Threshold Value: how binding thresholds affect the outcome of a negotiation

Sylvie Thoron (1)

1 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille

The objective of this paper is to give the prospective outcome or "prospect" of a negotiation when the players' value can only be realized if a certain threshold is reached. Thresholds can be of different forms such as a certain number of players, a certain coalition of players or a certain total level of contribution. A value is proposed, which is defined for a given game and a given threshold. It is derived from a decomposition of the Shapley value.

Mots clés: threshold; commitment; Shapley value; coalition structures; weights

Domaines: Economies et finances

Sylvie Thoron. Threshold Value: how binding thresholds affect the outcome of a negotiation. 2010. ⟨halshs-00512774⟩