A Note on Values for Markovian Coalition Processes

Ulrich Faigle (1) , Michel Grabisch (2, 3)

1 Universität zu Köln = University of Cologne
2 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics

The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $N$ when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. The authors have proposed in a previous paper an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain, and need not finish at the grand coalition. The aim of this note is to develop some explanations in the general context of time discrete stochastic processes, exhibit new properties of the model, correct some inaccuracies in the original paper, and give a new version of the axiomatization.

Mots clés: coalitional game; coalition formation process; Shapley value

Domaines: Economies et finances

Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch. A Note on Values for Markovian Coalition Processes. Economic Theory Bulletin, 2013, pp.111-122. ⟨halshs-00912889⟩