Moral hazard and risk-sharing: risk-taking as an incentive tool

Mohamed Belhaj (1) , Renaud Bourlès (1) , Frédéric Deroïan (1)

1 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille

We examine how moral hazard impacts risk-sharing when risk-taking can be part of the mechanism design. In a two-agent model with binary effort, we show that moral hazard always increases risk-taking (that is the amount of wealth invested in a risky project) whereas the effect on risk-sharing (the amount of wealth transferred between agents) is ambiguous. Risk-taking therefore appears as a useful incentive tool. In particular, in the case of preferences exhibiting Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), moral hazard has no impact on risk-sharing and risk-taking is the unique mechanism used to solve moral hazard. Thus, risk-taking appears to be the prevailing incentive tool.

Mots clés: Risk-Taking; Informal Insurance; Moral Hazard

Domaines: Economies et finances

Mohamed Belhaj, Renaud Bourlès, Frédéric Deroïan. Moral hazard and risk-sharing: risk-taking as an incentive tool. 2010. ⟨halshs-00512779⟩