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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2006

"Deep Pockets'', Collateral Assignments of Patents, and the Growth of Innovations

Bruno Amable
Kirsten Ralf
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Résumé

This paper studies how the imperfect collateral assignments of patents contribute to "deep pockets'' savings of innovative firms facing random investment opportunities in research and development (R&D) and determine the growth of their innovations, using a version of the Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] model of credit cycles. Results are: patents as collateral leverage R&D finance and magnify the effect of innovative rents on investment; the composition of current versus future financial constraints implies that firms savings decrease the steady state aggregate debt/patent ratio; the interaction between households and firms savings determines a leveraged growth of innovations which increasing when legal reforms reduce the imperfection of patents as collateral.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00112518 , version 1 (08-11-2006)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00112518 , version 1

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Bruno Amable, Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Kirsten Ralf. "Deep Pockets'', Collateral Assignments of Patents, and the Growth of Innovations. 2006. ⟨halshs-00112518⟩
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