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Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity

Pascal Billand 1, Christophe Bravard 1, Sudipta Sarangi 2

(2011)

In this paper, we pursue the work of H. Haller and al. (2005, [10]) and examine the existence of equilibrium networks, called Nash networks, in the noncooperative two-way flow model (Bala and Goyal, 2000, [1]) with partner heterogeneous agents. We show through an example that Nash networks do not always exist in such a context. We then restrict the payoff function, in order to find conditions under which Nash networks always exist. We give two properties : increasing differences and convexity in the first argument of the payoff function, that ensure the existence of Nash networks. It is worth noting that linear payoff functions satisfy the previous properties.

1 :	Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne)
	CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière - Lyon II – École Normale Supérieure - Lyon
2 :	Department of Economics, Louisiana State University
	Department of Economics, Louisiana State University

Discipline

:

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economie et finances

Mots-Clés : Nash networks – two-way flow models – partner heterogeneity

halshs-00574277, version 1

http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00574277

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Contributeur : Nelly Wirth <>

Soumis le : Lundi 7 Mars 2011, 15:56:37

Dernière modification le : Mardi 8 Mars 2011, 10:09:24