 |
 |
 |
|
|
|
| HAL : halshs-00464387, version 1 |
| Fiche détaillée |  Export this paper |
 |
|
|
| Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision |
|
|
| Ahmet Ozkardas 1Agnieszka Rusinowska 1 |
|
|
| (2009) |
|
|
|
| In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria between the union and the firm for the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each period in which there is a disagreement. A certain generalization of the original Rubinstein bargaining model is applied to determine these equilibria. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 : | Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne) |
|
|
|
CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière - Lyon II – École Normale Supérieure - Lyon |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Discipline | : | Humanities and Social Sciences/Economy and finances |
|
|
| union - firm bargaining – alternating offers – varying discount rates – subgame perfection |
|
|
|
| Liste des fichiers attachés à ce document : | |||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
| halshs-00464387, version 1 | |
| http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00464387 | |
| oai:halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr:halshs-00464387 | |
| Contributeur : Nelly Wirth | |
| Submitted on : Wednesday, 17 March 2010 08:55:29 | |
| Updated on : Wednesday, 17 March 2010 13:42:11 | |
