Disclosure Quality and Ownership Structure: Evidence from the French Stock Market

Chiraz Ben Ali (1) , Mireille Gettler Summa (2)

1 DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management
2 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision

This paper aims to examine the effect of many ownership features on firm's disclosure quality using the theoretical framework of the agency theory, which states that investors information demand increases with agency costs of the firm. Public ownership increases agency costs and therefore should improve shareholders' information need and enhance disclosure.
After controlling for size, debt and multi-quotation, our tests indicate significant negative associations between disclosure quality and ownership concentration, family control and separation between voting and cash flow rights. The results also show that French listed firms providing good disclosure are more likely to offer stock option plans for their executives, are listed on American stock exchange and are included in CAC40 index

Mots clés: corporate governance; Disclosure quality; ownership structure; agency theory

Domaines: Gestion et management

Chiraz Ben Ali, Mireille Gettler Summa. Disclosure Quality and Ownership Structure: Evidence from the French Stock Market. Apr 2007, LONDRES, United Kingdom. pp.1-36. ⟨halshs-00154970⟩