Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2014

Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences

Résumé

We try in this paper to characterize the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia. Our study is based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and a comparison of the critical threshold of collusion between operators in developing countries like Tunisia. The market power is estimated based on the work of Parker Roller (1997) and the assumption of "Balanced Calling Pattern". We use then the model of Friedman (1971) to compare the critical threshold of collusion. We show that the "conduct parameter" measuring the intensity of competition is not null during the period 1993-2011. Results show also that collusion is easier on the Tunisian market that on the Algerian, Jordanian, or Moroccan one.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00956638 , version 1 (07-03-2014)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00956638 , version 1

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Sami Debbichi, Walid Hichri. Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences. 2014. ⟨halshs-00956638⟩
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