. The Oslo case.**

<sup>55</sup> Department for Transport, (April 2005), *How to monitor indicators in Local Transport Plans and annual Progress Reports – 2005 Update*, Statistics Travel Division, 48 pages.

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.bvpi.gov.uk>

<sup>57</sup> Department for Transport, (April 2005), *How to monitor indicators in Local Transport Plans and annual Progress Reports – 2005 Update*, Statistics Travel Division, page 21.

<sup>58</sup> <http://www.bvpi.gov.uk/pages/Index.asp>

Three steps of the performance exist in Oslo : the **customer oriented project**, a **quality monitoring system** (customer satisfaction survey, travel guaranteed), and the **development of a new performance contract**<sup>59</sup>.

1. *Market oriented statistics for Norwegian Public Transport : a proposal for scheduled Public Transport Statistics*<sup>60</sup>

The Norwegian Ministry of Transport (and Communications) calls for a market oriented statistic data base for public transport : a “*system for new market oriented statistics for scheduled public transport by bus, boat, trams, the underground and railways in Norway*”<sup>61</sup>. Those statistics allow and improve local decision making-tools for the local authorities. In accordance with the Ministry of Transport and Communications requirements, the statistics will cover a number of key factors which describe provision, demand, operating costs and productivity together with external framework conditions. It is proposed that the statistics should be on three level : urban/regional, County Council and national level. For the Ministry of Transport, it is vital that the same information is obtained everywhere, no matter where the transport activity takes place. The legislative authorities (the Ministry of Transport and the County Councils) play a central role in achieving this. It is proposed that the new public transport statistics should be based on the Internet both for collecting baseline data. Consequently, the **Norwegian Institute of Transport Economics** suggests a new statistic system in 2003 based on **30 performance indicators** (Table 5).

**Table 5: Market oriented performance indicators for Norwegian public transport** <sup>62</sup>

Quality of the service	1. Spatial cover	Kilometre line by km2
	2. Frequency	Vehicle kilometre, train kilometre by line kilometre
	3. Capacity	Places kilometre by vehicle kilometre
		Passenger kilometre by place kilometre
		Vehicle kilometre by inhabitant
	Total number of vehicle on duty in peak period	
4. Speed	Vehicle kilometre by vehicle hour	
5. Price	Tariffs revenues by journey	
	Tariffs revenues by passenger kilometre, if possible for adults, schoolchildren, pensioner	
Demand	Journeys by inhabitant	
	Journeys by working people in the served territory	
	Passengers kilometre by inhabitant	
	Number of school journeys	
Cost and productivity	1. Revenues and expenditures	Ratio tariffs revenues on total cost (%)
	2. Tariff revenues	Tariffs revenues by vehicles kilometre
	3. Efficiency	Total costs by vehicle kilometre and vehicle hour
		Commercial cost by vehicle kilometre, by vehicle hour and by passenger kilometre
	4. Public financing	Buying or repayment for “public service” by vehicle kilometre, by passenger and by inhabitant
		public buying of school transport
		Indirect subsidies by vehicle kilometre, by passenger and by inhabitant
	5. Productivity	Vehicle kilometres by kilometres
6. Priority given to public transport in town	Length of bus lane	
	Number of crossroads with priority to the public transport	

<sup>59</sup> Bard Norheim, (2004), *Competitive pressure as an alternative to competitive tendering? The development of a performance contract in Oslo*, Institute of Transport Economics, Norway, 14 pages.

<sup>60</sup> This title is inspired to the follow document: Edvin Froysadal, Bard Norheim, (2003), *Market-oriented statistics for public transport. Proposal for scheduled public transport statistics, including buses, boats, trams, Metro and trains*, Institute of Transport Economics.

<sup>61</sup> Edvin Froysadal, Bard Norheim, (2003), *Market-oriented statistics for public transport. Proposal for scheduled public transport statistics, including buses, boats, trams, Metro and trains*, Institute of Transport Economics, report abstract ([www.toi.no](http://www.toi.no)).

<sup>62</sup> Thierry Gouin, (CERTU), Yves Mathieu (Missions Publiques), (21 juin 2005), *Les indicateurs de performance dans les transports publics, Comparaison des approches françaises et étrangères*, 16 pages, **confidentiel**.

External factors	1. Prices ratio between car and public transport	Between car and public transport
	2 Possession of a car	Number of vehicles
		Number of driving
	3. Market share	Data on travelling practices
		Development of the public transport comparatively to the car use.
		Sale of diesel oil and petrol
		Use of the urban toll
4. Level of revenues		

2. *The customer oriented project : a model near to the Sweden Public Transport Barometer?*

In 1991, a customer orientation project is launched in Oslo. The double objectives remains in reducing subsidies and threaten by the competitive tendering. The goal consist in increase the traffic to 25% before 2001 through a policy of more “satisfied customers”.

The different elements that compose the customer orientation project are : systematic collection and use of market information and data, efficient utilisation of resources based upon improved market knowledge principally.

3. *The development of a quality monitoring system : customer satisfaction and the “Norwegian Travel Guaranteed”*

The quality monitoring system introduced in Oslo is based on two performance instruments : the customer satisfaction, and the travel guarantee arrangements.

Initially, **in Norway**, national customer satisfaction studies started in 1995 (Norsk Kundebarometer). In the service sector, nine different industries are included. Public transportation in the capital Oslo is studied separately for city buses, local trains and trams. The service quality indicators measured are safety, stations and stops, travel times and the ticket prices<sup>63</sup>.

Then, in the case of Oslo Public Transport, customer satisfaction measurements are leaded to measure the aspects of quality and level of service of transport public in Oslo (**Table 6**). The parameters to control the service are : the purpose of the journey, the travel time, the information, the soft service attributes, amenities at transport stop, means of transport, fares and discount systems, and the route network<sup>64</sup>. As from 1996, the survey is extended and in addition to customer satisfaction/service quality, the frequency and extent of journeys and comfort was measured also.

Then, the Oslo public transport develop a travel guarantee which provides a good indication of the extent to which Oslo Public Transport has provided an acceptable public service in the view of passengers. The Travel Guarantee is a completely **unique quality indicator** as it emphasises the fact that the passengers have specific rights in respect of the services offered by Oslo Public and compensation is given when the service fails to meet these objectives : “the travellers shall receive compensation for any inconvenience when the terms of the guarantee are not met. The introduction of the Travel Guaranteed shows an increase in the total number of complaints from under 1000 per month to approximately 2000 per month.

<sup>63</sup> Market Reviews, (1996), *Norsk Kunderbarometer : Norwegian Customer Barometer*, n°1.

<sup>64</sup> Further, aspects relating to the use of various means of public transport, journeys and passengers themselves were registered.

**Table 6: Overview of Oslo Municipal Transport on going market surveys<sup>65</sup>**

Measurements	Customary travel	Quality of service	Journey satisfaction
<b>Level</b>	Strategic level What influences the travel customs and how has the share of public transport developed ?	Tactical level Satisfaction with various aspects of the public transport system	Operation level How does the passenger experience the particular journey on a given route ?
<b>Number of interview per year</b>	2000 interviews among Oslo	About 1500 interviews among Oslo residents who have used public transport within the last six months	About 5000 interviews among Oslo residents who have used public transport within the last seven days
<b>Frequency</b>	On going with tri-annual reports	On going with tri-annual reports	On going with monthly reports
<b>Content of surveys</b>	Choice of transport means Market share Purpose of journey Transfer points Journey Type of tickets	Price Stopping places Ticket system Journey and journey time Transport network Safety and control	Frequency, Transfer Punctuality, Operational interruptions On going information Advertising, Comprehensibility Driving style, Available seats Cleanliness, Safety Payment, Service quality

The system of performance of Oslo is original as a compensation is paid directly to the passenger concerned. This is an important principle which makes the Travel Guaranteed a better alternative than the other quality Contracts. The Travel Guaranteed is also an indicator to passenger that they have certain rights and that Oslo Public Transport makes compensation if the expected service is not delivered. The extent to which this is regarded in a positive light depends upon whether the compensation paid is a necessary condition for the development of a simple and manageable performance dependent subsidy system. The recommendation of the Institute of Transport Economics : the measurements are not to be associated with the level of subsidy but rather seen as a framework for the contract between Oslo Public Transport and Oslo City Council. This implies that the contract may be terminated or renegotiated if journey quality measurements fall below a certain level. With long term Contracts, this is an effective “safety net” for ensuring the quality does not depreciate and that a significant “competitive pressure” can be developed.

Both the customer satisfaction measurements and the Travel Guaranteed are important indicators of the development of the quality of services as experienced by the passengers<sup>66</sup>.

#### 4. *The development of a new performance Contract*

In Norway, it is not the tender as such but the threat imposed by tendering which is the main reason for the development of new performance Contract. As from 1991, efficiency agreements have dominated the Contracts form in Norway. **One of the cities which has experienced the most comprehensive restructuring contract during recent years is Oslo<sup>67</sup>**: with the introduction of new a performance contract, the main focus is to increase productivity and the numbers of passengers. The long term objective is a performance contract where all subsidies depend on the level of performance.

- **Some conclusions for the urban public transport in France?**

##### 1. *Performance and national indicators : the statistical system since 1970s*

From 1970s, the French Ministry of Transport and the local authorities started to follow voluntarist policies in favour of the public. Through contract process since 1979, the practice of the indicators existed through the **contract of productivity** and the **contract of development**. Those

<sup>65</sup> Bard Norheim, (2004), *Competitive pressure as an alternative to competitive tendering? The development of a performance contract in Oslo*, Institute of Transport Economics, Norway, 14 pages.

<sup>66</sup> Compensation given to passengers when the system fails is larger than the « fine and bonus » systems introduced in Copenhagen and in other cities with similar arrangements.

<sup>67</sup> Bard Norheim, (2004), *Competitive pressure as an alternative to competitive tendering? The development of a performance contract in Oslo*, Institute of Transport Economics, Norway, 14 pages.

Contracts were deleted in the 1980s. With legislation, the French Ministry of Transport initiates practices of evaluation of the public policies of transport. Several national initiatives exist to produce indicators or, at least transport ratios.

First, the “urban travel plan” (plan de déplacement urbain) are evaluated with indicators. Those indicators must measure the balance between financial means and public transport policy goals. Thus, a panel of **251 indicators**<sup>68</sup> are proposed by the Ministry of Transport (Center of Studies on the Networks, Transport and Public Constructions, CERTU). Among those indicators, **5 key indicators** affect the public transport.

**Note 7: Evaluation of “urban travel plan”. National indicators of the French Ministry of Transport**

- **kilometric offers by type of material**
- **Block speed of urban collective transport**
- **The number of clean collective freight vehicles by type of motorization**
- **Annual frequentation of the urban collective grid system**
- **The distribution of displacements by type of collective transport document**

Next, the French Ministry of Transport encourages the local authorities to introduce **local observatories ensuring the definition of indicators**. Those indicators are necessary to follow the local travel plan and the collection of local data.

Another initiative of the French Ministry of Transport consists on the **production of a statistical data base** (since 1975) with statistical ratios. This statistical data results from an annual survey called “Green Books”<sup>69</sup> by local authorities and operators. This collection makes it possible to produce an **annual statistical book**<sup>70</sup> with **specific transport ratio**.

**Note 8: Ratios of the surveys "Green Books" in the French Public Transport**

- **Characteristics of the network**: the service road, the number of lines, the amplitude, the speed of exploitation, yearly consumption of energy
- **The offer of transport** the number of kilometres, total number of place measures in offered kilometres
- **The use of transport**: accomplished journeys, the rate of correspondence
- **Staff of the exploitation**
- The vehicle fleet used by the operator
- Tariff receipts
- The operating statement: capital expenditures, resources of investment


To sum up, in the French public transport, 3 processes allow produce indicators.

<sup>68</sup> CERTU, (octobre 2001), *Guide : observatoire des PDU : de la méthode aux indicateurs*, Ministère de l'Équipement, des Transports et du Logement.

<sup>69</sup> “Collection of information on the urban systems”. This survey is organised by the CERTU, the GART and the UTPF.

<sup>70</sup> DTT, CERTU, GART, UTP, (2004), *Annuaire statistique des transports collectifs urbains, évolution 1998-2003*, 487 pages.

**Figure 2: The national scheme of production of indicators in the French public transport**



*2. Produce performance indicators at local level ?*

The local authorities and the operators product, at local level indicators. Generally, it represent quality indicators that are in the Contracts. Unfortunately, the production of indicators is not still generalised and homogenised. Although the national data exist and sometimes used by local authorities, it is not sufficient to express the public transport performance. And although the local authorities have contractual instruments to control not only the commitments operators but also the service, they are looking for performance indicators.

Perhaps, we must reflect to introduce homogeneous performance indicators on the other European models where the customer seems to have an important role? It will perhaps allow more transparency of the information between local authorities and their operators.



#### **4. General conclusion**

In this paper, it was about to make a European comparison in the practise of indicators performance in the public transport.

First, it was about to analyse the legislative evolution in the field of the performance in the public transport defined as a “public service”. It seems that the British legislation is the most advanced in the field of the public service performance. Indeed, the best value plan introduced in the 1990s incites to a real “culture of the performance” that does not really exist in other legislative process. In France, the criteria of “public transport efficiency” exist trough the “Loi d’Orientation sur les Transports Intérieurs”. In Italy, there is a recent new transport organisation: the performance is really a recent concern.

Then, different type of actors intervene to promote the public transport performance. Above all, it seem that in the Scandinavian areas, the research Institutes (Swedish Public Transport Association, Norwegian Institute of Transport Economics) are deeply involved in the public transport and performance instruments (public Transport Barometer, contract performance in the Oslo experience, the Oslo Travel Guarantee, new Norwegian statistics, ...). In France and Norway, the idea to develop a regulation by the performance emerges. It is due to the need of public authorities to control more the operator for creating a real “**culture of the performance**” (more precise in the Anglo Saxon model).

In countries like England, the practice of performance of the public services is integrated for a long time and is much more systematic. In France, it seems to appear indirectly in the contractual processes and in national statistical tools. Furthermore, apart from England where privatisation begin quickly (because of the failures of the sector and the authority of the Government), the other European countries engaged themselves in dispersed experiments of privatisation. Italy prepares the change to “contract of service” but the political consensus necessary to competitive tendering appears difficult to find.

In the next steps of this research, other European experiences will be developed : the **Observatory of the metropolitan mobility** in Spain which produce performance indicators in the field of public transport<sup>71</sup>; the **Arriva<sup>72</sup> experience in the development of “key performance indicators”** in Scandinavia.

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<sup>71</sup> Ministerio de Fomento, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, (junio 2006), *Observatorio de la Movilidad Metropolitana*, 66 pages.

<sup>72</sup> *Arriva in Scandinavia*, 2007.

Arriva is one of the important dominant operator in England.

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