The strange "Majority Judgment"

Abstract : "Majority Judgment" is an evaluative voting rule that picks a candidate with the best median evaluation. This paper deals with the following question: what does one do when choosing according to the best median? This principle amounts to finding which half-population should be neglected in order to satisfy, in the sense of a Rawlsian compromise, the other half. This principle clashes with the definition of democracy as the participation of everyone, not half of the population plus one. Moreover, providing the highest possible level of satisfaction to that half-population that is the easiest to satisfy is not what is achieved by the rules of choice called "majoritarian," which respect the Condorcet principle. On the contrary, these rules favor consensual solutions, in particular in standard political environments. This explains why the "Majority Judgment" often yields surprising outcomes. ____________
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01965227
Contributor : Jean-Francois Laslier <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, December 25, 2018 - 2:06:09 PM
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Long-term archiving on : Tuesday, March 26, 2019 - 2:59:44 PM

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Jean-François Laslier. The strange "Majority Judgment". 2018. ⟨hal-01965227⟩

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