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Submitted on 28 Jul 2012

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Learning lessons from the past: A historical exploration of a century of business education at Oxford and Cambridge (1900s-2000s)

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Preliminary Version
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Management History Research Group Conference
28-29 July 2010
School of Management
University of St Andrews
Abstract: This research aims to identify a set of generative mechanisms which are shared by business schools’ process of development in their search for strategic comparative advantage. We use a processual approach (Pettigrew, 1997) based on two detailed historical studies supported by unexplored archival data and interviews: the case of the Saïd Business School at the University of Oxford and the case of the Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge (1990s – 2000s). Preliminary results indicate a complex process of emergence, development and institutionalisation which was neither a conscious desire expressed by existing academic institutions nor the result of a clear vision provided by academic leaders at the time. This research confirms Weick’s idea that business schools are loose couple systems that do not systematically express plans and intentional selection of means that get them to agree upon goals set a priori (Weick, 1976). Last but not least, our research shows that the nature of business schools’ organisational change combines a series of exogenous and endogenous generative mechanisms, through disjointed clusters of events. It is from this combination of exogenous and endogenous generative mechanisms inherited from the past that future business schools’ strategies might be considered.

Acknowledgments: The authors would like to acknowledge Dr. Bob Tricker for his useful comments and for letting us quote extracts of his 1970s personal diary. We are deeply grateful to Ashley Raeburn who regrettably died in January 2010 and to his son Richard, for giving us permission to quote extracts of his unpublished memoirs and of an interview we conducted with him in October 2009. We would like to thank Dorothy Cooke and Bill Impey, former administrators at Templeton College, Oxford, who facilitated our research by introducing key people to us and by providing us with personal archival material. The authors are also deeply grateful to Dr Elizabeth Garnsey and Professor Mike Gregory: without their precious help and welcoming attitude, we would never have had access to the Cambridge case study. They have facilitated the authors’ access to the Cambridge archival data. We are also very appreciative of the regular input and motivation given by Dr Tim Minshall (including the archival picture) and David Gill (Managing Director of St John’s Innovation Centre). Last, the authors would like to dedicate this work to Professor Anthony Hopwood who has been Lise Arena’s D.Phil. internal examiner and who sadly passed away in May 2010 for his precious comments and suggestions.
Introduction

In the 1960s, American graduate schools of business administration constituted a reference model in terms of management education for several European universities. American business education inspired the British system which was soon to develop various institutions, promoting business studies at the university level. These developments sparked off a controversy over the legitimacy of university involvement in management education and led the whole subject to become a matter for public debate. An increasing number of British businessmen gathered to establish the Foundation for Management Education (FME). Far from impressed by the FME’s developments, some other industrialists, met informally at the Savoy Hotel in London to work on the creation of a “British Harvard” calling themselves the Savoy Group (Whitley, Thomas, Marceau, 1981: 44). These establishments were soon followed by the creation in 1961 of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) to reconcile trade-unions, industry, and government, as a response to England’s economic and social decline (Locke, 1996: 46). Two years after its creation, this Council reported the need for “at least one very high-level new school or institute, along the lines of the Harvard Business School, or the School of Industrial Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology” (NEDC report, 1963: 5-6). From this conclusion, the FME, the Savoy Group and the NEDC appointed a Committee, led by Lord Franks, which sought to provide detailed recommendations about the implementation of these new schools of business in the UK. Lord Franks’ enquiry was made easier by the conclusions drawn from the Robbins report a month earlier, which suggested that “two major post-graduate schools should be built up in addition to other developments already probable in universities and other institutions” (Robbins, 1963: 65).

Almost twenty years later, there was sizeable growth throughout Britain’s business education sector, but various unresolved problems remained. The emergence of the Management Charter Initiative in 1988, as a result of negotiations between industry and the Government, expressed the construction of “a system of qualifications on the basis of what industry wanted and felt to be most consistent with its actual needs” (Tiratsoo, 1999: 121). This system was not particularly well received among the academic management community and, overall, “some long-standing weaknesses were still very much in evidence” (Ibid: 122): the MBA format was perceived as too theoretical and very few business schools in the UK achieved international excellence.

This short history of management education in the UK provides insights into a range of issues. It shows how, with respect to management studies, Britain stood as an exception, how controversial the process of development and the institutionalisation of business schools in the country have been and how it is only recently that business schools have found legitimacy in the academic world. The role of management education in the selection of future managers and in the professional training of leaders has had – and still has – a tremendous societal impact. As a result, trajectories used by business schools to reach a high status within the academic and the industrial community constitutes a key issue, not only concerned with the business education sector but regarding the country’s economic system as a whole. Despite the recent and disjointed process of emergence of management education, the United Kingdom has succeeded in founding the two of the most prestigious business schools in the world; namely the Said Business School (SBS) at the University of Oxford and the Judge Business School (JBS) at the University of Cambridge³.

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¹ The FME financed the establishment of London and Manchester Business School, a few years later. The FME still exists and seeks to encourage business leaders to make the transition between the private sector and business school academia. For further details on this institution: [http://management-education.org.uk](http://management-education.org.uk)

² The members of the Savoy Group differed from the FME’s work, mainly because their main idea was in favour of the need for a ‘completely new type of college which would be tailor-made to fit industry’s requirements’, created independently from any existing structures (Whitley, Thomas, Marceau, 1981: 44).

³ Respectively ranked 2nd and 1st in the UK for their MBA programmes (Financial Times Global MBA Rankings 2010).
This paper seeks to better understand the key factors, which lead some business schools to encounter better success than others. Various scholars in business history argue that reputation and social capital are both significant factors in this search for success, claiming that “even if the content of a particular educational programme is excellent, it will not be able to play a significant role as long as the potential students and employers of the graduates do not realize its excellence” (Engwall, Zamagni, 1998: 2). Obviously, it could not be denied that reputation-related issues play a central role in the emergence, the development and the strategy of business schools. Yet, our contribution goes beyond this statement and stresses the deep causes underlying management education dynamics. Our analysis is supported by the exploration of two case-studies from a historical perspective: the SBS and the JBS. More generally, beyond their reputation, this contribution shows that the current status of the SBS and the JBS is neither a conscious desire to acquire business studies expressed by the University administration, nor the result of a clear vision provided by academic leaders of the time. Rather, this paper demonstrates that management education at Oxford and Cambridge emerged from a combination of muddle, confusion, personal antagonism, vested interests, Oxford and Cambridge’s ways of building new disciplines on existing ones, shortage of academic staff in management, and inherited ambivalence about vocational education. It is argued that management education in both Universities was an unintended ironic consequence of these factors, and that this explains the lateness, the peculiar structure, and the multidisciplinary orientation expressed by both Schools’ current status. Consequently, both case studies illustrate that business schools are considered as loose couple systems (Weick, 1976). Overall, the aim of this work is to identify a set of hidden generative mechanisms which are shared by both business schools’ process of development which lead them to the competitive status they have today.

The paper falls into three parts. The first part of the paper introduces the theoretical framework of our work, and the methods used to identify a set of hidden generative mechanisms. The second part of our contribution offers an in-depth processual analysis of the two-case studies selected for our research. Last but not least, the third section aims to discuss early results, especially through the identification of similar patterns in the respective development process of the SBS and of the JBS.

I. Theoretical Framework and Methods

I.1. Theoretical Framework

Existing contributions to the management education literature are often concerned with highlighting the weaknesses of the way business knowledge is delivered in business schools (Pfeffer, Fong, 2004) – from both a practical (Mintzberg, 2004) and an ethical (Birnik, Billsberry, 2007) point of view. Some scholars try to understand the place of business schools and their added-value to the economic and societal system (Locke, 1996), others seek to evaluate the gap between theory and practice (Pearce, 2004) and few others admit that this place, although not yet understood, still makes management scholars “hugely successful” while showing “no real signs of failing to be so” (Spender, 2005: 1285). Our work aims to identify a set of generative mechanisms in the institutionalisation and the legitimacy of business schools.

To this end, our contribution aims to apply some strategic management concepts to management education issues. The identification of these key factors requires a contextual knowledge which can be found in the business history literature as well as a more general knowledge of strategic management tools used in organisations. As Pfeffer and Fong would argue (2004: 1510), “explaining how business schools have arrived in their present predicament is undoubtedly a complex process and there are many and varied causes”. Indeed, while as for any other organisations, there is not one best way to develop a business school; yet, we believe that there are some shared organisational characteristics in this path. Ironically though, universities are still not
well understood as organisations (Bess, 1984; Cohen, March, 1974) and as rightly pointed out by Gray (1996: 125), the irony is reinforced by the fact that “though university teachers have played an important part in the development of management training in commerce, industry and the public service, universities have been almost wilfully neglectful of management development (...).” In particular, while a very large set of different organisations are studied in the management literature, business schools have been neglected. Only a minority of articles identify strategic options for business schools organisations (Pfeffer, Fong, 2004; Friga, Bettis, Sullivan, 2003; Cummings, 1990; Harrigan, 1990), even though it is agreed that business schools constitute one of the areas of greatest growth in universities over the past fifty years (Friga et al., 2003: 233). The study of business schools’ emergence, development and future strategies, therefore, constitute a relevant area of interest which justifies the particular attention given to it in this paper. Hence, our paper constitutes a first step towards the construction of an adequate theory of organisation applicable to business schools.

The general view defended in this article is that the evolution of business schools is not mainly a smooth process which results from vested interests, contextual factors and institutional history. On the contrary, we argue that business schools’ trajectories of evolution follow a complex dynamics which is governed by both exogenous and endogenous forces. On the one hand, the economic context has a strong impact on business schools’ orientation at a theoretical and an empirical level. The growing need for management training expressed by the industrial sector is a key to understanding business education in the UK. However, we do not believe that business schools are systems which are exclusively governed by exogenous forces. Rather, we argue that unintended consequences and contextual factors also play a significant role as endogenous forces to business schools’ dynamics of evolution.

However, to a large extent, business schools are organisations which differ from more traditional organisational forms. Firstly, the emergence of these schools on the market of business education rarely results from the ideas of one man, but is rather the consequence of a slow institutional process of negotiation formed by a collective or a collegiate decision within the University and between different stakeholders, seen as an expanding set of players (Pfeffer, Fong, 2004: 1511). Business schools evolve within the institutional context of a university and are often casted as cash-cow used to cross-subsidize less viable departments on campus which also requires business schools’ leaders “to protect the financial interests of the school whilst acting as responsible citizen in university governance” (Bolton, 1996: 494).

Secondly and in relation to the first characteristic, innovations within business schools are not as frequent as in a private business, since it is argued that “forces for change are frequently distrusted and seen as threats to successful, effective patterns of faculty interaction and self-interest” (Cummings, 1990: 695). Resisting change related issues within university departments is largely stressed in the literature and often seen as the result of “a greater inbuilt organisational conservatism (some would claim it to be inertia) than almost any other kind of organisation” (Gray, 1989: 124).

Thirdly, since business schools rely on ideas such as “competition, growth, and return on investment as they think about their role and strategy” and tend not to see education “as a mechanism for socializing and educating the young” (Pfeffer, Fong, 2004: 1510)’, they should express very much concern for looming changes in the environment in which they operate (Porter, McKibbin, 1988: 311). Hence, management of organisational change also seems to be a critical issue in the development of business schools. That is; on the one hand, accountability for the use of public money by business schools is required and, on the other, their need for sustainability by generating new sources of income for the university as a whole also matters.
Last but not least, leadership roles in a business school (and, more generally, in a University) are often considered to be “difficult to carry out successfully”, since “unlike in industry, to hold a senior management position is not normally a leading goal”; as academics are instead motivated by “the intellectual challenge of making new contribution to knowledge” (Bolton, 1996: 491).

Overall, this paper follows Karl Weick’s idea arguing that business schools take the form of loose coupling organisations that do not systematically express “plans, intentional selection of means that get the organisation to agree upon goals, and all of this is accomplished by such rationalized procedures as cost-benefit analyses, division of labor, specified areas of discretion, authority invested in the office, job descriptions, and a consistent evaluation and reward system” and are therefore proven intractable to analysis through rational assumptions (Weick, 1976: 1). Rather, business schools convey the image of a set of unexpected properties of “less rationalized and less tightly clusters of events” (Ibid.: 3).

It is this substantial unexplained remainder – set of unexpected properties and generative mechanisms – that is the focus of this paper. In the next section, the main methods used to answer the research question are introduced and discussed.

1.2. Methods

This paper uses a comparative case study for theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989) with an investigation on the case of the SBS at the University of Oxford and the case of the JBS at the University of Cambridge. The aim is to inductively understand their developmental and institutionalisation processes. In accordance to the theoretical framework discussed above, a particular attention is given to the hidden generative mechanisms that have influenced these processes. The SBS and the JBS were particularly ideal sites to compare and draw lessons about business education in the UK and to explore their patterns of emergence, institutionalisation and current strategies.

Comparative case study research usually tend towards a choice of “polar type”, i.e. theoretical sampling with extreme and opposite samples to facilitate the researcher’s observation of contrasting patterns in the data (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). On the contrary, in this study we have chosen two apparently similar cases (SBS and JBS) and have observed the dynamics underlying the emergence and institutionalisation of each of these two business schools. As emphasised by the research conducted by Garnsey and Lawton Smith (1998) or Garnsey and Longhi (2004), the comparative case study of two cases that are often categorised together (such as Oxbridge) - and therefore apparently similar- particularly favours the investigation and the process of sorting out the similarities and differences of each developmental process, and enhance the capacity to provide conceptual tools for coherent comparison.

In addition, the comparative study of SBS and JBS seemed particularly well suited to avoid cultural bias as well as size bias. SBS and JBS are both located in the UK and constitute the two most competitive business schools in the country (ranked respectively 2nd and 1st in the UK for their

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4 A more detailed definition of loosely couple system could be read as follows: “By loose coupling, the author [Glassman, 1973] intends to convey the image that coupled events are responsive, but that each event also preserves its own identity and some evidence of its physical or logical separateness. Thus, in the case of an educational organisation, it may be the case that the counselor's office is loosely coupled to the principal's office. The image is that the principal and the counselor are somehow attached, but that each retains some identity and separateness and that their attachment may be circumscribed, infrequent, weak in its mutual affects, unimportant, and/or slow to respond. Each of those connotations would be conveyed if the qualifier loosely were attached to the word coupled. Loose coupling also carries connotations of impermanence, dissolvability, and tacitness all of which are potentially crucial properties of the "glue" that holds organisations together” (Weick, 1976: 3).
MBA programme\(^5\) and are perhaps two of the most prestigious in the world. This allows studying the emergence and success of two business schools that are similar in their reputation but that have emerged in different locations. Although they emerged in different locations, both schools are of the same national tradition, avoiding bias related to the country’s level of education, wealth, social specificities or culture. Moreover, the contextual aspect of the two cases is particularly important: both schools proved to have the same general way of functioning (colleges system, same hierarchical organisation etc.) and foster the same rituals (such as formal dinning in colleges, the mayballs, the structure of honours degrees divided in “tripos” etc.). All these characteristics play a central role in both business schools and in their institutional maintenance (Tracey, 2010), from which a specific jargon have derived overtime\(^6\). These two schools are thus endowed with a specific contextual and cultural background that has facilitated a more rigorous and accurate comparison.

Both schools are also similar in size: they are part of universities with on average the same number of students. In 2010: around 20,000 students are studying at the University of Oxford (including 11,766 undergraduates and 8,701 postgraduates) and 28,776 students at the University of Cambridge (including 18,183 undergraduates and 10,593 postgraduates). They also obviously exhibit a very strong scientific tradition deriving from the two historical Universities to which they belong. Indeed, SBS and JBS provided us with cases presenting a very rich history of development: over 800 years of University history (both universities were founded respectively in the 12th and 13th century) and have experienced several attempts to develop Management Studies (MS) within the University.

Given the aim of our paper and the rich case data, we have chosen to adopt a processual approach (Pettigrew, 1997; Langley 1999, 2007; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005; Musca, 2006). In fact, the exploration of hidden generative mechanisms that have influenced the developmental and institutionalisation processes of SBS and JBS involves considering how they “come to be constituted, reproduced, adapted and defined through ongoing processes” or “organisational becoming” (Tsoukas and Chia 2002, Langley, 2007). As the role of context and time in both cases is particularly important, we think that investigating the complex process steps accounting for the current results, hold promises for a more complete understanding of the emergence of successful business schools. As emphasised by Pettigrew (1997: 347), the processual approach enables us to explore “human conduct and organisational life and to embed such dynamics over time in the various layers of context in which streams of activity occur”. On the contrary, most traditional approaches (especially variance theories e.g. Mohr, 1982) provide only partial pictures of the phenomena and ignore the non-linear effects of action under complexity and evacuate the role of time (Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001). Precisely, for the cases we investigate, what is interesting is the temporally embedded accounts that would allow to understand how the two schools come to be what they are and identify patterns giving insights into their processes of emergence and institutionalisation.

To this purpose, one of the main ways to develop a processual approach is to invest in historical studies on the two organisations to understand the organisational actions, events and conditions that generated patterns in the present, and trace the processes by which they arrived at their current positions (Langley, 2007). However, the aim of this research is not to provide a case history but a case study that would finally generate contribution for those who seek guidance on how two performing business schools have emerged and what are the favourable or unfavourable features identified that could help to understand this process of emergence. Pettigrew suggests “the case study goes beyond the case history in attempting a range of analytical purposes. Firstly there is a search for patterns in the process and presumably some attempt to compare the shape, character and incidence of this pattern in case A compared with case B. Secondly, there is a quest to find the

\(^5\) Source Financial Times Global MBA Rankings 2010
\(^6\) For further details about this jargon, see Table of “Abbreviations and brief glossary of the Oxbridge jargon” located at the end of the contribution.
underlying mechanisms which shape any patterning in the observed processes.” (Pettigrew, 1997: 339). We followed this established research practice to conduct our data collection and analysis.

The paper relies on two main sources for both business schools. The first is interviews with academic fellows who participated in, or at least witnessed, the emergence and the development of Business Studies in Oxford or in Cambridge. Copies of unpublished papers dealing with the theory of the firm and of industry were also used. The second source is archival data. These archival data took three forms: first, documents related to the introduction of Business Studies in Oxford or in Cambridge, held in the Bodleian Library archives or Marshall Library archives and specific newspapers such as the “Oxford University Gazette” and the “Cambridge University Reporter”. Second, documents on the theoretical content of the first courses taught in Management through an analysis of tripos (examinations for the BA degree with honours) and the list of lectures proposed by the Board of the Faculty. And third, examination questions addressed to Economics and Management students, as well as examination decrees and regulations. These multiple data collection and analysis methods made possible a triangulation, which gives the case a stronger substantiation of the constructs.

To begin with, we wrote an analytical chronology of the research setting so as to have an important point of reference for progress and pattern recognition (Pettigrew, 1997). This is the reason why we started with analysing within case data through a temporally embedded account for each school. Then, coupled with the within case analysis we conducted a cross-case search for patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989).

II. The Oxbridge context of management education from a historical perspective

This paper argues that the organisational context does significantly matter in the emergence and development of organisations; yet, arguing that some similar organisational philosophies can be seen as unintended consequences of this emergence and development. This section constitutes a temporally embedded account, which illustrates development trajectories of both business schools in the UK, in order to identify similar patterns in part III of the paper. This section starts the analysis in the 1900s, since this is when the first evidence exists that business studies was needed at Oxford (although the first Oxford Business Diploma failed to be introduced in 1913). At Cambridge, the early 1900s correspond to Alfred Marshall’s developments of industrial and business organisation, which particularly argued for the need of management education at the University level. From this time, the section falls into three main sub-sections, structured chronologically. The first part covers the first part of the twentieth century and stresses the early (failed) initiatives related to the introduction of management education in Oxford and Cambridge. Then, in a second part, we depict the gradual acceptance for business education in both business schools which covers 1950-1980. The third and last part focuses on the institutionalisation of both business schools which became the current Saïd and Judge Business Schools.

II.1. The Oxbridge intransigence regarding management education (1900s – 1950s): Early initiatives and their failures

Academics in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century were far from considering business as noble enough to be taught at British Universities. It is often argued that this was mainly due to the lack of interest displayed by businessmen in recruiting undergraduate or graduate candidates. For instance, in 1914 Sir Herbert Morgan, a wealthy English businessman knighted in 1917, claimed that “[...] if a man has to make business his career, to make his own way in life, I should strongly urge in probably the majority of cases, that he enter the office direct from school” (Morgan, 1914: 64-65). This personal statement illustrates a more general trend of the time, in which only few businessmen saw an advantage in recruiting their staff from higher schools of education. Thus, the
lack of interest in Business Studies as a worthwhile academic discipline was partially caused by industrialists’ failure to realise that a University degree could provide its possessor with useful skills to apply to managerial practice. The rejection of Business Studies as a worthwhile academic discipline did not only come from the side of business but also from the attitude of University functionalities. They considered business to be a vulgar and ignoble profession. This remark is especially true in the context of Oxford and Cambridge Universities and this is what the following account seeks to illustrate.

The unsuccessful attempts to get business training programmes in Oxford University

Interestingly, the first potential Oxford Business Diploma failed to be introduced in 1913. One year earlier, the suggestion of a substantial two years course aimed at training students for business careers made by the University Chancellor, Lord Curzon⁷, was rejected in November 1913 by the Convocation⁸ (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 613). To a large extent, this was due to the general view then shared by Oxford academics on business education at Oxford. In the Congregation debate, this common view was well expressed by the Warden of New College, Dr. Spooner⁹, who pleaded against “too much of the brains and vigour of the country” being attracted towards the “wealth-amassing career of commerce or business” to the neglect of “the more ennobling careers of the clergyman (…), the lawyer, the doctor, and even the public servant” (Snow, 1991: 16). Alternatively, it is possible to interpret this statement on the basis of a purely institutional reason, underlying the fear that students would be attracted away from the Diploma in Economics and Political Science which had been recently introduced in 1909. Oxford disliked proposed courses “that encroached on established vested interests” (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 613). In addition to the high degree of competition for students, the importance of vested interests at Oxford also suggests a lack of resources able to establish a proper Management degree at the University level.

Moreover, the vocational nature of business education fuelled the debate about the merits of establishing it as an academic discipline. Prejudice existed against business education at Oxford (Chester, 1986: 24). Here, it could be argued that the denunciation of the principle of vocationalism mainly resulted from the transmission of the British cultural heritage of the Victorian period. Oxford dons were more concerned to preserve this heritage than to help the University to keep ahead of its competitors¹⁰. Then, to that extent, the danger of establishing business education at Oxford was that it might “bring young men to Oxford merely to follow a technical preparation for business” (Oxford Magazine, 22: 176). Until the First World War, although the Oxford University Appointments Committee was preoccupied with the integration of students into businesses, it seemed very difficult to establish a business training program for young men in the Oxford context; that is, Oxford had no particular hostility to business, but did not consider it an academic discipline. To some extent, according to Morgan, Oxford was developing “an astonishing and profound ignorance of all that business means”, preserving a very “detached and theoretical outlook” in its studies of trade and business (Morgan, 1914: 72-74). Before the Great War, trade and business or even economics were not studied inside the University. It was only in 1909 that the first Diploma in Economics and Political Science was introduced, still depending on the Schools of Literae Humanaiores and Modern History. In 1920, this lead to the creation of the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Even then, the content of the lectures was very much theoretical, mainly focusing on political economy (Chester, 1986; Young, Lee, 1993) and was not orientated towards understanding managerial practical issues. During the Inter-War period, although

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⁷ Oxford University Chancellor (1907-1925)
⁸ Oxford University Gazette, 1913: 189
⁹ William Archibald Spooner (1844-1930), Warden of New College (1903-1924)
¹⁰ This idea relied on two easily made assumptions, “first, that Britain would retain its leading industrial and financial position, and secondly that, when an undergraduate chose his career, he might well put the likely material reward above all other considerations: his chief temptations would be towards materialism and avarice”. (Brock, Curthoys, 2000: 855)
a few fellows were in favour of business education, no more was heard about the idea of setting up a business education programme at Oxford.\footnote{For instance, Lionel Hichens (New College), wanted a recognition that “industry was primarily a national service”, the object of those engaged in it being “first and foremost the good of the community as a whole” (Hichens, 1918: 22).}

It was as late as 1949 that the need for business education were mentioned more seriously. This confirms the idea of an existing correlation between Oxford’s lack of interest in business education and the very nature of British capitalism. In fact, the increased interest of Oxford fellows in management education corresponded to the success of the “managerial revolution” in the United States (Berle, Means, 1968). Family capitalism was giving way to the economy of the modern business enterprise. An increasing number of businessmen started questioning why business should remain a profession which needed no academic training and was considered on a lower level than medicine or engineering.\footnote{At the end of the 19th Century, Oxford University began to recognise Engineering as a discipline. After some struggle, the Department of Engineering Science was originally established and first recognised by Oxford University in 1908. Engineering appeared as the interstice of applied maths and mechanics (Borthwick, 2008; Howatson, 2008).} It is in this context that Oxford welcomed the annual Conference of the Federation of British Industry, which gathered fifty-five representatives of industry and sixty university members in 1949 (Weston, 1994: 129). The Committee’s Annual Report for that year revealed that “MS for undergraduates were deprecated. (…) More Arts men should be recruited into industry, but medium- and small-sized firms who have not previously recruited inexperienced graduates find practical difficulty in working them in during their first year or two… To this problem is related the Conference’s preoccupation with the need for vacation courses for Arts men in industrial companies” (Ibid). The needs of business education were now formulated explicitly for the first time and stated the requirement for the creation of educational training programmes in business, within University.

The unsuccessful attempts to get business training programmes in Cambridge University

At Cambridge, the 1900s coincided with Alfred Marshall’s developments of industrial and business organisation. He is the one who specifically argued the need for management education at the University level.\footnote{Cf. on that matter Nishizawa, T., (2002), “Marshall, Ashley on Education of Businessman and ‘Science of Business’? Marshall School of Economics in the Making”, \textit{Study Series n°48}, Centre for Historical Social Science Literature, Hitotsubashi University.} His first attempt to introduce MS can be traced back to the late 1850s. The social sciences at large only appeared in the list of subjects for examination in Cambridge in 1969, but the idea of studying the human was sowed at Cambridge University with the introduction of the “Moral Science Tripos” by William Whewell in 1848. However, the Moral Science Tripos included all the kinds of human enquiry and worldly concern. Soon, each started to assert itself by claiming a separate tripos. It is in this context that Alfred Marshall, Professor of Political Economy (1885-1908), pleaded for a separate economic tripos growing out of the Moral Sciences tripos. Just back from the United-States in 1885, he lectured on American industry and began to write the Economics of Industry (Marshall, 1879) for the university extension classes. By the 1890s, Marshall had already moved economics much nearer to industrial life and practical affairs. In a “Plea for the Creation of a Curriculum in Economics” (Marshall, 1902), he claimed the need to make economics a separate subject on the grounds that business needed managers specifically trained as such (Sanderson, 1989: 198-202).\footnote{Geoffrey Hawthorn’s account in “Studying the Human World”. Geoffrey Hawthorn is a Fellow of Clare Hall College and was Professor of International Politics until 2007.}

As states the “Report of the Economics and Political Science Syndicate (dated 4 March 1903), which was the founding stone of the Economics Tripos at Cambridge, Marshall started his battle of professional independence of economics by pointing out: “England, which long held the undisputed leadership in Economics, has suffered in recent years from the lack of adequate provision for the study of that subject at the Universities” (Nishizawa, 2002:7). He compares the recognition of
Economics in the United States to Britain - and particularly Cambridge - where only forty or fifty undergraduates have done some work related to economics during their studies. Thus, he stresses: “There was no scope for a young man to earn a livelihood in Cambridge by preparing himself to deal with the economic problems of coming generation. This is our most urgent need” arguing that in the objective to deal with the subject adequately, Cambridge needed at least one additional Professorship or Readership in Economics. “But, even so, Cambridge would be much less equipped not only than Harvard and Yale, but also than younger university like Columbia”. (Nishizawa, 2002: 8). In order to have an effective Cambridge “school” of economics, new tripos needed to be set up. But painfully, it was not until eighteen years later that Alfred Marshall could achieve his objective of gaining an independent status for Economics. By tracing back the origins of the Economic tripos, many reasons emerge that could explain the rejection of MS at Cambridge.

When in 1885 Alfred Marshall came back to Cambridge, political economy courses were taught and examined within the Moral Sciences Tripos as a minor part of the Indian Civil Service course. The subject could therefore only be studied seriously as an optional special subject in Part II of the Moral Sciences Tripos, for which there were very few candidates. Marshall disliked this configuration and had the desire to liberate Economics from the Moral Science tripos so as to systematize the subject (The Cambridge University Reporter, 1885-86: 579). Major actors of Cambridge history of economics, such as Keynes and Cunningham were in favour of increasing Economics studies. However there were central disagreements. Keynes was opposed to Marshall’s idea that economics should be liberated from the philosophical pressure of Moral Sciences. Keynes also liked the idea that post-graduate study of economics should be more developed in Cambridge but did not think that any fundamental change in undergraduate curriculum was necessary. This disagreement nurtured a long dispute and constituted a serious hurdle to the establishment of the new training programme.

Alfred Marshall’s struggle was primarily conducted with the idea that Economics should have practical use. This was the other main reason explaining why the process was so long. Marshall was a pioneer in attempting to relate economics to the real world of business and industry. At Cambridge this position was clearly denounced in two main ways. For Keynes, Marshall’s statement that Economics is an inductive science was wrong. Still, Marshall thought it was essential for students that may become future managers to “acquire an extensive knowledge of facts i.e. big facts, in order that they may understand how a sense of proportion is, after sound reasoning, the most important equipment of an economist. (…) The influence of clear reasoners without sense of proportion, or knowledge of reality, is not an unmixed good”.15

Another main opposition is to be noted, coming from the influential Cunningham.16 He was a fervent opponent to the proposed New Tripos claiming that there was no need to introduce MS in the form of a full three years course. On the contrary, he thought it desirable to only develop a more specific business course. According to Cunningham, it was not wise to try to promote economic study and at the same time, develop training for businessmen at University level. He would rather tackle the two issues one at a time, and make business education more specific. In other words, he viewed the introduction of a Management tripos as a tendency of the institution towards “over specialisation” and so preferred specialisation of some courses only. He also totally disagreed with Marshall’s struggle for a new tripos in so far as the idea was to develop non-specialised training for businessmen. Indeed, Marshall believed that general management education including subjects that do not have any direct connection with what the manager will do, would produce better managers.

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15 Marshall’s letter to Keynes on 6 February 1902, quoted by Nishisawa, 2002, p. 16
16 Ven. William Cunningham ; 1874 : Lecturer at the University of Cambridge, 1884 : Professor of Economics, King’s College London, 1891 : Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. He was also a candidate to Professorship of Political Economy in 1884, the same year as Marshall, which can explain part of the conflict and his harsh criticism against Marshall.
than only technical instruction. In this perspective he argued iteratively: “To a colliery manager, who has made a thorough study of geology, the shafts and galleries of a mine are a scientific museum and laboratory: his mind grows with his work, and he may increase the world's wealth of knowledge. As geology is related to mining, so is economics to general business” (Marshall, 1919: 821-22).

Although Marshall tried to tone down his position at the Senate in 1903, saying that of course providing a good education for business men was “not the main object” but “a secondary objective”, he emphasised the importance of this secondary objective for the university’s durability: “For, if this University should refuse to do what business men required: if in return they should, as it was said they were already doing, tend more and more to send their sons to new Universities (even though thereby the glorious training of Oxford or Cambridge corporate life were lost); and if, in consequence, the rising generation of wealthy business men became the loyal sons of the newer and not the older Universities, then...this University might regret too late that it had seemed somewhat different to the opinion of business men.”

In reality, Marshall was absolutely convinced that businessmen were hostile to Economics because they have a false view of Economics. Therefore it was necessary to open this discipline further to get businessmen and public recognition. Marshall finally managed to create the Economics Tripos in 1903, with the idea that it would particularly address future businessmen.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note the way MS evolved in Cambridge was very particular. It was completely linked to the Engineering Department. This may perhaps have stifled the growth of MS at Cambridge from thereon. It certainly oriented the specialisation of the discipline at Cambridge. Thus, the first evidence of the existence of MS in Cambridge can be found in 1954, as part of the department of Engineering. There was no department for Management in its own right. The lectures, mostly “industrial management” were given as part of the Engineering Department, and most engineers thought the subject was a complete waste of time.

In the early 1960s, there was a 1 year post-graduate Diploma in Industrial Management within the Engineering Department, with a dedicated group of lecturers from within the Department. The Diploma started life in 1959 and had a strong managerial theme to it, taught mainly in the department.

II.2. The gradual acceptance of Management Education at Oxbridge (1950s – 1980s)

The failure of early initiatives to establish business education at Oxford and Cambridge was followed by a period of gradual acceptance by some of the departments and fellows in both Universities. This gradual process took various forms and differed in both institutions; yet being strongly influenced by an increasing relationship with industry. The publication of the Robbins’ report in the early 1960s emphasised the need for two major post-graduate schools and was soon used by Lord Franks who wrote a complementary report which sought to provide detailed recommendations about the implementation of these new schools of business in England. Lord Franks, who had just become Provost of Worcester College in Oxford in 1962, first thought about the possibility of establishing a business school in Oxford and Cambridge. However, as Graves remarked, “(…) nobody in Oxford was thinking in those terms’, suggesting that this might provide

18 The Cambridge University Reporter, 14th May 1903, p.774.
19 The Economics and Political Science Syndicate finally reported on 4 March 1903, recommending the establishment of a new Tripos. This Report was debated by Senate on 7 May and a full account appeared in the Reporter, 14 May 1903. pp. 763-74.
20 Judge Business School’s Website (« A Brief History », « Facts and figures »)
the University with “low grade study’” (Graves, 2001: 16). As a result, the Vice-Chancellor made clear to Franks that the University would not approve such a School. Therefore, on the basis of Robbins’ conclusions, Lord Franks’ committee recommended the establishment of “two high quality post-graduate schools, in association with London and Manchester Universities (...)”22. The following accounts the years which followed Lord Franks’ recommendation, leaving Oxford and Cambridge without a school of business.

- The foundation of the Oxford Centre for MS (1965) and of Templeton College (1983): A long process of emergence

Before the beginning of the 1980s, management could be studied in Oxford under the hospice of an Oxford Centre for Management Studies (OCMS). The creation of this Centre was the result of a slow but increasing cooperation between the University and industry. As seen in the previous section, the 1949 Federation of British Industry Conference expressed the first needs of business education and gave Ewart Escritt, the Oxford University Appointments Committee’s secretary (1947-1970) of the time, the idea to set up a course and “to bring together groups of young men in the age bracket 27 to 33, who have varied specialist experience, but are not yet in high administrative or technical posts”23. As a result, the first Oxford University Business Summer School (OUBSS) took place in the summer 1953 at Worcester College. The lectures given in this Summer School were taught by economists and involved mainstream economic theory, namely microeconomics (theory of the firm and of industries) and macroeconomics (labour economics and government issues). The School was not officially recognised as part of Oxford University, but was considered as an “associated institution”24. Although it would be misleading to argue that the OUBSS was a conscious attempt to establish a management education programme in Oxford, it still seems reasonable to argue that the organisation of the School strengthened bonds between the University and the business world. In the mid-1960s, after the various attempts made to diffuse business education in the University, a group of Oxford dons, including Norman Leyland and Sir Norman Chester gathered a small group of businessmen to indulge in a “notable piece of private enterprise and set up a management centre, if not within the University, at least in Oxford” (Snow, 1995: 5). In 1965, the administration of the OUBSS was passed from the Appointments Committee to the newly formed Oxford Centre for MS. Until then, the Summer School was run under the auspices of the University, but was not a University course in the usual sense.

At this time, Oxford was still hostile to the introduction of business education. The Advisory Council on Education for Management in England, represented by Mr. Platt, initiated discussions with some Oxford fellows. Hence, in January 1961, Mr. Platt, on behalf of an American educational trust founded by the management consultancy firm McKinsey & Company Inc., offered financial help to fund a report on the possibilities of developing management education in Oxford (Cf. Appendix 3). Following this generous offer, the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies in Oxford agreed to form a special Committee on management education25 which soon agreed on two main points. The first was that the enquiry suggested by Platt was needed and “very desirable”26, the second the idea that a College Fellow was to be relieved from his college duties for one term to visit

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22 London Business School Administrative Records, Collection Outline.
24 In Oxford, an ‘associated institution’ was associated, but financially independent from the University and cannot deliver any Oxford University degrees. At the time, the Oxford Centre for Hebrew Studies (initially financed by Barclay, who also financed the Oxford Centre for MS, in 1965) along with the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies were also both considered as “associated institutions” (Personal conversation with Clark Brundin, 22nd September 2008).
25 For this purpose, the following members of Oxford University were appointed: Professor Hicks (Chairman), Warden of Nuffield (Professor Chester), Professor Ayer, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Leyland, Mr. Nicholas, and Mr. J.F. Wright. Minutes of the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies, 2nd February 1961, Oxford MS Archives hold at the Bodleian Library (for now on referred as OMSA).
26 Report of the Committee on MS, Board of the Faculty of Social Studies, 13th March 1961, OMSA.
the United States and to write a report on Business education in Oxford\textsuperscript{27}. However, the committee did not agree on the source of the funding, as some members thought that it could be embarrassing to apply for a grant to an American Foundation “closely associated with a Firm of Management Consultants”\textsuperscript{28}. As an alternative, Norman Chester approached Nuffield College and successfully collected the required sum for the purpose of this investigation into the possibility of developing management education in Oxford\textsuperscript{29}. In May 1961, John Wright was chosen as the person to be sent to the US for three months, in the following autumn. For this occasion, he suggested to the Chairman of the Committee, Professor Hicks, a preliminary outline of the way in which he would plan his enquiry. This letter - reproduced in Appendix 4 – raised two main questions the inquiry should be able to answer. The first aimed at testing the extent to which management education was considered “academically respectable” by Oxford standards. The second took the issue one step further, assuming that Oxford would in fact require business education, and posing the question of which type of organisation would then be adequate for introducing management education.

When John Wright returned from his visit to America, the conclusions of his report were not in favour of the establishment of a business school in Oxford, and delayed any potential move in this direction the University might have contemplated. Part IV of the report, entitled ‘Some Conclusions and Inconclusions’, acknowledged the significant effort made by the American system into the development of management education and its consequences for the “useful research” done in the leading US business schools. However, John Wright argued that this successful research was not in any way integrated with the teaching programme of the schools. Therefore, according to him, “given that business education is to take place immediately after graduation, I could find little fault with the United States schools I visited. But I can work up little enthusiasm for the establishment of similar programmes in Oxford” (Wright, 1962: 41). Wright concluded his report, claiming that “if MS are going to be introduced here [in Oxford], it must be on the grounds that they bear some useful relation to our existing studies. But that will not bear that relation unless more interest can be fostered here within the existing social studies faculty about topics in the field of managerial studies” (Ibid: 42). This statement outlined the irony of the matter as a whole: Business Studies could start being taught at the university level on condition that research in the discipline already existed. The only way of providing initial research in the field could, therefore, only be initiated by colleges, which were independent entities from the University, unlikely to be able to cope with the financial costs of hiring a fellow in management. John Hicks organised a meeting to discuss issues arising from Wright’s report. The conclusions were that “without additional staff, not much more could be done than broaden the University Business Summer School” (Graves, 2001: 15)\textsuperscript{30}. As Graves stated, “MS was seen as useful but not really Oxford’s cup of tea, or glass of port” (Idem).

Despite the various oppositions to the establishment of management education at Oxford, persistence and Leyland’s enthusiasm led him to create a privately funded centre in MS\textsuperscript{31}. Clifford Barclay, a 50 years old London businessman, who had already made his fortune, offered his financial help to establish management education at Oxford. However, this financial help would

\textsuperscript{27} “He would be responsible for writing a report describing and analysing American and other experience and would be free to express his own views as to the way MS might develop in Britain” (Idem).

\textsuperscript{28} Idem.

\textsuperscript{29} Letter from D.N. Chester to the Vice-Chancellor, 10th March 1961, OMSA, File 1.

\textsuperscript{30} The idea of establishing a Diploma in MS also arose, but the committee stated that “because the background of the students would be very miscellaneous; the studies in which such people could usually engage in common, at anything more than a very elementary level, are not easy to find… A general Diploma would, inevitably, be a low-grade Diploma; and we see no advantage in the provision of that sort of training in Oxford’ (Graves, 2001: 15).

\textsuperscript{31} The justification of the Centre, being privately funded was expressed by Norman Leyland, as follows: “(…) we think that administratively the best way of achieving this is by establishing an institution completely independent of University control so as to be free to experiment, yet drawing upon the teaching resources available in Oxford and at the same time contributing a new element to these resources.” (in Graves, 2001: 18).
only consist of investing the initial capital, i.e. the fixed costs of the building site\(^{32}\). The OCMS was incorporated in 1965 as a company limited by guarantee but was not recognised as a University institution, but obtained the status of an “associated institution”. The Centre combined students with different statutes, namely “a six-month course for general managers and be-spoke courses for specific companies; although there were also some university students taking a B.Phil. in MS and some management orientated courses for undergraduates” (Tricker, 2006: 20). In the early years of the existence of the Centre, the main programme was a six months Senior Managers Development Programme. This programme was aimed at men who were “already senior managers” or who were “likely to become so” (Senior Managers Development Programme, 1970: 1). The contents of the courses – reproduced in Appendix 5 - give a good indication of the orientation of management education at Oxford: Wright’s recommendations from 1962 were applied. First, the teaching was aimed at executive managers and second, the lectures were built on existing ones in other social sciences in the university.

When Kitzinger became the Director of the OCMS in 1980, he argued that “Oxford is a collegiate University. (…) The attempt to create a Faculty of Management, which is not dominated by the Faculty of Economics, will never work. We have to turn the Management Centre into a college” (Ibid: 21). At this point, the Centre encountered financial difficulties; “the revenue account was healthy, but capital was still badly needed to enlarge the Centre” and Kitzinger firing “an arrow into the blue” (Raeburn, 1995) persuaded the editor of the American Oxonian, the house magazine of North American Rhodes Scholars Alumni to publish an article entitled “College in Search of a Founder”. After some weeks, John Templeton, who had been a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol, contacted Uwe Kitzinger and negotiations led to a conditional offer of five million dollars. After John Templeton’s benefaction, three years later, Templeton College (TC) was born. Templeton was then seen as preserving the independence of the discipline from the University, as had been Leyland’s preferred option.

- **Towards a co-operation between the university and the business world: The Cambridge Science Park (1970-Present)**

MS began life at Cambridge in 1954 thanks to an endowment that enabled the first courses to be developed in the Engineering Department. Cambridge was in fact clearly oriented towards technology management and, to a large extent the emergence of MS at Cambridge was particularly unusual compared to Oxford. In the 1960s, the Wilson Government urged British universities to engage more with industry and to strengthen the links with public and private firms. Interestingly though, Cambridge’s response to this, was not to develop management education, but rather to set up a science park. These initial conditions influenced the way MS emerged and was shaped by the context of Cambridge University.

In particular, a key turning point was in 1967, when Cambridge University set up a senate subcommittee in order to give recommendations on the planning aspects of the relationships between the University and science based industry. As a result, the Mott report named after its chairman Professor Sir Nevill Mott (Head of the Cavendish Laboratory) was published in 1969. The report argued that the Holdford report – previously published in 1950 – had caused a series of issues both for the University of Cambridge and industry. In fact, Sir Holdford had recommended constraining and discouraging the development of new industries in Cambridge, so as to preserve the University’s city character. This had led to many refusals towards companies that wanted to locate in Cambridge. For instance, IBM did not get permission to set up its European R&D Headquarter there (Segal Quince Wicksteed, 1985: 18)\(^{33}\). After various burning debates, the Mott report – which took over a year to compile – involved scientists who had ascertained the benefits to

\(^{32}\) Personal conversation with Desmond Graves, 23\(^{rd}\) September 2008.

\(^{33}\) Some suggest this is one of the reasons why the French Riviera seized the opportunity to welcome the company near by Sophia-Antipolis Science Park (at La Gaude).
MIT and Stanford University of close interaction between university and research based commercial activity. The report recommended the establishment of a Science Park. In 1972, it was Trinity College which officially established Cambridge Science Park. At the same time, the increasing effort of collaboration with industry was also illustrated by the creation of the Wolfson Cambridge Industrial Liaison Unit which aimed to support technology transfer and was originally part of the Engineering Department.

From 1972, MS at Cambridge slowly and gradually emerged around the Cambridge Science Park’s activities. Hence, unsurprisingly, the type of management research developing at Cambridge was significantly different from the one evolving in Oxford at the same period. The impact of the science park’s activities on the future theoretical and empirical shape of MS is therefore essential to understanding the current orientation followed by management education in Cambridge.

As Garnsey and Lawton Smith (1998) pointed out, Cambridge was known to have a stronger science and technology base than Oxford and probably contained the largest concentration of physical, technological, biological, medical and agricultural research laboratories in any university in the country. In particular, Cambridge is often referred to as a leader in computer development and applied sciences. As a matter of fact, the Mott Report estimated that up to 25% of the research and technical staff at the University were involved in applied industrial research. In contrast, no equivalent estimates were made for Oxford. Essentially, the applied sciences were stronger in Cambridge, especially in engineering and in computing (Garnsey and Lawton Smith, 1998). The emphasis put on engineering activities had two main consequences: first, the type of activity fostered (computing, hardware software) was better adapted to the creation of small firms, which led to the construction of a whole network of university spin outs. Second, the existence and development of this network enhanced the need for management training of new high-tech firms.

In 1985, a report entitled The Cambridge Phenomenon: The Growth of High technology Industry in a University Town was published by a Cambridge Consulting firm Segal Quince Wicksteed (SQW) and sought to analyse the growing links between the Cambridge industrial cluster and the University. In particular, the report highlighted growth of high-technology business activities in Cambridge and found that the academic spin-offs tended to grow faster, “not be owner managed, and to be more likely to receive venture capital” (Kenney, 2003: 179). The links between the University and the industry were therefore a success through the networks of high-tech companies from the University it was fostering. The next priority was therefore for the University side to provide business support aimed at the participating firms of the cluster. In collaboration with the University and in a similar way the OUBSS emerged in Oxford, the creation of various independent institutions seeking to develop business support for innovative firms followed.

Dr. Chris Johnson, Senior bursar of St John’s College, following a visit to the USA in 1984 proposed the idea to open a Centre for Innovation, as existed in Salt Lake City (Utah) at the time. The Cambridge Phenomenon report convinced St John’s College that investment in the innovation sector was likely to be successful and the St. John’s Innovation Centre eventually opened in 1987. This independent institution proposed to give support to young start-ups and usually University spin-outs. The University gradually realised that business training was increasingly needed to acquire the appropriate skills to run an engineering firm and started to think more seriously about the development of management education in response to the innovative environment of the Cambridge Science Park. On the same basis, Dr. David Keeble – Fellow in Geography – founded in 1989 with three Cambridge colleagues, the University’s Small Business Research Centre. Keeble was one of the first geographers “to recognize the growing importance of entrepreneurship and innovation in a world increasingly being driven by these key forces” (Kitson, Martin, Tyler, 2004: 34)

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34 Cf. Appendix 8: The Hi-Tech Start-ups associated with the Cambridge University (Copyright: Y.M.Myint and Dr. Shailendra Vyakarnam, CfEL, Judge Business School)
The context of the Cambridge Science Park was particularly influential on the research of the newly constituted centre oriented towards the way entrepreneurship, innovation and enterprise shaped regional economic development. The Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre brought together a group of academics drawn from two different departments: Applied Economics and Geography and was hosted by the Department of Applied Economics. The Centre’s primary function was, yet, closely concerned with MS issues as it aimed to integrate data on industrial organisation, firm behaviour and organisational change and to apply it to the study of small companies. Substantial funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) secured the future of the Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre which became in 1994 the Centre for Business Research (CBR). Since then, the centre has made a major contribution to national and international understanding of small firm development and to UK and European Union policy on small businesses. The modern CBR is still independent of any academic unit and is directed by Professor Alan Hughes.

Thus, research on business organisation, innovation and organisational change existed in Cambridge but was studied under the hospice of independent institutions such as St John’s Innovation Centre and the Small Business Research Centre, which later became the centre for Business Research. Interestingly, the only academic community who was interested by management related issues was the economic geographers and to a lesser extent, applied economists. The only courses recognised by the University in MS at Cambridge were located in the Engineering Department. The institutionalisation of the Cambridge Business School from this small group of researchers in the Engineering Department is accounted in Section II.3.

II.3. The Oxbridge process of business schools’ institutionalisation (1980s – Present)

This paper argues that the emergence of the SBS in Oxford and of the JBS in Cambridge cannot be understood outside their contexts of emergence and processes of institutionalisation. Rather, within the perspective of a processual analysis, the creation of both schools is the result of the existence of previous institutions which paved the way for the current specificities adopted by the schools. The processes of emergence of previous institutions concerned with management education have been described in the previous sub-section, and we now aim to show how both current business schools have emerged from these existing institutions.

- From Templeton College (1983) to the emergence of the Saïd Business School (2001)

The understanding of the current status, orientation, functioning and climate of the Said Business School has to be built around the analysis of a sequence of unintended consequences inherited from the past historical context of management education at Oxford University. This account constitutes a very recent history and while the interviews we conducted provided us with a large amount of detail regarding the period pre- SBS, most people were very much less inclined to share information for publication about a more recent period (1990-2010). Various controversial debates as well as internal conflicts characterising this period involved fellows and university players who are still around and are not willing to comment in detail on this evolution. It is therefore fair to say that this account does present some bias, since parts of the interviews cannot be published. Yet, documentary sources (primary source - diary notes and unpublished manuscripts - as well as secondary sources - media covers and secondary literature) are used to reinforce stories derived from interviews (Pettigrew, 1979).

In the early 1980s, John Templeton’s benefaction to the OCMS required four conditions listed by Ashley Raeburn in his unpublished memoirs, including requirements for matriculation rights and
seeking for a Royal Charter (Raeburn, 1995: 4). In 1984, the University did its bid and agreed on the matriculation right but did no more at this stage than “to note the Royal Charter ambition” (Ibid.) (37). The early years of development of TC were coupled with an unfavourable economic climate which indirectly strengthened management education at Oxford. As rightly stressed by Robert Tricker (38), the fund raising campaign organised by Oxford was a response to “very severe financial problems”, mainly resulting from “Mrs. Thatcher and her ministers”, who were, therefore to a large extent, “unwittingly the cause of the next flurry of interest in management study in Oxford” (Tricker, not dated, OX91A: 1). At this stage, Oxford University was, to a large extent, forced to participate in the development of MS in response to this economic climate, but also to remain competitive on the academic international scene and possibly to generate some financial support from executive education, such as an MBA programme (39). Hence, the University set up a small working party under Sir Claus Moser (Warden of Wadham College) which was equally composed of economics dons and of Templeton fellows (Raeburn, 1995: 5) and became known as the Moser Committee (40). A report, entitled “Report on the future of MS” was completed in March 1988 and circulated, on confidential basis, on 11 April to all members of Council and the Board of Faculties. Its circulation among TC was subject to discussion with Mr. David Rowland, Chairman of the Council of Templeton, indicating as stressed by the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Faculties “signs of unease about the report in some quarters connected with Templeton” (Ibid.: xxx). Yet, after further discussion, the Council finally authorised the Vice-Chancellor to approve the final version of the report and to publish it in the *Oxford University Gazette* on 5 May 1988 (*Gazette*, 1988: 766) (41). The major recommendations of the report published in the Hebdomadal Council of the GBF (20 April 1988) are reproduced in Appendix 6.

The Moser Committee also began to enquire about the delicate problem regarding the relationship between a new school of business and the existing TC. Raeburn refers to Moser’s recommendation as “a takeover of Templeton College by a new University School for MS”, mentioning that it was “to take over the assets of Templeton, appoint its fellows as university lecturers and adopt the Templeton name as the “Templeton School of MS”” (Raeburn, 1995: 6). According to former members of TC we interviewed and as the Moser report seems to indicate at first (42), this new school was meant to be built on the ground of Kennington – the then land of TC – and the existing college would be used as a hall of residence. The Moser Committee expresses what Raeburn referred to as a “takeover” more such as a natural process of evolution within the University; that is, the assets of Templeton were being used to enrich the new School of MS. The report mentions:

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36 A royal charter made an institution into an independent college of the University of Oxford. The only two universities in the country that had that were Oxford and Cambridge

37 A detailed factual history of TC would be far too long to be developed here – to a large extent also irrelevant – and has been previously reported by Desmond Graves, former fellow of Templeton in his book “Templeton College – The First Thirty Years, A Family Affair” privately published in 2001. Interestingly though, the title of the book is in itself significant. Beyond its development towards the world of business and its *rapprochement* with the University, TC staff was very much willing to develop a family oriented atmosphere, through for instance its programme for gastronomy entitled “Gourmet’s Oxford” during the long vacation, its reputation for conference venue providing excellent administrative and domestic support staff and its commissioned programmes which were typically lasting two to four weeks and exclusively run for corporate members.

38 Former President of the OCMS during the years 1971-1978.

39 In 1988, it was argued in a discussion by the Planning and Development Committee of the University that “a major expansion of MS will unlock funds for other purposes” (GBF, 1988: 767).

40 Michael Earl was the only Templeton man appointed to the Committee.

41 This journal constitutes the official and authorised journal of record of the University of Oxford. Its weekly issues, from September to July, throughout the academic year have been published since 1870 and only put online since 1990. The *Gazette* provides its reader information regarding Oxford University, such as lists of events and lectures, the official announcements, the newly appointed professors, or the available vacancies.

42 “So our eyes turned naturally to TC and the Kennington site. Not only has TC been the main home of MS, but it has many other attractions, not least its attracting facilities and staff. Moreover, its site is a fine one with much opportunity for development” (Moser report, in Tricker, not dated, OX91A: 6)
“Templeton College would not be the School of MS, but would be incorporated as a central part of it…In this connection we would wish to recognise the current tenure position of the academic staff, and, indeed, the employment rights of all those working at Templeton College: they should become University employees at appropriate grading” (Ibid.: 7)

Whatever the tacit strategy of the University was, the Moser Committee anticipated the existence of some “problems”, stressing that this “integration (…) would mean that the facilities on the site would become those of the School of Management of the University”; that “raising money from various sources would become part of University fund raising” and last but not least, that “total independence would inevitably be lost, since the School, of which Templeton College would be part would ultimately be responsible to the University” (Ibid.). However, somehow expecting the Templeton council members’ reactions, the report admitted that this integration would face real problems but that “the gains for Templeton College far outweigh the losses”; since the central role offered to TC in the new School would be preferred to the “creation of a new institution which would compete with it” (Ibid.). Hence, it is often argued that it is from the relationship between the University and TC that lies “the key to understanding the future path plotted for MS at Oxford” (Snow, 1995: 7).

Three other relevant issues were also raised by the publication of the Moser report in the Gazette. Firstly, the Council of TC strongly questioned the “control of MS by the Social Studies Board” 43. The University’s response to this concern was supported by the fact that “post holders in Management would, for a long time because of shortage of resources, need to teach in related disciplines, and the Faculty Board would have to be responsible for the organisation and distribution of the teaching resources in these circumstances” (GBF, 1988-1989: cxviii). Interestingly, this paradox echoes to a large extent, the unresolved conclusions already made by John Wright more than twenty years earlier. Concern about the salaries of the potential new members of the School was also brought up by the report. The University remained rather clear on this matter, arguing that “it was recognised that de facto the new salary proposals would not enable the University to pay significantly higher salaries to particular individuals” (GBF, 1988-1989: xi). However, the Board adds that “considerable flexibility would be necessary in certain areas (in order to attract the best staff to those subjects were high quality individuals were scarce) but that a way to achieve this was not for the university to pay higher salaries but for individuals to be allowed considerable latitude in consultancy arrangements or arrangements for holding part-time appointments in the University together with part-time appointments elsewhere (Ibid.: xi-xii)” 44.

Last but not least, the proposal of a two-year MBA did not gather enough evidence to convince the University for such a course as against a one-year one. According to the Planning and Development Committee, it seemed difficult to believe that “many employers would be willing to let their staff go for as long as the 21 months of the proposed course” (GBF, 1990: 768). As a result, the final version of the Moser report rejected the two-year MBA “above all (because) it would be hard to get financial support for it…” and suggested, instead, a “specialist” one-year MBA.

One year after its publication, in November 198945, the Moser Report was soon followed by a second University report on the subject chaired by Donald Hay, prominent industrial economist at the time. Although the Hay Working Party Report takes Moser as the starting point, it differs from the Moser recommendations, especially regarding the MBA programme. Hay rejects the

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43 Independence issues related to the content of the discipline per se have been documented in a previous paper. For further details on the subject, see Arena (2009).

44 Later on that year, the Planning and Development Committee admitted to be reluctant “to see a different salary structure in Oxford for teachers of Management, when many other subjects are having difficulty in recruiting, and it hopes that outside earnings could be a way round the problem” (GBF, 1990: 769).

45 As its predecessor, the Hay report was published in the Oxford University General Board of the Faculties (Hilary Term 1990, Vol. CLXXXIV).
“specialist” one-year MBA and suggests a two-year MBA, instead. As a result, the buildings estimated by the Hay report need to be much larger to handle 300 MBAs. Despite their points of divergence on financial estimations of the School, the overall aim of both reports was to submit legislation to Congregation early in Hilary Term 1990 establishing the new School of Management; yet first needed to be secured of “a few key benefactions before any package was made public” (GBF, 1990: 764). The target under the funding Campaign for Oxford was set at £40 million (Oxford University Gazette, 1997).

In the establishment of the new School, the integration of TC in the new Business School was not an easy task, since the various governing bodies of the University had strong doubts about the academic rigor and excellence of MS at TC. In 1989, in the research selectivity exercise, Oxford was given “a score of 2 for Business and MS, this being the median figure, but rather below the mean of 2.4.”. Consequently, the Planning and Development Committee expressed the need for the University to see “an improvement in both the graduate teaching offered in its name at TC and in the research done there which is attributed to the University” (GBF, 1990: 767). At last, in 1990, Congregation agreed that the University should establish a business school. The integration of TC in the new School of Management was thought to be facilitated by the appointment of a single Director simultaneously acting for TC and for the New School. In 1992, Dr. Clark Brundin, an engineering scholar was brought up from Warwick University, where he had been the Vice-Chancellor since 1985, to become the President of TC and the first Director of the Management Department at the University (since the School was not officially created at this point). At that stage, the whole operation was led by this one figure who soon and unsurprisingly became a target for general criticisms from both sides. Although the decision of building the new School on the premises owned by TC in Kennington had been taken and approved by Congregation, Clark Brundin expressed his view that the School should, instead, be located at the heart of Oxford. This view resulted from a more general feeling that the difficulty to get fundraising was probably due to the fact that no benefactors would be willing to invest in a fringe site not emblematic of Oxford, both in terms of location and architecture. After all, the whole idea of Oxford is to have departments and colleges collaborating between each other beyond disciplinary divisions, and having the business school in town was facilitating these interactions. As a result of this general view, an embryonic Oxford School of MS emerged in the Old Radcliffe Infirmary and began to host some courses in Management. Some space of the working hospital was converted into a lecture theatre, a library and some offices to welcome the first intakes of students in Management in 1993. The conversion of this space was funded by the University, while the Oxford’s School in MS was still waiting for a benefactor.

It was as late as 1996 that – coinciding with Clark Brundin’s retirement from full-time employment – that the University announced, after three years of discussions, the Syrian-born businessman Wafic Said put up the first £20 millions. The donation led the whole subject to become a matter for public debate and newspapers were all of a sudden announcing that “the relatively modest Oxford School of MS, created in 1990, was turned into the expensive and ambitious Said Business School” (Beckett, The Independent, 1999). One condition introduced by Mr. Said was that the University would obtain a matching £20 millions from other benefactors. At that stage, the biggest donation was from Lord Sainsbury who gave his name to the Saïd Business School library. John Kay was then invited to become the first Director of the Saïd Business School. The next step was to find a

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46 This is the rejection of “the comments of a group of personnel directors from major companies, the major recruiters of MBAs” which “show that they would not know what to do with specialist MBAs since they would not fit normal management and career development schemes. Like Moser the working party also rejects the one-year generalist MBA…” (GBF, 1990, Annexe E, MS: Note by the Chairman of the General Board: 778)

47 TC’s architecture was designed by Norman Leyland at the end of the 1960s and looked very modern. For further details about the building, see Design (1969).

48 At this time, Anthony Hopwood, who will then become the Dean of the SBS was appointed as the first director of the School’s MBA programme.
new site for this new “expensive and ambitious” Saïd Business School. Originally, the Planning and Development committee proposed to build on a green playing field site near Merton College in the centre of Oxford. Soon after this suggestion, in November 1996, Congregation voted 259-214 against the business school proposals “because of concerns over the site, Saïd’s business background49 and his level of control over the School” (Carrie, 1999). The University had given an undertaking that no building would ever take place on this ground (Beckett, The Independent, 1999). After the rejection of this new plan by Congregation, John Kay threatened to resign if the dons rejected the plans one more time. “A lot of kerfuffle and much behind-the-scenes negotiation” followed these series of drama50. In June 1997, a new site for the development emerged despite its low quality and became the eventual home of Business Studies in Oxford. The site was located opposite Oxford railway station and was occupied by a prefabricated listed building – the old wooden London Middland and Scottish station – which had to be packed flat and sent off to railway enthusiasts in Buckinghamshire. Planning permission including pulling down the listed building was required. By the end of June, Congregation voted 342-55 to accept the plans and in December 1998, Oxford City Council eventually granted planning permission51.

Yet, at this stage, the remaining problems with TC were unresolved. John Kay lost count of the numbers of times he was “asked to explain the relationship between the University's business school and TC, especially to potential corporate supporters”. He pursues saying:

“I could not explain it, because I could not understand it myself. Nor could the College, as is evident from Templeton's extensive press advertising, and its website. I inherited an entire drawer of a filing cabinet, containing records of discussions going back to 1982 on the relationship between the University and TC: but the discussions had no conclusions.” (Kay, 2000: 4)

As soon as he was appointed in 1996, Kay became determined to establish a strategy for the school’s development. However, although he had been a tutor in Oxford in the past, he was considered as an “outsider”52 as he was running a high-profile consultancy firm in London and soon realised the complexity of Oxford’s governance structure. In particular, he outlines “at this point, the process ran into the ground” since, according to him, “the University had no mechanism for proceeding with such discussions”. He pursues: “I was advised that I had to turn the document into specific proposals which would then be considered individually by diverse relevant committees. Of course, this approach missed the point. A plan to establish a new institution rests on a serious of interlinked initiatives (…)” (Ibid.) To cut the story short, as a result of this series of inconclusions, John Kay resigned suddenly in 1999 after two years of a five-year contract and provoked the publication of a large amount of articles in the press, arguing that John Kay “disappeared on holiday for the whole of his notice period” (Beckett, 1999), pursuing the “on-off saga” (Davies, 1999) of “Wafic Said's dream of building a business school in Oxford [which] has been dogged by controversy since its inception” (Currie, Griffiths, 1999).

Nevertheless, this sequence of dramas was followed by a much smoother and successful series of events after Anthony Hopwood became the new Director of the School in 1999. According to his Obituary recently published in the Guardian, “he was fond of saying that “business is so interesting, and most business schools are so boring”. His vision was for an “intelligent” business school” (Miller, 2010: 35). On 5 November 2001, the SBS building finally opened – designed by Jeremy Dixon and Ed Jones, architects of the Royal Opera House conversion and the subtle extension of the

49 Wafic Said has been accused to be a Syrian arm-dealer and to use this money to fund the SBS. For further details about this controversy, see. Alderson, 2001
50 Various people were surprised Wafic Saïd did not pull out; Kay who was one of them argued: “I do not think if it had been me I would have stuck with the project for so long” (Carrie, 1999).
51 One last unintended drama was the protesting eco-warriors who were not too pleased about the removal of some trees by the School (Currie, Griffiths, 1999).
52 This “outsider” element of his profile was considered as a strength by the appointment committee.
National Portrait Gallery. During the last ten years, the media coverage of the School has been far less frequent, and much more positive regarding its reputation, its performance and its intellectual vitality. Through the creation of additional teaching programmes and new research centers, the School became highly competitive and managed to catch up with some older implemented schools of business such as the London Business School. As early as 2002, the School was awarded a grade 5 by the Research Assessment Exercise and still pursues its search for academic excellence in the Business schools’ top international rankings. In 2002, Professor Michael Earl took over as Dean of Templeton, which retained responsibility for executive education. In 2005, this responsibility was also transferred to the Saïd Business School, “as a result of a successful round of complex negotiations between Michael Earl and Dean Anthony Hopwood, thus creating a comprehensive academic business school, but with the facilities of the Kennington site (Egrove) retained for the teaching of a range of executive education courses” (Snow, 2010). The difficult relationship with Templeton College was ended in 2008, when Templeton left the Kennington site merging with Green College to form a new graduate Oxford college, Green-Templeton.

- The emergence of the Judge Business School (1990-2005)
While in Oxford, it is often argued that the main emphasis had been put on pure science, developing a significant comparative advantage in chemistry research, Cambridge built its reputation on applied research and engineering soon became the largest department in the University. In 1984, when Jacques Heyman became Head of the Engineering Department, the first year courses were reformed to put more emphasis on information engineering and electronics. For instance, Acorn Computers, a British computer company established in Cambridge, donated 60 microcomputers, allowing computer based teaching packages to be implemented. At the time, the first Management courses were taught by a small group of academics in MS who were still lobbying since the 1960s for the creation of a business school. Lecturers in MS were still located in the Engineering Department, but there was no Professor in Management. The key understanding for the current status of management education in Cambridge lies in the links built between the Engineering department and MS; and also in the role of the early advisors and benefactors in allowing the set up and the institutionalisation of the JBS.

In the context of the Cambridge Phenomenon report published in 1985 and mentioned in the previous section, the University was increasingly concerned with management education but, yet, rather focused on technology management’s specific needs. The Department of Engineering in Cambridge rapidly became one of the leading centres of engineering in the world and constituted the most visible roots of management education in Cambridge. As Professor Arnoud De Meyer – current Director of the JBS – argues: “None of JBS growth or achievement over the last 20 years would have been possible without the aid of many supporters both inside and outside the University ranging from the Engineering Department, which gave this school much support in its early phases, to our benefactors.” Soon, the aim of the Department of Engineering was to “address the world’s most pressing challenges with science and technology by working in collaboration with other disciplines, other institutions, companies, and the entrepreneurial community and also focus on applying research”. The Department consists of six divisions, among which the division “Manufacturing Engineering” enhances the Group's international multidisciplinary research community to develop new understanding of manufacturing technology, operations, strategy and

53 The School counts nine research centers in 2010: The BT Centre for Major Programme Management; The Oxford Centre for Entrepreneurship and Innovation; The Institute for Science, Innovation and Society; The Novak Druce Centre for Professional Service Firms; The Oxford Institute of Retail Management; The Oxford Private Equity Institute; The Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation; The Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation and The Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship.

54 Cambridge University Engineering Department And Engineers’ Association: http://www-g.eng.cam.ac.uk/enginuity/.
policy, in close partnership with industry. Through its aim to understand and to provide policy tools oriented towards industrial competitiveness, the department is very closely linked with industry. This orientation is not new and probably started when a MS group within the Engineering Department was set up in 1971. Members of this embryonic group played a significant role which is at the heart of the creation of MS at Cambridge. As recalled by Professor Geoff Walsham:

“When I arrived in the Engineering Department in 1975 to start teaching Management Studies, there was a small group of lecturers. Very small. MS were not perceived as respectable in Cambridge. But then, I heard about the crusty old academic who used to say, apropos Engineering, that Cambridge had never been the same since it started awarding degrees in “plumbing”! (…) It showed my colleagues and I that if we worked long enough, Management Studies too could become respectable”.

This small MS research group was soon about to constitute the “founding members” of JBS with Dr Elizabeth Garnsey (that later has decided to go back to the Engineering Department in order to provide direct support to engineers in running the industrialisation of their innovation), Dr Andy Cosh, Professor Geoff Walsham, Dr David Livesey, Professor David Watson, Colin Gill and Professor Eddie Anderson (See Picture Appendix 10). This group of early management researchers have built the MS, lobbying and negotiating for the establishment of an independent MS tripos. Professor Stephen Watson recalls:

“When I became head of the MS research group in 1978, we started lobbying for a business school. London, Manchester and Warwick had one; other Universities were following suit. It seemed silly for Cambridge not to do so. The subject was becoming popular. We wanted to acknowledge this by offering a MS tripos separate from Engineering tripos.”

In particular, in 1986, the action of Peat Marwick (from KPMG) who decided to generously endow a chair in MS has particularly leveraged the establishment of the discipline in Cambridge. As a result, Stephan Watson applied and was appointed, making him the first Professor of Management at either Oxford or Cambridge. Now that MS had its own professorship and tripos, the small MS research group started to develop and expressed the growing needs to create a business school, fully integrated in the University. The need for the institutionalisation of management education in Cambridge was also coming from industrialists. Matthew Bullock, Chief Executive at Norwich & Peterborough Building Society, was working for Barclays in the 1980s and thought that “until Oxford and Cambridge started to teach business, university graduates would always regard industry as being below the professions and civil service”. He argues:

“I was then working for Barclays, and soon realised that though people in these companies were very bright, they had no business training – there was not much cross-over of business ideas into teaching in technology subjects in the university. However a Manufacturing Engineering Tripos was being introduced and it included some materials about the skills needed to run an engineering firm (…)”.

It was in this context, that Matthew Bullock was put in contact with Stephen Watson, who had recently become head of the MS Group within the Engineering Department. Bullock asked for Watson’s help in his project to institutionalise management education at Cambridge. Bullock commented:

55 “The total contract value of the Department of Engineering’s research portfolio is approximately GBP90M. One third of this income comes from collaboration with industry; generating knowledge for companies that can be translated into new and improved products and services. Since the 1970s, the Department has played a significant role in the creation of new companies in and around Cambridge. It is at the centre of many University initiatives to provide inspiration, training and support. Since 2001, staff and students founded over 20 spin-out and start-up companies with a total investment of over GBP50M”.

56 Matthew Bullock was a long standing supporter of the JBS
“I became an early advisor, and also persuaded Barclays to fund a lectureship in Management. By then, I had started to lend to the technology based companies and I argued that the people creating these firms needed more management training.”

To a large extent, the Institute for Manufacturing Management (IfM) has largely contributed to pushing the Engineering Department towards a Technology Management oriented strategy. Although it was only established in 1998, the IfM is the Department of Engineering's Management Division. It has a cross-disciplinary approach, bringing together expertise in management, technology and policy to address the full spectrum of industrial issues. The IfM’s activities take place within an unusual structure that integrates research and education with practical application in industry, via a university-owned company, IfM Education and Consultancy Services Ltd. IfM’s research is undertaken in close collaboration with businesses, ensuring its relevance to industrial needs and the rapid dissemination of new ideas and approaches. In October 1995, the IfM ran the first Management Engineering course. Students will spend half their time working on major projects, many in collaboration with industry, as well as being taught modules on advanced topics.\(^{57}\)

The most significant turnabout comes, however, from Sir Paul and Lady Judge, the key benefactors of the Judge Business School, whom together with a generous donation from Simon Sainsbury, decided to invest in management education at Cambridge. At the time, Sir Paul Judge felt very concerned with the urgent need to provide management education in Cambridge. He could particularly acknowledge the specificity and the value of management education, as he himself studied in the Engineering Department at the University of Cambridge, before leaving the country to pursue his education at the Wharton Business School in the United-States. He remembers that he initially came to Cambridge to study Natural Sciences but realised he didn’t want to end as “a person with test tubes at a bench”. This is mainly why he “switched to Industrial Management, then being taught in the Engineering Department”, giving him, according to his own words “a wider perspective and an interest in business”. However, as his interests were shifting towards Management he faced the lack of management programmes in the UK. Regarding this lack of adequate business education in the UK, he argues:

> “Doctors and lawyers should be properly trained before they can practise but historically, in the UK we had not treated management as a profession (...) so I decided to go to the US (Wharton Business School). Returning two years later, I saw the difference between British and American attitudes to management. In the UK, it was seen as administration whereas in the US it was about strategy and managing change. (...) I offered to help”.

In 1990, Sir Paul Judge gave £8 million to the University of Cambridge to found the Judge Business School. The University of Cambridge Judge Institute of Management Studies was at last established. In September 2005 the School was re-named as the Judge Business School. Simon Sainsbury also contributed through Monument Trust. The School is currently situated on the site of the original Addenbrooke's Hospital (1766) on Trumpington Street, near the University's Fitzwilliam Museum and is really noticeable with its colourful facade.

**III. Preliminary results and discussion**

The last section of our contribution provides a cross-case search for patterns among the two historical cases which have been developed in the previous section. Our research suggests two results which, overall, argue against the existence of a smooth process underlying the development of business schools. Rather, our preliminary results indicate a complex process of emergence,

\(^{57}\) IfM’s website: www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/

development and institutionalisation, which was neither a conscious desire expressed by existing academic institutions nor the result of a clear vision provided by academic leaders at the time. This research confirms Weick’s idea that business schools are loose couple systems (Weick, 1976). Our contribution shows that the nature of business schools’ organisational change combines a series of exogenous and endogenous generative mechanisms, through disjointed clusters of events. Obviously, our results do not suggest that these generative mechanisms are universally applicable across all organisations in different institutional spheres (Pettigrew, 1979: 580). Yet, it is from this combination of exogenous and endogenous factors that future business schools’ strategies might emerge, in the future.

- **Exogenous generative mechanisms**

It is generally argued that it was the absence of an answer to the question “what was the University doing for business?” which forced Oxford and Cambridge Universities to begin some “heart-searching about [their] hitherto largely passive” involvement in management studies (Raeburn, 1995: 5). As suggested by the historical cases presented in Section II of the paper, Oxford and Cambridge witnessed some **major changes in their business environment** and were, to a large extent, forced to adapt their educational programmes and research to the new needs emerging within the industrial community. The influence of the creation of the Cambridge Science Park on the institutionalisation of the future Judge Business School is significant enough. The general idea about management education was that in a constantly moving world, managers must be trained to be flexible. Consequently, teaching management also had to evolve adequately. As pointed out by Harrigan (1990: 697), “educators can reinforce the value of this attitude in their students, but they must first subscribe to this philosophy themselves. They must embrace change by adding continual innovation in their teaching and research efforts”. Put differently, historical trajectories followed by business schools from their emergence to their institutionalisation forced their academic members to adjust their strategies given the changes in their environment.

As shown in our historical accounts, this changing world required increasing **cooperation between Universities and industry**. The publication of the Robbins report in the early 1960s led towards controversial open questions within the British business education system highlighted by Nick Tiratsoo (1999) and which, we believe, are, to a large extent, still relevant to today’s world of business schools. One of them “How should the new business schools be launched and run?” opposed, on the one hand, the defenders of collaboration with existing Universities and, on the other, their opponents who strongly believed that business education should be kept free from “the clutches of unworthy dons” and oriented towards “essentially practical goals” (Tiratsoo, 1999: 117). Through the creation of independent institutions such as the Oxford University Business Summer School or the Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre, Oxford and Cambridge got gradually closer to the business world before initiating management studies as an academic discipline. In Cambridge, Vice-Chancellor (1996-2003) Lord Broers, stressed the importance to teach managers how to run technology based-businesses, “arguing that Business Schools like JBS can do this when often companies themselves can’t.” Although the growing idea diffused in the 1980s that “knowledge creation takes place not only in ivory towers, but also in corporate boardrooms” (Friga et al., 2003: 236), Oxbridge acceptance of MS was a long drawn out process of negotiation among the different governing bodies of the University. Often, issues identified as requiring strategic attention were more concerned with the way to avoid too much vocational education than to provide concrete tools and techniques for businesses. The Oxbridge perception of management studies and business education lies probably somewhere else than in the pure development of new techniques for businesses and somehow agrees with Spender’s suggestion that “management might be better understood if we take a different viewpoint – I suggest as an art form – possibly the most significant art form to be found in today’s complex society. Recall Simon
(1991) told us we are a society of organisations, not of markets, and these organisations have to be managed.” (Spender, 2005: 1285)

The debate suggested by the Robbins report in the early 1960s also introduced two divergent views regarding the orientation of management teaching: the industrialists who were in favour of courses which could “service their immediate needs”, arguing for short post experience courses and most academics who were defending “one or two year MBAs, taught by a faculty which was itself engaged in research” (Tiratsoo, 1999: 117). Hence, the introduction of new vocational programmes within the Oxbridge teaching curriculum was also the result of an exogenous shock first initiated by the American model of Masters of Business Administrations. As pointed out by our research, the introduction of MBA programmes in Oxbridge raised a series of issues, and yet prior to the institutionalisation of both business schools, took time to be implemented (in 1990 in Cambridge and in 1998 in Oxford). The structure of the programmes was subject to discussion and scrutiny in several University reports (Moser report and Hay report) and evolved from a three to a two to a one year programme in Cambridge and from a two-year MBA to a one year specialist MBA in Oxford. To a large extent, this can be seen as a specific ability in Oxbridge to follow an evolutionary model which leaves behind programmes which are not sufficiently ‘performant’ over time. Both MBA programmes still pretend to be highly demanding as they cover in one year what many business schools do in two. In 2002, an article published in Oxford Today (2002) argued that “MBA students have an image of being loud-talking, Porsche-driving, Rolex-snapping types who cannot wait to pull down big bonuses in consultancy or banking”. In response to this stereotype, Anthony Hopwood, first MBA Director in Cambridge wanted to break the mould and argued: “Our job is to produce rounded and knowledgeable citizens for the 21st century, not to process stereotypes” (Hopwood, in Oxford Today, 2002). Interestingly, the success of MBA programs in Oxbridge were highly critical as it set ideals to convince the different governing bodies to create a business school. The future development of these programmes requires specific strategic attention, especially since MBA programmes recently became the basis for business schools’ rankings (see, for instance, the Financial Times’ ranking).

Fund raising issues also emerged from the recent evolution of the business world, which has increasingly expressed the need for management training. Interestingly, fundraising strategies naturally provoke competition between Universities. The 1989 minutes of the General Board of Faculties in Oxford mentioned as a “relevant development” that “at the end of July, Cambridge announced its plans for an MBA on a much smaller basis than that proposed by the Oxford working party” (GBF, 1988-1989: 765). In 1988, the Planning and Development Committee noted that “Cambridge has estimated that it needs capital of £10m in order to launch its Institute of MS and MBA, and that these will be self-financing after five years. Cambridge’s situation is very different from Oxford’s (...) but, given what already exists at Templeton, the committee thinks it is difficult to see why expansion at Oxford need cost more than twice as much as that at Cambridge” (Ibid.). Yet, the race for fundraising and the effort of maintaining viable relations with the alumni network appears to be a central strategy which was not needed in more traditional departments evolving at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Questions related to salaries and recruitment in new business schools were also considered as exogenous factors. Regarding this matter, John Kay argued that “it is not possible to attract internationally distinguished business school faculty if a newly appointed lecturer is paid less than £20.000 and the standard professorial salary is around £40.000 (Would you listen to a lecture on corporate finance or option pricing from someone earning for less than the pay of the receptionist at an investment bank?)” (Kay, 2000: 4). To a large extent, there is an exogenous trend that most schools “strive to develop and market distinctive strengths and to pre-empt their rivals in hiring new members of faculty or in luring away others with an established reputation” (Bolton, 1996: 494).
Last but not least, the recent internationalisation of academic institutions constitutes another challenge for business schools. Multicultural degrees as well as international research projects became necessary conditions in the search for maintaining or developing a future comparative advantage. These conditions were easily reached by Oxford and Cambridge management education, since both Universities have always valued a very vigorous international exposure. For instance, Oxford Today claimed in 2002 that the SBS MBA programme is represented by 33 nationalities and the School has a “higher proportion of Americans than either INSEAD or the London Business School”.

This series of ‘exogenous shocks’ coming from business schools’ business environments forced them, to a large extent, to participate in management education, even in the case of anti vocational and traditional institutions, such as Oxford and Cambridge. To sustain a comparative advantage, contemporary business schools now need to equally set their priorities around four main strategic poles: research, teaching, alumni networks and cooperation with industry. As pointed out in a study about the level of stress encountered by Deans of business schools (Bolton, 1996: 493), it is relevant to note that success for a business school “tends to manifest itself for the faculty in salary awards, recruitment of new colleagues, size of teaching load, availability of research assistants and funding for research, quality of students, especially PhDs and MBAs, secretarial support and physical facilities”. In addition to that, “not only are deans striving to satisfy the material and collegial needs of their faculty, they must court alumni, employers and the media to help ensure that the school’s reputation is continuously enhanced. This helps to ensure a virtuous circle with income from corporate executive teaching programmes and consultancy, from donations, with attractive jobs for graduating students and positive references in the press” (Ibid.). However, if these exogenous shocks can explain a part of the emergence of management education; they only partially describe the dynamics underlying its evolution. The understanding of the shape taken by research and teaching in business studies also results from endogenous generative mechanisms, which are more subjective to the context of the institution.

- Endogenous generative mechanisms

The historical cases explored in Section II showed that management education – beyond a response to exogenous factors – was an unintended ironic consequence of confusion, personal antagonism, vested interests, Oxford and Cambridge’s ways of building new disciplines on existing ones, shortage of academic staff in management, and inherited ambivalence about vocational education. To a large extent, these endogenous generative mechanisms explain the lateness, the peculiar structure, and the multidisciplinary orientation expressed by two ancient Universities in a modern world. In particular, we can discuss six endogenous mechanisms resulting from similar patterns emerging from our case studies.

Firstly, the notion of time in decision-making processes is, to a certain extent, idiosyncratic to the Oxbridge context. We argue that the Universities’ late entrance on the market of business education is largely due to the University’s governing structure, as a whole. As for any other Universities, faculties’ desire of stability in their discipline paradigms adds “longevity to evaluation criteria from one cohort of faculty to the next” (Cummins, 1990: 695). Changing curriculum for individual faculty is often considered as inefficient “in terms of the time it takes to adjust courses significantly and for the composite faculty” (Ibid.). It also raised political issues “around the relative power of different faculty interests (e.g., behavioral and non-behavioral) implied in any major curriculum adjustments” and therefore implies “realignments of faculty power and influence” which tend to take time (Ibid.: 696). In addition and more specifically to the Oxbridge context, the crucial role played by the governing bodies (and their distribution across the University), by the Vice-Chancellor and the pro Vice-Chancellors, the democratic role of Congregation which allows academic and administrative staff to vote for (or against) any changes, and therefore the need for a
A series of reports documenting every step of a possible evolution tend to slow down the decision-making process and every new initiative. The efficiency of such a governing system is not clear and often discussed among the academic community. John Kay’s personal experience in Oxford led him to argue that this governance was “a constant source – at first of incomprehension, then of frustration – to Mr. Saïd, who spent five years trying to persuade the University to accept a £20 million gift” (Kay, 2000: 4). This general view about the constant frustration when trying to implement a new initiative in Oxford or Cambridge is not shared by everyone. In our interviews, many academics and administrative staff admit that when the University is facing an evolution, “things are not going to happen tomorrow”. As argued by one of the founders of the current Cambridge Centre for Business Research, “the Cambridge story indicates that it is possible to start from virtually nothing and achieve a critical mass, but this takes time” (Keeble, 1989). Each new initiative is discussed and patience is often required when one has the desire to implement a new idea. Interestingly though, one of the interviewees denies the impossibility of individual enterprise in the Oxbridge context and rather, argues that nobody in the governing bodies really has the power to stop an individual initiative. This second view is also defended by Anthony Hopwood who rightly remarked that “it was always going to be complicated here because of the sort of place Oxford is. It’s democratic, it’s lateral, it’s conversational” (Hopwood, in Beckett, The Independent, 1999). This position defends the idea that people with energy, enthusiasm, conviction and views have the power to build a range of new institutions and Centres, as we can count so many of them in both Universities at the moment.

These two views show that the key factor here is a good understanding of the context in which the business school operates. The governing structure and the time horizons illustrate a more general relevant organisational aspect which is a set of tacit rules, norms and conventions which govern business schools’ organisational change and need to be assimilated by the players who wish to contribute to institutional evolution. To a large extent, this is common knowledge in the Oxbridge context and particularly well expressed by John Kay himself regarding Oxford:

“There was always an element of ritual, of games played according to arcane and implicit rules. The vast majority of participants (…) had spent much of their lives learning the Oxford processes, and did not recognise their peculiar and idiosyncratic nature, although there was a certain pride in the uniqueness of the Oxford way.” (Kay, 2000: 5)

The author goes even further and adds that “when decisions are made, or meaningful discussions take place, it is often in secret and within groups with no formal status” (Ibid.: 8). Unsurprisingly, this tacit set of rules is the result of the history, the heritage and pattern of an organisation.

As Bolton argued in his study of deans’ behaviours and roles in business schools, the leadership style of a business school often appears to match the culture of the institution, since working “‘with the culture’, even whilst promoting change, has been revealed as perhaps the fundamental requirement for successful academic leadership” (Bolton, 1996: 499). More generally, business schools’ strategies of development gain to be aligned with their organisational culture. In particular, this is well illustrated by Lord Broers Vice Chancellor of Cambridge University (1996-2003), who believed “in the application of technology for the benefit of mankind”, recognises that “successfully managing technological research and development require a special kind of knowledge” and is pleased “to see that the current Director of JBS, Arnoud de Meyer, is an expert in technology management, because that is something we really need in the UK”. That is; the case of the Judge Business School is particularly significant, since it represents “genuinely entrepreneurial, new-firm-based growth – based on computing hardware and software, scientific instruments and electronics, and, increasingly, biotechnology – which has spun off from university research on the Silicon Valley model” (Castells and Hall, 2001).

Interestingly, this organisational culture is also reflected by the architectural effort made by Oxford and Cambridge in the institutionalisation of their respective business schools. Regarding the
current SBS building, Anthony Hopwood early described “how it is transforming the way the School works, facilitating those accidental-opportune Oxford collisions in corridors and quadrangles” (Oxford Today, 2002). In Oxford, the choice of architects such as Jeremy Dixon and Ed Jones (architects of the Royal Opera House conversion and the subtle extension of the National Portrait Gallery) indicates the importance given to the design of the business school. This very special piece of architecture even received significant media coverage (for further details, see Glancey, 2001). In Cambridge, the role of the architectural design was similar, as Simon Sainsbury, one of the benefactors of the JBS wanted a building that was architecturally outstanding. The JBS building still constitutes one of the unique attractions of the School: a colourful building that would stimulate imagination, creativity and innovation.

Another endogenous force which is emerging from our historical cases is the disjoined nature of the evolution of management education at Oxbridge. As shown in Section II of our contribution, the institutionalisation process of the SBS and the JBS experienced periods of expansion of management education, separated by long intervals of obstinate hostility towards business education and **internal conflicts of interests** between academics and decision-makers. Overall, the institutionalisation of business schools resulted in the (gradual) imposition of a solution by a small minority of interests. This endogenous factor is closely related to the concept of subsequent dramas developed by Pettigrew in 1979. As argued by the author, “the point of studying a sequence of social dramas longitudinally is that they provide a transparent look at the growth, evolution, transformation, and conceivably, decay of an organisation over time” (Pettigrew, 1979: 570). The series of social dramas outlined in Section II (especially in the context of Oxford) is therefore significant, as we argued that “each of these dramas was sufficiently engaging of the minds and actions of the people in the school to be regarded as critical events” and consequently, it is not just “the researcher’s judgment which pinpoints the social dramas” (Ibid.: 571). To a large extent though, the existence of internal conflicts seems to apply to other business schools as Bolton remarked “the introduction of new recruits to a school otherwise dominated by longer-established members presented a leader with difficulties. This was especially the case if there was a tendency to divide into two camps: one teaching-orientated, older, loyal to the school; the other research-orientated, younger, driven by the need for individual achievement” (Bolton, 1996: 498).

The resolution of these conflicts of interest is one of the key factors of the institutionalisation of business schools, and yet has to be seen as details of a School’s evolution which should dedicate its resources in more strategic assets. The strategic line of orientation should remain a priority for the school. According to Kay, the very own nature of the governance structure of Oxford University leads to the resolution of contested issues which “can be postponed for many years by avoiding discussion, by deferral, by ambiguity, by referral to other committees, and by other forms of procrastination. But eventually these devices run out. If a small group of people is sufficiently persistent, it stands a good chance of getting what it wants, after a long delay. This is true however small the group and however weak the merits of its case” (Kay, 2000: 3). This remark strengthens the idea of democracy in the decision-making processes.

Last but not least, the whole paradox is to find the right balance between making sure that Management exists as an independent academic discipline from other social sciences and yet; is able to use and collaborate with **other disciplines** in order to enrich management from other approaches/ paradigms. This issue was already raised by the Robbins report when it was time to decide the content of the courses in management and lead to disagreement about the range of subjects that should be taught: “some valued the importance of economics and accountancy, while other insisted on integrating other social sciences, as psychology and sociology” (Tiratsoo, 1999: 59). Interestingly, a relevant comparison with the designing of the Social Studies building in Manor Road that same year could be made. As one of the interviewees noted, the difference of attitudes was significant: while the Business School was selecting the best Italian stones to put in the entrance of the building, for the department of Economics, “as long as people had computers, rooms to sit in which were not uncomfortable, that was fine”.

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The Oxbridge context showed us two different disciplinary trajectories. Unquestionably, the current orientation of management education in Cambridge results from a long tradition of Technology Management and has been mainly constructed through the Engineering Department. Yet, as argued by Professor Robert Mair (Chairman of the Faculty Board of Business and Management in Cambridge):

“The school has become more integrated with the University as a whole. Interdisciplinary has always been encouraged in Cambridge, but the links between the school and different departments have become much stronger. A number of programmes now involve lecturers from across University, with experience in a wide variety of fields, alongside business school faculty. And the school hosts several collaborative research group, for example, is a joint initiative with the Faculty of Economics, while the Cambridge Center for Energy studies involves colleagues of mine from engineering. These links put JBS at the heart of the University’s teaching and research”

This interdisciplinary orientation of the discipline is also expressed by the interest of the school in targeting different industry activities such as hospitals, science-based firms and consultancy companies.

Regarding the content of the first MS degree in Oxford, institutional endogenous factors have also been seen as decisive. At first sight, looking at the content of the first course in MS held at Oxford University, it could be argued that the field was very much multidisciplinary, mixing a range of social science topics (Arena, 2009). However, our analysis has shown that this multidisciplinarity was not really consciously constructed arose from a shortage of suitable resources, as well as the ambivalence of the University about management education. Consequently, this unconscious choice of multidisciplinarity made further overlapping research between sub-disciplines even more difficult. Unsurprisingly then, this interdisciplinary desire is still expressed by the Oxford University business school which is “aiming to transcend the traditional functional divisions of a business school in order to reflect the complex realities of business and society in today’s global economy”.

As Anthony Hopwood remarked “most major European business schools are stand-alone institutions” and the SBS involvement “with the wider university means that we can build on links with scientists, lawyers and others, which is much harder for places like London Business School, Insead or IMD” (Hopwood, in Beckett, 1999). In a subsequent interview Hopwood remarked that although “its almost filial relationship with Oxford economics, the Saïd is pursuing close links in areas such as psychology, history, politics and international relations” (Oxford Today, 2002)

**Concluding remarks**

The overall purpose of this contribution has been to highlight some generative mechanisms underlying the dynamics of evolution of business schools, as organisations. Supported by two historical case studies, our research shows that the institutionalisation and development of business schools are not the result of a steady evolution, but rather of a disjointed cluster of events. This series of unplanned events and unintended consequences is not purely contextual and is partially explained by forces exogenous to the organisation which force business schools to adapt rapidly over time. As stressed by our contribution, these exogenous forces result in a constantly changing business world which leads to the existence of a proper market for management education. Through the two historical case studies, this contribution suggests three different strategic periods which coincide with three different levels of combinations of exogenous and endogenous mechanisms. The first one which roughly corresponds to an extension of what G.L.S. Shackle called the ‘years of high theory’ covers the period 1900s-1950s. During this period, academics in the UK were mainly

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60 For example, Professor Stefan Scholtes has helped to develop a typically interdisciplinary programme among the executive courses at JBS, for senior health leaders and hospital managers in conjunction with Cambridge University Hospital NHS Foundation trust.

driven by endogenous forces as their priority was to develop rigorous economic theories in ivory towers, yet not necessarily applied to the business world. The exogenous factors of evolution were almost inexistent. The publication of successive reports on University education at the beginning of the 1960s modified this dynamics and put a stronger strategic attention on the teaching aspects of economics and management at University. Then, this opens a second period of interest (1960s-1980s) which is explained more equally by exogenous and endogenous factors. It is from the (exogenous) increasing need for business training that (endogenous) debates started flourishing about the need for management education within Universities’ programmes. The most recent period (1980s-2010s) of business schools’ evolution constitutes a set of strategies mainly driven by exogenous forces expressed by the business world. These forces became powerful enough to outweigh the remaining hostility towards management education at Oxbridge. However, to a large extent, our preliminary results converge towards and complement JC Spender’s recent view that, today, the value of business schools tend to rather lie in what they “do” than in what they “know”, in their “credentialing activity” rather than in their “research” (Spender, 2005: 1289). In agreement with this view, it is therefore relevant to argue that “how and why, and for how long we can sustain this is a matter of speculation, perhaps an area of management we have not yet dared research” (Ibid.: 1290).
Abbreviations…

CBR : Centre for Business Research
ESRC : Economic and Social Research Council
FME : Foundation for Management Education
GBF : General Board of Faculties
JBS : Judge Business School
MS : MS
MT, HT, TT : Michaelmas Term, Hilary Term, Trinity Term (Oxford)
MT, LT, ET : Michaelmas Term, Lent Term, Easter Term (Cambridge)
NEDC : National Economic Development Council
OCMS : Oxford Centre for MS
OMSA : Oxford MS Archives
SBS : Said Business School
TC : Templeton College

… and brief glossary of the Oxbridge jargon

- **Cambridge University Reporter**: Official and authorised journal of record of the University of Cambridge. The Reporter is issued weekly on Wednesdays during Full Term. It provides its reader information regarding notices of all University business – announcing University events, proposals for changes in regulations, Council and General Board decisions, as well as information on awards, scholarships and appointments.

- **Chancellor**: University formal head who is more of a titular figure than someone involved in a day-to-day running of University affairs.

- **Congregation**: This governing body, also often called the “parliament of the dons” includes members of the University’s academic and administrative staff. It has ultimate responsibility for legislative matters and discusses on policies proposed by the University Council. Oxford and Cambridge, in a similar structure, are unique for this democratic form of governance.

- **Convocation**: Body which comprises all graduates of the University. Members of the Convocation elect the University Chancellor.

- **Council of the University**: Executive policy-forming body, which consists of the Vice-Chancellor as well as heads of departments and other members elected by Congregation, in addition to observers from the Student Union.

- **General Boards of Faculties**: Bodies responsible for the academic and educational policy of the University.

- **Oxford University Gazette**: Official and authorised journal of record of the University of Oxford. Its weekly issues, from September to July, throughout the academic year have been published since 1870 and only put online since 1990. The Gazette provides its reader information regarding Oxford University, such as lists of events and lectures, the official announcements, the newly appointed professors, or the available vacancies.

- **Royal Charter**: A royal charter made an institution into an independent college of the University. The only two universities in the UK that had this possibility were Oxford and Cambridge.

- **Tripos**: The Tripos refer to the degree courses given at the University of Cambridge. The term ‘Tripos’ goes back to the seventeenth century when verses would be read out by someone sat on a three-legged stool (or Tripos) at graduation ceremonies. These became known as the Tripos verses. Eventually ‘Tripos’ was
used to refer to courses offered by the University, when the lists of graduating students for each subject were written on the back of the Tripos verses. A Tripos is divided into two parts: Part I, which is broadly based, and Part II, which allows specialization within the student's chosen field.

- **University Calendar:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Cambridge</th>
<th>Oxford</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>First Term</strong></td>
<td>Michaelmas Term</td>
<td>Michaelmas Term</td>
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<td><strong>Second Term</strong></td>
<td>Lent Term</td>
<td>Hilary Term</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Third Term</strong></td>
<td>Easter Term</td>
<td>Trinity Term</td>
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- **Vice-chancellor:** Head of the University, who unlike the Vice-chancellor, deals with the day-to-day business of the University. In Oxford, five Pro-Vice-Chancellors have specific responsibilities for Education; Research; Planning and Resources; Development and External Affairs; and Personnel and Equal Opportunities.
Appendix

Appendix 1: Evolution of MS in Oxford over the 20th Century

1913: The Convocation rejects the first potential Oxford Business Diploma
1953: Creation of the OUBiSS
1969: Lord Franks' Report followed a couple of months later by the Robbins' Report
1983: The OUCMS becomes Templeton College
2001: the University of Oxford School of MS becomes the Said Business School

1949: Annual Federation of British Industry held at Oxford
1965: Creation of the Oxford Centre for MS
1967: Introduction of the B Phil. in MS
1962: Wright's report + McClelland's appointment as a fellow in MS at Balliol
1991: Creation of the University of Oxford School of MS (first recognised institution)

Appendix 2: Evolution of MS in Cambridge over the 20th Century

1960: Mott Report published with recommendation for an expansion of 'science-based industry' in Cambridge
1970: Inspired by Mott Report, Trinity College establishes Cambridge Science Park; Set up of Wadsworth Cambridge Industrial Liaison Unit to support technology transfer
1971: The MS group within the engineering department
1984: new Professorship in MS is endowed by Peat Marwick and Co. Stephen Watson is appointed to this Chair
1988: University of Cambridge Institute for Manufacturing (IWM) established; Cambridge Network formed to provide a voice for the high-technology business community
1990: University of Cambridge Entrepreneurship Centre, University Challenge Fund and Cambridge University Entrepreneurs established

1994: Introduction of Engineering Tripos
1996: Cambridge Phenomenal report published by SOM, highlights growth of high-technology business activities in Cambridge
2001: Benefactions from Sir Paul Lady Judge and Monument Trust, introduction of the 1st Cambridge MBA

1975-1985: Marshall journey in the US and his appointment as Professor of Political Economy upon his return at Cambridge
1998: The University agrees MS to have its own department (1st institutionalisation)
2000: University of Cambridge Judge Institute of Management Studies officially set up
2006: The Institute for Management Studies became Judge Business School
Appendix 3: Letter from J.W. Platt to the Oxford Registrar, 17th January 1961, (OMSA, File 1)

Dear Registrar,

I shall be grateful if you will convey to the Vice-Chancellor a financial offer to Oxford University, which arises out of a luncheon held in St Anthony’s College on 3rd December 1960, at which the Vice-Chancellor and several University personalities interested in MS were present. This offer comes from the McKinsey Foundation for Management Research in the United States, which is an educational trust founded by the prominent firm of Management Consultants, McKinsey & Company Inc. The Trust is willing to put at the disposal of Oxford University a sum of $10,000, to be used to finance a report on the possibilities of developing MS at Oxford. It has been felt that in view of the diversity of opinions on this subject, Oxford University might wish to make their own careful appraisal of the possibilities and problems of introducing MS at the University, before they are officially initiated.

Although I am authorised to convey this offer to Oxford, I am sure you will understand that the formalities of this educational Trust will have to be observed, i.e., they will require a formal proposal which has to be submitted for the approval of the Trustees.

I am not fully familiar with Oxford procedure in these matters, and if you wish to talk this over me, I shall be happy to come up to Oxford on some mutually convenient date.

Yours truly, James W. Platt.

Appendix 4: Letter from Mr. Wright to the Chairman of the Board on MS, Professor Hicks, 25 May 1961, (OMSA, File 1)

As I see it, there are two major questions to be answered. The first is: ‘Is there, within the general field of MS, a substantial and unified collection of subjects that is also academically respectable when judged by our Oxford standards?’ The second is ‘What type and scale of facilities would have to be provided if these studies were introduced here?’

Before the Committee and university can answer these, it ought to be provided with answers to questions of the kind listed below. The list is not intended to be comprehensive, and there is inevitable over-lapping.

A. Questions relevant to ‘academic respectability’ to be asked about individual management subjects:
1. Can the teachers of the subject indulge in genuine academic research? Do they do so?
2. Would their interests cross-fertilize with those of present members of the University?
3. Is the subject ‘genuine’ is it large enough and sufficiently well provided with books to be taught and examined in the Oxford manner? i.e. is it well enough developed for examiners to be able to set papers which do not degenerate into requests for the performance of a limited repertoire of model answers?
4. What sort of intellectual spirit does the subject foster amongst those who study it?

B. Questions relevant to facilities to be asked about particular subject and also about possible courses (programmes’ in American):
1. Can the subjects be taught on a tutorial/lecture system or do they need the provision of more continuous classes and seminars?
2. Do these or other factors set an economic minimum to the scale of the course to be provided?
3. To what extent would the appointment of specialists be necessary?
4. Could the subject be organized within the system of colleges and existing institutions?

I believe that it is only by finding out the answers to lesser questions of this kind that we can give an answer to the greater. These lesser questions themselves are not all matters on which one man can come to definite conclusions, but they are matters on which a good deal of quite intensive detailed investigations would need to be made. One wants to see the subjects being taught, to see the work that is produced, and have plenty of time to absorb the intellectual atmosphere. I hope that about six weeks would be long enough to do this in a few US business schools selected for their quality and their contrast: Harvard, MIT, Columbia, Carnegie Tech., Cornell, and possibly Chicago.
Appendix 5: Oxford Centre for MS – Pamphlet - 1970

SENIOR MANAGERS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME – 1970

- (1) Quantitative Methods (C.A. Rands):
  The Quantitative Methods seminars are designed to develop the manager’s awareness of how mathematics can help him in decision-making. They demonstrate the manner in which problems may be analysed, and mathematics applied to provide a feasible solution. The aim is to enable a manager to use an O.R. or systems department to its full potential.

- (2) Managerial Economics (N.H. Leyland):
  Managerial Economics is the application of economic concepts to management problems. The purpose of this group of subjects is to develop the manager’s awareness of his problems by examining them from the point of view of an outside analytical observer.

- (3) Government-Industry Relations (N.H. Leyland):
  In the seminars the managers are given an insight into modern economic theories. The relations between the environment, government and the firm are explored.

- (4) Industrial Sociology (A.Fox):
  The course begins by examining the variety of men’s attitudes to work and the causes of the differences. What are the consequences at the different levels of the organisation in terms of co-operation and conflict? This involves a study of the social structure of the enterprise in respect of work roles and rewards, power and authority, group values and attitudes, and communications. The causes of conflict are further explored, along with the implications for management strategy.

- (5) Industrial Relations and Personnel Management (Dr. W.E.J. McCarthy):
  Managers are given an appreciation of what is necessary for the development and application of effective industrial relations and personnel policy. The focus throughout is on the problems of the firm and different levels of management within the firm. The central aim is to provide the basis of analysis for more effective use of manpower resources.

- (6) Marketing (H.R. Windle):
  Marketing is viewed as an adaptive process enabling the enterprise, within its total Corporate Strategy, to adjust continually to the changes in its markets and technologies. Special emphases include the increasing pressure towards an international view of markets and problems of organizing for effective marketing action.

- (7) Organisation (Rosemary Stewart):
  The aim is to show the manager why it is worth thinking about organisation; to help him to know when his problem is an organisational one and what kind of organisational problem it is. The seminars focus on different organisational decisions that must be made, and on some of the most common organisational problems that arise.

- (8) Finance and Investment (A.H. Vause):
  The seminars attempt to give an understanding of the underlying concepts of finance and the ability to use and interpret financial data.

- (9) Management Information (A.H. Vause):
Budgeting. Costing. Planning and Control. Measurement of Managerial Performance. Cost Effectiveness. Impact of Information Systems. Information for Decision-making. This section of the programme starts by surveying information and investment control systems; then it concentrates on the adaptation of this to the manager’s own decision-making situation, enabling him to get the maximum benefit from the flow of accounting information within his own organisation.

- (10) Business Policy (N.H. Leyland):
  Corporate Planning. Long-range Forecasting. Reconciliation of Objectives.
The purpose of this seminar is to consider the business as a whole in relation to its environment and to discuss the appropriate methods for the firm to adapt to its environment.

Appendix 6: Major recommendations of the Moser Report (Oxford University General Board of faculties, 1988)

(a) “That there should be an Oxford University School of Management responsible for all Management education within the University (possible involving a change of status of TC);
(b) that a number of faculties should establish bipartite or multipartite undergraduate courses in which Management-related subjects occupy a significant part of the course;
(c) that a full-time, two-year MBA course should be introduced consisting of a “generalist” first year and a “specialist” second year – students with the appropriate qualifications would be entitled to exemption from the generalist year and would proceed immediately to the specialist year;
(d) that students should have the option of part-time study for the MBA;
(e) that a full-time, three-year doctoral programme should be introduced of which the first year should consist of research training, to be followed by two years of research;
(f) that the University should approve an increase in overall undergraduate and graduate student numbers to allow for the proposed development of MS.
(Extract from the General Board of the Faculties, Hebdomadal Council, Vol. CLXXIX, 20 April 1988: 39)

Appendix 7: Letter to the Chairman of the General Board from the Chairman [Donald Hay] of the working party (Oxford University General Board of faculties, 1989)

The Working Party has now completed its task, and the Report has been submitted. We have interpreted our brief to include design of an academic programme (and particularly an MBA) that accords with Oxford’s traditions of international academic excellence, and the exploration of the financial implications of that programme. In making our proposals, we have been greatly influenced by the need to compete with the leading Schools of Management in terms of both staff and students. (…) we believe that the proposals represent the best way forward: institutional difficulties should be regarded as matters to be resolved rather than as inseparable obstacles to the whole scheme. Many of these difficulties could be avoided by creating a School of Management with only minor links to the rest of the University (e.g. if all MBA students were matriculated through Templeton). But we believe that in the long run both the University and the School of Management would be the losers from such an arrangement. Integration of the School into the life of the University should be accorded a high priority.
The Working Party also considered timing, in respect of fund raising. We are aware that both the London Business School and Cambridge University will be making major fundraising initiatives for management education in 1990. Unless Oxford can act quickly, we may find that potential benefactors have been lured elsewhere. A key to acting quickly in this field is the appointment of the Dean or Director of the School to spearhead a fundraising effort, once a decision has been taken in principle to go ahead, and without waiting for all the details to be agreed across the University. Such an appointment should be made no later than June 1990, as a signal to potential donors that we are committed to the creation of a major School of Management at Oxford within a relatively short time period.

(Signed) Donald Hay
(Extract from the General Board of the Faculties, Hebdomadal Council, 1989: 772)
Appendix 8: The Hi-Tech Start-ups associated with the Cambridge University (Copyright: Y.M.Myint and Dr. Shailendra Vyakarnam, CfEL, Judge Business School)

Appendix 9: MS Tripos in Cambridge (Within the Department of Engineering tripos) 1998

Lectures proposed by the Board of the Faculty of Engineering

ENGINEERING TRIPOS, PART IA  MICHAELMAS 1998 / LENT 1999 / EASTER 1999

PART II (continued): MS TRIPOS

Paper M 1 (Organisational behaviour) (Sixteen lectures)
Leader: A.N. Other: DR N.OLIVER AND DR A.D. BROWN

Paper M2 (Quantitative methods)
Leader: Dr C.W. Hope: DR C.W. HOPE AND DR I. RUDY

Paper M3 (Economics of firms and markets) (Sixteen lectures)
Leader: Dr J. Collier: DR G. HODGSON, DR J. COLLIER, DR A.D. COSH AND DR C. PITELIS

Paper M4 (Finance management accounting) Details to be announced (Sixteen lectures)

Paper M5 (Operations management) Details to be accounted (Sixteen lectures)

Paper M6 (Marketing) A.N. OTHER

Paper M7 (International HRM) Details to be announced (Sixteen lectures)

Paper M8 (Management Science)
DR F. VANDERBECK (Sixteen lectures)

Paper M9 (International business economics)
DR C. PITELIS

Paper M10 (Corporate finance)
DR B.LAMBRECHT (Sixteen lectures)

Paper M11 (Information systems)
DR J.ALLEN AND DR I.RUDY (Sixteen lectures)

Paper M12 (Strategic management)
DR J. HENDRY (Sixteen lectures)

MS TRIPOS (A detailed timetable will be displayed in the Department) Lectures in LT1, Judge Institute
Appendix 10: The early days of MS in Cambridge: The MS research group members constitute the actual “founding members” of JBS with Dr Elizabeth Garnsey, Dr Andy Cosh, Professor Geoff Walsham, Dr David Livesey, Professor David Watson, Colin Gill and Professor Eddie Anderson.
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