Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing ; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks

Muriel Fadairo (1) , Jianyu Yu (2)

1 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
2 Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

This paper investigates the rationales of exclusive dealing (ED), which is one of the most common forms of vertical restraint and attracts intense policy debates in anti-trust regulations. Based on a survey of the theoretical literature, we derive several hypotheses relative to the anti- and pro-competitive motivations of ED. These hypotheses are submitted to French data regarding several types of distribution networks in a wide range of sectors. Considering the industry features, our empirical analysis indicates that in the French distribution system, ED contracts tend to be procompetitive. The evidence suggests that the motivation of ED mainly lies in its positive role to foster the investment of upstream firms.

Mots clés: Exclusive dealing; Vertical restraints; Competition policy

Domaines: Economies et finances

Muriel Fadairo, Jianyu Yu. Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing ; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks. 2014. ⟨halshs-00945551⟩