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Any: from scalability to arbitrariness

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In general, it is impossible to achieve complete logical parity between individuals and arbitrary objects; the difference in their logical, or rather meta-logical behaviour, must show up somewhere.
Fine (1985, p. 12)

Abstract In spite of the existence of a vast literature on any, no clear consensus has finally emerged as to its semantic nature and behaviour. We argue here that the deep unity of any is to be found in the link that this item sets up between scalability and arbitrariness in the sense of Fine (1985). The traditional distinction between any as a free choice (FC) or as a polarity sensitive (PS) element is put in a radically new perspective: any is analysed as scalar at root, along the lines of Lee & Horn (1994), but it emerges either as FC or PS depending on which type of link between scalability and arbitrariness on events is constructed. So, the 'two' any appear as two different but related strategies towards the same problem, instead of two parallel and accidental similar behaviours.

1 Introduction

Two behaviours of any have been mentioned and studied in the literature. The so-called free choice (FC) any is a sort of quodlibetic operator (Horn 1996), often represented by a universal quantifier. The polarity sensitive (PS) any is a sort of indefinite and is often represented by an existential quantifier. However, independently from these distinctions, there is also the persistent feeling that a common core meaning underlies the distribution of the item. Whether PS and FC any are two separate elements or two readings of a single item is a matter of much debate. No clear consensus has emerged so far from the literature as to its semantic nature and behaviour. We propose that (i) any is scalar and concessive, as in (Lee
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& Horn 1994), (ii) it is neither an indefinite nor a quantifier but a more abstract item which signals that some property holds of the endpoint of some appropriate scale, which is interpreted (iii) in connection with arbitrariness, in the sense of Fine (1985), that is, as an object which possesses all and only the properties characteristic of a class. We first point out some problems with recent approaches on any (section 2). Next, we draw the scalar profile of any (section 3.1) and relate it to arbitrariness (section 3.2). Finally (section 3.3), we show the difference and articulation between PS and FC any.

2 Recent approaches

Kadmon & Landman (1993) propose that any is an indefinite that must satisfy two semantico-pragmatic constraints termed widening and strengthening. Widening is the property according to which, in a sentence of for \( \phi(\text{any } N) \), \( \phi \) is asserted to hold of absolutely every individual of the N class, not only of the most typical ones. For instance, the generic sentence in (1a) is analysed as equivalent to (1b) plus instructions on how to extend the domain of owls in the interpretation, because widening forces one to consider just any owl, not only the most normal, typical, etc. Strengthening is the requirement that the any statement \( \phi(\text{any } N) \) entails the statement \( \phi(a \ N) \). Since any is assumed to be an indefinite, strengthening, in non-generic sentences, amounts to say that, if \( \phi \) holds of some N-individual \( i \), which may be typical or not, \( \phi \) holds also of some typical individual. (2) is ruled out by the condition of strengthening because the any N statement, meaning Mary read a possibly atypical book, does not entail the corresponding statement Mary read a typical book.
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(1)  
   a. Any owl hunts mice  
   b. An owl hunts mice  

(2)  Mary read ??any book  

(3)  
   a. Mary read any book which was on the reading list  
   b. Mary read any book ??which happened to be on her desk.  

There are several problems with this description of any. We will mention only three. First, the reading of any in (3) is clearly the FC one since, as noted by Dayal (1995), it is possible to insert almost or practically in it (Mary read practically any book which...). These adverbs are considered universal quantifier modifiers, and their acceptability in this context does not square well with a characterisation of any as an indefinite. Second, it is unexpected that non-accidental\(^1\) modification definitel improves this type of example as in (3a). Finally, note that the difference between must-obligations (4) and imperatives (5) is not explained. (4) can be ruled out for failing to satisfy strengthening, since the obligation to read a standard or non standard book does not entail the obligation to read a standard book. However, the same line of analysis applies also to (5), which would be incorrectly ruled out. This problem is general to approaches characterising any as a polarity sensitive item (PSI), whose behaviour must be ultimately explained by some form of unidirectional scalar entailment (Krifka 1995, Israel 1996).\(^2\)

(4)  Mary must read ??any book  
(5)  Read any book (Pick any card, any apple, any cake, ...)

\(^1\) The modification of a noun is accidental whenever it refers to a contingent property of the entities which make up the denotation of the noun.  
Other recent proposals by Zwarts (1995), Dayal (1995) and Giannakidou (1997) focus on notions such as veridicality or existentiality without taking a firm stand on the nature of *any*. They assume that *any* marks a lack of commitment with respect to the existence of individuals in its domain. Hence, it is semantically licensed precisely in those contexts where one needs not suppose that the domain of the N -predicate is non-empty. In Dayal's analysis, the distribution of *any* in non intensional contexts is regulated by two constraints. First, Non-Existence says that an occurrence of \([\text{NP any } \beta]\) in a statement \(\phi\) is licit iff it does not entail \(\exists \beta \phi\). Second, Contextual Vagueness says that uses of *any* which satisfy Non-Existence, must also not give rise to an interpretation in which the speaker knows the individuals who/which constitute the set referred to by *any* \(\beta\).

The difference between (2) and (3a) is explained by postulating that, in extensional contexts, universal quantifiers bearing on an unmodified noun N entail existence of individuals of the N category, while this entailment is not in force with some types of N modification (e.g. relative clauses).

Although the veridicalit -based type of approach seems natural for questions and downward monotone contexts (including negation), we showed (Tovena & Jayez 1997a,b) that it runs into problems in some cases. It leads to cases of overlicensing (6), i.e. *any* is wrongly predicted to be possible and indiscrimination (7), i.e. observations support two competing hypotheses.

(6) (A psychologist instructing a subject):
That is the room, plastic shapes are scattered on the floor. A given shape may or may not be there. Once you've entered the room, you must pick up

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3 Carlson (1981) makes a similar proposal and says that *any* is antilicensed in a sentence that entails the material existence of the referent of an NP.
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quickly every/any square and then push the green button. If there is no square, push the red button.

(7) In that period any foreigner was considered as responsible for the war, but there were no foreigners.

If the discourse (6) has any coherence, the clumsiness of any vs every is problematic. The existence of squares on the floor is suspended. Yet, any is not felicitous. Also, one cannot discriminate between non-existence and non-individuation when interpreting (7) as ranging over a set of situations. The sentence could be possible because the existence of foreigners is not entailed in every situation or because their identity varies across situations. (7) shows only that we cannot deny the existence of foreigners per se. In addition, the status of imperatives in contrast with that of obligations is not very clear.

A possible answer is that non-veridicality is lexical in nature. So, it may not be detected by tests on entailments or presuppositions. For instance, in (6), the existence of squares is lexically supported, even if discourse suspends it. Dayal (1995) borrows from von Fintel (1994) the idea that structures of form $Q \forall N^0$, where $Q \forall$ is a universal quantifier (every, each, any in English) and $N^0$ an unmodified noun, convey an existential entailment in non-generic sentences. This would account for (6). Any square forces the existence of squares, which conflicts with the preceding discourse as well as with the requirement of non-veridicality.

However, two problems remain. First, one has to explain why the generic sentence (7) seems to entail the existence of foreigners, since existential entailment is assigned to the form $Q \forall N^0$ in non-generic sentences. Second, the contrast $Q \forall N^0$ vs $Q \forall N$ is not that robust. In (6), every is possible. Yet, it should sound strange since (i) (6) conveys an existential entailment and (ii) this entailment is inconsistent with the
existence suspension created by the discourse. We conclude that non-veridicality is not supported by sufficiently clear empirical evidence.\footnote{Dayal (1998) gives up non-veridicality because she finds it a slippery notion (her terms). Problematic as}

In the next section, we take a different perspective on any. We adopt the proposal that any is scalar and claim that, in addition, it is sensitive to arbitrariness, in the sense of Fine (1985). This allows us to connect PS and FC any in a more principled way.

3 Scales, information and arbitrariness

In this section, we expound some basic ideas of the information-based analysis of scalar phenomena and introduce gradually the highly abstract notion of (scalar) arbitrariness behind PS and FC any. Let us explain intuitively the connection between scalarity and arbitrariness on the FC example (3a). 

Mary read any book which was on the reading list can be interpreted as saying that Mary read even the book(s) that she was not expected to read, because they are dull, too difficult, partly irrelevant, etc. This is the scalar flavour of any advocated in various works. Since Mary read books which, in a sense, she should not have read, given their particular properties, this might be so because she selected and read books just in virtue of their being on the reading list, without considering further properties (their interest, easiness, etc.). In other terms, Mary can read an arbitrary book, provided it shows up on the reading list. In such cases, the scalar reading denotes a situation which is a consequence of the fact that books are read in virtue of being on the reading list and might be quite arbitrary otherwise. In section 3.1, we briefly describe the scalar aspects of any. We introduce arbitrariness and relate it to scalarity in section 3.2.
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Finally, in 3.3, we address the FC/PS distinction and extend our proposal to various types of any sentences.

3.1 Scalar value of any

It has been proposed in recent work that any is a sort of scalar concessive item with an intuitive meaning akin to even (so), (Lee & Horn 1994, C. Lee 1996, 1997). The general idea is that a sentence with any asserts that even some object which was expected (not) to exhibit a certain property or (not) to participate in a certain event does not (does) exhibit that propert or does not (does) participate in that event. So, (3a) means that Mary read even a book on the reading list that was the least likely to be read. An entailment reversal procedure (Fauconnier 1978) then generates a plausible interpretation under which Mary read all the books. Similarly, for Mary did not read any book (8c), even a book that was the most likely to be read was not read by Mary. Again, by virtue of scalar entailment, Mary did not read a book. Following the argumentation of Dayal (1995, 1998), we reject the idea that FC any is an indefinite. Yet, we keep the idea that it is scalar/concessive. The effect of any is to signal that even the objet which is the most likely to satisfy (not satisfy) φ does not satisfy (satisfies) φ, with the usual consequences of entailment reversal.5

Independent evidence for this hypothesis comes from the parallelis between any and the French le moindre (lit. the least), which has both PS and FC readings, as shown in (8).6

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5 This is in agreement with the general information-based view of polarity developed in particular in (Krilka 1995) and (Israel 1996). For space reasons, we will not elaborate on this point here.

6 We ignore here the fact that le moindre requires that its complement N be naturally conceived as unimportant or lo -degree on some scale. So, in (8a), la moindre référence can only denote the least significant, interesting, etc., reference. It may not denote the most difficult one. This disparaging character of le moindre explains why our reviewers expressed doubt on the existence of FC le moindre: it turns out that they considered examples for which no disparaging interpretation is natural. Examples like le moindre
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(8) a. Marie est très compétente. Elle connaît la moindre référence sur
Mary is very competent she knows the least reference on
la question
the topic

b. Marie est très compétente. Elle connaît ??la moindre référence
Mary is very competent she knows the least reference

c. Mary did not read any book

d. Marie n’a pas lu le moindre livre
Mary did not read the least book

It is unlikely that the correspondence between any and le moindre is a mere
twist of fate, especially since they also share the phenomenon of
subtrigging. However, the present analysis of any in terms of scalarit
does not explain the subtrigging, nor the fact that accidental predication on
any phrases is infelicitous (see the contrast (3a)-(3b)). In the next section,
we turn to the Finian notion of arbitrariness as the missing link between
the scalar concessive and modal sides of any.

3.2 Fine's arbitrariness

If Mary read any book on the reading list, she read all the books on it. This
is FC any. Also, she read even the book one would not have expected her

portier est bavard (lit. The least doorman is talkative) are strange, because being talkative is not an abilit
but rather a failing. So, the sentence says something like Even the less able doorman is talkative. In
contrast, le moindre étudiant sait cela (lit. The least student knows that) is perfect because it means Even
the slowest/laziest/most ill-informed student knows that. Any, in contrast, seems to be quite neutral as
regards its N complement.

We borrow this convenient term from the literature on any. It refers to the fact that an otherwise
unacceptable any phrase becomes natural when the head noun is modified, generally by a relative clause
or a postnominal modifier (adjective or prepositional adjunct). In addition to the similarity between any
and le moindre, there is a parallel similarity involving subtring between any and tout (Toven & Jayez
1997c).
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to read. This is concessive scalar *any*. The two are sensitive to individuals, they are *about* individuals from the reading list. Consider the scalar concessive sense. Let *b* be the least-likely -to-be-read-by-Mary book. Reading *b* goes against all odds. Still, *b* is read. Why? Under a (plausible) interpretation, just because it is a book on the reading list. *b* is read because it has all the properties of a book on the list and only because of them since, when it comes to its other properties (e.g. intrinsic interest or clarity), it might *not* be read. This implies that Mary would read everything which has all and only the properties of being a book on the reading list. Such a thing is no longer an individual but a generic or arbitrary object in Fine's (1985, 1988) sense. Roughly speaking, an object is arbitrary with respect to a set *P* of properties (*P*-arbitrary) if it has all and only the properties in *P*. In the more current type lingo, if *σ* is a type, *x* is arbitrary with respect to *σ* (*σ*-arbitrary) whenever *σ* is the most specific type which classifies/describes *x* in a perfect classification system, where every subset of properties of an individual can be reflected in some type. This suggests the following criterion for FC *any*.

(9) **FC any criterion** In a sentence *φ(any N)*, the FC reading is felicitous only under an interpretation where the truth of *φ(any N)* appears as a consequence of the fact that the property *φ* holds of the arbitrary object of type *N*.

As such, this criterion is able to block examples like (3b), because an accidental predication is not compatible with a rule. If *φ* is an accidental property of every *N*-individual in a relevant domain, it is certainly *not* the case that *φ* holds for *N*-individuals in virtue of their being *N*-things. What

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8 Kempson (1985) was the first to stress the interest of Fine's theory of arbitrary objects for *any*. In particular, she detected the importance of the notion of *dependency* (see below). Unfortunately, her proposal did not attract the attention it deserved.
the sentence says is that $\phi$ holds for a set of individuals, and that, accidentally, the *happen* to correspond to the set of $N$-individuals in the domain. It is not natural to assume that Mary read books on her desk *because* they were on her desk, but rather because they were interesting, assigned for a course, etc. However, some contexts might perhaps prime this interpretation. Suppose that Mary (rather stupidly) bets that she will read every book on her desk. Isn't the property of being on Mary's desk an essential trigger of the reading in this case? Unexpectedly, the answer is *no*, even in this case. Mary is bound to read every book on her desk because she bet that she would do so, not because the books are on her desk. The fact that the books are on the desk does not *motivate* the fact that they form the target of the bet. In other terms, the property of being on the desk remains accidental with respect to that of constituting the target of the bet.

3.2 Contextual Vagueness, variation and arbitrariness

Dayal (1995, 1998) observed that FC *any* is not natural when the *any* N form refers to a contextually salient set of individuals. So, *any* requires that *any* N be *contextually vague* (CV criterion). Similarly, Tovena & Jayez (1997a,b,c) propose that *any* is licensed only under possible *variation* on the domain of individuals.\(^9\) This seems to be a straightforward consequence of the criterion (9). When a special set of individuals is mentioned, accidentality can creep in much more easily than if the identit of the set remains indeterminate.

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\(^9\) Technically, although they use different logical idioms, (Dayal 1998) and (Tovena & Jayez 1997b,c) seem to be essentially similar.
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Yet, subtrigging remains to be explained. Dayal (1998) proposes that the relevant constructions allude to a sort of temporal spread which restricts the domain of individual-situation pairs an any sentence is about. An assertive episodic sentence of for $\phi(any \ N)$ corresponds to the logical form (10).

(10) **Logical form for episodic statements $\phi(any \ N)$**

$$\forall s, x \ [N(x) \text{ in } s] \ [\exists s' (s' \text{ extends } s \land \text{loc}(s') \land \phi(x) \text{ in } s')]$$

(10) says that for every situation $s$ and individual $x$, if $x$ is a N-thing in $s$, then there is some localised situation $s'$ such that it contains more information than $s$ (*extends* $s$) and that $\phi$ holds of $x$ in $s'$. The loc predicate indicates that the situation occupies a determinate spatio-temporal location. On this account, (2) is strange because the sentence says something like *In every possible situation where there is a book, Mary read it*. This is not plausible since there are many situations in which there is a book Mary did not read, for instance all the situations before Mary's birth or after Mary's death. In contrast, a sentence like *Mary read any book she found* does not offend plausibility, because it says that every situation where Mary finds a book can be extended to a situation where she reads it. The contrast between the two logical forms is the following.

(11) a. *Mary read any book*

$$\forall s, x \ [\text{book}(x) \text{ in } s] \ [\exists s' (\text{loc}(s') \land s' \text{ extends } s \land \text{Mary read } x \text{ in } s')]$$

b. *Mary read any book she found*

$$\forall s, x \ [\text{book}(x) \text{ in } s \land \exists s' (\text{loc}(s') \land s' \text{ extends } s \land \text{Mary found } x \text{ in } s')]$$

$$[\exists s'' (\text{loc}(s'') \land s'' \text{ extends } s \land \text{Mary read } x \text{ in } s'')]$$

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10 We drop Dayal's typicality restriction on situations for it does not play any substantial role in the present discussion.
It is unclear how this proposal works for examples like (12)

\[\forall s, x [\text{result}(x) \text{ in } s \land \exists s' (s' \text{ extends } s \land x \text{ depends on C.T. in } s')] \]
\[\exists s'' (\text{loc}(s'') \land s'' \text{ extends } s \land \text{Mary considered } x \text{ in } s')] \]

Let \( r \) be a certain mathematical result which actually depends on Craig’s theorem. The problem is that such a dependence holds in every situation, under the commonsense interpretation of mathematical truths as non episodic. So, no loc predicate applies to the situation \( s' \) in which \( r \) depends on Craig's theorem. Then, the logical form in (12) is as offending as that in (11a), since it predicts that Mary considers every result depending on Craig’s theorem in every possible situation where there is such a result.

This problem stems from the assumption in (10) that \( \phi(\text{any N}) \) is an assertion about every possible situation. (9) is more circumspect in this respect. It says simply that the universal judgement appears as a consequence of a stronger judgement based over arbitrary objects. Consider (2) (Mary read ??any book) again. What is wrong with this sentence is that it does not assert the existence of any link between properties. Admittedly, it is compatible with a dependenc-based reading. For instance, it might be interpreted as implying that Mary read all the books, rather than the papers, because there is some link between the property of being a book and other parameters of the situation. But this is not what the sentence says. In contrast, generic sentences involve constraints between properties, and, in a sense, they are about such
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constraints. In *channel theory* (Barwise & Seligman 1997, Cavedon & Glasbey 1995), generic sentences can be analysed as involving dependencies between different aspects or parts of individuals. For example, (1) (*Any owl hunts mice*) corresponds to a regularity which associates the zoological category of an animal (e.g. *owl*) to its predator behaviour (e.g. *hunts mice*). The perspective under which such associations hold is called the *core* (of a *channel*). A core is essentially a set of typed connections. In (1), the core contains connections of form *owl* a constraint, it obeys the constraint. Otherwise it is an *exception* to the constraint. For example, if *owl* is an owl of type *owl* but its predator behaviour predator -behaviour* is not of type *hunts mice*, the connection *owl* rable. For instance, it could concern only one particular individual, a set of individuals, individuals in such or such situation, etc. In this respect, the analysis of generic sentences extends to episodic ones if they make manifest some regularity.

The crucial point is that subtriggers force a dependenc -based reading when they do not denote an accidental condition. A sentence like (3a) means that, *if* a book was on the reading list, Mary read it. A sentence like (3b) asserts that Mary read a set of books which were on her desk. A sentence like (2) asserts that Mary read all the books, but does not establish any connection between the category of books and the fact of being read. There is no informational core which predicts that there is a link between some categories. We are free to interpret the sentence as describing a situation where such a link holds, but the sentence itself does not describe the situation as a situation of this kind. We conclude that

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13 The idea that relative clauses are analogous to *if*-sentences has been exploited in (von Fintel 1994). More generally, we see subtriggers as introducing restrictions of a conditional nature. This is in agreement with the observations of Dayal (1998), but does not commit us to any particular view on the temporal nature of these restrictions.
Dayal's (1998) hypothesis must be modified. We want to keep the idea that subtriggers function as restrictions, but we do not retain the view that any quantifies directly over possible individuals in all cases. Rather, the licensing condition for FC any in generic or episodic positive statements is that the sentence expresses a dependency. Dependencies can hold for ever possible individual of some type, but they also hold in restricted settings. For instance, the natural interpretation of a sentence like (3a) is that, in every possible situation which is sufficiently similar to the situation described by the sentence, Mary would have read every book on the reading list. On one side, the sentence does not say simply that Mary read all the books on the list, since it also asserts that there is a dependency. On the other side, this dependency is not absolute, but relative to those aspects which determine which dependencies are supported by the situation, that is, formally, to the core of the channel which is used to describe the dependency system.

There are several ways to reflect the relativization to situations in the language of situation semantics. One of the most simple ways is to use constraints of the form:

\[ \lambda x. s \text{ supports information } A(x) \rightarrow \lambda x. s \text{ supports information } B(x) \]

For (3a), A and B must contain at least the information corresponding to the property of being a book on the reading list and being read by Mar respectively. s is the reference situation. The constraint associates object types relativized to the reference situation s. We call such a constraint an \textit{A-B relativized dependency}.\textsuperscript{14} We now reformulate the criterion (9) for generic and episodic positive statements.

\textsuperscript{14} There is much more to be said on relativized dependencies, for instance on alternative formulations in terms of situation types or proposition types (rather than object types). We chose the object type approach for simplicity. Note that the distinction between arbitrariness and accidentality is mirrored by the difference between constraints and connections. Every information in A and B is a part of the dependency. In contrast, an information which is supported by s but which is not declared in the dependency is
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(13) **FC any criterion.** In a generic/episodic positive statement $\phi(\text{any } N)$, the FC reading is felicitous only when the sentence expresses a $\phi$-$N$ relativized dependency.

Since constraints admit exceptions, a classical model of arbitrariness like the one in (Fine 1985) or a strong notion of dependency (Fine 1988) cannot be maintained. However, we will not discuss here the possible treatments of exceptions (see (Cavedon 1995)).

This proposal allows us to explain the appeal of non-veridicality. If non-modal positive statements with *any* assert essentially dependencies of form *if X then Y*, their non-veridical nature is predicted by the possibility of $X$ being false. So, non-veridicality is not incorrect but rather too weak.

We have not yet considered the relation between PS and FC *any*. This is the aim of the next section.

### 3.3 The PS/FC distinction reshaped

PS *any* raises two difficulties. First, subtrigging is not necessary, cf. (8c). Second, accidental interpretations are found in negative contexts.

(14) Mary did not touch any object on her desk

To explain the possibility of (14), one is tempted to give to Mary's behaviour a dispositional colour. However, (14) is not necessarily generic or habitual. We could insist that (14) describes a disposition of Mary. Not only did Mary not touch any object on her desk, but she *avoided* or was

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considered as accidental. Suppose all books on the reading list in $s$ have a red cover. If $A$ contains only *being a book on the reading list* but not *having a red cover*, the latter property remains accidental, although it holds of every relevant book in the reference situation. Finally, note that, for generic sentences,
unable to do so. In this respect, Mary wouldn't have touched any object on her desk no matter which precise objects were to be found there. Unfortunately, a similar solution applies to (2). If Mary read every book, maybe she did so in virtue of her nature. Maybe she would have read ever book in any conceivable situation. But things do not work this way. We cannot create an acceptable reading for (2) by invoking a disposition of Mary. A second proposal for (14) consists of stripping the event of an individual substance, because (14) mentions negative events, which are not considered as genuine events in some traditions. On this type of account, (14) would not qualify as a descriptive sentence, since it does not allude to a determinate set of particular negative events. However, it is not clear how we would explain examples such as (15) in this perspective.

(15) The department made three different offers to Mary, but she did not accept any of them

Since the department issued a limited number of particular offers, Mary's behaviour created a limited number of particular events of refusal. Yet, any is appropriate. Le moindre has a similar distribution, cf. (16)-(17).

(16) Marie n’a pas touché le moindre objet sur son bureau
Mary didn’t touch the least object on her desk
(17) Marie n’a pas accepté la moindre offre du département
Mary didn’t accept the least offer from the department

the relativization to s can be dropped if genericity is considered as a quantification over all possible situations.
15 So, we abandon the view proposed in (Toven a & Jaye z 1997a) that any is basically dispositional in negative sentences.
16 There is ample variation on this and related topics, see Amsili & Le Draoulec 1995 for a recent review. However, le moindre and any have different distributions with respect to adversative verbs. Refuser (to reject) does not accept object NPs of for le moindre N, see Marie a refusé ??la moindre offre du département, in contrast with He refused any sympathy (Toven a 1996).
Recall from section 3.1 that the basic value of *any* is concessive. This characterisation was motivated by the desire to cast a bridge between PS and FC *any* and by the parallelism with *le moindre*. The concessive behaviour was modelled by appealing to possible choices on individuals ranked on various scales. Some of the FC examples were explained deriving an arbitrariness requirement from the concessive basic value. This derivation does not work with the examples of PS *any* just reviewed. Note that the link between concession and arbitrariness was based on individuals. Thus, (3a) was interpreted as saying that Mary read even the least 'readable' book in the domain of books on the reading list, which implied that Mary read books of this type in general. The option we will take now is slightly different: it consists of putting arbitrariness on *events*. Negative sentences like (8c,d) exclude all events of a certain type. For instance, (8c) excludes all events of Mary reading a book in a given domain. Suppose you want to prove (8c) for a finite domain of books. You have to enumerate books and check, for each book *b*, that Mary did not read it. But how can you check it in a strong sense? The fact that Mary did *not* read the book is not a visible fact of nature. You cannot watch Mar 'not reading a book' (?). For all you know, Mary might have read *b* before your checking. Unless you spy or debrief Mary, in general you are not in a position to prove that she didn't do something. More importantly, even if you can prove it, this 'proof' may not consist in a finite enumeration of events. On a given temporal interval, there are in general infinitely many possible events of reading the book *b* which are excluded by a judgement like *Mary didn't read b*. Let [t₁,t₂] be the interval and suppose that time is dense and t₁ ≠ t₂. Then, *Mary didn't read b* entails that Mary didn't read *b* during any [tᵢ,tⱼ] ⊆ [t₁,t₂] whose duration is sufficient to allow Mary to read the book. If the duration of [t₁,t₂] is superior to the minimum duration
necessary for Mary to read the book, there are infinitely many such \([t_i,t_j]\) in virtue of the density of time. This extends easily to cases where we consider only partial readings of a book.\(^\text{18}\)

How does this compare with the channel theoretic approach of subtrigging in section 3.2? In a channel core, connections associate individuals and/or parts of or perspectives on an individual. They also associate types. It is this second mode of association which pertains to any, le moindre and tout. If we assume that accidental readings are possible in negative contexts, we cannot attribute the felicity of any or le moindre in those contexts to a type association, since type association is intended to reflect essential predication. So, in (14), we have no constraint of for object on Mary's desk infinite number of potential events. So the situation described by (14) is of the following type (18b).

\[
\text{(18) a. Mary did not touch any object on her desk is true in } s \\
\text{b. } s \text{ is of type: } \neg \exists e (e \text{ is an event of Mary touching an object on her desk})
\]

The arbitrary flavour of (18b) and its similarity with constraints on types comes from the following parallelism, exemplified on (3a) and (14).

— (3a): consider the events of reading the \(n\) books on the reading list in the reference situation. They form a set \(\{e_1 \ldots e_n\}\). One may not prove the existence of a non accidental constraint being a book on the r.l.

— (14): consider a finite set of negative events of not touching the \(n\) objects on Mary's desk in the reference situation. They form a set \(\{e_1 \ldots e_n\}\). One may not prove that the reference situation is of the type (18b) from the set \(\{e_1 \ldots e_n\}\), because, although this type might be accidental (=  

\(^\text{18}\) Example (15) if of the same kind. The number of refusals is limited, but the number of non-acceptances is infinite.
An y: from scala rity to arbitrari ness

might not involve any constraint), it characterises a type of event, not particular events.

The two cases are parallel in that the type of the situation, as described by the sentence, is not reducible to a finite conjunction of individual subtypes. In situation semantics, individual types can be approximated as individual propositions, that is, closed predicative structures asserted or denied of some spatio-temporal location in some situation $s$. E.g. the information that Mary read the book $b$ at place $l$ and time $t$ in $s$ is a proposition of form $[s \text{ supports } << \text{read}, \text{Mary, } b, l, t, 1>>]$, where $l$ is the assertion polarity. The proposition $[s \text{ supports } << \text{read, Mary, } b, l, t, 0>>]$ is the corresponding proposition with a negation polarity. Constraints or types of for $\neg \exists e \phi$ have an arbitrary flavour in a given situation whenever, in that situation, they are not equivalent to a boolean combination of individual propositions, for some polarity. In its strong form, arbitrariness corresponds to a notion of provability and dependency (Meyer Viol 1995). In a weaker, and more general, form, it corresponds to the irrelevance of individual choices with respect to a judgement. An object is arbitrary, in the sense of Fine, when it can be replaced by any object with the same properties. More generally, an information $I$ (e.g. an individual proposition) is arbitrary with respect to an information $J$ if $J$ entails $I$ and any individual variant of $I$. We are now in a position to extend the criterion (13) to PS any.

(19) Non Individuation or Weak arbitrariness Any is licensed in episodic or generic statements only when the statement describes a situation type which is not equivalent to a boolean combination of individual propositions, for some polarity.
From scalarity to arbitrariness

As indicated, we consider here only certain categories of sentences. Lack of space precludes a discussion of modal (must and may) sentences, downward monotone contexts other than negations, questions, and imperatives. Suffice it to say that these cases are accommodated by extending the criterion (19) to presuppositions of sentences. So the central idea remains essentially the same.

4 Conclusion

Any has a scalar concessive use. It points at the strongest position in a scale of implicatures independently from the direction in which they run. It also has a modal use. It shuns descriptive sentences and is not subtrigged by accidental property predication. The Finian notion of arbitrariness captures the link between them and opens the way to a general characterisation of FC any in terms of dependency. Finally, by putting non-individuation on events we regain unity of treatment for PS and FC any. Since dependenc and non-individuation appear as weaker forms of the strong logical notion of arbitrariness, we conclude that the latter is the key notion in the analysis of any and le moindre.

References

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