Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores

Aymeric Lardon (1)

1 GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion

In this article we study interval games in oligopolies following the γ-approach. First, we analyze their non-cooperative foundation and show that each coalition is associated with an endogenous real interval. Second, the Hurwicz criterion turns out to be a key concept to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of each of the induced core solution concepts: the interval and the standard γ-cores. The first condition permits to ascertain that even for linear and symmetric industries the interval γ-core is empty. Moreover, by means of the approximation technique of quadratic Bézier curves we prove that the second condition always holds, hence the standard γ-core is non-empty, under natural properties of profit and cost functions.

Mots clés: Interval game; Oligopoly; γ-Cores; Hurwicz criterion; Quadratic Bézier curve

Domaines: Economies et finances

Aymeric Lardon. Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores. Annals of Operations Research, 2016, ⟨10.1007/s10479-016-2211-7⟩. ⟨halshs-00544044⟩