Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains

Joseph M. Abdou (1, 2) , Hans Keiding (3)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics
3 UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet

We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic gameform using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider gameforms with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding [Abdou, J., Keiding, H., 2003. On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 243-260].

Mots clés: Nash equilibrium; Strong equilibrium; Solvability; Effectivity; Acyclicity

Domaines: Economies et finances; Topologie générale [math.GN]

Joseph M. Abdou, Hans Keiding. Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, 45 (11), pp.708-719. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.005⟩. ⟨halshs-00633578⟩