s'authentifier
version française rss feed
HAL : ijn_00000138, version 1

Fiche concise  Récupérer au format
Qui a peur des qualia corporels?
Dokic J.
Philosophiques 27, 1 (2000) 77-98 - http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000138
Qui a peur des qualia corporels?
Jérôme Dokic () 1
1 :  Institut Jean-Nicod (IJN)
http://www.institutnicod.org/
CNRS : UMR8129 – Ecole normale supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS]
Pavillon Jardin 29, rue d'Ulm 75005 Paris
France
Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain "inside" and perceiving it "outside" (seeing oneself or another in pain). I sketch another reductionist analysis which is compatible with materialism, and according to which the intentional object of bodily awareness, unlike that of external perception, constitutively depends on the subject's experience.
Articles dans des revues avec comité de lecture
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de l'esprit

Philosophiques
27
1
2000
77-98

Liste des fichiers attachés à ce document : 
PDF
ijn_00000138_00.PDF(78.8 KB)
TXT
ijn_00000138_00.txt(71.6 KB)