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| HAL : halshs-00527563, version 1 |
| Fiche détaillée |  Récupérer au format |
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| Economic Inquiry 50, 2 (2012) pp. 484-501 |
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| Biased Information and Effort |
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| Julie Rosaz 1 |
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| (2012) |
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| We study the impact of information manipulation by a principal on the agent's effort. In a context of asymmetric information at the principal's advantage, we test experimentally the principal's willingness to bias (overestimate or under-estimate) the information she gives to her agent on his ability in order to motivate him to exert more effort. We find that i) principals do bias information, ii) agents trust the cheap-talk messages they receive and adjust their effort accordingly. Therefore, biased messages improve both the agent's performance and thus the principal's profit. This, however, does not increase efficiency. We also find that over-estimation occurs much more often than under-estimation. Making the signal costly in an additional treatment reduces this effect. |
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| 1 : | Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne) |
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CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière - Lyon II – École Normale Supérieure - Lyon |
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| Discipline | : | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economie et finances |
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| information – feedback – bias – motivation – experiment |
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| Liste des fichiers attachés à ce document : | |||||
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| halshs-00527563, version 1 | |
| http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00527563 | |
| oai:halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr:halshs-00527563 | |
| Contributeur : Nelly Wirth | |
| Soumis le : Mardi 19 Octobre 2010, 15:54:44 | |
| Dernière modification le : Jeudi 12 Avril 2012, 16:25:52 | |
