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Article Dans Une Revue B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Année : 2013

Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information

Résumé

We experimentally study an asymmetric coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one is Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. We assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate the imperfect equilibrium. Our treatments involve three information-enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals: messages from partner or observation of his past choices. Repetition-based learning increases the frequencies of the most efficient outcome and the most costly strategic mismatch. Moreover, it is superseded by individual signals. Like previous empirical studies, we find that signals provide a screening of partners' intentions that reduces the frequency of coordination failures. Unlike these studies, we find that the transmission of information between partners, either via messages or observation, does not suffice to significantly increase the overall efficiency of outcomes. This happens mostly because information does not restrain the choice of the dominated action by senders.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00845123 , version 1 (16-07-2013)

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Nicolas Jacquemet, Adam Zylbersztejn. Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2013, 13 (1), pp.215-247. ⟨10.1515/bejte-2012-0018⟩. ⟨halshs-00845123⟩
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