Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms

Eric Guerci (1, 2) , Sylvie Thoron (1)

1 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
2 GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion

We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitration) with a new arbitration scheme, non compulsory, we proposed in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron (2008)): ROC (Recursive Offer Conciliation). The two mechanisms are also compared with a negotiation without arbitration. We observe that the ROC mechanism seems to cumulate the advantages of the two other procedures, it avoids the high frequency of impasses observed under the FOA procedure and it is as efficient as the Free procedure in this respect. Furthermore, in an asymmetric treatment, it helps the subjects to find an agreement around the equal split of the surplus, like the arbitrator of the FOA procedure does, but without imposing anything on them.

Mots clés: negotiation; bargaining; arbitration; Raiffa solution; chilling effect; dispute resolution; experiments

Domaines: Economies et finances

Eric Guerci, Sylvie Thoron. Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms. 2011. ⟨halshs-00584328⟩