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Ambiguity and Coordination in a Global. Game Model of Financial Crises
Daniel Laskar 1, 2
(11/2012)

We consider a two-player global game where creditors, who finance some investment project, have to decide whether to roll over their loans or not. We use a non-Bayesian approach where creditors exhibit some aversion to ambiguity. We show that an increase in ambiguity reduces the perceived coordination of players in rolling over their loans. This contibutes to increasing the probability of a financial crisis, and therefore provides an additional argument in favor of transparency in the model considered.
1 :  Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics (EEP-PSE)
Ecole d'Économie de Paris
2 :  Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
CNRS : UMR8545 – École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) – École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris – Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economie et finances
Financial crises – Ambiguity – Uncertainty – Global games – Coordination – Transparency
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