What is Wrong with Reid's Criticism of Hume on Moral Approbation?

Abstract : In his Essays on the Active Powers, Thomas Reid criticises Hume's theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that Reid shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure (disputable) assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings.
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Laurent Jaffro. What is Wrong with Reid's Criticism of Hume on Moral Approbation?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2006, 2 (2), pp.11-26. ⟨halshs-00163169⟩

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