North-South Regionalism: A Challenge for Europe in a Changing World

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1. Introduction. The World and the European Territory

1.1. How the vision of the World influence the future of the European Territory

A system of description of the world is what Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor propose to call a "metageography". For P.J. Taylor (2001) "globalization represents a metageographical moment, a time when the taken-for-granted way in which, collectively, we organise our knowledge of the world as spatial structures is being eroded. Globalization challenges the mosaic metageography of states with a new putative network metageography of connections". But as noticed by Grasland (2007) a vision of the world – or metageography - is not a purely scientific production. It is also an ideological production or, in other words, a "political geography".

The objective of this paper is to explain what are actually the dominant representation of the situation of Europe in the World and what are the consequence of this visions of the world for European Spatial Planning. We assume that many political decisions which are apparently related to purely "internal affairs" of European Union are in fact based on wider conception of the situation of the world. As stated by Faludi (2005) about the concept of territorial cohesion, we are not facing a simple opposition between liberal and social-democrat point of view. The European model of society is much more complex and take its root in wider spatial and historical scales.

In other words, our conceptions of European Spatial Planning are strongly grounded in our mental representations of the World and the fact that we are not clearly conscious of this scalar relation is a real barrier for further progress in political as in scientific fields. We will therefore present firstly a brief overview of the three dominant visions of the World that are used in Europe (part 2) before to explain in details their territorial consequences for Europe (part 3).

1.2. How the European Concepts of territorial planning help us to understand the actual situation of Europe in the World

But the proposal can be reverse and we propose also to explore how concepts elaborated specifically by European scientists and decision makers for internal policies can be valuable inputs for a better evaluation of the contemporary organisation of the World. Polycentrism, territorial cohesion, accessibility to public services, cross-border integration ... are typical concepts of European Spatial Planning which can be easily transposed at world case for an evaluation of present situation or for the elaboration of new policy options. As a very simple example, the reader can do him self the parallel between spatial polycentrism in Europe and geopolitical multipolarity at World scale ...

Not only concepts but also tools and methods are likely to be transposed from one scale to another. For example, the spatial analysis tools that has been used for the measure of regional disparities between European region (map of discontinuities, evaluation of barriers, comparison of deviations at local, national and European scales ...) has been proved to be very useful when transposed to the analysis of the relation between European Union and neighbouring countries in project ESPON 3.4.1. Qualitative tools like territorial impact assessment, decentralised cooperation, learning regions ... are also typical tools of European regional policy that could be applied for a renewal of European Neighbourhood policy.

1.3. Modernity and accuracy of an old notion : the region

But the most interesting case of scale transposition appears to be related to a very old geographical notion : the region.

Sur le plan purement descriptif de l'organisation de l'espace, la « région » permet de penser l'insertion de l'Europe dans l'espace mondial en termes de polarisation, discontinuités, d'effets de proximité, d'aire d'influence etc. Sur le plan des politiques, la région est au cœur de l’expérience européenne : décentralisation et développement par projets ; dynamisation de politiques publiques que l'Etat central n'est plus à même d'impulser ; coordination des enjeux d'environnement et d'aménagement, et, en règle générale, transversalité des politiques sectorielles ; articulation possible des exigences de l’efficacité économique et de la participation des acteurs locaux. Dans son échelle élargie, la « région » désigne aussi la subdivision du Monde en sous-ensembles qui ne se réduisent plus à la juxtaposition d'Etats-nations ; elle ramasse cette constitution de vastes ensembles plurinationaux qui, tout à la fois, captent l'essentiel de la croissance des échanges.
internationaux des dernières décennies, et sont l'échelle d'innovations essentielles dans la régulation des échanges internationaux (Alena, « Asean Plus Three », Euromed etc. cf partie 4).

2. The three prominent views of the place of Europe in the World and their impact on European planning

Various dominant representation of the world are currently available: the “continents” view, which describes territories in the traditional – but still active – shape of continents or, more recently, in civilisation areas (Huntington 1996); the “centre-periphery” view, which stresses on the dissymmetry of the North-South relations and the real but quickly decreasing Northern domination; the “archipelago” view, based on the networking organisation of space, which highlights the remote connections of territories.

![Figure XX. The three dominant views of Europe in the world](image)

Each of these views provides partial evidence of the reality of the contemporary world. They are not really contradictory: continental territories may have strong frontiers and dissymmetrical relations with the developing countries located in their periphery, and intense exchanges with global nodes of other world dominant areas. But these three patterns have to be analytically distinguished because (i) they mean different representations of the place of Europe in the world, (ii) because their territorial impacts are quite different, and (iii) because they design different European planning policies.

2.1. The "continent" view

The main political features

In this scheme, the priority is given to the EU’s internal integration, that is to the convergence between the new member states and the rest of the Union. Regarding the rest of the world, the stress is put on security. The geographical idea here is that Europe is one of the civilisations of the world, is strictly defined and defined, should be internally as homogeneous as possible and highly protected against external threats (illegal migrations, environmental menace, human trafficking...). Here, the borders are of high significance; planning policy is devoted to cohesion (see Espon 3.2 cohesion scenario and baseline scenario).

1 See Grateloup (2006).
That might be the interpretation of the European Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2004\(^\text{2}\). Beyond the EU 27, a “ring of friends” (Prodi, 2002), from Morocco to Russia, is essential to European stability and development, and, with it, “everything but institutions should be shared”\(^\text{3}\). The goal is to set there “the four freedoms”: free flows of goods, services and men, together with free capital movements. But as a matter of fact, since this policy has come into force, agreements have been enhanced for capital and invest (through Action Plans that make the neighbours adopt the liberalised pattern reform in order to create transparent markets of capital, host and protect foreign investments), goods and services (a free trade zone including agricultural trade is scheduled for 2010 with the Mediterranean neighbours) – but not for people. Restriction to entries in the EU’s territory remains high, asylum has rather become more difficult than it used to be. Last, many see this ENP as a way to avoid the entrance of Turkey in the European Union, since this policy would – in theory – give to the Turkish almost all the assets of a member state.

Eastward, this continent view is consistent with a strong European integration ongoing process. Eastern new member States already are, and would be favoured in the industrial relocation of western firms. Since the beginning of the 1990s, many EU Foreign Direct Investments have chosen Central and Eastern European Countries. The fact that their entry in the EU was certain has given them credibility for investors. And the move continues: between 2002 and 2006, 80% of the FDI by western European investors have reached other western Europe countries (innovative industries, banks and services) or eastern new member states (automobile industry and other manufacturing sectors). The continent is actually becoming one integrated productive system (Hatem 2007). The table XX shows that during the recent years, the continent has hosted more than 40% of the world FDI inward flows, mostly in western Europe, and more than 30% of the related created jobs, mostly in eastern Europe; western European firms have in both case been the major investors. According to this continent view, the evolution of the European economic geography would be intensified, towards new members and, maybe further on, towards Ukraine, Georgia and other Caucasian countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table XX. The place of western and eastern Europe in Foreign Direct Investment (billion dollars)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Inward Foreign Direct Investment (annual average 2002-2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 new member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Europe &amp; NIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (incl. Hong Kong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other East &amp; SE Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNCTAD

<table>
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<tr>
<th>b. Jobs created by Foreign Direct Investment (annual average 2003-2006)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central &amp; eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific (industrialized countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific (developing countries)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\)the European Neighbourhood Policy unifies various previous policies and budgets dedicated to the surrounding countries: MEDA, Phare, Tacis etc. The new European and Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument concerns: (i) nine Mediterranean countries, those of the former Barcelona process, minus Turkey (that benefits from a specific budget), Cyprus and Malta, plus Libya; (ii) the three Caucasian countries; (iii) the three eastern countries that are located between the EU and Russia (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus - though the latter is still not included for well known political reasons). The Balkan countries are not included because they have been given an entry perspective. Nor is Russia, because it has a specific strategic agreement with the EU - the general goals of which are nevertheless quite similar to the ENP’s: create a common space for trade, finance, migrations, training, culture and security.

When it comes to agriculture and subsidies, the bulk of the European subsidies would be devoted to the adjustment of the new eastern member States’ agriculture, in order to get as fast as possible to an homogenous agricultural European market. When it comes to regional policy, these states would also benefit from the main amounts. Trans-European Networks policy would be mostly implemented in eastern Europe too, either for transport, telecommunication and energy facilities (DG Transport, 2005). In a word, this view is simply the continuation of what has been occurring since the beginning of the 1990s. Since then, the Central and Eastern European Countries have become by far the first beneficiaries of the EU’s subsidies, in order to prepare their entry in the EU.

The European (Commission + member states) share in terms of total assistance given to the CEEC has been booming. It is less high in the Balkans (where reconstruction is largely supported by the EU) and in the Maghreb countries; and significantly lower in the Near and Middle East, where the USA’s share is impressive. Since the 1990s, the EU’s share has declined in North Africa, in the Near and Middle East. The fact that CEE countries received such important amounts of European subsidies has contributed to their credibility for private investors; the fact that these subsidies have been devoted to the adjustment of their fiscal, administrative and economic systems has convinced these investors that their territories would be very well connected to the western markets. Indeed, this “continental” view is strongly supported by recent and actual facts.

Concerning regulation, for instance regulation of the telecom, or of the energy market, the stress would be put on the European market’s integration: prices, technical coordination, commercial exchanges would be ruled at this pan-European scale, instead of the purely bilateral agreements system that organises the markets today for telecoms and for energy.

**Territorial impact**

The territorial impact entails several assets:

- Trans European Networks would be implemented at a large European scale, which would be favourable to all the European territory;
- German territory would become the genuine centre of Europe;
- Central and Eastern European member States would benefit from subsidies and to western private foreign direct investments; they would quite rapidly catch up with the EU GDPs average;
- The regional policy focused on these countries and namely in their less developed areas would foster these territories.

On the other hand, this view would have territorial shortcomings:

- the focusing on the EU borders’ security, and the “Nimby” interpretation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, would have negative impact on the peripheral parts of the EU’s space. The Mediterranean areas of the EU would be misused, especially cities like Sevilla, Barcelona, Marseille, Napoli, Athens, Malta, ....
- The figure is still worse on the eastern side. The worsening relationship between the Baltic States and Russia is the reason why the borders have almost become barriers; European Union have financed high tech devices for electronic surveillance on the border, Russians have chosen to avoid the Baltic States as logistic interface with the West (they have rather been developing new port facilities near Saint Petersburg and they have implemented a direct sub-marine route for the new pipeline to Germany and other countries of north western Europe). Such a path could well be extended to the whole eastern side of the European Union, which would diminish the dynamism of peripheral territories that would become some sort of dead ends and “tunnel effects”. This scheme would not be a winning option for Poland for example (despite it favours the entry of
Ukraine in UE). It would neither be for Romania. This latter country, as the other former members of the soviet world, has experienced a surprisingly rapid shift from a Comecon integrated trade system to a mostly westernised trade. Flows toward the East have declined to almost nothing, whereas flows towards the West have boomed. But such geography is hardly sustainable, unless EU’s regional policy’s funding would multiply in the long run to foster oriental dead-end areas. Last but not least, the option of an anti-ballistic (i.e. anti-Russian) defence system that would be stretched along the eastern European Border with US support, would strengthen this “dead end” eastern vision. But what about the actual flows and historical linkage between countries like Romania/Moldavia, Poland/Belarus, Slovakia/Ukraine?

- Another shortcoming would certainly hamper the eastern territories. All projections indicate that they would not very quickly catch up with the EU’s economic average (in terms of GDP per capita and salaries). Their actual economic growth rate is actually higher than countries of western Europe but this is precisely an effect of the strong gap. These countries could rapidly lose their competitive advantages upon western member states. The relocation of the western industries would then probably chose other competitive labour markets, most certainly in Asia - where European FDI go more and more. Moreover, demographic crisis of this countries will also reduce soon their potential economic growth.

- Would the size of these eastern markets be a sufficient asset per se for Western investors? The answer is no. The absolute size of these markets is quite small (100 millions people), and the population is rapidly decreasing (Table 1). Briefly speaking, it can be forecast that the economic rise of the new member states, fostered by public and private Western European funding, would slowdown quite quickly, in particular in their eastern peripheral areas.

### Table 1: Evolution of the share of old and new member states in EU (1995-2003)

**Source**: Eurostat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (Millions)</th>
<th>GDP (Billions of Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NMS12</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMS15</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (%)</th>
<th>GDP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NMS12</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMS15</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- A general social, economic and territorial shortcoming has to be added. It deals with the necessity for the EU to gain new labour forces (due to the overall demographic decline of the Union), and especially skilled labour forces (for the Lisbon strategy cannot be met if the EU only bases its strategy of attraction of skilled workers on far and uncertain links to Asia or Latin America). A continental European scheme obstructing people exchanges with the neighbourhood, would hamper the European economy and territory as a whole, and increase its ageing (see. ESPON Project 1.1.4 Demography).

- Considering this age concern, it has to be assumed that, contrary to what if often said, today’s population that come form the Mediterranean neighbouring countries and live in Europe, are not a lot – were they documented or illegal. Generally speaking, North America hosts many more Latin Americans than Europe hosts migrants coming from its neighbourhoods. 15% of the US population are foreigners (of which 4% are undocumented); the sole share of Mexican is almost 10%. By comparison, at most 7% of the EU15's population are foreigners (of which less than 1% are undocumented), the share from South Mediterranean is less than 4%. The European aging demography is to have major impact on territories, because of lacking labour forces, because, too, of local strategies rather based on tranquillity than on risks and activity. In a word, this “continent”
closed view, which Samuel Huntington would certainly claim for, could be that of a giant "Swiss Europe".

2.2. The "centre-periphery" view

This view could well be regarded as a sub category of the previous one. The difference is that here the Neighbourhood Policy would be more dynamic – not for people exchanges but for economic exchanges. Such a view is based on the complementarities between low cost peripheries, and high technology centres, on the assumption that Europe has a valuable area of influence that it should take advantage of, and not leave to US or Asian competitors (has Chinese happen to do in Africa, including North Africa).

The main political features

Several figures of our ESPON 3.4.1. work, document this notion of European area of influence. When it comes to labour forces, the map XX shows that, in spite of the globalisation of migration routes, the Mediterranean neighbouring countries remain a major source of European labour forces for the next 20 years and Subsaharian African countries for the next 50 years.

Map XX: Origin of migrants in ESPON according to their country of birth

According to traditional push-pull theories, disparities between countries that are economically rich but demographically declining, such as Europe, and countries that show a reverse profile, should, in a purely free market, give rise to high migration from low wealth/high population growth countries to high wealth/low population growth ones. This implies that a labour surplus and low wages in the developing countries will be the determinant factors behind the migration decisions. This implies, reversely, that the mobility of capital be the driving force with flows directed from the North to the South.

In the Euro-Mediterranean area, the two main (potentially attractive) poles for migrants and (emissive) poles for capital and investments are North Western Europe and the Persian Gulf. The net migration map (XX) confirms that they indeed are the main poles of net immigration observed in the region. The high number of net migrants in southern European countries (Spain and Portugal) is all the more striking, that in the 1950’s they were net-exporters to the rest of Europe.
southern Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt) and the eastern European ones shown as potential senders, are effectively net emigration countries and will be more and more final destination for migrants from Subsaharian Africa because of the achievement of their demographic transition. In 2006, the total fertility rate are only 1.74 for Tunisia and 1.89 for Algeria which is comparable to Finland (1.73) or France (1.84).

Further than the Mediterranean, the map XX shows the European’s commercial area of influence, that is to say the countries that count for Europe, while the following map shows the areas with which Europe trades. The dissymmetry is obvious. The most caricatured example is sub-Saharan Africa: while it is of negligible importance for European trade, Europe is vital for the existence of this part of the world. The “centre-periphery scheme” is the continuation of these structural features.
Such a North-South set could allow Europe to compete with East-Asia and North America. Those two areas have implemented a huge relocation of firms and stretched a transnational productive system based on North-South complementarities. In the American and East-Asian cases, there are few (East Asia) or high (Mexicans to United States) migrations, but in both case there have been significant Foreign Direct Investments from industrial countries to developing countries. When 100 dollars are invested out of the United States, 18 are invested in Latin America; when 100 dollars are invested out of Japan, 18 are invested in its developing or emerging East Asian peripheries. But when 100 are invested out of Western Europe, only 10% are invested in its peripheries – all, almost, in the Central and Eastern European countries and less than 2 in the Mediterranean developing countries!

What if the North-South strategy was adopted by Europe?
- the competitive delocalisation would increase toward eastern but above all southern neighbours located between the Mediterranean and the Sahara.
- in particular, the non desirable European activities would be released to this “friendly” partners. An example of the “three D” activities (dirty, difficult, dangerous) is the construction of power plants and refinery facilities: for environmental reasons, they become difficult to build in Europe, whereas they could be more easily build on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, which deadly need industrial investments, and “benefit” from lower pressure on environmental issue;
- Europe would benefit from secured procurement in oil, gas and electricity (thanks to the ongoing connection of the electricity grid in the euromediterranean space). Further than North Africa and Middle East, Europe would benefit from secured procurement of African raw materials;
- This North-South partnership does not mean more than the optimisation by Europe of low cost inputs strategy, in raw material, energy, manufacturing, and also services sectors. The friendly partners could host the growing European demand for call centres of course but also: safe tourism, sanitary tourism (a growing number of Europeans go to Tunisia or Morocco to get surgery service in first rank hospital which only rich residents or European can afford), handsome cheap areas for retirement, and so forth.

In that context, the European Neighbourhood Policy would be used as a tool for compensation, for making these peripheral areas secure and bringing them into line with European standards. Countries located in northern Africa would play the role of “gatekeepers” against sub-saharian countries with financial counterparts. This could be described as a neo-colonialist or, rather, paternalist policy. As a matter of fact, this is roughly the kind of relationship that has until today
prevailed in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. This is the reason why the recent Barcelona Summit (in November 2003 for the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Euromed Agreements), which was supposed to enhance the Mediterranean partnership through the new ambitious ENP, was a failure. Whilst all EU states where represented by the heads of government, only two Mediterranean partners sent theirs. The explanation of this failure relates to the inherent limits of the Barcelona process: disconnectivity, paternalism, overall weak attention paid by European leaders towards the developing peripheries. This is reflected in the statistic that during the past decade, EU Commission’s subsidies reached 300€ per inhabitant in Greece, 27€ in the CEE countries, but less than 2€ in the MEDA countries.

**Territorial impact**

Such a pattern would enhance the European economy, and would quite deeply change the regional geography due to a greater Euro-Mediterranean economic integration, despite asymmetrical. The 2010 Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone would accelerate the new geography of the value chains in all sectors, with strong impacts in the Mediterranean cities of the European Union. More than the eastern peripheral parts of the Union, its southern ones would benefit from this change, although in some sectors such as fruits and vegetable, European Mediterranean rural areas would be harmed by the relocation in the southern shore. In the short run, European economy would partly catch up with its Asian and American counterparts, although not on the high tech base of the Lisbon strategy.

Nevertheless,
- the relocation of the environmental burden on the southern shore can only be a short term solution. The ongoing telluric pollution of rivers for instance, would increase the pollution of the Mediterranean sea. This would help EU to fulfill its objective of CO2 reduction according to Kyoto protocol. But it would be in fact a statistical illusion as it would be the simple effect of transferring the “dirtiness” on southern shore of the Mediterranean without any progress at world scale (Grasland, 2001).
- the prominent policy of migration control will diminish the rise of the European Mediterranean rim. No change would occur in the European migration mix: the lowest levels of education are observed for migration toward south-western Europe, that is to say France, Italy, Spain and Portugal; the highest are observed toward northern Europe (Sweden, Norway, the UK, Ireland) and to a less degree toward Germany and Switzerland. In other words, Mediterranean territories of Europe would not take any in-depth advantage of this centre-periphery deal. The most probable evolution would be the increase of the highly skilled people’s departure from Africa, North Africa and Middle East, to North America, as it has been more and more occurring during the two last decades (Fargues 2006). Aside from this highly skilled workers’ migration to America, the southern neighbouring countries (North Africa and Turkey) of Europe would still be “specialised” in low skilled migration to Mediterranean Europe.
- For the Mediterranean neighbouring countries, the brain drain would not be stopped, because the centre-periphery only offers medium skilled new jobs to the developing peripheries. The elites would continue to quit for northern Europe and North America. This would hamper the trans-Mediterranean networks in the long run. Moreover, the social problem of integration of southern immigrant in EU metropolitan areas would be reinforced by this low level of migrants and the lack of elites. No doubts that xenophobia and racism will develop in such a scenario.
- The worse consequences could be obtained if EU try to use north African countries as gatekeepers against poor migrants from sub-Saharan countries, in a context of increasing pressure to depart induced by climate change and reduction of water resources. The thousands of people who dies actually trying to enter the Schengen Space could be nothing as compared to the horror of what could happen in this scenario at the gates of the fortress Europe.

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4 Politically, the initiative and the money come from Europe. Economically, the MEDA countries are highly dependent upon western European markets and investors, though they are not significant partners for European exports nor investments.

5 In absolute terms, EU members give larger subsidies than the Commission to the neighbourhood. In relative terms however, the Commission follows a clear political line in making targeted efforts towards the neighbourhood, whereas member states do not really favour the neighbouring countries among their aid policy.
2.3. The “archipelago” view

The main political features

The axis of this view is the openness to global networks, free trade and deregulation, low European protection and decreasing subsidies. In this view, globalisation has overcome regionalisation, DG Trade has overcome DG Regio. The European policies are dedicated to R&D rather than to regional policy or Common Agricultural Policy. The only territorial policy enhanced by the EU Commission would then be the TEN policy, but only for major spokes.

Here, the Lisbon strategy is on the top of the agenda, the commercial leading goals are the rapidly growing markets of East Asia and namely China. The main European partnership remains with North America, far from any Euromediterranean partnership. The European Neighbourhood Policy is strictly limited to the implementation of liberal reforms in the partner countries; the Euromediterranean free trade zone becomes a purely liberal area, with direct competition with North African economies (including agriculture) as well as with any other part of the world.

The geographical pattern is dominated by the networks. This is Manuel Castells’ “space of flows” rather than “space of places”, and the liberal scenario of Espon 3.2. Due to the foremost importance of capital flows, the prominent territory is the Global City (see Sassen 1991, 2002, GaWC Taylor (2005)’s works, Brunet & Dolfus (1990)’s metropolitan archipelago). Of course, authors like Qttan (2004) or Veit (1996) argue that the network is more important than the nodes themselves: what does really matter is not to measure the power of world cities, but rather the degree of inter-connection that they provide between different parts of the world and at different scales. Still, the multidirectional connection to world territories is the main feature of this archipelago view.

When it comes to migration, whereas migrations of low-skilled workers follow the centre-periphery pattern, those of high-skilled workers are rather more closely aligned to the archipelago. The migration policy focuses on attracting international highly skilled people, including from the neighbouring countries – which means that the brain drain would increase dramatically. On the European ground, on the contrary, the strategy is to reduce the emigration of researchers and young entrepreneurs, avoiding them to leave the UE for North America.

The archipelago view entails many territorial assets:
- most of the major European cities become highly internationalized metropolitan regions. The top of them is still dominated by London and Paris, but many others become major gateway cities, connecting their country to the rest of the world (development of air flows, transnational corporation networks, financial services, international events such as fairs and congresses);
- western countries which benefit from such international metropolises (UK, France, northern Spain, northern Italy, Netherlands and Belgium, Western and southern Germany), experience a fast economic growth;
- the western large metropolises are more and more integrated in a top urban network, which increase their comparative advantage and nourishes growing profitable transport links between them;

It entails specific shortcomings though:
- the main one is the increase of territorial disparities in Europe: within western Europe in favour of the large metropolitan regions of the “pentagon”; in the eastern states members too, because the stress is put on the capital cities. According to the European Cities Monitor, a survey realised each year on a sample of 500 responsible of multinational firms (Cushman & Wakefield, 2006), the ranking of European cities in terms of attractiveness for international firms will not be strongly modified by EU enlargement, even if Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow and Prague can expect some relocations related to a comparative advantage in (i) cost of staff, (ii) value for money of office space and (iii) financial incentives. But when it comes to accessibility and infrastructure, most responsible of firms still prefer to locate in western cities or new emerging pole of southern periphery like Barcelona.

6 Several major works in economic history have stressed the importance of how contemporary territories interact through trade, migration and capital flows (Dillard 1967, Kenwood & Loughhead 1989, Polland 1991, Castells 1996 [peut être pas les citent tous]).

Faludi
28/03/2003
- Quite rapidly, the eastern member states lose their competitive advantage due to the rise of salaries and costs in their capital cities. For example the European Cities Monitor indicated in 2005 that 52% of the European firms was interested by a relocalisation in cities of new member states of eastern Europe but they were only 43% in 2006. During the same time the project of relocalisation increased from 22% to 36% for China, 22% to 30% for India and 21% to 28% for eastern Europe countries outside EU (Cushman & Wakefield, 2006).
- But the degradation of the social, economic and environmental situation is especially damaging in the neighbouring countries: eastern neighbours might benefit from the rising costs in the CEEC, but the bulk of European business abroad would rather target the remote large (America) and/or rapidly growing (East Asia) markets.
- The destabilisation would be dramatic in the Mediterranean neighbouring countries. The tough 2010 liberalisation of trade would have a terrible impact on their trade. The situation in agriculture would be particularly worrisome: highly protected production such as cereals would disappear in less than a decade, leaving millions of farmers without revenues (the three quarters of Moroccan farmers grow cereals, with incredibly low productivity). The pressure for rural emigration – probably reinforced by climate change – would get a critical level, and raise the illegal dwellings in the large cities’ suburbs, increasing unemployment and despair. The push factor for migration to Europe would be enhanced, but with low possibility for Europe to host all those unskilled workers. To some extent, this rural-urban scenario could occur too in Caucasus countries or Moldavia, where the necessary agricultural adjustment is huge. No regional policy would ever compensate such a destabilisation.
- Many other sectors would be destabilised. In the logistic sector for example, European firms would gain major position on the southern shore. Until now, there has been a striking contrast between the two shores: a modern and highly integrated system (North) contrasts with a scattered and highly corrupted one (South), which provide many revenues to many actors, but hampers the transport integration or the Euromed region, and explain why it does not take advantage of proximity (some ship coming from Asia deliver goods in Europe almost as rapidly as ship from South Mediterranean ports!). In a most liberalised framework, this logistical integration would happen but benefit exclusively to the large northern companies, and provoke large job losses in the southern shore. The actual crisis of textile in the northern and central regions Tunisia is a good example of what could happen in the future.
- The overall result would be the increase of the divide between Europe and its neighbours. The territorial consequences for the European peripheral territories would thus be negative on the long term: the growing destabilisation of the neighbours would widen the border, and get the future closer to the first “continent” scenario.
- The only neighbouring winner could well be Russia, since the oil and gas procurement would obey a purely commercial line. Europe would fail at hooling the Russia-Algeria cartel in gas, because Europe would offer no valuable alternative strategy to Algeria.

3. The strategic vision of Europe as the main part of a Global Region

As we said, the three views of Europe in the world entail a part of reality. This section tries to make a positive synthesis and proposes a desirable and feasible vision of Europe that would imply the territorial assets of the three former views without their main shortcomings. This optimistic vision – one should rather say voluntaristic vision which implies determined policies namely in territorial fields – is based on the idea that Europe and its neighbours represent one major world region. This means that it considers the Neighbourhood Policy as the key policy, either to complete the Lisbon strategy and to enhance all the territorial European policies.

Such a vision is, indeed, embedded in the three dominant views of Europe in the world, but in some sort of a politically upgrading position:

- from the centre-periphery view, it rejects the paternalist side and dissymmetry as a strategy; but it takes the reconnection between North and South, with a strong preference for the regional territories and a in depth regulated North-South relationship;
- from the archipelago view, it rejects the purely liberal aspect and the credo that territorial zones would not matter any longer; but it takes the openness of borders that would rather be hinges than barriers, and stresses on mobility of people – and not only capital, goods and services; it also keeps the idea that nodes are crucial for the connexion of territories but not only at the global scale of the World.
- from the continent view, it rejects the purely protective aspect, the geographical approach of “natural facts” or “for ever designed civilisation areas”; but it takes the necessity of cohesion – this time enlarged to a new wide definition of the region, and it takes the need for secured Russian and arabo-islamic territories – which implies a strong win-win connection between the core and its immediate neighbours (Mediterranean countries, Ukraine, Caucasian countries) and more distant ones (Subsaharian Countries, Central Asia).

3.1. The need for new geographical categories

It becomes more and more obvious that we all need a new definition of the world sub-regions. We had continents – but it is illusory to pretend that they would be natural facts even if they are representations of common sense shared by a majority of scientists and policy makers in Europe (ESPON 3.4.1.); in reality they are projections on the world map of the European vision of the world inherited from the medieval age (an unified World surrounded by an ocean and divided in three parts, Europe, Asia and Africa, a view itself inherited from the Myth of the son of Noah). The vocabulary is becoming more and more dubious; what then does the term “Asia” now mean? Increasingly, in both statistical tables or in the newspapers, the “Middle East” (from an European point of view) is not in Asia, though, on occasion, Australia, which formally belongs to the Oceania continent, is (not absurd when considering economic regionalisation and Triad zones, but puzzling in a cultural approach). What is at stake here is the need to see the world in a more complex way that the “continents”. The model of global urban networks and the classic North-South World, are not sufficient to provide us with convincing geographical concepts that would help understand the place of Europe in the world and its territorial stakes.

Concerning the archipelago view for instance, our Espon report has established that European territory is certainly well connected to the rest of the world by six major gateway cities (London, Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Zurich and Madrid) but that it can also rely on external gateways which enable more specific connections with the neighbouring countries, in particular Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Dubai or Moscow. This means that between the global level and the national level, it is possible and necessary to identify an intermediate situation of regional networks which are specifically able to organise subparts of the world and contribute to the development of the neighbourhoods. Miami plays this role of North-South connector in America. The situation might be less clear in Europe since Madrid enables preferential connections with Latin America, Paris with North and West Africa, London with the Persian Gulf, Frankfurt with Central Asia, and Ljubljana with the former Yugoslavia, etc; but precisely, this proves that there is absolutely no contradiction between a network view and a regional view.

Figure XX: Regional world cities and their spheres of influence

A major output of our report for the practice of European policy-makers, is the introduction of a supplementary level in the actual “3-level approach” [À mpelecr] which has been elaborated by Espon: Europe, whatever its délimitation, is indeed not an isolated system; the global level should always be taken into account in order to obtain a complete view of the territorial stakes; last but not least, the region than encompasses Europe has to be taken into account if one wants to give to
the “neighbourhood” its geographically accurate meaning. It is important to stress on the growing importance of this regional level at both the world and the European scales.

But when it comes to the geographical definition of region, the problem is that many divisions of the world in “regions” (clusters of states) are actually used by international organisations, either private (transnational firms) or public (UN agencies etc). This makes it impossible to use any of them as the reference point. We have therefore produced a tool that is the elaboration of a harmonised hierarchical system of the world called WUTS, for World Unified Territorial System. Our division of the world into regions is based on four groups of criteria: mental representation (how firms, associations, governments usually divide the world); accessibility (morphologic distribution of land, population and wealth); homogeneity (structural division of the world according to levels of economic and social development); and interactions (functional organisation of trade and air transport flows). This proposal is organised into five hierarchical levels, from the state level (WUTS 5) to the world level (WUTS 0).

As a result, at the first comprehensive level (WUTS 0) Europe, the Russian world, eastern and southern neighbours of Europe as well as Africa, constitute one region; the two others are America, and South & East Asia. More precise levels (WUTS 2 and 3, fig.XX) highlight the specificity of the neighbours with regard to Europe (see also the Europe’s area of influence on map XX). Clearly, a large European region, encompassing industrialised countries and developing countries, appears, just like other “North-South Regions” in East Asia and North America (including Mexico, which fits with current analysis of the country by international investors who nowadays regard it as a “northern” country since the FDI are guaranteed and the access to US markets easy7).

The new design of the European region (neighbourhood included) is conformed by the analysis of spatial discontinuities. In terms of GDP per capita, literacy and life expectancy, spatial transitions between western Europe and its peripheries show a regular gradient in the easterly direction. Southward, there is a double line of discontinuity, one on the Mediterranean Sea and the other on the Sahara; but clearly, the main and growing discontinuity is nowadays settled between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, which define Maghreb as a “buffer area” with regard to Europe (map XX). It is important to precise that the WUTS system is a technical tool elaborated by members of EU, for members of EU, and not a universal proposal like could be a division elaborated by UN. Having this in mind, we can compare the WUTS system to the Civilisations of Huntington or the “Greater Middle East” which are equivalent tools elaborated by USA for the production of their own vision of the World.

Map XX: The World in 7 macro regions (WUTS 2) and 17 meso regions (WUTS 3)

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7 since the beginning of the NAFTA agreement, Mexico has significantly increased its exports to the USA (and even to Canada), and has now a positive trade balance.
Map XX: Diffusion of human development in the Euro-Mediterranean countries between 1975 and 2000

Residuals of the model $HDI_{res} = 0.73 \times HDI_{exp} + 0.27$ ($r^2 = 89\%$)
A cluster analysis was applied to the 18 variables in order to define synthetic types of relation between Europe and the rest of the World. This analysis reveals four main types of European external relations.

Type B: Responsibility; gathers together the states for which Europe has significant responsibility for their future development, primarily because of Europe’s historical responsibility for colonisation and the exploitation of African countries.

Type C: Opportunity; gathers together large emerging countries (namely India and Brazil) located far from Europe but sharing a common language or history. They could potentially be very close allies.

Type D: Challenge; highlights those countries which Europe is less able to influence or to easily develop cooperative relations because of differences in language, geographical distance, or the weakness of historical relations (South East and East Asia).

Type A: Functional Integration (North-South regions); concerns the states located in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe whose trade and air relations are strongly polarised by Europe.

Source: Grassand C., in ESPON (2006)
3.2. The rise of “North-South Regions”

Firms find many interests in locating in remote but dynamic areas. But they also find it very convenient to “near-shore”. In this respect, the European building process is one of the numerous regional processes that are being energised by globalisation. The strategic advantages of proximity are all the more growing as the oil price rises and transportation costs thus rise also. As a result, regional trade agreements have multiplied during the last decade. One of their major characteristic is that they encompass both North and South countries. DeBlock & Regnault say (2006) that they reconnect North and South, after the large disconnection due to the end of colonialism and the Cold War in the second half of the 20th century. Such a reconnection, by the way, is the reason why Unctad now pleads for regionalism (Mashayekhi 2009⁸), seen as a positive interface vis-à-vis globalisation.

In our Espon report, the use of Maddison’s data base has allowed us to give a comprehensive view of this new North-South geographical set. As the scale of exchanges enlarge, it is very useful to enlarge the time scope of analysis in order to understand the basic trends of the North-South issue. The 1950-2000 analysis of GDP and population cartography shows the decreasing part of rich countries. But the developing states located in their immediate periphery have generally experienced the reverse evolution, with a joint increase of their share of population and GDP in the world. Even if their GDP per capita did not necessarily increase more quickly than the rest of the world, their economic and demographic size has clearly grown. The states in this situation define a Golden ring of growth from Mexico to Brazil, North Africa, the Middle East and south-eastern Asia. It is generally only in the deep peripheries, located at longer distance from the Triad, that the worse situation of an increase in the share of population and a decrease of the share of GDP has become manifest.

The southern Mediterranean countries happen to be actually in the most favourable demographic situation for economic development, with a good proportion of young adults with relatively high life expectancy and a stable fertility rate, which means not too numerous children nor too numerous old persons to look after. This moment in history where a country has its maximum proportion of active population, provides a unique opportunity both for these countries and for the EU.

Map XX: Joint evolution of the share of the world population and GDP (PPS) from 1950-54 to 1996-2000

⁸ There have been ancient and controversial debates among economists about globalisation and regionalisation. From now on, Unctad is in favour of the latter because the insertion of developing countries and the reconnection between North and South, are more easily made through regions than through a unique global regulation, or through simple bilateral agreements in which the balance of power mostly favours the North. Regions are not fortresses that divert or hamper free trade (open regionalism thesis). As GATT and then WTO’s rule allows it, regions are often the necessary step for developing countries to enter the international trade.
North-South Regions benefit from four assets. The first one is economic. Firms, whether they are small or transnational, need a regional stable location based on partnership, because they have to deal with a most uncertain and challenging globalisation. International trade (map XX) increases faster within the regions than with the rest of the world; growing populations live on both sides of borders between two countries. In East Asia, Chinese traders’ networks have reinforced since the 1990s. In the Mediterranean area, migrant workers send more than 8 billion euros every year from Europe to the Maghreb country they come from. Every day, two million Mexicans legally cross the border between Mexico and the United States. The North-South regions are the winning territories of globalisation (Michalet 2004). It is mainly because they benefit from the complementarities between capital and technology on the one hand, large labour forces and booming markets on the other. Martine Azuelos (2004) has showed it for America, Christian Taillard (2004) for East Asia.

Map XX : Regionalisation of the World based on trade flows 1996-2000

All things being equal in terms of economic size, some states develop clear regional preferences which are revealed by the map of positive residuals. Omitting distance in this interaction model helps to reveal how the cost of transportation and other types of historical and cultural proximities influence trade relations between states. At least 12 integrated trade regions can be derived from this analysis, some with clear limits (e.g. southern Africa) but the majority with overlaps, as in the case of the Euro-Mediterranean area, which in 1996-2000, clearly crosses the area of preferential relations with Russia in eastern Europe. From these regional preferences, the map also reveals a few long distance preferential trade relations, especially in the case of relations between the USA and eastern Asia. But above all it shows that the main economic regions in the world encompass industrialised and developing countries (Canada / USA / Mexico; Japan / China / Tigers / Asian; Europe / Mediterranean countries).
Focusing on the connections between Europe and the rest of the world, and considering the EU as one entity (i.e. excluding intra-EU traffic), one can point out that several regional connections emerge, as for example between Buenos Aires and Santiago and Sao Paulo on the one hand and between Mexican cities and Los Angeles on the other. This means that several integration processes at the regional level are actively engaged in these territorial integration processes at the global level. Source: Cattani in ESPON 3.4.1 (2006)

The second asset is political: the regional scale has certainly become the best chance for a North-South international regulation. The need to re-regulate the world economy is an important driving force in response to the excesses of the era of borderless footloose capitalism. Of course some rules have been implemented at the global scale such as those on trade (WTO). However, the failure of the WTO's Cancun meeting concerning the Doha round (making development and free trade compatible) and the Millennium goals, the failure of the Kyoto's agenda, and the lack of common global legislation on labour or public health, show how difficult it is to regulate the wide world. For example, Grasland (2001) argue that the reduction of CO2 is impossible with an international approach (where each state defends its own interest) and suggest the organisation of three regional agencies mixing developed and developing countries according to the WUTS1 division of the world. The regional scale can be seen as more relevant for the introduction of new public policies, due to the complementarities between the national economies concerned, common environmental stakes (pollution of rivers, seas and air), shared cultural values — or at least an understanding of each other's cultural values, historical links, migratory flows, and any other assets important in creating win-win co-development.

This is why regional trade agreements have multiplied worldwide in the last fifteen years, and why existing agreements have been re-invigorated with new environmental or social concerns. As demonstrated by the French economist J.M. Siroën (2000), the debate over the economic benefits of multilateralism and regionalisation at world scale is a false one because both forms of global integration are in fact complementary. What is really important is not the liberalisation of trade (which is not an objective in itself) but rather "the question of defining the scale where public goods and services can be produced most efficiently according to the cost and the preferences of societies for certain specific characteristics which are often associated with geographical territories." The European reader will easily recognize the principle of subsidiarity here which is the basis for the political organisation of the European Union.

The third asset is cultural: it is more relevant to define collective preferences on this regional scale than on a global one. The fourth asset is geopolitical: regionalisation is the best and maybe the only way to impose polycentrism to the United States, because they would have to deal with strong European and Asian regions, and because these regions promote a more regulated liberalism than the one found in the NAFTA — even if this North American liberalism is not as "pure" as Europeans may think...
3.3. North-South regionalism and European economic stakes

This notion of "region" is thus a key issue, territorial, economical, and scientific. It is of utmost importance to distinguish between the two geographical notions of "Europe". (i) The first notion is the institutional one. "Europe" means the EU. Its borders are established, not necessarily forever (the Western Balkans will enter one day and perhaps Turkey), but at any time they are precisely defined. (ii) The second one is that of what we may call the functional "Europe." This means the Euro-Mediterranean (Euro-Africa in a wider sense) which is the socio-economic region in which Europe is embedded. Its geography is unclear; its borders vary according to the index one uses (very large when it comes to commercial trade, closer when it comes to sea pollution). But in any case its dimension is broader than the institutional definition of the EU. The geographical difference between the two definitions is the "neighbourhood".

Compared to that of eastern neighbours, the potential demographic and economic dynamism of the North African and Middle East countries is a major opportunity for Europe, the harvesting of which probably provides the only possible way of maintaining its position as a global actor. The evolution of the share of population and GDP of Europe at world scale decreased between 1950 and 2004. During this period however, although this structural decline continued, it was always balanced by the dynamic of EU enlargement. The question is: what will happen when the enlargement is over?

![Figure 1: Evolution of the share of World GDP (pops) of the European Union (1950-2020)](image)

Source: Grasland (2006)

The response is: European Neighbourhood Policy. But, if this policy were to be the continuation of the dissymmetric Barcelona process, if the major part of the European Neighbourhood financial Instrument go to eastern neighbours, if European firms keep on targeting eastern Europe and remote developing countries rather than this enormous potential Mediterranean markets, and if the Arab countries refrain the speed of their very necessary reforms, the two shores of the Mediterranean will have missed the opportunity of a North-South recononction that should be further completed by an equivalent connection between northern and southern shores of Sahara.

If Europe and its neighbours were as economically integrated as Japan and the other Asian countries around it, the growth of EU’s GDP would be 0.5 point higher, and that of France’s GDP 0.75 point. The studies of the Cercle des Economistes (Chevalier 2003) and IFRI (Colombani 2002) have shown that, up to 2030, there is only one scenario in which Europe catches up with North America and eastern Asia: the scenario of south and eastward regional integration. Moreover this is the only scenario in which Europe’s neighbours develop significantly. Almost all of the Mediterranean neighbours face high rates of structural unemployment, due to their economic
structures, their lack of economic reform, the need to modernise their agricultural systems which will have severe effects on employment, and the persistence of numerous internal and external conflicts. In addition, they also face growing competition from other developing countries (e.g. the entrance of China into the WTO, and the dismantling of import quotas in the textile industry). They deadly need a strong partnership with Europe.

EU has a vital role to play here. Firstly, the EU must help its neighbours to create a reliable legal background for investments in order to help in the creation of the thousands jobs urgently needed. Otherwise, a continuing flow of undocumented immigrants will turn Europe’s borders into ramparts. Secondly, the EU will increasingly need labour force recruits in order to compensate for its demographic decline and labour force shortage. This labour force could in large part be taken from the neighbouring countries. The lack of a common policy framework, particularly in respect of teacher training, prevents the southern neighbours from tackling the huge increase in new students that confronts with.

This drives to a political issue: that of the philosophy of regional integration. The European states have a crucial choice to make between (i) remaining a continental integrated area based on homogeneity: gathering together comparable countries, with cohesion as the main goal, through a process promoted mainly by States through public policies - what could be called “convergence regionalism”. And (ii) building a more ambitious entity with the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries: a “North-South regionalism” gathering together uneven countries, with economic growth as the main goal, through a process promoted by firms, e.g. Nafta or “ASEAN Plus Three” (Thrice: Japan, South Korea, China). No need to say that this second pattern of regionalisation presents much better economic results than the first one.

3.4. Political stakes

Security issues and the fear of terrorism have come to preoccupy the Barcelona process which was initially based on a much wider vision of joint economic, social, ecological and cultural development on both sides of the Mediterranean. In the short term, and out of any moral consideration, any “bunker-continent” or “center-periphery” strategy could appear realistic for an economically declining and demographically ageing Europe. In reality, this construction of an island of prosperity surrounded by oceans of poverty would have tragic consequences:

- migrations have never been stopped by borders when wealth differentials are greater than 1 to 5. In such a scenario, the European Union would be obliged to invest more and more in the military control of its southern border. In a context of limited economic growth, such policy option will necessarily oblige to limit EU budget allocations to other objectives like social cohesion, sustainable development or R&D;
- the developing states of the southern shore of the Mediterranean will never agree to the proposal of being simple gatekeepers for the European Union against the poorest societies of Sub-Saharan Africa. They could therefore develop partnerships with other parts of the world like United States (its Great Middle East project) or China, instead of being allied to Europe and would develop as competitors in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood;
- the integration of immigrants from the southern shore of the Mediterranean would be profoundly affected by the limitation on travel and family reunification, multiplying the problems Europe’s inner cities and suburban ghettos. Conversely, tourism flows and the retirement of European people to southern countries would be dramatically affected by the degradation of political relations, producing increasing economic and ecological pressure on the coastal areas of the northern shore of the Mediterranean;
- the psychological climate of the European Union would be affected by the climate of fear and guilt produced by Europe’s isolation from the poorest people of Africa. The universal dimension of the European project would be seen as hypocrisy. Moreover, this global degradation of the international image of Europe could have significant negative consequences from a political point of view.

3.5. Territorial stakes

This regulated regional vision has an important territorial side:

9 The December 2005 Kuala Lumpur Summit enhanced the notion of an “East Asian Region” or “ASEAN Plus Five” since Australia and New Zealand attended the Summit and discussed their participation.
the European region (that is Europe + neighbours, we say “European” region because Europe represents 50 to 80% of any economic and social exchanges for the non European countries of the region) should become a reference in the regulation of agricultural or energy (gas and electricity) markets. For the latter, that means that the – slow and difficult - regulation of the European market should right away encompass the southern neighbours, which facilities are very compatible with those of western Europe (contrarily to eastern new member states’), and some of which have strategic energy resources. For the former (agriculture), that means that Europe and its neighbours should negotiate a regional set of regulation with the WTO, for example through a regional label for Mediterranean products, even maybe through a regional tariff in order to protect and promote during a transition time the modernisation of agriculture on the southern shore.

**Regional regulation. The case of Mediterranean agriculture**

One of the most relevant examples of the need for a win-win regional production and regulation process is agriculture and the food industry. The current situation is suboptimal. Some typically southern products such as citrus fruits or olive trees are also produced along the northern shore, whilst some typically northern products such as wheat are produced on the southern shore. In Morocco, 1.3 out of the 1.4 million agricultural farms produce wheat, most with incredibly low productivity and small profit margins. The inescapable downsizing of agricultural subsidies, on both shores of the Mediterranean, will see this situation progressively worsen. The winner however will be neither the northern nor the southern shore, but rather Chile, Australia or California, all of which are industrializing their food production industries. What has to be done then is a rational re-location of production within the Euro-Mediterranean area, the development of the food industry related to these products on the southern shore, and the common promotion of regional Mediterranean products.

Actual trends as well as possible common responses to the challenging nature of international competition will have an increasing impact on the rural areas of both shores of the Mediterranean. Highlighting the necessity of an overall regional view would help in the modernization of the Common Agricultural Policy, especially its second pillar (rural development) in the framework of the ENP.

- The ENP should carry out this transition time, in order to prepare the liberalisation of the 2010 (probably rather 2013 in fact because the agreements between EU and neighbours entail transitional periods) free trade zone. In 2013, either the southern Mediterranean countries will have given up free trade agreements with Europe, the Mediterranean will thus become an actual barrier for long – and the “continent” view will have won. Or, they will have adopted the rough free trade that the ongoing negotiations are promoting, and the "archipelago" will have won. In both case, this kind of partnership will be unlikely to avoid the destabilisation of the South and therefore of the whole region. Or, a genuine regional regulation will have been implemented, in order both to allow an effective transition period for the southern shore, and to deepen the partnerships between North and South.

- A policy of networking the common regional euromediterranean territory would be implemented: gas and electricity, but also transports and logistics, telecoms, an euromed postal network, an euromed financial space (under way thanks to the European Investment Bank), a common structure of diplomas in order to promote the mobility of the skilled people.

- Common policies would regulate the regional public goods. In particular, several environment issues have a regional dimension. These include the pollution of common seas (Black and Mediterranean Seas, for which pollution was one of the main issues of the November 2005 Barcelona Summit); air pollution, nuclear risks, relating to the upkeep of the antiquated power-plant stock in the East, the forecast new ones (Russia on the Black Sea’s coast) and the potential building of new plants in the Mediterranean (potentially in Turkey and Algeria after 2010).

- Balanced relocation of the value chain between North and South would enhance competitive advantage of the complementary and neighbouring territories, especially if the price of oil remain high and limit the comparative advantage of long distance trade (Cf. the different scenarios of oil crisis presented in ESPON project 3.2).
- Mobility of the elites, of other workers and students would be promoted, so that the fourth freedoms of the ENP, that of the circulation of the people\textsuperscript{10}, could ultimately be met, instead of brain drain. For what the people in the southern shore want is not to emigrate to Europe, what they want is to have easy opportunities to go there and come back as often as necessary.

3.5. Territorial impacts

This wide regional vision would undoubtedly have overall very positive impact on demography and economy, and specific territorial impacts:
- The main one would of course be the rise of the peripheral parts of the EU’s territory, Eastward (and not only in capital cities) and mostly Southward.
- The networking of the euromed space would give a gateway function to many ports and cities of the Mediterranean rim, on both shores. Many partnerships, such as decentralised cooperation, between actors of North and South would be facilitated, enhancing moilities, way of life and of work astride the two shores.
- The regional integration of western Balkans and Turkey would be facilitated.
- The role of North Africa as an interface between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa would be fostered. Maghreb would no longer be a buffer state, but a true interface.

4. Conclusion about policies: the role of territories in the Euromediterranean economic development implies coordination between DG Relex and DG Regio

4.1. Four principles of common action

Throughout its Action Plans with each of the Mediterranean partners, the ENP promotes the four freedoms. As we explained, they are necessary but not sufficient: four principles of common action have to be added to this motto:

- the solidarity with the southern shore of the Mediterranean (not only northern Africa but also sub-saharan countries), in order to prevent any outburst of social unrest: aid for the building of dwellings and for setting up basic services where they are lacking; aid to manage a transition for the rural space, in order to avoid the dramatic consequences that a rough liberalisation of agricultural trade could have on migrations. Several European policies should be expanded to the Mediterranean Partner Countries: methods of the Rural Development policy – a growing part within the CAP – should be stretched to the southern rural space, for providing essential services, improving competitiveness, protecting environment, and introducing locally based bottom-up approaches (a "Leader Med" has already been prepared by EU and Arab countries). By the way, crossing CAP and ENP would certainly be the best way to avoid a rapid decline of the CAP, which legitimacy is at stake; Europeans as well as the WTO would certainly not like to extend this policy after 2013 – but they could accept it if it were associated to a North-South integration policy. In urban and regional areas, the tools of the European regional policy could be profitably used. The example of Turkey shows that the neighbouring countries can very actively adopt the philosophy of action and the methods of European territorial policies, when there is a strong European commitment. This commitment consists in money of course, but essentially in methods and political involvement. Indeed, there is a lot of money in these countries; every year, billions of Euros cross the Mediterranean to be invested in Europe since there are no local reliable opportunities. The ongoing project of Euromediterranean financial space could well create the conditions for secured and reliable investment in the southern shore. The Persian Gulf could appears in this schema as a complementary partner rather than a competitor of European Union for the investment. The stake is to run such investments in local development projects.

- The creation of meshing networks over the greater regional territory: the development of banking services connecting the two shores, integrated transport and electricity networks, a well connected transmediterranean urban system, compatible pattern of higher

\textsuperscript{10} Some analysts already figure out how to set the Shengen line.. on the Sahara.
education’s degrees in order to promote mobility. The related European policies here are the TEN, which have begun to be studied at an Euromediterranean scale (see for instance the EIB work group on Euromed transport and logistics). The Bologna process is at stake too, as the recent Tarragona Declaration by the Universities willing to create actually the Euromed higher education & research space shows. Other common policies should take an Euromed path, namely the regulation of gas and electricity markets - discussions on those topics have begun in 2003 between the EU and the MPC.

- The North-South economic complementary nature: better sharing out of the value chain in agriculture and in manufacturing or services, after a pattern developing in East Asia and North America; cross investment between firms of the North and firms of the South in order to restore enduring mutual confidence. No European policy is involved here, since these are firms concerns. But the EU has a main role to play in enhancing this industrial cooperation as a key component of the Lisbon strategy. The EU should clearly say that if Europe wants to cope with USA and Japan, it has to embrace the North-South regionalism that makes them surpass us.

- The common interest in regional public goods: promotion of democracy, common agreement to promote regional regulation and tariffs vis-à-vis the WTO and the World Bank, fight against air and sea pollution. In the framework of the European Sustainable Strategy launched in 2004, the EU has initiated common actions in the field of environment (for instance the “2020 Horizon” for the de-pollution of the Mediterranean coordinates the various plans developed by bordering countries, UNEP and Global Environment Fund). The overall stake here concerns the negotiations with WTO, and the way the EU would consider Euromed as its reference regional area.

The Euromed free trade zone between EU and the Mediterranean Partners Countries will come into force in 2010 – more probably in fact by 2012 or 2013. Then, either the southern Mediterranean countries will have given up free trade agreements with Europe, and the Mediterranean will thus become the true frontier that fits in with Samuel Huntington’s bunker-continental view concerning the relationship between Europe and the Arab-Muslim world. Or, they will have adopted the unmitigated free trade that the ongoing negotiations are promoting, but then this kind of partnership will be unlikely to avoid the destabilisation of the South and therefore of the whole region. Or, public policies and a real regional regulation will have been implemented, in order both to allow a transition period for the southern shore and to deepen the partnerships between North and South.

4.2. The need for crossing DG Relex and DG Regio

These Southward expanded European policies deal very much with territories, for many reasons:

- efficient local territories are nowadays a genuine factor of production. Therefore a territorial action is necessary to enhance the economic development of the Euromed countries. If fostering the local dimension of ENPs projects, with a strong commitment from local public and private actors, the EU could more easily monitor the implementation of projects and make regular evaluations, using a similar system to that used in the context of European regional policy.

- Many social issues in the South cannot be met without taking the local territories into account, were it in rural areas or in informal urban suburbs;

- The promotion of local actors is a key mean for democartisation in the South. The promotion of local projects is one way in which to encourage decentralisation in neighbouring countries, which happens to be poorly developed. Although expectations of immediate changes on the political organisation of these countries local structures are not realistic, the initiation of such a process could, ultimately, improve their development and the efficiency of cross border cooperation programmes. Decentralised cooperation and cooperation between NGOs of the two shores of the Mediterranean, are the today’s best way to build an in depth North-South regionalism.

- Last but not least, there is a need for coordination of these various territorial actions, were it at the local level or at the regional level.
That is why the DG Regio should have a prominent role here: its method for local development have proved efficient; its connexion to local actors and especially to European Regional Councils would facilitate their involvement in the Euromed region; its know how to draw an overall regional blue print is very useful because the region needs a comprehensive vision of the Euromediterranean territory - which the bilateral Action Plans nor the ENP's four freedoms certainly do not meet. EU’s Territorial Agenda should draw the path to an “Euromediterranean or Euro-African Spatial Development Perspective”.

Our geographical analysis shows how important the ENP is to fulfil the goals of the Lisbon strategy (we do not believe that the “continent” view of Europe could be a relevant vision for Europe); how necessary it is to enhance territorial projects within the ENP if one wants to avoid a rough confrontation between the two shores of the Mediterranean (the “centre-periphery” view); how obvious it is that regional territories matter, that a purely hub-and-spokes pattern cannot meet the needs for a sustainable development (the “archipelago” view), that globalisation does not mean the abolition of borders but rather the reallocation of national borders to an upper scale which is that of the world region11. Therefore how relevant it is to run a strong coordination of the Euromediterranean territorial policies. Indeed, the very beginning cross-cutting actions and budgets of DG Relex, which is actually in charge with the ENP, and DG Regio should be largely boosted, in the prospect of an European region’s policy.

4.3. Fifty years ago …

The 4th July 2005, The president of the European Commission was invited at the opening session of the African Union Assembly. In a declaration entitled “From Schuman to Sirte : a tale of two unions” (Barroso, 2005), he made a parallel between the story of European and African Union,

Let me start with an affirmation about the organisation of a continent. The contribution which an organized and living Africa can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. Africa will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.

If this sounds vaguely familiar to you, you shouldn’t be surprised. Replace ‘Africa’ with ‘Europe’, and you have the famous Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. This set in motion an unprecedented period of integration and co-operation which has delivered 50 years of peace and prosperity on my continent.

At first glance, the discourse was full of ambition and generosity as the President of the Commission pursue the speech by a generous proposal of partnership or pact between both side of the Mediterranean ...

Regional integration has transformed - is transforming - the face of both Africa and Europe. But it has also altered our relationship. Today, we can, we must, do more … to put in place a new and solid political partnership between an enlarged Europe and a re-emerging Africa. Today, in this city which has come to symbolize the ideal of African unity, I call on you to elaborate with your European partners on the other side of the Mediterranean an ambitious Euro-Africa Pact.

A Pact that should reassess the principles and values that govern our relationship. Equality, true ownership and dialogue should replace guilt or charity as the determining features of our partnership.

But Devil is in the details … And looking better at the speech of M. Barroso indicate clearly that the real message was the net affirmation of a continental vision which separates definitively the destiny of both shore of the Mediterranean. Let African follow their own path of development means in this precise case that they should never hope more than a friendly partnership with Europe but based on a clear division in continents which is not so far from Huntington’s point of view on civilisations. Few weeks after the speech of Mr Barroso, the European Union had the

11 See Krugman (2004): "Distance matters a lot, though possibly less than it did before modern telecommunications. Borders also matter a lot, though possibly less than they did before free trade agreements. The spaceless, borderless world is still a Platonic ideal, a long way from coming into existence".
opportunity to prove the reality of its "Pact" to Sub-Saharan immigrants waiting outside the gates of Europe around the Spanish enclave of Melilla on African soil. As explained by Faludi (2006):

In late-September 2005, an estimated one thousand of them scaled the three-meter wall surrounding it, with three hundred making it to Spanish – and thus European – territory where they enjoy a degree of protection under international law. In subsequent nights, the police was on the alert, and there were ugly scenes, and even uglier ones when Moroccan authorities called upon to co-operate relocated would-be refugees to the Sahara Desert. Another surreal answer was to increase the height of the walls surrounding Melilla to six meters...

If the president of the European Commission had better read the famous declaration of R. Schuman, he could have noticed this small but very crucial sentence where he explains what could be the better use of European prosperity:

With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.

Of course, it is true that R. Schuman was also speaking from "continent" like J.M. Barroso. And, of course, we can not ignore the context of colonial crisis that exist at this moment of history and which implies different possible and contradictory interpretation of Schuman’s sentence. But we support strongly the assumption that the man who declared that "World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it” would certainly not have supported the morbid Huntington's vision of civilisation, neither the soft variant "continent" which is actually dominating European debate.

The long-term impulse that Schuman’s Plan gave to Europe relies precisely on the fact that it appeared extremely ambitious and – according to many observer of the time – unrealistic. As quoted by Mark Twain: they did not know it was impossible so they managed to do it.

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ANNEX : NORTH SOUTH PARTNERSHIP & THE EU COMMISSION.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Changing times impose greater responsibilities, and the responsibilities of the European Union at this time could not be weightier. We are striving to keep pace with a world in flux that is opening up new opportunities but also throwing up new challenges.

The political map of the European continent will be redrawn in less than two years. Next week, at Copenhagen, we shall take a historic step and invite up to ten new members to join our Union. This decision will give Europe a new dimension and impose on us new responsibilities.

This sixth World Conference of the European Community Studies Association has given us an opportunity to discuss in depth peace, security and stability-related issues. All the participants here are aware of the great responsibility represented by the half a billion people who will be living in the EU after 2007.

These 500 million people will not settle for less security than the citizens of the present Union of Fifteen. They want the same protection against organised crime and international terrorism as present members. And they want the benefits that led them to choose the EU as their political haven: stability, prosperity, solidarity, democracy and freedom.

If we are to keep pace with this changing world and shoulder our growing global responsibilities, we, as the Union, have to take the necessary measures. If we want to satisfy the rising expectations and hopes of countries abroad and the peoples of Europe, we have to become a real global player. We are only beginning to act as one.

The Balkans, Afghanistan and the Middle East are only three examples of the challenges facing the world community. The EU has to play its part in dealing with them.

The EU's foreign policy must be brought up to speed. It must be expressed with one voice and vested with the necessary instruments. There is no other way to guarantee our security in the long term.

The Commission has just presented its second communication to the Convention. We made detailed proposals for reform of EU instruments. There is no other way to guarantee our security in the long term.

The EU's foreign policy must be brought up to speed. It must be expressed with one voice and vested with the necessary instruments. There is no other way to guarantee our security in the long term.

The Community method will be valuable in the field of foreign relations too.

The EU has much to do yet if it wants to make an effective contribution to international security.

Let me now deal in more detail with the central item on this conference's agenda: stability. Lasting and sustainable stability in the European region, has been the crowning achievement of the European Union. This is what we do best, if I may say so.

We are projecting stability beyond the borders of the current candidate countries, which are already sharing in our prosperity. We should recognise that this success creates legitimate expectations in the EU's future neighbours which, in turn, wish to reap benefits from the current enlargement.

Is our present neighbourhood policy well-defined enough to meet the challenges thrown up by enlargement? I want to focus on this issue because I think we have not yet got to grips with the underlying problem. Today I am going to talk about the need for a new political perspective on relations with our southern and eastern neighbours. My aim is giving them incentives, injecting a new dynamic in existing processes and developing an open and evolving partnership. This is what we call our proximity policy, a policy based on mutual benefits and obligations, which is a substantial contribution by the EU to global governance.

Let me reiterate. The current enlargement is the greatest contribution to sustainable stability and security on the European continent that the EU ever made. It is one of the most successful and impressive political transformations of the twentieth century. And all this has been achieved in a less than a decade.

This achievement is the fruit of a decision taken by the EU in 1993 and the consistent efforts of the Union and the candidate countries ever since. The initial decision gave these countries hope for the future.

By holding up the goal of membership we enabled these governments to implement the necessary reforms. Only this prospect sustained the reformers in their efforts to overcome nationalist and other resistance and fears of change and modernisation.

Such hope is a strange thing. It has much in common with the trust people have in you. It determines how you look at people or events. How does a country envision its future when it is lacking direction or confidence? Hope gives direction and so inspires confidence. But the future must be attractive to inspire hope.

The EU looks certain to remain a pole of attraction for its neighbours. For many of the countries in our future "backyard" the EU is the only prospect. Many of these countries have already received a formal undertaking from the Union.

The integration of the Balkans into the European Union will complete the unification of the continent, and we have held out this prospect to them. Although there is still a long way to go, the Balkans belong to Europe. The process of integrating them will create a sort of bridge between enlargement and neighbourhood policy.

Each enlargement brings us new neighbours. In the past many of these neighbours ended up becoming candidates for accession themselves.

I do not deny that this process has worked very well. But we cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale.
We need a debate in Europe to decide where the limits of Europe lie and prevent these limits being determined by others. We also have to admit that currently we could not convince our citizens of the need to extend the EU's borders still further east. It is a question of responsibility: We have to develop a blueprint for future action to deal with a problem stemming directly from the success of enlargement.

What have we to offer our new neighbours? What prospects can we hold out to them? Where does Europe end? These are the questions we have to answer. The European public is calling for such a debate. I know: This debate will heat up after the accession of new members. Therefore it is our duty to start finding some answers.

I want to be perfectly clear on this point: Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union provides that any European State which respects the fundamental principles of the Union can apply for membership. So whatever our proximity policy is or will be, no European state that complies with the Copenhagen criteria we established in 1993 will be denied this prospect.

But to clear up any doubt, let me also say this. Holding out such a prospect to a country does not mean promising this country that it will definitely join.

Accession is not the only game in town. Remember that enlargement does not benefit only present and future members. Future neighbours will benefit too.

Being a neighbour of the EU means better market opportunities in a more stable economic and political environment. In many cases, for instance, future trade tariffs will be lower than the existing ones for the candidate countries.

But enlargement will also create new challenges for our neighbours. Repositioning existing markets may well pose problems. We need to find solutions that will allow us to share the advantages of enlargement with our neighbours. This calls for a comprehensive approach to our neighbours.

The geographical scope of this approach is our neighbourhood in the literal sense of the word, our backyard. It includes our future eastern neighbours and the whole Mediterranean area, as I recently explained in Louvain when I spoke on “Europe and the Mediterranean – time for action.”

I want to see a “ring of friends” surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea.

This encircling band of friendly countries will be diverse. The quality of our relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on either side. Of course, geography will play a role too.

It is the Commission’s responsibility to come up with a way of improving relations with all these countries.

Let me try to explain what model we should follow. I admit that many of the elements which come to my mind are taken from the enlargement process. What struck me about that process is that just the prospect of accession has brought benefits to the central and eastern European countries.

You can improve the climate for direct investment without being a member of the EU. You can align your legislation on the EU's without being a member. You can have limited or even unlimited access top the internal market without being a member. You can tighten budget controls and boost economic growth without being a member.

But--and this is an important but--these benefits can only be obtained if and when the process is well structured, when the goals are well defined and the framework is legally and politically binding. And only if the two sides are clear about the mutual advantages and the mutual obligations.

The goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? A substantive and workable concept of proximity would have a positive effect.

The existing and well functioning instruments of the EU’s policy for its neighbours are the foundations for any new approach. We should be able to combine this proposal with the variety of existing partnership, cooperation, association and stabilisation agreements. But we must also better exploit their potential and build on this basis.

Let me concentrate on the question of what political perspective would best extend the area of stability without immediate enlargement of the Union.

We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter. So what would a proximity policy do for our old and new neighbours look like?

- It must be attractive. It must unlock new prospects and create an open and dynamic framework. If you embark on fundamental transformations of your country’s society and economy, you want to know what the rewards will be.
- It must motivate our partners to cooperate more closely with the EU. The closer this cooperation, the better it will be for the EU and its neighbours in terms of stability, security and prosperity, and the greater the mutual benefits will be.
- It must be dynamic and process-oriented. It should therefore be based on a structured, step-by-step approach. Progress is possible only on the basis of mutual obligations and the ability of each partner to carry out its commitments.
- We need to set benchmarks to measure what we expect our neighbours to do in order to advance from one stage to another. We might even consider some kind of “Copenhagen proximity criteria”. Progress cannot be made unless the countries concerned take adequate measures to adopt the relevant acquis. The benefits would be directly felt. As would absence of any progress.
- A proximity policy would not start with the promise of membership and it would not exclude eventual membership. This would do away with the problem of having to say “yes” or “no” to a country applying for membership at too early a stage.

I can imagine what might be the first question that comes to your mind. What is attractive about such an offer? Where’s the best? The answer is simple. But to make it work will take time and effort.
On other occasions I have already referred to this concept, which I described as "sharing everything with the Union but institutions". The aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union.

The centrepiece of this proposal is a common market embracing the EU and its partners: it would offer a single market, free trade, open investment regime, approximation of legislation, interconnection of networks and the use of the euro as a reserve currency in our bilateral transactions.

As the Union is more than a common market there are other dimensions to be included, too:

- If we have common goals, we must also be ready to deal with common threats, such as crime, terrorism, illegal migration and environmental challenges.
- We must act together to put an end to the regional conflicts on our continent.
- We have to make sure that our common border is not a barrier to cultural exchanges or regional cooperation in the period when there cannot be completely free movement of people and labour.

Let me come back to the question as to whether we need new instruments or structures to create this new political impetus. I am normally cautious about setting up new structures if your aims can be achieved with existing ones.

The idea of "sharing everything but institutions" itself applies to existing EU institutions. But this does not exclude the possibility of developing a new structures with our neighbours at a later stage, if necessary.

I am thinking of innovative concepts such as institutions co-owned by the partners: The Euro-Mediterranean Bank and the Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations might be cited as examples here; both were conceived as tools to strengthen an existing process, not as an alternative to it.

I would also like to launch a new political dialogue on the basis of "shared principles and values", making full use of all the potential offered by our common external policies.

Consider, for instance, policies on the environment, transport, research, education and culture, to mention but a few. New forms of assistance and cooperation based on the social cohesion model. Or new joint measures to tackle problems we all have at our borders.

Let me try to explain how the concept of sharing everything but institutions should be understood: The example I have in mind is the proposal I made to Russia:

A Common European Economic Space could provide a framework in which we could ultimately share everything but institutions. Though it will obviously not be built in a day. Clearly each partner would need to consider whether they are ready and able to adopt our standards and legislative models. However, this is only a first attempt to build something new that we can share with our neighbours to our mutual benefit.

A European-Russian High Level Group is exploring the possible building blocks of such a Common Economic Space: standards, customs, financial services, transport, industry and telecommunications are just a few.

And we can point to an example of a working economic area which has all this, and more.

The European Economic Area, based on the EEA Agreement, brings together the EFTA countries and the European Union under a single roof: We share one single market, which is governed by the same acquis communautaire. The single market entails all four freedoms: the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. If a country has reached this level, it has come as close to the EU as it is possible to be without being a member.

I know this might take a long time for many countries. But it would help them to carry out the necessary reforms and take the right measures because they would have an objective to aim at. And it would clearly bring mutual benefits, and consequently mutual incentives, to both the Union and its neighbours.

The EEA model does not presuppose accession as a pre-requisite. But, as history shows, being member of the EEA does not exclude membership of the EU at a later date. To me this seems very attractive.

Of course, the situation of countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus differs completely from that of Norway, say. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to offer them a reasonable degree of proximity that does predetermine the question of future membership in advance. Indeed, because their situation is very different and because much more time will be needed to reach a certain stage, it is worth seeing what we could learn from the way the EEA was set up and then using this experience as a model for integrated relations with our neighbours.

I feel that we need more time to develop this concept. We identified relations with our neighbours as a strategic objective of this Commission in February 2000. The job of the Commission is to seize this opportunity to find a comprehensive solution to the question of the Union's relations with its neighbours.

That is what I meant by "sharing everything but institutions."

In this wider Europe we cannot confine our action to ad hoc, bilateral initiatives. We cannot simply ignore what is happening beyond our borders. Neither can we solve problems with our new neighbours simply by letting them join the Union.

We are tolerant and open to dialogue, to coexistence and to cooperation. We have to assume our role as a global player. The development of a substantive proximity policy should be one of the first steps.

We need to institute a new and inclusive regional approach that would help keep and promote peace and foster stability and security throughout the continent, ultimately promoting the emergence of better global governance.

Thank you for your attention.
Your Excellency, your excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

É para mim um grande privilégio participar na sessão de abertura desta Assembleia da União Africana. É com muito gosto que estou de volta ao vosso continente pela segunda vez no espaço de uma semana, já que acabo de visitar a África do Sul, Moçambique e a República Democrática do Congo.

Let me start with an affirmation about the organisation of a continent.

The contribution which an organized and living Africa can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations...Africa will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.

If this sounds vaguely familiar to you, you shouldn’t be surprised. Replace ‘Africa’ with ‘Europe’, and you have the famous Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. This set in motion an unprecedented period of integration and co-operation which has delivered 50 years of peace and prosperity on my continent.

I believe what worked for Europe can work for Africa too. Six years ago, here in Sirte, Africa also picked the path of political, economic and cultural integration and co-operation. The African Union and NEPAD gave the continent a new vision, a mission and a strategy. The dynamic and bold performance of the African Union in Sudan or Ivory Coast has impressed the world. The African Peer Review Mechanism is proving to be both a just and effective tool for the self-monitoring of Africans by Africans.

Today Africa looks into the future with more confidence and optimism than ever before. Because it has endowed itself with a mission and a vision that will guide it into a more peaceful, safe, and prosperous 21st century.

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Is it unrealistic to draw parallels between Europe’s experience and Africa’s potential? I don’t think so. Let’s not forget the scale of the problem in Europe in the years running up to the Schuman Declaration. Sixty or seventy years ago, battles were being fought across the continent which killed millions of Europeans. Attempted genocide lead to the horrors of the Holocaust, a mass murder of Europeans by Europeans.

Turn the clock forward. Thirty-five years ago, dictatorships were still ruling many European countries, including my own. Just over thirty years ago I did not yet have the right to vote in free and fair elections. And it wasn’t until 15 years ago that countries in Central and Eastern Europe recovered their freedom. Yesterday was the tenth anniversary of the massacres of Srebrenica... So when I say the path of regional integration has brought us peace, stability and prosperity, I am not talking about ancient history.

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

Regional integration has transformed - is transforming - the face of both Africa and Europe. But it has also altered our relationship. Today, we can, we must, do more to put in place a new and solid political partnership between an enlarged Europe and a re-emerging Africa. Today, in this city which has come to symbolize the ideal of African unity, I call on you to elaborate with your European partners on the other side of the Mediterranean an ambitious Euro-Africa Pact.

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It is not by chance that I mention equality first. The emergence of the African Union and the consolidation of European integration represent a unique opportunity to break with neo-colonial and paternalist reflexes and look forward with a relationship which reflects the true spirit and potential of Europeans or Africans.

Europe has much more to offer than development assistance. Europe has a unique track record of integration, of co-operation and of building supra-national political institutions, even if progress is sometimes slow and never easy.

In addition to equality, this pact between Europe and Africa also needs to be informed by true ownership. We say the word ‘ownership’ so often that it has turned into a bureaucratic term emptied of its original meaning. So let me say what I mean by ownership; ownership means the acknowledgement that each person, society, country or group of countries has the right, and the duty, to take command of its own destiny.

This means for example that Africa has the duty to assume responsibility for tackling its own conflicts, as it is now doing. As I said earlier, the performance of the African Union in Sudan and Ivory Coast has impressed the world. The African Union Mission in Sudan has confronted this complex conflict with courage and perseverance. Europe has responded to your appeal with the same sense of responsibility, and with the €250 million Peace Facility for Africa, to give the necessary financial muscle to support your determination.
The third central pillar of this new pact is dialogue. I strongly believe in the need for permanent political dialogue with Africa. A frank, but always constructive dialogue, based on respect and mutual interest, characterised by openness and honesty.

Of course it is not for Europeans to lecture Africa. History creates sensitivities. But the principles of human rights and good governance are not European exports. They are universal, for Africans, Asians, Europeans. And what is universal must be defended universally, by all of us here.

Europe can, I hope, help Africans to help themselves. This is the key reason why the growth and early achievements of the African Union are so encouraging. But setting up institutions is the easy part. You are now at a critical juncture. The whole world, which has watched your achievements with wonder and admiration, is now holding its breath, willing you to succeed. The Strategic Framework, prioritised, budgeted and adopted last December, needs to be implemented. Promises on democracy, good governance and development need to be followed through.

Permettez-moi de vous donner trois exemples de domaines dans lesquels j’ai le sentiment que l’on pourrait faire plus si l’Europe et l’Afrique travaillaient ensemble.

Premièrement, la gouvernance. Ces dernières années, l’Afrique s’est résolument engagée dans la voie de la démocratie. Au cours des cinq dernières années, plus des deux tiers des pays de l’Afrique subsaharienne ont eu des élections multipartites qui, dans un certain nombre de cas, ont conduit à des changements de gouvernement démocratiques et pacifiques. Et il y a plus. Avec le mécanisme africain d’évaluation par les pairs, l’Afrique dispose maintenant d’un instrument unique et innovateur. Vingt-trois pays, représentant 75% de la population de l’Afrique subsaharienne, y ont maintenant adhéré. La Commission européenne offre son soutien inconditionnel à cet effort, et elle apportera les moyens financiers nécessaires pour vous aider à mettre en œuvre les recommandations dudit mécanisme.


Troisièmement, le commerce. La part de l’Afrique subsaharienne dans le commerce mondial a connu un déclin constant. De 6 pour cent en 1980, elle est tombée à 2 pour cent en 2002. Pour chaque dollar d’aide reçu, la moitié a été perdue en raison de la détérioration des termes de l’échange. Si l’Afrique subsaharienne pouvait regagner juste 1 pour cent de plus du commerce mondial, elle gagnerait 70 milliards d’euros de plus en exportations. Cela représente presque cinq fois ce que la région reçoit en aide étrangère et en allègement de sa dette.

Il y a quelques années seulement, certains pays en développement – en Asie, par exemple – éprouvaient autant de difficultés que certains des pays les plus pauvres d’Afrique n’en éprouvent aujourd’hui. Ils ont cependant trouvé le chemin de la croissance et sont aujourd’hui des concurrents efficaces sur le marché mondial. Leurs populations connaissent un accroissement sans précédent de leur niveau de vie.

L’Afrique, avec la richesse de ses ressources naturelles et humaines, est prête à décoller pour peu qu’elle bénéficie d’une aide extérieure suffisante. L’Europe est à vos côtés, par le biais d’acès à nos marchés sans tarifs ni quota, par une aide de commerce et par les accords de partenariat économique, qui constituent le processus commercial le plus ambitieux, le plus vaste et le plus orienté vers le développement jamais négocié entre le Nord et le Sud. À ce propos, vous pouvez compter sur la disponibilité et l’engagement de la Commission européenne pour mettre en œuvre avec les pays concernés un programme ambitieux permettant de créer les conditions de réussite de ce processus. Les Commissaires responsables pour le Développement et pour le Commerce travaillent déjà ensemble pour en optimiser les effets.

Excellences,

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Aujourd’hui, 40 pour cent de tous les Africains vivent avec moins d’un dollar par jour. Trois maladies qui meurent du sida sur quatre sont des Africains, souvent des adultes économiquement actifs qu’aucun pays ne peut se permettre de perdre.

Il ne peut donc y avoir de pacte euro-africain crédible et durable sans accroissement de la solidarité financière entre nos deux continents.

Aujourd’hui, l’Europe est le plus grand donneur d’aide au monde ; elle fournit 55% de l’ensemble de l’aide au développement outre-mer.

Mais il en faut encore davantage.
Et il y a plus. Les dirigeants européens ont accepté il y a quinze jours une proposition de la Commission européenne visant à permettre à l'Europe de doubler son aide. Ils sont convenus d'un nouvel objectif collectif de l'UE permettant une majoration annuelle de l'aide de 20 milliards d'euros d'ici 2010 et de 45 milliards d'euros d'ici 2015. En tant qu'Européen, je suis fier de ce résultat et j'y vois un exemple donné au monde. J'irai au G8 à Gleneagles dans 2 jours et au Sommet des Nations Unies à New York en septembre, afin d'encourager les autres pays riches du monde à égaler notre initiative.

L'augmentation de l'aide au développement doit aller de pair avec le placement de l'Afrique au premier rang des priorités. La Commission européenne a fait valoir avec force que l'Afrique mérite une attention toute particulière. Les dirigeants européens ont décidé d'investir au moins 50 pour cent de cette aide accrue au continent africain. Pour faire en sorte que les populations de l'Afrique retirent un bénéfice maximum de ce financement supplémentaire, toutes les mesures prises pour améliorer la cohérence des politiques et la qualité de l'aide s'appliqueront en priorité à l'Afrique sub-saharienne.

Excellences,

Mesdames et Messieurs,


À la suite de cette Proposition, nos deux continents devraient se rencontrer pour élaborer un nouveau pacte euro-africain. Un pacte capable de canaliser l'énergie positive qui s'exprime actuellement dans toute l'Afrique par des réalisations politiques concrètes. Un pacte qui puisse mettre à profit notre expérience, un pacte qui fera en sorte que le partenariat entre l'Afrique et l'Europe, entre le Sud et le Nord, devienne une coalition solide pour un monde multilatéral plus fort et plus stable.


L'Afrique et l'Europe sont des continents voisins, qui ne sont éloignés que de quelques kilomètres. Grâce à l'Union africaine, nous partageons désormais la même certitude d'un devenir commun d'assurer la paix, la sécurité et la prospérité pour nous-mêmes et pour autrui.

La longue route vers le développement social, politique et économique durable de l'Afrique est une route que l'Afrique et l'Union européenne doivent parcourir ensemble. Je me réjouis de penser qu'un jour viendra où tous les Africains commémorent la Déclaration de Sirte de 1999 de la même façon que les Européens commémorent la Déclaration Schuman de 1950 – comme le début d'une transformation qui a converti pauvreté et souffrance en prospérité et fierté, l'espoir en réalité.