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Article Dans Une Revue Social Choice and Welfare Année : 2007

On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members

Résumé

Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game
have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have
interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain
of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual
independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power
and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which
the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight
remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we
propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random
game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the
asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined
by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of
the European Union.

Mots clés

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Dates et versions

halshs-00010168 , version 1 (12-04-2006)

Identifiants

Citer

Vincent Merlin, Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Jean-Louis Rouet. On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members. Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 28 (2), pp.181--207. ⟨10.1007/s00355-006-0171-6⟩. ⟨halshs-00010168⟩
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