Can shorter transfer chains and transparency reduce embezzlement?
Salvatore Di Falco
(1)
,
Brice Magdalou
(2)
,
David Masclet
(3)
,
Marie Claire Villeval
(4)
,
Marc Willinger
(2)
Brice Magdalou
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 170253
- IdHAL : brice-magdalou
- ORCID : 0000-0001-7733-703X
- IdRef : 196910390
David Masclet
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 177109
- IdHAL : david-masclet
- ORCID : 0000-0003-4670-6247
- IdRef : 068930097
Marie Claire Villeval
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 596
- IdHAL : marie-claire-villeval
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8578-5449
- IdRef : 029244730
Marc Willinger
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 170514
- IdHAL : marc-willinger
- ORCID : 0000-0001-5880-3453
- IdRef : 029203651
Résumé
We study embezzlement when donations have to pass through intermediaries to reach recipients, by means of a sequential game tested in a laboratory experiment conducted in Tanzania. We investigate the impact on the amount embezzled of both the number of intermediaries in transfer chains and transparency about the donation. We show that donors are less generous in the presence of intermediaries. When transfer chains are shorter, aggregate embezzlement decreases, at least when donations are transparent. At the individual level, intermediaries embezzle less, the longer the transfer chain; this is due to less embezzlement at the beginning of the chain. We fail finding significant positive effects of transparency on the honesty of individual transfers through social judgment. JEL Codes: C91, D73, O19
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Can shorter transfer chains and transparency reduce embezzlement?
|
Résumé |
en
We study embezzlement when donations have to pass through intermediaries to reach recipients, by means of a sequential game tested in a laboratory experiment conducted in Tanzania. We investigate the impact on the amount embezzled of both the number of intermediaries in transfer chains and transparency about the donation. We show that donors are less generous in the presence of intermediaries. When transfer chains are shorter, aggregate embezzlement decreases, at least when donations are transparent. At the individual level, intermediaries embezzle less, the longer the transfer chain; this is due to less embezzlement at the beginning of the chain. We fail finding significant positive effects of transparency on the honesty of individual transfers through social judgment. JEL Codes: C91, D73, O19
|
Auteur(s) |
Salvatore Di Falco
1
, Brice Magdalou
2
, David Masclet
3
, Marie Claire Villeval
4
, Marc Willinger
2
1
UNIGE -
Université de Genève = University of Geneva
( 154620 )
- 24 rue du Général-Dufour CH - 1211 Genève 4
Suisse
- Suisse
2
CEE-M -
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier
( 1002397 )
- 2 Place Viala
INRAE - MSA
34060 Montpellier Cedex 2
- France
3
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
4
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2020
|
Titre de la collection |
103-143
|
Volume |
7
|
Numéro |
2
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Embezzlement, corruption, donations, transparency, experiment
|
DOI | 10.1561/105.00000119 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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