The effects of politics on local tax setting : evidence from France
Sonia Paty
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 171982
- IdHAL : sonia-paty
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8061-7075
- IdRef : 098214705
Résumé
This paper investigates the hypothesis that local politics has an impact on local taxation in the French public sector by using a cross-sectional dataset on departments in 1999. Political variables are included in a tax-setting equation to provide empirical evidence whether local governments in France adopt business taxation behaviour closer to the Leviathan government hypothesis, with higher tax rates when political competition decreases, or to the partisan government hypothesis, with differences in tax rates according to partisan variables. It is shown that the wider the seat's margin, the lower the tax rates, and that this cut is weaker in the case of a left-wing local majority than a right-wing majority. It is therefore concluded that the partisan government hypothesis is more supported by the French data than the Leviathan one, even after controlling for tax interdependencies between departments.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
The effects of politics on local tax setting : evidence from France
|
Résumé |
en
This paper investigates the hypothesis that local politics has an impact on local taxation in the French public sector by using a cross-sectional dataset on departments in 1999. Political variables are included in a tax-setting equation to provide empirical evidence whether local governments in France adopt business taxation behaviour closer to the Leviathan government hypothesis, with higher tax rates when political competition decreases, or to the partisan government hypothesis, with differences in tax rates according to partisan variables. It is shown that the wider the seat's margin, the lower the tax rates, and that this cut is weaker in the case of a left-wing local majority than a right-wing majority. It is therefore concluded that the partisan government hypothesis is more supported by the French data than the Leviathan one, even after controlling for tax interdependencies between departments.
|
Auteur(s) |
Eric Dubois
1
, Matthieu Leprince
2
, Sonia Paty
3
1
LAEP -
LAboratoire d'Economie Publique
( 16346 )
- Maison des Sciences Economiques 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital 75647 Paris cedex 13
- France
2
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
3
CESAER -
Centre d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales Appliquées à l'Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux
( 1005266 )
- France
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Page/Identifiant |
1603-1618
|
Numéro |
8
|
Volume |
44
|
Date de publication |
2007
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Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Localisation géographique du document |
UMR 1041 UMR INRA / ENESAD : Centre d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales Appliquées à l'Agricutlure et aux Espaces Ruraux, Centre de recherche de Dijon, 21079 DIJON CEDEX, FRA (Coll. TAP Inra Dijon Paty 2007)
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Voir aussi |
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Domaine(s) |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
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Mots-clés |
en
local politics, local taxation, French public sector
|
DOI | 10.1080/00420980701373487 |
ProdINRA | 250926 |
UT key WOS | 000248539900010 |
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