A. Daron and J. Robinson, A Theory of Political Transitions, American Economic Review, vol.91, issue.4, pp.938-963, 2001.

G. A. Akerlof and R. E. Kranton, Economics and identity, Quarterly journal of Economics, pp.715-753, 2000.

D. Acemoglu, R. , and J. , Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 2005.

D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions, American Economic Review, vol.98, issue.1, pp.267-293, 2008.

G. A. Akerlof and R. E. Kranton, Identity economics: How our identities shape our work, wages, and well-being, 2010.

G. A. Akerlof and R. E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, The Quarterly Journal of Economics no, vol.115, issue.3, pp.715-753, 2000.

D. W. Allen and C. G. Reed, The Duel of Honor: Screening For Unobservable Social Capital, American Law and Economics Review, vol.8, pp.81-115, 2006.

D. T. Andrew, The code of honour and its critics: the opposition to dueling in England, 1700-1850, Social history, issue.5, pp.409-434, 1980.

R. Baldick, The duel : a history of dueling, 1965.

F. Billaçois, The duel: its rise and fall in early modern France, trans, Trista Selous, 1990.

D. Blackbourn, In The German bourgeoisie: essays on the social history of the German middle class from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, pp.1-45, 1991.

K. Boulding and . Ewart, Conflict and defense: A general theory, vol.3024, 1962.

J. Buchanan, R. D. Mcgill, and . Tollison, The Theory of Public Choice: II: University of, 1984.

W. C. Bush and L. S. Mayer, Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.8, issue.4, pp.401-412, 1974.

C. Carlton, Charles I: The Personal Monarch, 1995.

J. Chesnais, Histoire de la violence en Occident de 1800 à nos jours: R. Laffont, 1981.

D. J. Clark and C. Riis, Contest success functions: an extension, Economic Theory, issue.11, pp.201-204, 1998.

J. G. Cockburn, R. Strahan, R. Knaplock, W. Goslin, T. Lewis et al., The History and Examination of Duels, 1720.

K. Demeter, The German officer-corps in society and state, pp.1650-1945, 1965.

G. Dosi, G. Fagiolo, and A. Roventini, The microfoundations of business cycles: an evolutionary, multi-agent model, In Schumpeterian Perspectives on Innovation, Competition and Growth, pp.161-180, 2009.

G. Dosi, G. Fagiolo, and A. R. , Schumpeter meeting Keynes: A policy-friendly model of endogenous growth and business cycles, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control no, vol.34, issue.9, pp.1748-1767, 2010.

A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete, Physical review no, vol.47, issue.10, p.777, 1935.

N. Elias, , 1937.

J. M. Epstein, Modeling civil violence: An agent-based computational approach, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, issue.99, pp.7243-7250, 2002.

J. M. Epstein, Chapter 34 Remarks on the Foundations of Agent-Based Generative Social Science, Handbook of Computational Economics, pp.1585-1604, 2006.

U. Frevert, In The German bourgeoisie: essays on the social history of the German middle class from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, pp.255-292, 1991.

U. Frevert and A. Williams, Men of honour: a social and cultural history of the duel, 1995.

L. Gagné, Non-rational compliance with social norms: sincere and hypocritical, Social Science Information, vol.46, issue.3, pp.445-469, 2007.

M. R. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas, Economics of Conflict: An Overview, Handbook of Defense Economics: Defense in a globalized world, 2007.

F. Guillet, L'honneur en partage. Le duel et les classes bourgeoises en France au XIXe siècle, pp.55-70, 2007.

F. Guillet, La mort en face: histoire du duel de la Révolution à nos jours, 2008.

H. Haferkamp and N. J. Smelser, Social change and modernity, 1992.

B. Hassani-mahmooei, W. Brett, and . Parris, Resource scarcity, effort allocation and environmental security: An agent-based theoretical approach, Economic Modelling, vol.30, pp.183-192, 2013.

S. Heckbert, T. Baynes, and A. Reeson, Agent-based modeling in ecological economics, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, issue.1185, pp.39-53, 2010.

J. Hirshleifer, Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success, Public Choice no, vol.63, issue.2, pp.101-112, 1989.

J. H. Holland, Complex Adaptive Systems, pp.17-30, 1992.

J. Jeanneney, Le duel-Une passion française, 2004.

V. Kiernan and . Gordon, The duel in European history: honour and the reign of aristocracy, 1988.

C. G. Kingston and R. E. Wright, The deadliest of games: the institution of dueling, Southern Economic Journal no, vol.76, issue.4, pp.1094-1106, 2010.

A. P. Kirman and N. Vriend, Evolving market structure: An ACE model of price dispersion and loyalty, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, issue.25, pp.459-502, 2001.

K. A. Konrad, Investing in regimes with stationary or roving bandits, Guns and Butter: The Economic Causes and Consequences of Conflict, vol.121, 2009.

P. Kooreman and L. Schoonbeek, The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest, Economics Letters no, vol.56, issue.1, pp.59-61, 1997.

T. Kurisu, Two-noisy-versus-one-silent duel with equal accuracy functions, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, vol.39, pp.215-250, 1983.

T. Kurisu, On a duel with time lag and arbitrary accuracy functions, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.19, pp.375-405, 1991.

S. Lang, Parliamentary Reform, pp.1785-1928, 1999.

B. Lebaron and L. Tesfatsion, Modeling macroeconomies as open-ended dynamic systems of interacting agents, The American Economic Review, issue.98, pp.246-250, 2008.

P. T. Leeson, The laws of lawlessness, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.38, issue.2, pp.471-503, 2009.

P. T. Leeson, Trial by battle, Journal of Legal Analysis, issue.3, pp.341-375, 2011.

P. T. Leeson and C. R. Williamson, Anarchy and development: an application of the theory of second best". The Law and Development Review, vol.2, pp.77-96, 2009.

Y. F. Liu, W. Zhang, and H. C. Xu, Collective behavior and options volatility smile: An agent-based explanation, Economic Modelling, vol.39, pp.232-239, 2014.

K. Mcaleer, Dueling: The cult of honor in fin-de-siècle Germany, 1994.

T. Mendez and . Auguste, Essai sur le duel: Bohaire, 1836.

R. Muchembled, A History of Violence, 2012.

D. C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, 1990.

D. North, W. John, J. Weingast, and B. , Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history, 2009.

, the Shadow of Violence, Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development, 2013.

R. A. Nye, Fencing, the duel and Republican manhood in the Third Republic, Journal of Contemporary History, issue.25, pp.365-377, 1990.

R. A. Nye, Masculinity and male codes of honor in modern France, 1993.

B. Powell and E. P. Stringham, Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey, Public Choice, issue.140, pp.503-538, 2009.

W. M. Reddy, The invisible code: Honor and sentiment in postrevolutionary France, pp.1814-1848, 1997.

L. Riccetti, A. Russo, and M. Gallegati, Financialisation and crisis in an agent based macroeconomic model, 2015.

E. M. Rogers, Social Structure and Social Change, The American Behavioral Scientist, vol.14, issue.5, p.767, 1971.

T. C. Schelling, Micromotives and macrobehavior. 1st ed, Fels lectures on public policy analysis, 1978.

K. Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I, 1992.

S. Skaperdas, Contest success functions, Economic Theory, issue.7, pp.283-290, 1996.

D. Starkey, Monarchy, 2006.

L. Stone, The crisis of the aristocracy, pp.1558-1641, 1965.

E. Stringham, Anarchy, state and public choice, 2005.

E. P. Stringham, Anarchy and the law: the political economy of choice, vol.1, 2011.

G. Tarde, Le duel, Études pénales et sociales, 1892.

L. Tesfatsion, Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Constructive Approach to Economic Theory, Handbook of Computational Economics, pp.831-880, 2006.

C. Thimm and . Albert, A Complete Bibliography of Fencing & Dueling, 1896.

B. Truman and . Cummings, The field of honor: being a complete and comprehensive history of dueling in all countries; including the judicial duel of Europe, the private duel of the civilized world, and specific descriptions of all the noted hostile meetings in Europe and America, 1883.

G. Tullock, In Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, pp.269-282, 1980.

M. Vahabi, D. Braddon, and K. Hartley, Elgar Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, pp.79-104, 2011.

M. Vahabi, The Political Economy of Predation: Manhunting and the Economics of Escape, 2016.

O. Volckart, « The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany, Explorations in Economic History, vol.41, pp.282-299, 2004.

R. Wallick, Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock, Public Choice no, vol.152, issue.1-2, pp.223-244, 2012.

M. Weber, An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol.1, 1968.

C. A. Wells, End of the Affair: Anti-Dueling Laws and Social Norms in Antebellum America, The, Vand. L. Rev, issue.54, p.1805, 2001.

U. Wilensky, , 1999.