K. Abbink, Laboratory experiments on corruption, Forthcoming, Handbook of Economic Corruption, 2005.

K. Abbink, B. Irlenbusch, and E. Renner, The moonlighting game, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.42, issue.2, pp.265-277, 2000.
DOI : 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00089-5

K. Abbink, B. Irlenbusch, and E. Renner, An Experimental Bribery Game, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.18, issue.2, pp.428-454, 2002.
DOI : 10.1093/jleo/18.2.428

URL : http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/428

D. Acemoglu and T. Verdier, Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: a General Equilibrium Approach, The Economic Journal, vol.108, issue.450, pp.1381-1403, 1998.
DOI : 10.1111/1468-0297.00347

A. Ades, D. Tella, and R. , NATIONAL CHAMPIONS AND CORRUPTION: SOME UNPLEASANT INTERVENTIONIST ARITHMETIC*, The Economic Journal, vol.5, issue.443, pp.1023-1042, 1997.
DOI : 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00005.x

R. Ahrend, Press Freedom, Human Capital and Corruption, SSRN Electronic Journal, pp.2002-2013, 2002.
DOI : 10.2139/ssrn.620102

G. A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.97, issue.4, pp.543-569, 1982.
DOI : 10.2307/1885099

G. A. Akerlof, Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory : Four Views, American Economic Review, vol.74, issue.2, pp.79-83, 1984.

S. Andrianova, Corruption and Reputation, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol.48, issue.3, pp.245-259, 2001.
DOI : 10.1111/1467-9485.00197

J. C. Andvig and K. O. Moene, How corruption may corrupt, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.13, issue.1, pp.63-76, 1990.
DOI : 10.1016/0167-2681(90)90053-G

M. Bac, Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.22, issue.2, pp.99-118, 1996.
DOI : 10.1006/jcec.1996.0013

M. Bac, Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.12, issue.2, pp.277-298, 1996.
DOI : 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023364

M. Bac, Corruption, Connections and Transparency : Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene ?, Public Choice, vol.107, issue.1/2, pp.87-96, 2001.
DOI : 10.1023/A:1010349907813

E. C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol.18, issue.3, pp.587-605, 1975.
DOI : 10.1086/466826

P. Bardhan, Corruption and Development : A Review of Issues, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.35, issue.3, pp.1320-1346, 1997.

G. S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of Political Economy, vol.76, issue.2, pp.169-217, 1968.
DOI : 10.1086/259394

G. S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, 1978.

G. S. Becker and G. J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.3, issue.1, pp.1-18, 1974.
DOI : 10.1086/467507

B. D. Bernheim and M. D. Whinston, Common Agency, Econometrica, vol.54, issue.4, pp.923-942, 1986.
DOI : 10.2307/1912844

T. Besley and J. Mclaren, Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives, The Economic Journal, vol.103, issue.416, pp.119-141, 1993.
DOI : 10.2307/2234340

M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, A Theory of Privatisation, The Economic Journal, vol.106, issue.435, pp.309-319, 1996.
DOI : 10.2307/2235248

A. Brunetti and B. Weder, A free press is bad news for corruption, Journal of Public Economics, vol.87, issue.7-8, pp.1801-1824, 2003.
DOI : 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00186-4

P. Buccirossi and G. Spagnolo, Leniency policies and illegal transactions, Journal of Public Economics, vol.90, issue.6-7, 2005.
DOI : 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.008

O. Cadot, Corruption as a gamble, Journal of Public Economics, vol.33, issue.2, pp.223-244, 1987.
DOI : 10.1016/0047-2727(87)90075-2

J. D. Carrillo, Corruption in Hierarchies, Annales d'Economie et de Statistiques, pp.37-61, 2000.

J. D. Carrillo, Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol.9, issue.3, pp.257-286, 2000.

G. Celik and S. Sayan, To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery ? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes, 2005.

P. Chander and L. Wilde, Corruption in tax administration, Journal of Public Economics, vol.49, issue.3, pp.333-349, 1992.
DOI : 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90072-N

J. Chang, C. Lai, and C. C. Yang, Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:, International Review of Law and Economics, vol.20, issue.1, pp.35-51, 2000.
DOI : 10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00020-X

J. P. Choi and M. Thum, CORRUPTION AND THE SHADOW ECONOMY*, International Economic Review, vol.45, issue.3, pp.817-836, 2005.
DOI : 10.1162/00335530360535180

D. J. Clark and C. Riis, Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.42, issue.1, pp.109-124, 2000.
DOI : 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00077-9

K. Clark and M. Sefton, The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation, The Economic Journal, vol.111, issue.468, pp.51-68, 2001.
DOI : 10.1111/1468-0297.00588

R. Cooper, D. V. Dejong, R. Forsythe, and T. W. Ross, Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games, Games and Economic Behavior, vol.12, issue.2, pp.187-218, 1996.
DOI : 10.1006/game.1996.0013

R. D. Cooter and N. Garupa, The Virtuous Circle of Distrust : A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics WP, p.32, 2000.

R. Damania, P. G. Fredriksson, and J. A. List, Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.46, issue.3, pp.490-512, 2003.
DOI : 10.1016/S0095-0696(03)00025-1

D. Tella, R. Schargrodsky, and E. , Controlling corruption through high wages, in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report, pp.377-379, 2003.

D. Tella, R. Schargrodsky, and E. , The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol.46, issue.1, pp.269-292, 2003.
DOI : 10.1086/345578

D. Dollar, R. Fisman, and R. Gatti, Are women really the ???fairer??? sex? Corruption and women in government, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.46, issue.4, pp.423-429, 2001.
DOI : 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00169-X

A. Dreher and T. Herzfeld, The Economic Costs of Corruption : A Survey and, 2005.

E. Fehr, S. Gächter, and G. Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, Econometrica, vol.65, issue.4, pp.833-860, 1997.
DOI : 10.2307/2171941

E. Fehr and K. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity -Evidence and Economic Applications, Advances in Economics and Econometrics -Eighth World Congress, 2002.

D. Fougère, F. Kramarz, and J. Pouget, L'Analyse Econométrique de la Délinquance, Revue Française d'Economie, XIX, issue.3, pp.3-55, 2005.

B. Frank and G. G. Schulze, Does economics make citizens corrupt?, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.43, issue.1, pp.101-113, 2000.
DOI : 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00111-6

L. Garicano, I. Palacios, and C. Prendergast, Favoritism Under Social Pressure, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol.35, issue.2, pp.208-216, 2005.
DOI : 10.1257/aer.91.5.1521

N. Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization, p.366, 1999.

N. Garoupa and D. Klerman, Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions, International Review of Law and Economics, vol.24, issue.2, pp.219-225, 2004.
DOI : 10.1016/j.irle.2004.08.006

R. K. Goel and M. A. Nelson, ECONOMIC FREEDOM VERSUS POLITICAL FREEDOM: CROSS-COUNTRY INFLUENCES ON CORRUPTION*, Australian Economic Papers, vol.48, issue.2, pp.121-133, 2005.
DOI : 10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00197-8

A. W. Goudie and D. Stasavage, A framework for the analysis of corruption, Crime, Law and Social Change, vol.29, issue.2/3, pp.113-159, 1998.
DOI : 10.1023/A:1008369307796

E. Hauk and M. Saez-marti, On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.107, issue.2, pp.311-335, 2002.
DOI : 10.1006/jeth.2001.2956

T. Herzfeld and C. Weiss, Corruption and legal (in)effectiveness: an empirical investigation, European Journal of Political Economy, vol.19, issue.3, pp.621-632, 2003.
DOI : 10.1016/S0176-2680(03)00018-1

J. Hunt and S. Laszlo, Bribery : Who Pays, Who Refuses, What Are The Payoffs ?, p.11635, 2005.

N. Jacquemet, Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence on Corruption under Delegation, SSRN Electronic Journal, pp.2005-2011, 2005.
DOI : 10.2139/ssrn.1805159

URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00180044

G. Kalb and J. Williams, Delinquency and gender, Applied Economics Letters, vol.49, issue.7, pp.425-429, 2003.
DOI : 10.1007/BF02900928

L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, vol.102, issue.3, pp.583-606, 1994.
DOI : 10.1086/261947

R. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, 1988.

M. A. Klochko and P. C. Ordeshook, Corruption, Cooperation and Endogenous Time Discount Rates, Public Choice, vol.115, issue.3/4, pp.3-4, 2003.
DOI : 10.1023/A:1024268211998

D. M. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson, Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.27, issue.2, pp.245-252, 1982.
DOI : 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1

A. O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, The American Economic Review, vol.64, issue.3, pp.291-303, 1974.
DOI : 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_8

M. Kugler, T. Verdier, and Y. Zenou, Organized crime, corruption and punishment, Journal of Public Economics, vol.89, issue.9-10, 2005.
DOI : 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005

URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754068

A. Lambert-mogiliansky, Why firms pay occasional bribes: the connection economy, European Journal of Political Economy, vol.18, issue.1, pp.47-60, 2002.
DOI : 10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00068-4

M. Levin and G. Satarov, Corruption and institutions in Russia, European Journal of Political Economy, vol.16, issue.1, pp.113-132, 2000.
DOI : 10.1016/S0176-2680(99)00050-6

F. T. Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, Journal of Political Economy, vol.93, issue.4, pp.760-781, 1985.
DOI : 10.1086/261329

F. T. Lui, A dynamic model of corruption deterrence, Journal of Public Economics, vol.31, issue.2, pp.215-236, 1986.
DOI : 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90019-8

S. Marjit, V. Mukherjee, and A. Mukherjee, Harassment, corruption and tax policy: reply, European Journal of Political Economy, vol.19, issue.4, pp.899-900, 2003.
DOI : 10.1016/S0176-2680(03)00047-8

P. Mauro, Corruption and Growth, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.110, issue.3, pp.681-712, 1995.
DOI : 10.2307/2946696

A. Mishra, Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.47, issue.2, pp.165-178, 2002.
DOI : 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00201-3

H. N. Mocan and D. I. Rees, Economic Conditions, Deterrence and Juvenile Crime: Evidence from Micro Data, American Law and Economics Review, vol.7, issue.2, pp.319-349, 2005.
DOI : 10.1093/aler/ahi011

N. H. Mocan, What Determines Corruption ? International Evidence from Micro Data, 2004.
DOI : 10.3386/w10460

M. Paldam, Corruption and Religion Adding to the Economic Model, Kyklos, vol.54, issue.2&3, pp.383-414, 2001.
DOI : 10.1111/1467-6435.00160

M. Paldam, The cross-country pattern of corruption: economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics, European Journal of Political Economy, vol.18, issue.2, pp.215-240, 2002.
DOI : 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00078-2

A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, Corruption and optimal law enforcement, Journal of Public Economics, vol.81, issue.1, pp.1-24, 2001.
DOI : 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00127-4

A. Prat and A. Rustichini, Sequential common agency, 1998.

C. Prendergast, Investigating Corruption, World Bank Policy Research WP, 2000.
DOI : 10.1596/1813-9450-2500

J. E. Rauch and P. B. Evans, Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries, Journal of Public Economics, vol.75, issue.1, pp.49-71, 2000.
DOI : 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00044-4

R. Reinikka and J. Svensson, Using Micro-Surveys to Measure and Explain Corruption, World Development, vol.34, issue.2, pp.359-370, 2006.
DOI : 10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.009

J. Rigolini, R. Gatti, and S. Paternostro, Individual Attitudes Towards Corruption : Do Social Effects Matter ?, p.3122, 2003.

S. Rose-ackerman, The economics of corruption, Journal of Public Economics, vol.4, issue.2, pp.187-203, 1975.
DOI : 10.1016/0047-2727(75)90017-1

R. W. Rosenthal, Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.25, issue.1, pp.92-100, 1981.
DOI : 10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1

A. Sanyal, Bribes in a Supply Line, Economica, issue.281, pp.71-155, 2004.

D. Serra, Empirical determinants of corruption: A sensitivity analysis, Public Choice, vol.76, issue.4, pp.225-256, 2006.
DOI : 10.1007/s11127-006-0286-4

C. Shapiro and J. E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, American Economic Review, vol.74, issue.3, pp.433-444, 1984.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511559594.004

A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, Corruption, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.108, issue.3, pp.599-617, 1993.
DOI : 10.2307/2118402

M. J. Skidmore, Promise and Peril in Combating Corruption: Hong Kong's ICAC, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.547, issue.1, pp.118-130, 1996.
DOI : 10.1177/0002716296547001010

F. Steves and A. Rousso, Anti-corruption programmes in post-communist transition countries and changes in the business environment, p.85, 1999.

H. Sung, Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited, Social Forces, vol.82, issue.2, pp.703-723, 2003.
DOI : 10.1353/sof.2004.0028

S. Suphachalasai, Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media, SSRN Electronic Journal, p.52005, 2005.
DOI : 10.2139/ssrn.722403

A. Swamy, S. Knack, Y. Lee, and O. Azfar, Gender and corruption, Journal of Development Economics, vol.64, issue.1, pp.25-55, 2001.
DOI : 10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00123-1

V. Tanzi, Corruption : arm's-length relationships and markets The Economics of Organised Crime, pp.161-181, 1995.

J. Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies : On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, Journal of Law Economics, & Organization, vol.2, issue.2, pp.181-214, 1986.

J. Tirole, A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality), The Review of Economic Studies, vol.63, issue.1, pp.1-22, 1996.
DOI : 10.2307/2298112

J. Tirole, Rational irrationality: Some economics of self-management, European Economic Review, vol.46, issue.4-5, pp.633-655, 2002.
DOI : 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00206-9

D. Treisman, The causes of corruption: a cross-national study, Journal of Public Economics, vol.76, issue.3, 2000.
DOI : 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00092-4