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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Public Economic Theory Année : 2009

Bargaining over Public Goods

Résumé

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bar- gaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lin- dahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The pro- cedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00633592 , version 1 (18-10-2011)

Identifiants

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Julio Davila, Jan Eeckhout, C. Martinelli. Bargaining over Public Goods. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, 11 (6), pp.927-945. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01438.x⟩. ⟨halshs-00633592⟩
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