La décision de l'expérimentation à l'interprétation : l'apport de Donald Davidson

Abstract : This Phd thesis examines the decision theory proposed by the American philosopher Donald Davidson. After having reading and discussing Ramsey (1926), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954), Davidson founded his own axiomatic theory and experimental procedure by introducing subjective probabilities, contrary to previous expected utility tests. However, 1957 and 1959's experiments results led him to criticize, even to deny, his fist decision analyses. He then turned his mind to philosophy of action and language which allow him to add and back his first criticisms. The most central one concern the way the experimenter eludes the significations subjects attribute to alternatives. He however built a new decision theory in the 1980's which integrates language interpretation. Taking over the Bolker-Jeffey (1965) model, Davidson proposes to simultaneously analyse desires (utilities), believes (probabilities) and significations. This dissertation determines to what extent this second original theory answer the criticisms one can made to the fist one. More generally, it highlights the contribution of a decision theory crossing economics and philosophy.
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Pôl-Vincent Harnay. La décision de l'expérimentation à l'interprétation : l'apport de Donald Davidson. Economies et finances. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2008. Français. ⟨tel-00363905⟩

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