Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

Nicolas Jacquemet (1, 2) , Stephane Luchini (3) , Robert-Vincent Joule (4) , Jason Shogren (5)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics
3 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
4 LPS - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale
5 Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming

Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

Mots clés: Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias; Earned Money

Domaines: Economies et finances

Nicolas Jacquemet, Stephane Luchini, Robert-Vincent Joule, Jason Shogren. Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction. 2008. ⟨halshs-00277283⟩