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A small model of equilibrium mechanisms in a city

André De Palma
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Abstract

We use a simple economy with two interconnected geographical zones. Individuals can live and work in one of the two zones or can commute between them. This model is used to explore the dynamics of housing and work decisions after a permanent shock in labour demand occurred in one of the two zones. We illustrate the role of the different levels of expectation of developers and government transport agencies for the equilibrium on the housing and the labour markets. The model is used to identify better Cost-Benefit rules for transport investments and the role of coordination between housing and transport decisions.

Keywords: urban economics, transport, housing, dynamic land use

JEL-codes: R42, R31, R13

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1 Introduction

How cities evolve is the result of complex interactions between many agents such as households, developers, firms and transport agencies. Describing the behaviour of all these agents simultaneously is not a simple task and is made even more complex due to the different speeds of adjustments characterizing the different urban changes. Construction of new transport infrastructure is typically a very slow process; large transport infrastructures can take a very long time to construct and once in place are more or less permanent elements. Buildings also have a long life-span, take several years to complete and are costly to destroy. Population and employment, on the other hand, can change fast; firms are established or closed down, households formed or dissolved and can move easily. Transport flows are the most flexible of all processes and can change in some cases almost instantaneously.

The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamics of housing and work decisions when a permanent shock in labour demand occurs in one of the two zones. The differences in speed of adjustment imply that decisions will be made on the basis of expectations rather than on basis of known market prices. Expectations may have different levels of rationality. The paper focuses especially on the role of these expectations on the future rental prices of the developers and the impact of government decisions on the transport infrastructure.

A few papers deal explicitly with this problem, but these only consider the housing market (interaction between developers and households). Anas and Arnott (1991&1993) develop a model for one housing market in which they introduce heterogeneity in the housing stock and in consumer tastes. Moreover, they foresee different types of conversions of the housing stock by profit-maximizing developers. They propose a perfect foresight equilibrium concept and an algorithm to compute it. Martinez & Hurtubia (2006) also propose a land use and housing model in which housing units are unique. Profit-maximizing developers supply housing units to the highest bidders. In contrast to Anas and Arnott, they introduce myopic foresight for the developers and therefore explore another limiting case. Developers are unable to foresee prices correctly and the future prices they anticipate are a weighted average of present and past prices. Other land use and housing models are less explicit about the supply decisions and the equilibrium mechanism (see e.g. Wegener (2004), Iacono et. al. (2008) for an overview on land use models and de Palma et. al. (2007)). Still other, more theoretical, models only analyse the steady state and its comparative static properties (see e.g. Arnott and McMillan (2006), Glaeser (2008)).
The paper is organized as follows: first we introduce a simple two zone model which will be used to analyse the reaction of housing, labour and transport markets to an exogenous productivity shock in one region. After a sketch of the different components of the model in Section 2, we study the different laissez faire equilibriums without transport investment (Section 3) for three different expectation mechanisms (perfect foresight, delayed reaction and myopic expectation), and illustrate the equilibrium mechanisms numerically. Next, we introduce a government that has the option to change the transport infrastructure and study the impact of a reduction of the commuting costs on the housing and labour market assuming perfect foresight for all agents (Section 4). In Section 5 we illustrate the findings when expectations are no longer perfect. The final section concludes.
2 Model components

We consider two regions, labeled A and B. There are $N$ households consisting of a single worker which choose simultaneously their residence and their workplace. Workers are allowed to commute, so that job and residence location need not to be in the same region. In each region there are competitive firms employing $n$ workers. Each household consumes one unit of housing which is provided by profit-maximizing developers. We use Figure 1 to introduce the basic notation.

Figure 1: Elementary notations

We distinguish different periods $t = 0,...,T$. At the beginning of each period, households choose their workplace and residence location, firms choose how much labor they need, and developers decide how many new houses will be built in each region.
2.1 Individuals

Let $N_A (N_B)$ denote the number of (homogenous) individuals living and working in $A (B)$. The number of commuters, i.e. individuals living in region $I$ but working in region $J$, is labeled $N_{IJ}$. We assume that there is no migration, so that the number of individuals in the economy is fixed and equal to $N$. We further assume that all individuals work and that the number of individuals is large enough that they take wages and house prices as given. Individuals are assumed to jointly select a residential location and a work location so as to maximize utility. The indirect utility of an individual $(U)$ depends on their net income which equals their wage $(w)$ minus housing costs $(r)$ minus the commuting costs $(tt)$, where the average commuting cost is a linear function of the number of commuters$^5$:

$$U_j(t) = U\left(w_j(t), r_j(t), t_{ij}(t)\right) = w_j(t) - r_j(t) - t_{ij}(t) \quad i, j = A, B$$

$$t_{ij}(t) = \mu N_{ij}(t)$$

As individuals can relocate at the beginning of every period, a spatial equilibrium for the individuals implies that the utility of every individual will be equal whatever their choice of residence and job. In addition, if there is commuting at equilibrium, the commuters have the same utility as those that do not commute:

$$U_{AA}(t) = U_{BB}(t) = U_{BA}(t) \quad (1)$$

$$w_A(t) - r_A(t) = w_B(t) - r_B(t) = w_A(t) - r_B(t) - \mu N_{BA}(t) \quad (2)$$

Workers will only be willing to commute from $B$ to $A$ if wages in region $A$ are higher to compensate the commuting costs. The differences in rents between the two regions will compensate the wage differences between them.

---

$^5$We only consider commuting from region $B$ to $A$, therefore $N_{BA}$ (the number of commuters) can be negative when commuting takes place in the other direction.
2.2 Firms

On the production side of the economy, we assume that there are firms in each region producing a single homogenous good and use labour as only input. Contrary to the individuals who can choose their residential location after each period, we assume the location of the firms as fixed. In each region all individual firms have the same quasi-linear production function. The aggregate marginal product function is decreasing in the number of workers \( n \) (this means that we neglect agglomeration effects which would imply an increase in marginal productivity with the number of workers):

\[
MP_i(n_i(t)) = \alpha_i - \beta_i n_i(t), \quad i = A, B
\]  

Production is sold on the world market and its price is normalized to 1. The shareholders of the firm are assumed to be residents of the region where the firm is located, so that profits will directly benefit the region. Labour and product are homogeneous, and perfect competition on the product and labour market implies that the marginal product is equal to the wage \( w \):

\[
MP_i(n_i(t)) = w_i(t) \Rightarrow w_i(t) = \alpha_i - \beta_i n_i(t), \quad i = A, B
\]  

We will refer to this condition as the labour market equilibrium condition.

2.3 Developers

While households can reallocate every period and firms can adjust their wages without delay, we will assume that building a house does take time. We assume that a housing unit lasts for two periods and it takes one full period to construct a house. Houses built in period \( t - 1 \) and available in period \( t \) will be referred to as the "new" houses in period \( t \), the same housing units available in period \( t + 1 \) will be referred to as the "old" houses (see Figure 2).
There is no depreciation or increased maintenance cost for old housing. We further assume that at the end of each period, individuals can move and relocate at a fixed moving cost $M$ that in our case is taken to be equal to zero.

The housing stock $s(t)$ in each period $t$ is the sum of the houses built $b_i(.)$ in period $t-1$ and $t-2$:

$$ s_i(t) = b_i(t-1) + b_i(t-2) $$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

The total construction cost (including the cost of land) of new houses $b(t)$ built in period $t$ in zone $i$ is given by:
Houses are rented to residents at a rental price $r_i(t), i = A, B$ at each period $t$. Rental prices are determined by demand and supply on the housing market and developers and households take rents as given (perfect competition assumption).

Developers maximize profits when deciding how many houses to build. The expected profits of a developer in region $i$ in period $t$ are given by:

$$\Pi_i(b(t)) = \rho \{r_i(t+1) + \rho r_i(t+2)\} b_i(t) - \left(\gamma + \frac{\delta}{2} b_i(t)\right) b_i(t),$$

where we use the discount factor $\rho = 1/(1 + ii)$, where $ii$ is the real interest rate for alternative investments on the international capital market. Their housing supply maximizes discounted profits in each period:

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_i(t)}{\partial b_i(t)} = 0 \iff \left(\rho r_i(t+1) + \rho^2 r_i(t+2)\right) = \gamma + \delta (b_i(t))$$

Perfectly competitive developers take rental prices as given and developers build until the discounted profit equals the marginal cost. If discounted rents do not cover the marginal construction cost, building activity will decrease and can disappear. In Eq(8) we can see the role played by future rental prices in the building decisions of the developers, the higher the expected rental prices the more houses will be built.

We now have all the elements to describe demand, supply and equilibrium upon the housing market. The demand for houses equals the equilibrium number of inhabitants in that region. The supply of houses consists of the houses constructed in that region in the two previous periods:

$$N_A(t) = s_A(t) = b_A(t-1) + b_A(t-2)$$

Up to now we have nothing that prevents vacancies or a lack of housing units for the given population. A good treatment of vacancies requires reconversion options for older houses (as in Anas & Arnott (1991)) and a shortage requires the reconversion of housing space into smaller units. In this exploratory phase we avoid these complexities and introduce an artefact to deal with both problems. We put a minimum rental price in the market by assuming that at rent $r_{MIN}$ there is an infinite demand for housing units for another purpose (commercial
storage, ..) . And we use a maximum price \( r_{\text{MAX}} \) at which there is an infinite and immediate supply of temporary housing (containers, ..).

To summarize, we give the four conditions that are valid in equilibrium:

I. spatial equilibrium for residents:
\[
(w_A(t) - r_A(t)) = (w_B(t) - r_B(t)) = w_A(t) - r_B(t) - \mu N_{BA}(t)
\]

II. labor market equilibrium:
\[
w_i(t) = \alpha_i - \beta n_i(t), \quad i = A, B
\]

III. housing supply:
\[
\rho_I(t+1) + \rho^2 r_I(t+2) = \gamma + \delta b_i(t), \quad i = A, B
\]

IV. demand for housing:
\[
\overline{N}_i(t) = s_i(t) = b_i(t-1) + b_i(t-2), \quad i = A, B
\]

### 2.4 The transport agency

Since the purpose of this paper is to understand the interaction between land developers and governments investing in transportation, we need to introduce a transport agency which is responsible for managing the transport infrastructure. We assume that there is only one such agency and that it can improve the existing transportation connection between the two regions. By doing so, it reduces the commuting costs and influences residential location choices of the households, the rents and development decisions. Improvements in the transport infrastructure are assumed to be slower than building houses, but once in place they will last longer: it takes two periods to complete the investments and they will last forever. This would be the case for rail and metro investments. The objective function of the agency is the sum of the welfare of the two regions, which is the sum of the total production \((TP)\) minus the construction costs of housing \((TC)\), the total commuting costs \((\mu(N_{ht})^2)\) and the transport infrastructure costs \((INV(\mu)):\)

\[
W(t) = W_A(t) + W_B(t) = TP_A(t) + TP_B(t) - TC_A(t) - TC_B(t) - \mu(N_{ht})^2 - INV(\mu) \quad (10)
\]

where

\[
TP_I(t) = \int_0^{n_I} MP_I(t) \, dn_I = \alpha_I n_I(t) - \frac{B_I}{2} (n_I(t))^2,
\]

\[
TC_I(t) = \gamma b_i(t) + \frac{\delta}{2} (b_i(t))^2, \quad I = A, B
\]
For the numerical simulation we will assume that the investment costs are inversely proportional to $\mu$, higher investment levels correspond to lower levels of $\mu$.

### 2.5 Shock and equilibrium concepts

Now that all the agents have been defined, we need to specify the exogenous productivity shock and the assumptions on behavior and information for the different agents.

The shock is assumed to happen in region A in period $t=1$ and is a permanent positive productivity shock, meaning that suddenly (e.g. due to exogenous investments in the zone) the marginal product function of region A will shift upwards from the start of period $t=1$ onwards:

$$MP_A(t) = \alpha_A^s - \beta_A n_A(t), \quad \alpha_A^s > \alpha_A, \quad t \geq 1$$

(11)

In order to characterize the equilibria, we need to specify the information and behavior of all agents that make decisions. For firms, we assume that they always hire workers until the point where the marginal product equals the wage cost. Individuals have to take two decisions: where to live and where to work. As they are fully mobile between the two zones, and as all individuals are identical, we need to satisfy the spatial equilibrium conditions: the location and work decisions will be in equilibrium when the utility of the individual cannot be improved by moving to another zone of residence or work.

As long as the transport agency is passive, it will be the behavior of the developers that will determine supply and equilibrium within the housing market and the economy as a whole. We can construct different types of equilibria: the perfect foresight, the delayed reaction and the myopic equilibria. Which equilibrium occurs depends on the information and expectation rules of the developers. The equilibrium obtained when the shock is correctly anticipated – both in timing and magnitude – and developers anticipate the future rental prices correctly is the perfect foresight equilibrium. If the shock is not anticipated but the developers have correct expectations on the future rental prices we end up in the delayed reaction equilibrium. Finally, when the shock is not anticipated and building decisions are based on past and current rents we have the myopic equilibrium. In Table 1 we summarize the three possibilities.
Table 1: Different equilibriums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perfect foresight</th>
<th>Delayed reaction</th>
<th>Myopic equilibrium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shock is fully anticipated</td>
<td>Shock is not anticipated but perfect foresight after the shock</td>
<td>Shock is not anticipated and decisions are based on weighted average of prices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to study the decisions on transport capacity we will, in addition, need to account for the expectations of the transport agency regarding the building activity of the developers. The agency can either anticipate that the developers will react to a productivity shock or not anticipate their reaction. Moreover, the agency can also anticipate (or fail to anticipate) that developers will adjust the housing stock to the change in transportation costs due to a transport investment.

### 2.6 Initial equilibrium

Initially the two regions are identical (same amenities, productivity etc.). This means that, before the shock, exactly half of the total population lives in each region. As there is no difference in productivity between the two regions, wages will be identical in both (see Figure 3), and both regions employ half of the population. As a result there will be no commuting and rents will be equal:

$$
N^0_A = N^0_B = N^0 = \frac{N}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad N^0_{BA} = 0
$$

$$
w^0_A = w^0_B = w^0, r^0_A = r^0 \equiv r^0 \quad \text{and} \quad s^0_A = s^0_B = \frac{N}{2}
$$
In the absence of a shock there is a housing stock that is the result of a steady state building activity:

\[ s_i(t) = b_i(t-1) + b_i(t-2) = \frac{N}{2}, \quad i = A, B \]  

(12)

for example at the stationary state, the function \( b(.) \) is constant and denoted by \( b'' \) and equal to \( N/4 \):

\[ b_i(t-1) = b_i(t-2) = b'', \quad i = A, B \]

but it could follow a relation of the form
\[ b_i(t-1) = \eta \quad \text{and} \quad b_i(t-2) = \frac{N}{2} - \eta, \quad i = A, B \]

The magnitude of \( \eta \) will be of no consequence for the rest of the analysis and will therefore be assumed to be \( N/4 \) which leads to a constant building activity.
3 Equilibrium without government investments in transport

We first assume that the government is completely passive and developers know that no investments will be made in the transportation network. As already pointed out, the building decisions of the developers depend crucially on the future rental levels and how developers anticipate these levels. In the subsequent subsections we will assume different expectation rules, and analyze the resulting equilibria. First we assume that developers have perfect knowledge of the timing and magnitude of the shock (perfect foresight). Next we assume that they do not anticipate the shock but once it occurs they anticipate the future rents correctly (delayed reaction). Finally we assume that developers are myopic, meaning that their predictions of future rental levels are based on actual and past rental levels. Households are assumed to react passively and to move without costs every period in function of their spatial equilibrium condition.

3.1 Perfect foresight equilibrium

3.1.1 Steady state equilibrium

We first develop the steady state equilibrium for the periods after the shock. Next we discuss the adaptation process. In a steady state after the shock, the rental prices, the stock and the population residing and working in each zone will remain constant over time. We proceed as follows. We first use the spatial equilibrium condition for the residents (condition I in section 2.3) and the equilibrium conditions for the labour market (condition II) to derive the demand for housing in each of the zones as a function of the rents in the two zones. Next we confront demand for housing units with the supply of housing units by the developers (condition II) to determine the equilibrium number of residents as well as the number of commuters, the wages and the rental prices.

The demand for housing can be derived from the spatial equilibrium condition, where we have used the labour market equilibrium condition. We have, in the steady state (for \( t >> 1 \)):

\[
\alpha^A - \beta \left[ N_A(t) + N_{BA}(t) \right] - r_A(t) = \alpha - \beta N_B(t) - r_B(t)
\]

\[
= \alpha^A - \beta \left[ N_A(t) + N_{BA}(t) \right] - r_B(t) - \mu N_{BA}(t)
\]
where $N_I$ is the number of people working and living in zone $I$. Inspecting the first and the third term implies that, in the presence of commuting, we always have that the two rental prices are linked via the commuting costs ($\Delta r(t) = r_A(t) - r_B(t)$):

$$\Delta r(t) = \mu N_{BA}(t) \tag{14}$$

The equality of the first and second term, together with the constraint on population ($N = N_A(t) + N_B(t) + N_{BA}(t)$) implies

$$N_A(t) = \frac{(\alpha^A - \alpha) - \Delta r(t) + \beta N - 2\beta N_{BA}(t)}{2\beta}.$$ 

Since we assume that there is only commuting from $B$ to $A$, the number of people living and working in $A$ ($N_A$) will be equal to the number of residents in $A$ ($\bar{N}_A$). Using the relationship between the two rental prices and the commuting costs gives us demand for housing units $\bar{N}_A(t)$ as a function of the difference in rental prices:

$$\bar{N}_A(t) = N_A(t) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ N + \frac{\alpha^A - \alpha}{\beta} - \frac{(2\beta + \mu)}{\beta\mu} \Delta r(t) \right] \tag{15}$$

The increase in the number of residents of $A$ will be larger when the productivity shock is larger because this increases the marginal product so that more workers are needed in zone $A$. Whenever the commuter costs ($\mu$) are higher, it is more attractive to move to $A$ than to commute, so this also increases the population in $A$. A higher rent in $A$ compared to $B$ will lead to a smaller increase of the population in zone $A$. Only the rent differences count and not the absolute rent because the number of individuals is fixed, and all individuals need exactly one housing unit. The number of people working and living in $B$ is:

$$N_B(t) = N - N_A(t) - N_{BA}(t) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ N - \frac{\alpha^A - \alpha}{\beta} + \frac{1}{\beta} \Delta r(t) \right]$$

For later use we also give the number of residents in $A$ ($\bar{N}_A$) and $B$ ($\bar{N}_B$):

$$\frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} = \frac{1}{\mu^2} \left( \Delta r(t) \right) > 0$$
\[ \bar{N}_A(t) = N_A(t) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ N + \frac{\alpha^A - \alpha^B}{\beta} - \left( \frac{2\beta + \mu}{\beta\mu} \right) \Delta r(t) \right], \]  

(16)

\[ \bar{N}_B(t) = N_B(t) + N_{BA}(t) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ N - \frac{\alpha^A - \alpha^B}{\beta} + \left( \frac{2\beta + \mu}{\beta\mu} \right) \Delta r(t) \right]. \]  

(17)

The difference between the two being:

\[ \Delta \bar{N}(t) = \bar{N}_A(t) - \bar{N}_B(t) = \left[ \frac{\alpha^A - \alpha^B}{\beta} - \left( \frac{2\beta + \mu}{\beta\mu} \right) \Delta r(t) \right]. \]

The next step is to use the supply of housing as a function of the rental prices. In a steady state the stock of houses and rental prices remain constant over time:

\[ r_A(t) = r_A(t+1) \text{ and } b_A(t) = b_A(t+1) = \frac{\bar{N}_A(t)}{2}. \]

Combining the supply equations for zones A and B (condition III) we can derive an expression for the difference in rental prices in the steady state (denoted by superscript SS):

\[ \Delta r^{SS}(t) = \frac{\delta}{\rho(1+\rho)} \frac{\bar{N}_A(t) - N_A(t) - N_{BA}(t)}{2} = \frac{\delta}{2\rho(1+\rho)} \left( 2\bar{N}_A(t) - N \right). \]  

(18)

Substituting the demand condition eq(15) in eq(18), we find the steady state population in region A:

\[ \bar{N}_{A^{SS}}(t) = \frac{N}{2} + \frac{1}{1 + A/2} \left( \frac{\alpha^A - \alpha^B}{2\beta} \right). \]  

(19)

where

\[ \frac{1}{1 + A/2} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\delta(\mu + 2\beta)}{2\beta\mu(1 + \rho)}} \quad \text{with} \quad B = \frac{\delta}{2\mu\rho(1 + \rho)}. \]

We see that, in equilibrium, the number of residents in A is increasing in the magnitude of the productivity shock \((\alpha^A - \alpha^B)\), is increasing in the commuting costs \((\mu)\) but decreasing in the slope of the building costs \((\delta)\). When the marginal cost of construction is constant, we see that the population of A is only determined by the productivity difference and that the
discount factor and commuting costs play no role for the equilibrium. Substituting this back into eq(18) and using the relationship between the rent difference and the number of commuters (eq(14)) we get

$$N_{BA}^{es} = \frac{2B}{1 + \frac{A}{2}} \frac{\alpha^A - \alpha^B}{2\beta}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (20)

An increase in the productivity shock will lead to more commuting, since working in A is more attractive and, as could be expected, a decrease in commuting costs $\mu$ will increase the number of commuters.

3.1.2 The adaptation process

In the previous section we described the steady state equilibrium after the shock. However, we are also interested in the adaptation to the shock. Demand for housing and commuting reacts every period to the rental prices. The rental prices are, in the end, determined by construction activities so we need to study the behavior of developers. One of the important factors is knowing when the housing market starts to adapt to the (known) shock. Does the dynamic equilibrium mechanism simply consist of building more houses in period 0 in zone A and less houses in zone B so that the housing market is again at steady state from period 1 onwards?

The developers decide on new houses in function of the expected rents. This means that all rental prices are linked. Using the developers’ equilibrium conditions eq(8), we have the following relations:

$$N_A(t) - N_B(t) = \frac{\rho}{\delta} \left[ \Delta r(t-1) + (1 + \rho)\Delta r(t) + \rho\Delta r(t+1) \right]$$ \hspace{1cm} (21)

We see that all periods are interlinked via the construction decisions that depend on the rental prices in the two coming periods.

In the perfect foresight equilibrium, there will be no adaptation period; developers anticipate the shock correctly and will ensure that the steady state levels are satisfied when the shock takes place. The intuition goes as follows:

Take period 0. The expectation of future rents implies that it pays for developers to increase the construction of houses in zone A in period 0 in order to satisfy the higher demand for houses in zone A in period 1 when the productivity shock increases the marginal product.
Does this imply that the adaptation to the shock will consist for region A of the following oscillating construction activity:

1. higher building activity in period 0 so that in period 1, the new houses $b(0)$ + old houses $b(-1)$ equal the steady state stock $s^{ss}$?
2. lower building activity in period 1 as one only needs to replace old houses built in $t-1$
3. higher building activity in period 2 in order to replace the housing built in period 0

etc.

This would mean that the stock is fully adapted in period 1 and that this adaptation only takes one period.

Does it make sense to smoothen the adaptation process by having a somewhat higher building activity already in period $t-1$? The answer is no for two reasons. First, the houses constructed in period $t-1$, will only serve one period after the shock at the beginning of period 1 while houses constructed in period 0 will serve in periods 1 and 2, two periods with higher demand in zone A. Second, a reason that developers would already increase construction in period -1 could be the construction cost function. The construction cost is increasing in $b(t)$ and this tends to make smoothing more interesting. But because the marginal housing construction cost function is linear, there is no net gain through spreading the extra construction over several periods.

### 3.2 Non anticipated shock but perfect adaptation (delayed reaction)

In this case one observes an unanticipated shock in period 1. Commuting can react immediately, but the change in the housing stock can only take effect in period 2. Future rental prices are perfectly anticipated. The new steady state is equal to the perfect foresight equilibrium. The only difference is that the adaptation is delayed by one period.

### 3.3 Myopic equilibrium

There are several versions of a myopic equilibrium. One commonly used assumption is that the rent in the next period is a weighted average of the rents in the past periods:
\[ \tilde{r}_i(t+k) = \lambda r_i(t+k-1) + (1-\lambda)r_i(t+k-2). \]

This implies that developers now decide on construction on the basis of:
\[
\left\{ \rho \tilde{r}_i(t+1) + \rho^2 \tilde{r}_i(t+2) \right\} = \gamma + \delta(b_i(t)).
\]

The optimal building strategy for the developer (eq(8)) then becomes
\[
b_i(t) = \frac{\rho(1+\rho)}{\delta} \left[ \lambda r_i(t) + (1-\lambda)r_i(t-1) \right] - \frac{\gamma}{\delta}
\]
and the stock of housing in zone A at \( t \) is equal to
\[
s_A(t) = \frac{\rho(1+\rho)}{\delta} \left[ \lambda r_A(t-1) + r_A(t-2) + (1-\lambda)r_A(t-3) \right] - \frac{\gamma}{\delta}.
\]

In the period of the shock there will be no adaptation yet, since \( r_A(t < 1) = r_B(t < 1) \equiv r^0 \) and
\[
s_A(1) = s_B(1) = \frac{N}{2},
\]
housing stock will be equal in both regions. This means that there will be an oversupply in region B and an undersupply in A, and some people will commute from B to A. The rent difference between the two regions can be derived by equating \( \Delta s(t = 1) \) with \( \Delta \bar{N}(t = 1) \):
\[
\Delta s(1) = \Delta \bar{N}(1) \Rightarrow \Delta r(1) = \frac{\mu}{2\beta + \mu} \left( \alpha^A - \alpha^B \right) > 0.
\]

the rents in B will be lower to compensate the commuters and the higher wages in B (due to the shock). The number of commuters is then
\[
N_{BA}(1) = \frac{(\alpha^A - \alpha^B)}{2\beta + \mu}.
\]

It can be shown that the rental price difference will be greater than in the steady state, meaning that there are more commuters. The reason is that the myopic developers did not adjust the housing stock to accommodate the increase in demand in A. In the period just after the shock \((t = 2)\), the developers will react to the increased rents in region A by increasing
construction in this region, indeed the difference in housing stock in the two regions at \( t = 2 \) is

\[
\Delta s_2 = \lambda \frac{\rho(1+\rho)}{\delta} \Delta r(1) > 0.
\]

We can derive the rent differences of all subsequent periods after equating the housing stock to the number of residents \( \Delta s(t) = \Delta \tilde{N}(t) \):

\[
\Delta r(t) = \Delta r(1) - \frac{1}{A} \left[ \lambda \Delta r(t-1) + \Delta r(t-2) + (1-\lambda) \Delta r(t-3) \right]
\]

where

\[
\Delta r(t) = 0 \quad \text{for} \quad t < 1.
\]

Analytically, it is not clear whether there is any convergence. It can, however, easily be checked, that whenever the system converges, it will converge to the steady state \( \Delta r^{ss} \). In the next section we illustrate that for reasonable values of the parameters of the model the system does converge.

### 3.3.1 Numerical simulations

The values used for the numerical simulations are given in the next table.

Table 2: variables values used in the simulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total population ( N )</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction parameter ( \gamma )</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction parameter ( \delta )</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>discount factor ( \rho )</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marginal production slope ( \beta )</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
In Tables 3 and 4 the results are shown for $\lambda = 0.5$ and 1 (where $\lambda$ is the weight given to the rental price in the previous period by a myopic developer). The first column of each table represents the initial equilibrium; the shock takes place in period 1 (second column). The developers only react in this period and the stock of housing adapts from period 2 onwards. The last column is the steady state. (Note that we only give the first eight periods after the shock, there may be need for more to fully reach the steady state). As can be seen in Figure 4, where the rent differences for the two different lambdas are compared, the parameter $\lambda$ does not seem crucial for the convergence. It seems that the value of the commuting costs plays a more important role. In Table 5 we give the simulation results for $\lambda = 0.5$ but this time $\mu = 0.1$ instead of 0.5 as previously, and in Figure 5 the rent differences for the two different values of $\mu$ are plotted in a single graph.

Table 3: Simulations for myopic developers with $\mu=0.5$ and $\lambda=0.5$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>SHOCK</th>
<th>Adaptation</th>
<th>SS2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_B$</td>
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<td>29.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20.00</td>
<td>16.58</td>
<td>16.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18.18</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>10.00</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
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<td>$U_{AA}$</td>
<td>35.96</td>
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<td>60.96</td>
<td>60.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U_{BB}$</td>
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<td>60.96</td>
<td>60.96</td>
<td>60.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U_{BA}$</td>
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<td>60.96</td>
<td>60.96</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>commuting costs</td>
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</table>
Table 4: Simulations for myopic developers with $\mu=0.5$ and $\lambda=1$

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<tr>
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<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>profit dev B</td>
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<td>364</td>
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Figure 4  Differences in rents during the adaptation period for $\lambda=0.5$ and $\lambda=1$

Table 5: Simulation results for myopic developers with $\mu=0.1$ and $\lambda=0.5$

<table>
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<td>60.96</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>profit dev B</td>
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</tr>
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<td>welfare A</td>
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<td>welfare B</td>
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<td>3801</td>
<td>3683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5  Differences in rents during the adaptation period for $\lambda=0.5$ for two different commuting costs ($\mu=0.5$ and $\mu=0.1$)

In conclusion, we found that the system does converge after more than eight periods. This has to be considered in relation to the lifetime of the building (2 periods) and the length of the rental period (1 period). If one period stands for 10 years, and the housing is fully renewed after 20 years, convergence after 80 years is very slow.
4 Optimum with transport investment

We now introduce a government transportation agency that can invest in transport infrastructure. To focus on the effect of including the housing market, we first look into the case where the housing stock is constant and compare this to the case where developers are active players and react to a change in commuting costs. More specifically, we are interested in understanding how housing market developments affect the optimal transport infrastructure investment rule. To compute the optimal investment level we assume that the government anticipates correctly the reaction of the developers. In the next section we will relax this assumption, and analyze other equilibria.

4.1 Constant housing stock and rents

Assume that the government knows that, due to a productivity shock, there will be a high demand for commuting. To avoid too high commuting costs, it decides to improve the transportation network between the two regions. Once the shock occurs, the investments are made and the commuting costs decrease relative to the non-investment equilibrium\(^7\). In this section we will, moreover, assume that the stock of houses and the rental prices remain unchanged.

If rents cannot adjust, we cannot impose the spatial equilibrium conditions between residents of A and B (if we do, we get that wages need to be equal and there will be no commuting), we can, however, impose that the utility of a commuter and someone working in B are equal. This implies that

\[
w_B = w_A - \mu N_{BA}
\]

Using \(w_B = \alpha_A - \beta(N_A + N_{BA})\) and the fact that if stock do not adjust it remains at the initial level and: \(\bar{N}_A = \bar{N}_B = N_A = N_B + N_{BA} = \frac{N}{2}\), we found that the number of commuters is:

\[
\]

\(^7\)So we assume that the government in charge of the investments has perfect knowledge of the timing and magnitude of the shock (perfect foresight).
\[ N_{BA} = \frac{(\alpha^A - \alpha^B)}{2\beta + \mu} \]

When commuting costs decrease, the number of commuters increases:

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial \mu} N_{BA} = -\frac{N_{BA}}{(2\beta + \mu)} < 0 \]

As the housing stock is constant, an increase in commuting implies an increase in the number of workers in region A which will lead to a decrease in wages in A (see Figure 6, where the wage in A decreases when going from point Y to V and X). This decrease implies that the utility of the residents of A will decrease. An increase in the wage in B, compared to the case where no investments are made, leads, on the other hand, to an increase in the utility of the residents of B (including the commuters)\(^8\).

\(^8\)Note that there is still an increase in wages for both regions compared to the situation prior to the shock.
It is straightforward to derive the optimal investment rule. In the case that the housing stock remains constant we have

\[
\frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\partial N_B}{\partial \mu} = 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial TP_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial TP_B}{\partial \mu} = (\alpha_A - \alpha_B) \frac{\partial n_A}{\partial \mu} - \beta (n_A - n_B) \frac{\partial n_A}{\partial \mu}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial TC_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial TC_B}{\partial \mu} = 0
\]
Using the expression for the welfare given in eq(10) and optimizing w.r.t. \( \mu \), it turns out that the government will invest up to the point where the marginal investment costs \( \text{MINV} \) equal\(^9\):

\[
-\text{MINV}^\lambda = \left( \frac{2\beta}{2\beta + \mu} \right) \left( N_{BA} \right)^2 = \frac{2\beta \left( \alpha^A - \alpha^B \right)^2}{(2\beta + \mu)^3}
\] (22)

The marginal benefits consist of two components, the marginal change in total production of the firms and the marginal change in total commuting costs. The marginal change in total commuting costs is squared in the number of commuters because the average cost is increasing in \( N_{BA} \). The marginal change in total production is also a function of the square of the number of commuters. Since people cannot move, the change in number of workers is only determined by the change in the number of commuters. For high values \( \mu \) (a large amount of congestion), there will be few commuters and a marginal change in the commuting costs will have less impact; the smaller the value of \( \mu \), the larger the impact. The marginal benefit is thus a decreasing function of \( \mu \). The larger the difference in productivity, the more people are willing to commute and the larger the benefits will be of an investment. The steeper the marginal product function of the firms (\( \beta \) larger), the less impact a change in commuting costs will have on wages and on the total production, and the smaller the benefits are of an investment. For later reference we will denote the resulting investment level as \( \mu^\lambda \).

### 4.2 Constant housing stock but rents can adjust

When rents can adjust, the spatial equilibrium constraints for the individuals will hold, and rents adjust until all individuals have equal utility. Compared to the case where the rents do not adjust, the residents of A will lose some utility since they see their rent increase, the opposite being true for the residents of region B. Note that this is the situation occurring at the period of the shock when developers are myopic; they did not anticipate the shock, and thus housing stock is still at the old levels but rents can adjust.

---

\(^9\)Note that since more investment in the capacity leads to a smaller \( \mu \), the marginal investment \( \text{MINV} \) is negative.
4.3 Housing stock and rents can adjust

In the situation where housing and rents can adjust freely we can make use of the steady state equations (13). We can show that in the steady state:

\[
\frac{\partial N_{BA}^{SS}}{\partial \mu} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial N_{A}^{SS}}{\partial \mu} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial N_{B}^{SS}}{\partial \mu} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \bar{N}_{B}^{SS}}{\partial \mu} < 0
\]

and

\[
\left| \frac{\partial \bar{N}_{A}^{SS}}{\partial \mu} \right| < \left| \frac{\partial N_{BA}^{SS}}{\partial \mu} \right|
\]

A decrease in average commuting cost will make commuting more attractive and so, as one could expect, the number of commuters increases. This implies that region B becomes more attractive to live in and less people will choose to move to A. Region A will thus see its population decrease (in Figure 7 the population in A goes from \( N_A^1 \) to \( N_A^2 \)). Although the total population in B increases, there will be a decrease in the number of workers in B (due to the increase in commuters) and thus wages will increase (see Figure 7 where wages in B go from \( w_B^1 \) to \( w_B^2 \)). In region A we see the opposite: the population decreases but, due to the increase in the number of commuters, total workforce will increase and wages decrease.
Compared to the case where stock does not adjust, the number of commuters will be inferior since some of the population has actually moved to A.

Next we look into the effects on rental prices. Using

\[ s_A = \frac{\rho 2(1+\rho)}{\delta} r_A - \frac{2}{\delta} \gamma = N_A \] and \[ s_B = \frac{\rho 2(1+\rho)}{\delta} r_B - \frac{2}{\delta} \gamma = N - N_A \]

we can derive

\[ \frac{\partial r_A}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\delta}{2\rho(1+\rho)} \frac{\partial N_A^{ss}}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{\partial r_B}{\partial \mu}. \]
rents in A decrease (to off-set the decrease in wages), while rents in B increase by just the same amount. Note that the total utility of all residents remains unchanged when investments are made since rents will adjust to counter the effect of the changes in wages and commuting costs.

The optimal investment rule will now look quite different. The number of commuters is in this case equal to \( N_{ba}^{SS} \), deriving this w.r.t. \( \mu \) yields:

\[
\frac{\partial N_{ba}^{SS}}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{1+\mu}{\mu} \frac{1}{1+A/2} N_{ba}^{SS} < 0
\]

The derivatives of the total production and construction costs are now:

\[
\frac{\partial TP}{\partial \mu} = \left[ (\alpha^A - \alpha^B) - \beta(n_A - n_B) \right] \left( \frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial N_{ba}}{\partial \mu} \right)
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial TC}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\delta}{4} (N_A - N_B) \frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu}.
\]

Putting this together, we get as optimal investment rule:

\[
-MINV^B = \Delta_A \left[ \frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial N_{ba}}{\partial \mu} \right] - \beta \left( N_A + 2N_{ba} - N_B \right) \left[ \frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial N_{ba}}{\partial \mu} \right] \\
+ \frac{\delta}{4} (N_A - N_B) \frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} - (N_{ba})^2 - 2\mu N_{ba} \frac{\partial N_{ba}}{\partial \mu}.
\]

Again, we can express everything in terms of \( (N_{ba})^2 \):

\[
-MINV^B = \Delta_A \left[ \frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial N_{ba}}{\partial \mu} \right] - \beta \left( N_A + 2N_{ba} - N_B \right) \left[ \frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial N_{ba}}{\partial \mu} \right] \\
+ \frac{\delta}{4} (N_A - N_B) \frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} - (N_{ba})^2 - 2\mu N_{ba} \frac{\partial N_{ba}}{\partial \mu}.
\]

It can be shown that the right-hand side of eq(23) is always smaller than the right-hand side of eq(22). Since there will be less commuters when the housing stock can adjust, the marginal benefits of a reduction of the commuting costs will be smaller, the optimal investment level \( (\mu^B) \) will therefore be smaller than in the case where the stock does not adjust. Governments who do not take the developers’ reaction into account are thus likely to overinvest.
5 The developers, the transport agency, their expectations and the resulting equilibrium

In the previous section we have studied the optimal transport investment when the transport agency anticipated correctly the reaction of developers to the productivity shock and transport investment. In this section we study the role of expectations of the transport agency and the developers for the housing and transport infrastructure decisions. We do this for the steady state.

Consider first the developers. They realize that the willingness to pay for additional housing in region A depends on the transport infrastructure in place. As the transport infrastructure has a longer life than housing, we know that, in the steady state, the housing stock will depend on the transport infrastructure in place. As long as we are only interested in the steady state we can therefore concentrate on the expectations and decisions of the transport agency. This will dictate the approach in this section.

Incorrect expectation by the transport agency can be based on an over- or underestimate of the adjustment of the housing stock adjustment to a shock. As the transport agency has to make only one decision on the size of the infrastructure we need to specify what information is used by the transport agency. In the previous section we already studied two extreme cases for the transport infrastructure investment. The first was where the housing stock does not adjust. The second had an optimal adjustment of the infrastructure stock. The transport agency could also anticipate (wrongly) that the developers react to the productivity shock but do not anticipate the (slower) adjustment of the transport infrastructure. In this case, the transport agency assumes that the developers do anticipate the shock and will built new houses in A up to the steady state level $s_A^{SS} (\mu)$, equal to eq(19), but since the agency does not expect the developers to anticipate an investment in the transport capacity it will assume that $\mu$ is equal to the intial capacity $\mu^0$. To find the level of investment chosen by the agency we maximize welfare for a given stock of houses equal to $s_A^{SS}$ which is assumed to be fixed (not depending on $\mu$).

For a given stock $s_A$ the government chooses $\mu$ that maximizes the welfare function. Since the housing stock is assumed to be constant we have again that
\[
\frac{\partial N_A}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\partial N_B}{\partial \mu} = 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial TP_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial TP_B}{\partial \mu} = (\alpha_A - \alpha_B) \frac{\partial N_{BA}}{\partial \mu} - \beta (n_A - n_B) \frac{\partial N_{BA}}{\partial \mu}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial TC_A}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial TC_B}{\partial \mu} = 0
\]

The number of commuters is expected to be equal to eq(20)

\[
N_{BA} = \frac{\beta}{2 \beta + \mu} \left[ \frac{N}{2} + \frac{\alpha_A - \alpha_B}{2 \beta} - \hat{s}_A \right],
\]

where the stock of housing in region A is expected to be:

\[
\hat{s}_A = \frac{N}{2} + \frac{2 \beta \mu^0 \rho (1 + \rho)}{2 \beta \mu^0 \rho (1 + \rho) + \delta (\mu^0 + 2 \beta)} \frac{\alpha_A - \alpha_B}{2 \beta}.
\]

Substituting this in the f.o.c. we get:

\[
-MINV^C = \frac{4 \beta + \mu}{2 \beta + \mu} \left( \frac{N_{BA}^2}{N_{BA}} \right)^2
\]

We can now sum up the three cases where the transport infrastructure is based on the following three expectation assumptions of the transport agency:

- no housing adjustment to shock and transport infrastructure \((\mu^A)\)
- housing adjusts to the shock but not to the changes in transport infrastructure \((\mu^C)\)
- correct expectations of the developers reactions to the shock and the infrastructure extension \((\mu^B)\)

where \(\mu^A < \mu^B < \mu^C\). The last inequality is not easy to prove but it is possible to show that \(N_{BA}^C < N_{BA}^B < N_{BA}^A\). The (expected) marginal benefit of a capacity extension will therefore be smaller in the case when the transport agency does not take into account that developers will react on an extra investment than when it does, and will thus invest less, resulting in a higher value of \(\mu\). We summarize the results in the Table 6:
Table 6: Summary of the results according to the expectations of the transport agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Transport agency’s expectation of the change in housing stock</th>
<th>Transport agency’s expectation of the number of commuters</th>
<th>Resulting investment levels</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No housing adjustments</td>
<td>$\Delta \xi_A^A(=0)$</td>
<td>$N_{BA}^A$</td>
<td>$\mu^A$</td>
<td>Large investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\land$</td>
<td>$\lor$</td>
<td>$\land$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimal adjustment to shock and investment</td>
<td>$\Delta \xi_A^B$</td>
<td>$N_{BA}^B$</td>
<td>$\mu^B$</td>
<td>Intermediate investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\land$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment to housing stock but not to transport investment</td>
<td>$\Delta \xi_A^C$</td>
<td>$N_{BA}^C$</td>
<td>$\mu^C$</td>
<td>Small investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\land$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 Concluding comments

In this paper we analyzed the role of expectations in the housing market and the possible interplay with transport investments. We used a simple two region model, where one region is subject to an unanticipated productivity shock that increases the demand for labour in that region. The demand for labour can be met by additional commuting, by more housing, or by additional investment in transport. When no additional investment in transport is possible, the result depends on the expectations of the developers. Developers with myopic expectations also arrive at the optimal housing stock, but need more cycles to reach the optimum (see de Palma et al 2013 for a general overview in urban and transport economics).

When we add a transport agency that can invest to improve the transport infrastructure, there is a coordination issue. Transport investment tends to have longer construction periods and lifetimes than housing investments. In this case the steady state equilibrium will mainly depend on the specific expectations of the transport agency. Depending on these expectations, our model predicts over- or under-investments in transport infrastructure.

The model is a very simple two region model with only one mode of transport. This is to be seen as a first exploration of the interaction between transport investments and housing developments. Two types of extensions can be envisaged. The first is enriching the analytical description of the model: include regional governments that can tax income and commuting flows, decide on building permits, etc. The second is to make the analytical model more realistic by integrating the main mechanisms outlined in the paper into existing land use models.
7 REFERENCES


## Appendix

A summary of the notation used in the paper can be found in the following table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$N_I$</td>
<td>residents of region $I$ working in region $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_{BA}$</td>
<td>commuters: residents of region $B$ working in region $A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{N}_I$</td>
<td>residents of region $I$ working in either region $I$ or $J$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>total population (fixed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n_I$</td>
<td>workers in region $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>slope of time cost function (inverse of capacity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_I$</td>
<td>wage received in region $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_I$</td>
<td>intercept of marginal product function of firms in $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_I$</td>
<td>slope of marginal product function of firms in $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_I(t)$</td>
<td>stock of houses in region $I$ at time $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b_I(t)$</td>
<td>number of houses built in region $I$ in period $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_I(t)$</td>
<td>rent of houses in region $I$ at time $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>discount factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>intercept of marginal cost function of the developers in region $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>slope of marginal cost function of the developers in region $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U_I(w_I, r_I, \mu)$</td>
<td>utility of residents of $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$MP_I(n_I)$</td>
<td>marginal product of firms in $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$TP_I(n_I)$</td>
<td>total product function of firms in $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$TC_I(b_I)$</td>
<td>total cost function of building houses in $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Pi_I$</td>
<td>profit of developers in $I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W$</td>
<td>welfare function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$INV(\mu)$</td>
<td>cost of investments in transportation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>