4129 articles – 7346 references  [version française]
HAL: halshs-00590841, version 1

Detailed view  Export this paper
The political economy of job protection and income redistribution
Bruno Amable 1, 2, 3, Donatella Gatti 1, 2, 4, 5
(2005-01)

This paper presents a model allowing to analyze voting, welfare institutions and economic performance. We consider a political economy framework with three classes of agents: entrepreneurs, employed workers and unemployed workers. Agents vote on alternative institutional options: the degree of labour market flexibility and the intensity of redistribution. We show that the welfare state configuration depends on the nature of the political system - majoritarian, coalition, twoparty. Because internationalization reduces the possibility for national government to e.ectively tax profits, the existing political coalition is fragilized by the process of globalization. The model generates results concerning the macroeconomic equilibrium employment level. Hence we can assess the effects of internationalization on macroeconomic performance. The impact of internalization depends on the nature of the political system (majoritarian versus coalition government) and on the institutional configuration (positive flexibility versus positive redistribution).
1:  Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications (CEPREMAP)
CEPREMAP
2:  Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] – Ecole des Ponts ParisTech – Ecole normale supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris
3:  Université Paris 10, Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense (UP10)
Université Paris X - Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense – Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique
4:  IZA
Institute for the Study of Labor
5:  Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UNIV LYON 2)
Université Lumière - Lyon II
Humanities and Social Sciences/Economy and finances
job security – redistribution – political equilibriums – unemployment
Attached file list to this document: 
PDF
wp200512.pdf(315.6 KB)