

Chinese Religiosities

Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation

EDITED BY MAYFAIR MEI-HUI YANG



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8 Republican Church Engineering

The National Religious Associations in 1912 China

Vincent Goossaert 高萬桑

Western paradigms of the political management of religion have been clearly and explicitly influential in China since the early twentieth century. These paradigms are quite varied, from the U.S. “wall of separation” to French *laïcité* and northern Europe’s national churches, but they all have in common a post-Enlightenment definition of religion as a church-like institution separate from society, and processes of negotiation between church and state for privileges and uses of the public sphere.

The effect on the Chinese world of these paradigms began at the turn of the twentieth century, when the Western categories that underpin these paradigms were first introduced in China and then used by the dying empire (–1911) and by the Republic of China (1912–) to elaborate new religious policies. The bottom line of these policies was the recognition and limited support for those “religions” that could prove they fit a certain definition of this alien category, along with active suppression of anything else, categorized as “superstition” (Goossaert 2003, 2006a). It is in this framework that the successive Chinese regimes have conducted a policy branded as secular, even though, as many of the chapters in this volume show, this secularism should be considered a claim rather than a fact. The new religious policies of the Republican regime entailed the abandonment by the state of the imperial regime’s religious prerogatives and the creation of a realm where “religions” could manage their own affairs within a framework of control and regulation set up by the “secular” state. Creating such a realm proved to be more complex than initially imagined by Republican leaders.

From an institutional perspective, one of the major aspects of state secularization worldwide has been the negotiation, or tension, between state and religion in defining their respective realms and the scope of their

relationships. Such a process of negotiation was first experienced in the Christian West, where religion was equated with the church, which had authoritative representatives able to negotiate with the state. In places long Christianized, such as Latin America, this model of the state versus religion-as-church fit naturally. But China, like many other countries in Asia and elsewhere, did not fit such a model: to negotiate the institutional processes of secularization, the modern Chinese state first had to engineer, or help engineer, the building of church-like institutions so as to have a legitimate religious counterpart to deal with. This process was a top-down initiative in which both political and religious leaders saw the need for a new kind of religious institution for a variety of reasons, including aligning Chinese practice with the Christian model, playing the new game of political representation, exerting effective control from the center, unifying the nation, and reforming society.

This is the context in which we can understand the sudden appearance, as early as the first months of 1912 (the Republic proclaimed by revolutionary insurgents having become the legitimate state with the emperor's abdication on February 12), of nationwide associations claiming to represent the various traditions seeking state recognition and protection under the new category of "religions." These associations were both rushed attempts to face immediate threats (temple confiscation, in particular) and attempts to reinvent traditional religions as Christian-like churches.

By comparing the creation of national Daoist, Buddhist, Confucian, and Muslim associations in 1912—we will see that Christians are a case apart—I would like to document and analyze the first stage of these church-building efforts, the effects of which have dominated the relationships between Chinese states (in the PRC and in Taiwan) and religions for almost a hundred years. In spite of disappointing early results, this church-building enterprise met with increasing success, notably during the Communist period. In Taiwan until 1986, and to a large extent in the PRC to this day, the national religious associations were the only legal and formal framework for practicing religion and for conducting negotiations between state agents and religious leaders.¹ This situation is now being contested, both by groups at the margin of legality and by increasing formal possibilities of conducting religious activities outside of these associations. And even though these century-long efforts at reinventing Chinese religions in the framework of the national associations have mostly (with the possible exception of Islam) failed to live up to the expectations of the associations' leaders, they have nonetheless deeply changed the way Chinese religions are organized, both in relation to the state and internally.

A NEW PARADIGM: RELIGION AND SUPERSTITION

A press article published in 1901 by the famed essayist Liang Qichao (1873–1929) introduced to the Chinese language the term *zongjiao* (宗教), destined to translate the Western notion of “religion,” and this word was from the start paired with its opposite, *mixin* (迷信, “superstition”). Both were taken over from Japanese, in which they had been coined some years before (Bastid 1998; Chen X. 2002). These neologisms were part of a larger set of imported categories used to reclassify the whole of knowledge and social and political practices, including such words as “science” and “philosophy.” Chinese intellectuals first debated the meaning of these notions, so foreign to the late imperial Chinese world where religious life and social organization were deeply intertwined. During the first years of the century, *zongjiao* was almost synonymous with Christianity, but soon also included Islam, which was logical because it translated Western models of “religion.” *Zongjiao* only gradually came to include Daoism and Buddhism, and heated arguments for and against the inclusion of Confucianism in this category raged for many years before the opponents gained the upper hand by the 1920s. Most of Chinese religion (or Chinese popular religion, as it is often labeled) remained excluded and was categorized as “customs,” “folklore,” or “superstition,” even though this is now changing with the formation of new official categories such as “popular faith.”

The notion of “religion” brought a theoretical justification to a vast project conducted by various sections of the late imperial and Republican political elites, aiming at reconfiguring the religious field and drastically reducing the realm of legitimate religion. This realm shrank from the rather encompassing category of orthodoxy defined by the imperial regime to just a few “religions” on a Christian-based model. One of the consequences of this drastic reduction was the confiscation and destruction of a very large number of local temples, formerly orthodox but now labeled superstitious. This destruction was conducted in the name of anti-superstition, but also in order to appropriate the material and symbolic resources of local religious institutions toward state-building. I have attempted in another publication (Goossaert 2006b) to sketch the emergence of this project around 1898 and the key figure of Kang Youwei (1858–1927).

The provisional constitution of the Republic of China, proclaimed on March 11, 1912, stipulated the “freedom of religious belief” (信教自由, *xinjiao ziyou*). This text did not guarantee protection against destruction and violence in temples, but it encouraged legislators and thinkers to elaborate on the difference between legitimate “religion” and “superstition.”

This approach to religious policies was carried over and formalized by the Nationalist regime after 1927. As Rebecca Nedostup (2001) has shown, after having rejected early temptations to declare an outright ban on religions, the regime decided to work with recognized, institutional religions along a corporatist model, while launching an all-out fight against “superstitions.”

Such is the intellectual context in which the early Republican government elaborated a new official doctrine for religious policies. Religious affairs were entrusted to a bureau under the Ministry of Education—itsself a telling fact in a context where tens if not hundreds of thousands of temples were being forcibly converted into schools. In June 1912, this bureau published a blueprint in which it declared that it aimed at reforming (*gailiang*) existing religions so that they might contribute to social progress.² This document did not in itself constitute the solid foundation of a long-standing policy because it was published in a time of political chaos, when leaders and ideas came and went in rapid succession. Yet it deserves attention inasmuch as it was part of the immediate context in which the first national religious associations were created. Furthermore, it established quite clearly, and very early on, the modern Chinese state’s fundamental positions in matters of religious policies, and these positions have remained more or less the same ever since: the state was ready to recognize “religions” as doctrinal, spiritual, and ethical systems with a social organization, but only if they got rid of “superstition” (including most of their ritual). The document plans to “respect each religion’s basic doctrines while rectifying its later derivations such as rituals and customs” (依據宗教之本義而糾正其末流之儀式及習慣, *yiju zongjiao zhi benyi er jiuzheng qi moliu zhi yishi ji xiguan*).

The document left the list of such “religions” open, but it included Buddhism (if cleansed of its ritual practices) a priori, while excluding Confucianism (the debate on this point would rage through the 1910s) as well as Daoism. Only on the last point would later policies depart significantly from the June 1912 blueprint, since Daoism—or, rather, a very purist, streamlined interpretation of “Daoism”—was included among the religions recognized by the Beiyang, Nationalist, and Communist states.

The criteria by which the modern Chinese state decided whether or not to include a religious tradition on its list of recognized “religions” have mostly remained hazy, with few explicit guidelines. Other countries, notably in Asia, have experienced comparable processes of selecting recognized “religions,” but they usually had clearer and more precise criteria that religions-to-be had to conform to.³ The Chinese state’s attitude has

been quite pragmatic: a religion was recognized if it could prove it was “pure” (spiritual and ethical in nature), well organized (hence the national associations), and useful (patriotic and contributing to social welfare and progress). Therefore, the official list of recognized religions was never closed but encompassed those for which a national religious association was officially registered by the state; requests for such registration were always treated on a case-by-case basis (Nedostup 2001:82–90). In practice, the current list of five recognized religions (Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Buddhism, Daoism) appeared as early as 1912, but at various points in Republican history some other traditions, including the new religious groups known in recent scholarship as redemptive societies, were added to the list when their association was officially recognized.

One of the earliest of these was the Zailijiao (Teaching of the Abiding Principle), which set up the Republic of China General Association for the Prevention of Alcohol and Tobacco according to Li Virtuous Teachings (中華全國理善勸戒煙酒總會, *Zhonghua Quanguo Lishan Quanjie Yanjiu Zonghui*) that was recognized by the Yuan Shikai government in June 1913. The Zailijiao chose to officially take the form of a charity, but other redemptive societies adopted a more clearly religious status, such as the Tongshanshe (同善社, Fellowship of Goodness), which set up its own nationwide association recognized by the Peking government in 1917; more redemptive societies were to follow the same path during the 1920s. Because I focus here on the national associations created in 1912, I must keep the redemptive societies largely out of the discussion, while remembering that they actually played a central role in the religious institutional engineering of the Republican period.

THE CHRISTIAN NORMATIVE MODEL

The religious policy paradigm at work in 1912 was based on the prestige and influence among political elites of a Christian normative model of religion. This influence was partly due to the role of Chinese Christians. The first and ephemeral president, Sun Yat-sen, had been baptized in 1884, at age 18, after having been trained in Christian colleges in Hawai‘i and Hong Kong (Bergère 1994:28–30). Among the 274 members elected (indirectly, through assemblies of local elites) between December 1912 and January 1913 to the first national parliament, 60 were Christians. This proportion was totally out of measure when we consider that Christians accounted for much less than 1 percent of the population. It was not as Christians that these MPs were elected, though, but because Christians accounted for a

large proportion of the new classes of urban elites and political activists that fully supported the Republican enterprise, notably professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers, custom officers).

One key factor in Christianity's influence over the new elites was its control over higher education. Many professionals and urban elites had been trained in Western colleges in China or abroad. Among the universities and technical training institutes founded since the last years of the nineteenth century, a good half were church-run (either Catholic or Protestant), and some private universities had been founded by Christian Chinese philanthropists. The only (but important) exception to Christian influence was military academies. In addition, the press, which was still in part inspired by Western interests, although to a lesser extent than during the last decades of the Qing, played a major role in the diffusion of Christian ideals about the building of a new China.

As a result, fair numbers of non-Christian political activists were, until the 1920s, happy to work with and to support the political and civic initiatives of Chinese Christians. Institutions such as the YMCA united Christian and non-Christian local leaders in projects to promote education or hygiene. Such non-Christian acceptance of Christian elites sprang from their sharing a political vision of a new, modern, democratic China that both espoused Western political ideals, most notably the U.S. model, and were ready to stand up and criticize Western powers for any encroachment on Chinese sovereignty (Dunch 2001a). Chinese Christians served as intermediaries in the transfer from the West of ideas and practices of a modern nation-state, such as civic rituals around the flag and the national anthem. Furthermore, Christians provided the notion that a good believer—that is, a public-minded, thrifty, honest, sober, decent person—was *de facto* a good citizen. The involvement of many Chinese Christians in public life, civic projects, and campaigns against opium, foot-binding, and other “social ills” convinced many urban Chinese of the practical benefits of religion, and these became sympathizers or even converted.

More than the number of converts, then, the Christian normative model of religion proved to be influential by its impact on Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist leaders. Not only was Christianity thus the model for “religion,” but throughout the twentieth century, Chinese political, intellectual, and religious leaders have been extremely sensitive to Western judgments and analyses of Chinese religion.⁴ A particularly telling case of such sensitivity is Kang Youwei's utterance: “Foreigners come in our temples, take photographs of the idols, show these photographs to each other, and laugh.”⁵ This sentence was later copied verbatim in the introduction

of the most important and famous anti-superstition law of the Nationalist government, the 1928 “Standards for Retaining or Abolishing Deity Temples” (*Shenci cunfei biaozhun*; Anonymous 1933b). This example and many similar statements show that under Western, mostly Protestant, influence, worship and ritual (the sensory forms of religion) were most often categorized as superstition.

THE 1912 INVENTION OF CHURCH-LIKE RELIGIONS

In the new context of 1912, in which a “religion” had to conform to a Western, Christian-based model to be recognized by the state and protected by law, Chinese religious traditions, notably Buddhism and Daoism, had to reinvent and redefine themselves. They were to represent themselves as religious institutions separate from “lay” society and without any connection to the local cults of village society (“superstition”). They had to create national associations capable of representing them and of negotiating with the state. This was the first time that Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, and Chinese Islam had organized themselves in a hierarchical manner. Such a reinvention was no easy enterprise, not only because it generated internal conflicts and confusion but because Buddhism and Daoism both actually operated as clerical, elitist traditions in the service of local cults and lay communities, providing them with salvation techniques, liturgies, and religious specialists trained to take over all sorts of clerical work (rituals, temple management, fund-raising, writing history and other kinds of texts, etc.). The task was particularly difficult for Daoism, which was intimately interlocked with local cults.

Before 1911, there were no Daoist, Buddhist, Confucian, or Muslim organizations coordinating all clerics at the national level, even though in some areas clerical specialists, like many other professions, had set up guilds. The late Qing years had also seen the birth of some local religious associations, mainly with educational goals. But the only kind of China-wide organization was the state, which controlled Confucians through the school system, and, more distantly, Buddhists and Daoists through the clerical branches of the bureaucracy, the Taoist Clerical Administration (*Daolu Si*) and the Buddhist Clerical Administration (*Senglu Si*). These two institutions, however, were weak and even nonexistent in many districts; they mostly worked as intermediaries between the state and clerics and did not play any role in helping Buddhists or Daoists get together and make collective decisions to further their common interests.⁶ In any case, the imperial state was opposed to any such organization and collective

action. For their part, Muslims were subjected to no such institution of control, and the “sectarian” traditions (out of which the redemptive societies emerged) were outright illegal.

The birth of new religious policies after 1898 and the advent of the Republic in 1912 dramatically changed this situation. First, the Daolu Si and Senglu Si, as well as the imperial code and the special status it granted to clerics, were all gone. Second, the ideology of the new regime, inspired by Western and Japanese political models, was to allow social groups to organize and represent their lawful interests to the state. Third, the assorted reformers and revolutionaries who staffed the various local and national governments of the Republican period shared a common program of assaulting traditional religion and expropriating temples. Being in a legal limbo and fearing, with cause, for their temples and monasteries, Buddhists and Daoists alike felt the urgent need to muster any kind of organized defense they could. Although less directly threatened, Confucians and Muslims also had to redefine their place in the new political and social order.

Faced with both the fresh possibility and the urgent need to form associations to unite and act on the political scene, Confucians, Buddhists, Daoists, and Muslims (terms by which I mean both religious specialists and engaged laypersons) reacted with energy as well as predictable confusion. Many of them had ideas about how to adapt their religion to the new context, and all proceeded to create their own national associations. Some were mostly apologetic, while others had more radical plans for a religious modernization. During the 1912–27 period, such associations mushroomed. Most had only an ephemeral existence, with tiny memberships and grand projects that never made the transition from paper to reality. Naturally, such competition among the numerous associations all claiming to represent the whole of their religion contradicted their common project of China-wide unification. The only associations that managed to build a China-wide membership, to obtain government recognition, and to score some success in the legislative battles against radical anti-religious projects were those presided over by prestigious leaders, usually charismatic clerics, and commanding widespread respect among lay sympathizers.

Buddhist Associations

The Buddhists were the first to organize during the early months of 1912, and they did so in a very disorderly fashion. Modernists, notably the radical monk Taixu (1890–1947) and the anti-clerical layman Ouyang Jian (1870–1943), proposed a complete overhaul of clerical training and manage-

ment of monastic property. Both men created an association that managed to get some degree of support from the nascent Republican government. In March 1912, Ouyang Jian established in Nanjing the Buddhist Association (佛教會, Fojiao Hui), which was granted recognition by Sun Yat-sen's government.⁷ This prompted a reaction by the monastic establishment, which set up on April 1, 1912 in Shanghai a broad-based national organization, the General Buddhist Association of China (中華佛教總會, Zhonghua Fojiao Zonghui), under the direction of the celebrated ascetic Abbot Bazhi (Bazhi Toutuo, or Jing'an, 1852–1912).⁸ It was the latter association that became the official representative of Buddhism, but it was disbanded in 1918, when its requests displeased the Republican government. Up to 1949, the same story of various Buddhist associations, jostling for supremacy, continued along the lines of a division between radical reformers and the monastic establishment.⁹

The charter of the General Buddhist Association (Shanghai) emphasized the role of the association in the diffusion of Buddhism. It envisioned the founding of schools (thereby institutionalizing various local initiatives toward Buddhist schools since the early 1900s), in addition to confessional universities along the Japanese model. It also planned to establish a corps of missionaries (who would be sent among the military, into prisons and hospitals, and abroad), presses and journals, research institutes, and various welfare programs.

At the same time, the association granted itself the authority to control the behavior of its members (in particular monks and nuns) and the power to prevent a master from taking a disciple who would not be fit for a clerical career. The following article in the association's charter, for instance, flies in the face of two thousand years of Chinese Buddhist practice, in which each temple and monastery was totally independent:

The current messy situation of the clergy is due to the lack of control over the selection of novices. From now on, any temple or monastery where [a monk/nun] wishes to take a novice must first submit a report to the local branch of the association, which will in turn enquire about the candidate's background and his/her motivation for entering the clergy. Only with the association's formal authorization will the candidate be admitted. (Zhongguo Di'er Lishi Dang'an Guan 1998:708)

Historians of modern Chinese Buddhism have emphasized the revolutionary aspects of the associations set up by Taixu, Ouyang Jian, and other reformers who wanted to gain control of religious landholdings and other resources (which were traditionally managed autonomously by each monastery or temple). Yet the innovations—notably those exerting control

over clerics and centralized discipline—that were brought up, at least on paper, even by the more “conservative” and “consensual” General Buddhist Association (Shanghai) are quite remarkable. They suggest the extent to which, in the context of 1912, even conservative leaders envisioned a radical and far-reaching reinvention of the way their religion worked.

Daoist Associations

The Daoists followed the Buddhist example in trying to establish an organization capable of acting on the political stage, and also in exhibiting divisiveness, although along different lines. They were mostly divided between the two major clerical orders, the monastic Quanzhen order and the Zhengyi order of priests, under the liturgical authority of the Zhang Heavenly Master (Zhang Tianshi). The first national Daoist organization, the Daojiao Hui (道教會, Daoist Association), was formed in March 1912 at the initiative of Chen Mingbin (1854–1936), the abbot of the White Cloud Monastery (Baiyunguan), a very prestigious Quanzhen monastery in Peking (Qing X., ed. 1995:291).¹⁰ It published a manifesto, as well as an open letter to the National Assembly, and on April 8, 1912, it obtained government approval and recognition (Anonymous 1994a, 1994b). This association clearly wanted to entrust the future of Daoism to the small group of abbots of the major Quanzhen monasteries in Northern China. The manifesto was signed by eighteen Quanzhen dignitaries: the main leaders, along with Chen Mingbin, were Ge Mingxin (1854–1934), the abbot of the Taiqinggong in Shenyang; Zhao Zhizhong, the abbot of the Baiyunguan in Shanghai; and Wang Lijun, the abbot of the Wuliangguan on Qianshan, a major Quanzhen center in Manchuria.

The manifesto insisted that Daoism was the most ancient indigenous religion in China, and thus best placed to become the national religion (國教, *guojiao*; Anonymous 1994a:1). Yet to conform to the new notion of “religion,” Daoism also claimed to be universal and planned for branches to be set up in every country. It offered a political vision of Daoism as the moral and spiritual arm of the Chinese state, and criticized those who saw Daoism solely as an individual pursuit of transcendence. According to the authors of the manifesto, only by coopting indigenous Daoism could the Republic gain the support of the people and expect compliance with its laws. More than two thousand years before, they wrote, Laozi had already set out a blueprint for democracy and freedom, nationalism and social progress. Practically speaking, the association proposed to organize the study of inner alchemy (*neidan*) and Quanzhen discipline for clerics, and the management of charity and morality programs for the laity. The

association's organization, laid out in great detail on paper, was very hierarchical, with the Baiyunguan abbot as ex officio president. Membership was open to clerics and "believers"; the association's charter made it an obligation for all members to congregate on Sundays for joining a Daoist service (Anonymous 1994b:10).

This document is a surprising, sometimes uneasy mixture of three different concerns: (1) the ambition of Quanzhen dignitaries to become effective leaders of Daoism as a whole, in which they saw themselves as the natural elite; (2) a hurried reaction to the pressing political needs of getting Daoism recognized and protected by the new regime (which, as we saw, was not self-evident at all) and of securing its monasteries and temples from seizures; and (3) an awkward attempt to recast Daoism as a "religion" with a national hierarchy, Sunday services, an organized laity, and other Christian-like features. It is not clear to what extent this attempt to reinvent Daoism was just a ploy to help gain Daoism government recognition as a "religion," and to what extent the abbots really meant to introduce Sunday prayers and other features of a church organization. Nothing resembling Daoist Sunday prayers or hierarchical congregations was ever implemented in actual fact, either in 1912 or at any later time.

Apparently, the Daoist Association (Peking) was dormant outside of these times of urgency, when it mobilized its political friends and networks of support. However, branches were created in various provinces, notably in Sichuan, where they seem to have been active throughout the Republican period (Qing X., ed. 1995:430–33). At any rate, this association dominated by Quanzhen leaders did not meet with universal approval among Daoists, and, immediately after its foundation, a rival association, the General Daoist Association (中華民國道教總會, Zhonghua Minguo Daojiao Zonghui), was established in Shanghai by the Sixty-Second Heavenly Master, Zhang Yuanxu (?–1924, Heavenly Master in 1904).¹¹ This association, however, failed to develop outside of the Shanghai area (Chen Y. 1992:428–34); although many Daoists were traditionally loosely affiliated with the Heavenly Master administration, they declined to translate such affiliation into membership in an institution that vowed to control them.

Confucian Associations

Reinventing Confucianism proved even more difficult than reinventing Buddhism and Daoism. In 1912, Confucianism had just lost its status as the official doctrine of the defunct imperial regime. Intellectuals identifying themselves as Confucians did not necessarily regret this change because

it offered the possibility of renewal. Since the last decades of the imperial period, some reformers had been thinking that the strength and cohesiveness of Western countries were due to their (supposedly) having a single national religion. During the 1890s, Kang Youwei had formulated a project of national religion (*guojiao*) based on a hybridization of Confucianism and Christianity. He envisioned the transformation of all Chinese temples into Confucius temples, operating as the centers of parishes, where the local population would gather every Sunday to hear Confucian priests read Confucian scriptures and preach. Although Kang's extreme views and personality repelled most of his contemporaries, many of his ideas were widely shared by intellectual and political leaders. In particular, the movement to protect Confucianism (*baojiao*, "protecting the teachings") by adopting Christianity's own weapons met with great success. Quite a few of Kang's contemporaries, including some of his declared opponents, developed projects similar to his, aimed at transforming Confucianism by imitating the Christian model of proselytizing, missionary activity (quite a few of them were dreaming of converting the West), and social engagement.

As Chen Xiyuan (Hsi-yuan) has brilliantly shown, this widespread but informal intellectual movement organized and institutionalized itself in 1912 (H. Chen 1999). A number of self-declared Confucians, many of whom were direct or indirect disciples of Kang Youwei, established Confucian associations with the aim of having Confucianism declared as national religion. The most influential of these associations, with more than 130 local branches, was the Kongjiao Hui (孔教會, Confucian Association), established in October 1912 and presided over by Chen Huanzhang (1881–1933).

Like its Buddhist and Daoist counterparts, the Confucian Association's project failed, at least as far as its immediate explicit aims were concerned. After several public debates in Parliament, the proposal it had introduced for instituting Confucianism as a national religion was voted down, first in 1913 and again in 1916. For many members of Parliament, the notion of national religion contradicted the freedom of religious belief enshrined in the 1913 provisional constitution. The Japanese model, which distinguished between a national cult, Shinto (Hardacre 1989), and *religions*, was not adopted or imitated. The radical break with the imperial regime necessitated, in the opinion of many members of Parliament, the abrogation of all kinds of state ritual and doctrine (Gan C. 2005). Incidentally, this decision was not perceived by all Chinese observers as reflecting a deep commitment to an equal treatment of all religions, but rather as a

desire to replace Confucianism with Christianity. The strong influence of Christians among the revolutionary elites (beginning with Sun Yat-sen) caused quite a few Chinese to consider the Republic to be a Christian regime.

Notwithstanding the failure of its national religion project, the Confucian Association deserves as much attention as the other national religious associations, with whom it shares some common features. Like the Buddhist and Daoist associations, it developed a project of religious reform and reinvention. Chen Huanzhang and the other leaders of the association set out to radically reinvent Confucianism—notably by making the cult of Confucius universal (until 1911 it was the privilege of the gentry, that is, those who had passed the first level of the examination system) in every Chinese home and village, and by totally suppressing the cults of all the other Confucian saints (such as Guandi, Wenchang, etc.). The association launched a confessional journal (*Kongjiao hui zazhi*) and institutionalized a Confucian proselytizing program (Chen himself was preaching on Sundays in New York's Chinatown when he was a student at Columbia in 1904). By means of an audacious reading of the Confucian classics, Chen justified the seven-day week and Sunday worship, and strove to prove that Confucianism is a religion because, like Christianity, it has uniforms, a canon, rules, a liturgy, a theology featuring a single god, belief in the immortality of the soul, a doctrine on retribution, schools, temples, and holy sites (H. Chen 1999:127–29).¹² Local Confucian Association activists established halls for studying and distributing the Confucian classics, modeled on Christian Bible-reading groups (Fang 2004:62).

Muslim Associations

Islam had in late imperial China a rather particular place, as an officially recognized religion (despite occasional bouts of intolerance by officials) but without any official organization of control. In 1912, Chinese-speaking Muslims established several associations, the largest and most influential of which was the Muslim Association for Mutual Progress (中國回教俱進會, *Zhongguo Huijiao Jujin Hui*), founded in Peking in July 1912 (Zhang J. 1997/98). The president was Ma Linyi (a Ministry of Education official); among the other leaders, three were particularly important: Wang Yousan, Wang Haoran, and Zhang Ziwen. All three were reformist *ahong* (imams), employed in various Peking mosques and with experience traveling in the Middle East. Zhang Ziwen was also active in the business of publishing Islamic books and journals.

During the months following the establishment of the association, these

leaders wrote to and visited a large number of Chinese Muslim communities throughout the country to elicit the creation of local branches. The association's aims, as detailed in its charter (Zhang J. 1997/98:16–18), included the publication of journals and translations into Chinese of Islamic texts, the foundation of schools and vocational training programs, the completion of surveys on the social conditions of the Chinese Muslims, and the promotion of frugality, hygiene, and nationalism. The Muslim Association for Mutual Progress was distinctive in that it combined a reinvention of religion (in this case, in the perspective of Muslim reformism) with an ethnic representation of the Chinese Muslims as a “people” or “race” (*Huizu*)—a notion that had appeared during the nineteenth century and recently been made official by Sun Yat-sen's notion of the Republic of China as comprised of five people (Han, Tibetans, Manchus, Mongols, and Hui). However, many of its aims and tools (journals, school, research) bear comparison with those of the Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian associations.

The nationalist commitment of the founders and later leaders of the Muslim Association for Mutual Progress proved to be a strong influence on Chinese Islam. The most influential Muslim leader of the Republican period, Ma Wanfu (1853–1934), studied in Arabia between 1888 and 1892, and on his return decided introduce to China a text-based, reformed Islam, opposed to particularistic and localist Sufi affiliations. His disciples advocated uniting the divided Muslim Chinese community, and—after one of Ma's disciples, Hu Songshan (1880–1956), had felt humiliated as an ethnic Chinese during the Mecca pilgrimage—contributing thereby to the building of a strong Chinese state.

Thus the introduction of reformist ideas—which coalesced into the Ikhwan movement, directly inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, and now dominant in institutional Chinese Islam—was intimately linked to nationalist ideas, and both the reformist and the nationalist strand promoted the invention of the ideal of a Muslim citizen. Although here the Western paradigm and its Christian normative model were much less at work than in the cases of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, we still observe a situation where religious leaders infused ideas of a nation-state into religious reform, and vice versa.

The Case of Christianity

Since the Western, Christian-based ideals of “religion” formed the primary basis for the reinvention projects of the various Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian associations established in 1912 (the Muslim case being distinct but parallel), it might come as a surprise that no national Catholic

or Protestant association was established that year. Indeed, the national Chinese Christian associations were only created later. The first plenary council of the Catholic Church convened in 1924 in Shanghai; for the Protestants, the National Christian Conference met in 1922 to launch the Church of Christ in China, which several Protestant organizations (but not Anglicans, Lutherans, or the new indigenous fundamentalist movements) joined. Not before the Communist period did inclusive national Catholic and Protestant associations form on the model already adopted by the Buddhist, Daoist, and Muslim associations. Thus we have here a process more complex and interesting than a pure adoption by “native” religions of Western paradigms, since the Western-influenced modern institutions crafted by local religions shaped in their turn the evolution of Western religions in China.

The reasons Chinese Christians did not adopt the model of the national religious association are many, including foreign leadership (missionaries); a specific relationship to the state different from that of the Buddhists, Daoists, and Muslims (Christian interests being already protected by the Western powers); and the existence among Chinese Christians of other, transdenominational organizations that played some of the roles taken on by the national religious associations among Buddhists, Daoists, Confucians, and Muslims. For instance, education, propaganda, and lobbying were carried out by institutions such as the YMCA and the Catholic Action groups.¹³

THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS: CHURCHES IN THE MAKING?

The historiography of the various national religious associations created in 1912, and those that followed in their footsteps, has most often focused on the conflicts and competition within each of the various confessions. Indeed, these associations have often been used as vehicles for personal ambitions and competing ideas. Yet they cannot be reduced to that aspect of their historical development: I rather think that these associations make most historical sense when considered together, as aspects of a single process of religious institution-building, since even associations that were locked in conflict with one another shared many ideas as to what a national religious association should be. Behind their real differences, they all shared a common model—the national religious association—which was a new phenomenon in the history of state-religion relationships in China, and which had far-reaching implications in and of itself.

Therefore, it may be illuminating to examine the various 1912 associations as a whole and to consider them as projects, independently of their actual realizations. Even though these projects may not have gained the active support of very many people, and may very well have had hidden agendas quite different from their apparent intentions, they were nevertheless the forerunners of the associations that later played a crucial role in the evolution of institutional religion in Nationalist and Communist China.

The first thing that strikes the reader who compares the various texts produced by the 1912 associations is a strong formal resemblance in the vocabulary, the charts, and the general rhetoric of the associations' projects. Their leaders envisioned on paper (we will never know how much they themselves believed in such projects) vast bureaucratic organizations, with bureaus for propaganda, doctrine, research, missions, and discipline, subdivided into numerous offices. What paradigm was at work here? The reorganization of the bureaucratic state, with a staggering expansion of the number of state agents, ongoing since the last years of the Qing, certainly formed the background for this organizational culture. Indeed, the religious traditions were not the only quarter of society that engaged in such institution-building: the year 1912 saw the proliferation of national associations for all sorts of professions (Xu X. 2001) and interest and opinion groups, including many religious groups smaller than those discussed here. All were based on a Western liberal model of social representation.

Mary B. Rankin has discussed the role of civic organizations (chambers of commerce, educational associations) that had already formed during the 1901–11 decade, as well as new private associations in the early Republican state-building process (Rankin 1997:272–73). These associations shared with Republican officials the goals of modernity and national progress, even though they might in some circumstances oppose the government. Rankin mentions the YMCA and the Red Cross as prominent examples, particularly relevant since they combined the Western liberal model of representation with the Christian model of religion (the two being in fact closely linked in their historical development in the West). Very early on, the combination of these two models by Christians in China was emulated by native religious associations, such as the Buddhist, Daoist, Muslim, and Confucian associations discussed here as well as the redemptive societies. The various ways the Christian associations established a presence in the public sphere, such as the confessional press (Löwenthal 1978), were adopted by all the national religious associations. The General Buddhist Association (Shanghai), the Muslim Association for Mutual Progress, and

the Confucian Association each published a journal; the Daoist associations did not, but the various journals of the redemptive societies did carry a lot of Daoist contents.

Another feature shared by all the national religious associations in 1912 was that they sought to redefine their relationship to the state. All of them insisted that the Republic had proclaimed the separation of state from religion, yet they also claimed for themselves a special relationship to the state. The Buddhist and Daoist associations presented themselves as the natural ally and moral arm of the secular state; the Muslim Association for Mutual Progress aimed to contribute to the process of state-building; and both the Daoist Association (Peking) and the Confucian Association claimed the status of "national religion." As the authors of the Daoist Association wrote:

The Daoist Association requests formal recognition from the Republican government so as to ensure the equal standing and mutual cooperation of political and religious powers (*zhengquan, jiaoquan*). State officials and religious leaders must help each other and build a magnificent, perfect nation, so that men will be able to expand Truth and our coreligionists' hopes will be fulfilled. (Anonymous 1994a:4b)

In addition, the various associations all insisted on the weakness of their current situation and the necessity for unity. The rhetoric of unification pervades all their texts, beginning with the statement of purpose. For instance:

[The Muslim Association for Mutual Progress] aims at bringing together all Muslims within the country and extolling their cohesion, furthering their unification and contributing to their common progress, in order to strengthen the nation and expand the Islamic doctrines. (Zhang J. 1997/98:16)

[The General Buddhist Association (Shanghai)] aims at unifying Buddhism and developing Buddhist teachings so as to help the moral progress of the masses and the prosperity of the nation. (Zhongguo Di'er Lishi Dang'an Guan, ed. 1998:707)

This rhetorical focus on unification is clearly related to a sea change in the official religious policies between 1898 and the early Republican period, that is, the new and strong desire among the political elites to unite the people behind a single unitary national project and ideology. This desire was seen as contradictory to the Chinese belonging to multiple autonomous communities, each with its own cults and religious practices. From this perspective, the state and its nationalist project appeared to ally themselves

with some religious leaders who also formulated the ambition to unite and standardize their religion through the suppression of the autonomy of local temples, communities, and traditions of practice.

As a consequence, all the 1912 associations also envisioned the enforcement of internal discipline. This certainly reflects a frustration, which must have been much older than 1912, among religious leaders unable to control fellow clerics and practitioners. Such leaders saw in the national religious association a means to gain at last the power to impose discipline—a power they had utterly lacked in late imperial times.

We should note, too, that even though the anti-superstition discourse was not yet very apparent in the 1912 texts (it would be more in evidence among the national associations of the Nationalist period), some of the religious reform goals of the state (or of some state agents, such as those who published the June 1912 blueprint) were endorsed by the religious associations. For instance, liturgy and ritual services to the population are markedly absent from the texts produced by the various associations.

These similarities between the discourses produced by the various new national religious associations were all derived from a common political and ideological context. Yet the associations also reacted to this context with different strategies. One important aspect of these differences is the nature of the leadership. Some associations gave authority and power to existing leaders who had already played a leadership role in the late imperial order of things,¹⁴ such as the Heavenly Master and the Baiyunguan abbot, who were *ex officio* presidents of the two competing Daoist associations, and the prestigious abbot of a Chan monastery who presided over the General Buddhist Association (Shanghai).

In contrast, other associations promoted to leadership positions persons who could not claim any religious authority on the national scene before 1912, such as the Confucian Chen Huanzhang, the Buddhists Ouyang Jian and Taixu, and, to a certain degree, the Muslims Wang Yousan, Wang Haoran, and Zhang Ziwen. This second type of leader, who gained access to leadership and authority thanks to the new associations, tended quite logically to propose more radical reinventions of “religion” than the first type.

From this perspective, the case of Daoism is atypical. Whereas among Buddhist, Confucian, and Muslim leaders, some were earnest, zealous reformers who conducted real (albeit limited) field experiments at changing their communities’ practices and implementing a reinvention of religion, there was no such figure among Daoist leaders, who remained clerics invested with traditional modes of authority. This was not due to a general

backward-looking attitude among early twentieth-century Daoists—far from it; in fact, various Daoist masters emerged who engaged with the modern media in order to create new networks and institutions for the transmission of their practice (Goossaert 2007, chap. 7). For instance, Chen Yingning (1880–1969) established seminaries and journals in Shanghai (Liu X. 2001). Although much less assertive and aggressive than radical Buddhist reformers such as Taixu, Chen Yingning did share some ideas with the famed Buddhist reformer. Chen and Taixu both developed a vision of a scientific religion that was rid of its liturgical tradition, concentrating on self-cultivation, and available to the masses through a systematic curriculum. Chen drew up plans for a modern, nonsuperstitious Daoism with a larger role for laypeople. But, remarkably, neither Chen nor any of the other new Daoist masters was interested in using the medium of the national association to further his own project and vision, at least before the late 1930s. For this reason, the adoption of anti-superstition ideas (and subsequent ruptures with the liturgical structures of Chinese religion) was much more limited among Daoist associations than among their Buddhist or Confucian counterparts.

Another problem linked to the question of leadership is the definition of the religious community. If such a definition is fairly straightforward in the case of Islam, it becomes rather tricky among the “three religions” of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. The issue is still not solved to this day precisely because Chinese religion was and is a pluralist religious system in which it is mostly clerics who declare themselves “Buddhists,” “Daoists,” or “Confucians,” while most other people pay respect to and use the services of all three traditions. In such a context the definition of the lay community, even though it might seem easy in theory (e.g., the Three Refuges identify a “Buddhist”), remains very hazy in actual social practice. Most of the 1912 associations’ charters—including that of the General Buddhist Association (Shanghai), the Daoist Association (Peking), and the Confucian Association—refrain from positing a precise definition of their lay membership, even though they make great use of a few prominent, politically connected lay supporters. As a matter of fact, throughout the twentieth century, the Buddhist and Daoist associations have remained clerical associations by and large .

The 1912 associations developed a rhetoric of a unification of the religious community, but without any apparent clear idea about how to proceed. The very notion of a unified, China-wide Buddhist or Daoist community was quite far from sight in 1912, and the first institutional leaders can be excused for being at a loss as to how to conjure up that modern

dream. Their subsequent failure can be contrasted with the situation of the Muslim community, which, through its associations and their print media, managed as early as the 1930s to mobilize large numbers of militants to stage protests against perceived insults or threats (Allès 2002). Another point of contrast is the redemptive societies, which had much clearer rules for joining and did maintain membership lists. For instance, the charter of the Tongshanshe (Fellowship of Goodness, established in 1917), in many other respects very similar to that of the other national religious associations, delineated more precisely how members were to be recruited and what their participation should be (Wang J. 1995:72–81), causing the Tongshanshe to be closer than the Buddhist and Daoist associations to the Christian model of a religion.

Whatever the success of such endeavors, uniting members in a hierarchical association was widely felt to be a crucial part of inventing “religion” and surviving in the modern context. Similarly, when nationalist leaders attempted to create Shinto as the national cult in Meiji Japan (1868–1912), their creation really began to take on a life of its own when all Shinto priests, heretofore organized in thousands of totally independent local lineages, formed a national association and a journal, and began to act on the political and religious scene as an organized body (Hardacre 1989:36–37).

THE LEGACY OF THE 1912 PROJECTS

The various national religious associations, formed in 1912 with both enthusiasm and a sense of panic, developed projects that mostly failed to become reality; their most notable achievement was official recognition by the state and the limited (though not negligible) protection that this entailed. The grand plans to create hierarchical churches with countless bureaus for research and propaganda, and branches in every part of China and the world, were never realized. Moreover, the reinvention of religion that these associations intended to carry out (exit superstition, ritual, and autonomous local groups, enter China-wide corps of ethical militants) did not overly impress their contemporaries. For instance, local gazetteers (*difangzhi*) of the 1910s and 1920s on the whole maintained the late imperial categories (official sacrifices, local cults, monasteries) to describe the religious situation in the field, and did not refer to either the associations or their vision of what “religion” was.

The associations themselves seem to have been locked in the national political arena, focusing their efforts, up to the late 1920s, on lobbying the president of the Republic and the Parliament to the exclusion of other pos-

sible fields of action. The Confucian Association is an extreme case because it identified itself so much with its project of a national religion that it became a marginal institution once this project was voted down by the Parliament. The real growth in relevance for the remaining national religious associations came only later, under the Nationalist regime, thanks to two factors: (1) the official recognition of the Buddhist and Daoist associations' role in the management of temples and monasteries in the Temple Management Act (December 1929), and (2) the creation in many districts of local branches of these associations. These local branches often managed to include the various orientations or clerical factions among the local clergy and to work quite efficiently, not pressing for any grand reform plan but striving, more modestly, to protect and help local temples and clerics through negotiations with local authorities.¹⁵ Thereby, the Buddhist and Daoist associations found a new *raison d'être* by taking over the role played under the imperial regime by the Daolu Si and Senglu Si.

Thus the national religious associations of the 1930s were different in nature from their 1912 predecessors. However, even though each change of regime entailed a re-foundation of the national religious associations, so that these associations could share the history and temporality of the political regime with which they were allied (hence the wave of new associations set up after 1928 and after 1949), closer examination shows that the associations were also characterized by a marked continuity in ideology and leadership. Therefore, in spite of their initial failure, the associations established in 1912 formed the first stage in a long process of religious institutionalization under state control. Indeed, reading the 1912 texts with later developments in mind, one finds in them many of the themes more usually associated with the Nationalist and Communist periods: bureaucratic control of religion, assimilation of political ideology into the religious discourse, anti-ritual rhetoric, national unification. From this perspective, then, the role of the 1912 associations in the religious history of modern China may not be so negligible after all.

A major part of the historiography of modern Chinese religions (including Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity) was built around the process of institutionalization (Jones 1999; Goossaert 2006a). Such political histories, as well as the biographies of institutional leaders, are of course necessary and welcome, yet they should not avoid questioning assumptions taken for granted in the discourse held by institutional leaders—particularly the idea, shared by all the associations, that their efforts at institutionalization, unification, and modernization actually ushered in a renewal of their religion. For instance, Buddhist, Daoist, and Muslim

leaders often consider that before the twentieth century, their religion was very poorly organized and therefore declining and weak: efforts at institutionalization and modernization through the national religious associations are therefore described as revivals in the face of decline.

This theme, found as early as 1912 and still common today in both confessional and scholarly discourse, needs to be critically examined. We should question what kind of “weakness” and “decline” late imperial Buddhism and Daoism were in, and whether institutionalization was not destructive of certain practices and ideas (notably, local variety in practices and answers to the population’s expectations) at the same time that it was a political road to survival and adaptation. Such an approach would certainly help us better understand the failures and difficulties encountered by the religious associations from 1912 to the present day, such as the refusal of certain clerics to join, heated debates about who is qualified to join,¹⁶ competition between rival associations, and, of course, tense negotiations between religious institutional leaders and local state agents.

In the political and ideological context of modern China, the legitimacy that a national association can confer on a religious tradition, both directly (through state recognition) and indirectly (through social prestige), nevertheless remains a very strong incentive for building up such associations. Recently, certain religious specialists, such as spirit mediums and diviners, who are not organized as clergies (that is, who have no national ordination and training institutions or unified textual traditions and rules), have taken the initiative to establish associations on the Buddhist and Daoist model. For instance, during the 1980s a fraction of Taiwanese spirit mediums organized a national association with training and licensing programs in order to gain state and social recognition (Paper 1996; Tsai Y. 2002).

CONCLUSION: OTHER MODERNITIES, OTHER SECULARIZATIONS

The history of the early Republican national religious associations (and of their successors up to the present day) could be used to make a case for postcolonial theories. These associations are clearly the result of the impact of Western paradigms of religion and political management of religion, adopted and zealously implemented by Chinese nationalist leaders, both religious and political. Postcolonial research tends to emphasize either the problems created by non-Western adoption of Western models or the agency of local cultural brokers who transform such models for their own ends. In our case, both aspects are in evidence. Indeed, the early

Republican associations exhibit both rank suppression of native models (as shown by the associations' rejection of varieties of local ritual practices) and interesting attempts at creating hybrid creatures. The Daoist and Confucian Sunday prayers and the Buddhist bureaucratic selection of monks were ultimately unlike anything else in either China or the West. Hence, rather than simply going along with postcolonial theories, I would like to emphasize the mixed possibilities opened up by the national association model in the Chinese religious field. The associations attempted to unify and/or destroy certain practices, but mostly failed; at the same time, as eloquently shown by Ji Zhe's chapter in this volume, they did invent a space for religion in modern China's public sphere. They did so by following a secularizing path quite different from the one anticipated by classic secularization theory.

Many of the major cases of separation of the state from religion during the twentieth century, such as those in Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, pitted a nascent nation-state against a religion that was organized more or less as a church. In such cases, the secular state labeled as superstitious the religion that it was separating itself from; no clear distinction was made between religion and superstition. In early Republican China, however, an important part of the political elite actually favored church-like institutions and "religions" in order to fight superstitions. For this reason, the Chinese state from 1912 to this day has not opposed the church-building projects of the new national religious associations, but rather favored and tutored them.

From this perspective, my analysis of the Chinese national religious associations, particularly during their earliest stage in 1912, concurs with Peter van der Veer's work on colonial India. Van der Veer (2001) finds a simultaneous production of "religion," secularism, and modernity. The separation of religions from the state creates religion under a new national form, and actually provokes its expansion into the public sphere. If the context (imperialist rather than colonial) and the particular institutions that are used to express the invention of religion (the national religious associations rather than new hybrid religions) are quite different in China than in India, the processes at work in both places are nonetheless comparable. In China as in India, the new "religions" also extended into the public sphere (the national religious associations published journals and actively engaged in political lobbying) in ways unimaginable in the late imperial context; and they defined themselves in ways that were intimately linked to the nation-state and its secular ideals.

Such an analysis has the potential to show that current paradigms about

secularization, which emphasize the “privatization” and “deconstruction” of established religions in favor of individual choices, may neglect opposite trends whereby modern states favor the creation of religious institutions with which they share many ideological options: national unification, self-definition in terms of national/global issues, exclusive ideological affiliation. These new religious institutions produced by modernity are much more centralized and institutionalized than the traditions that they claim to continue. In other words, the extremely complex construction of nation-state and nationalism as it unfolded in the interplay between state and religion in China actually created a modernity and a secularization quite different from those exemplified and exported by Western countries.

cadres opposed granting a separate written language to the Tajiks (personal communication December 4, 2003); however, political concerns over links to Iran and Tajikistan through the promulgation of a Persian script are clearly an important factor.

7. Cited in Allen T. Cheng, "A surprise move by the mainland's Islamic community," *South China Morning Post*, March 25, 2003.

8. *Ibid.*

9. "Ma" (馬) is the most common surname among Hui Muslims in China, tracing its origins to the Ming dynasty, when many Muslims were required to take Chinese surnames and "Ma" most closely resembled the first syllable for "Muhammad." It is also the Chinese character for "horse," and since many Hui were engaged as caravaneers, it was a natural choice for a surname.

10. See Agence-France Press, August 1, 2005, "US keeps Uighurs at Guantanamo after found innocent: rights group." In March 2006, five Uyghurs were released to Albania; the fate of the remaining 17 is still undetermined.

11. See September 29, 2005, "China orders renewed crackdown in Muslim-populated Xinjiang" <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4292466.stm>.

12. See Ma Dazheng (2002:128): "Since the first half of the year 2000, the situation in Xinjiang has been peaceful (平靜), despite my earlier description of the seriousness of this issue, and should be accurately described as dramatically changed since the internationalization of the Xinjiang problem (新疆問題國際化)."

13. Cited in Allen T. Cheng, "A surprise move by the mainland's Islamic community," *South China Morning Post*, March 25, 2003.

CHAPTER 8. REPUBLICAN CHURCH ENGINEERING

1. For Taiwan, see Katz (2003) and Jones (1999); for the PRC, see Potter (2003).

2. "Guanli zongjiao zhi yijian shu," *Shenbao* (Shanghai), June 22, 1912.

3. On Indonesia's case, see Picard (2003).

4. On the missionary discourse about Chinese religion, see Reinders (2004).

5. This famous sentence was first published in a "fake" memorial (written by Kang Youwei but, contra Kang's later assertion, not sent to the emperor during the 1898 reforms): *Qing zun Kongsheng wei guojiao li jiaobu jiaohui yi Kongzi jinian er fei yinci zhe*, 請尊孔聖為國教立教部教會以孔子紀年而廢淫祠摺 (Huang Z. 1974:464–70).

6. On the Senglu Si and Daolu Si, see Goossaert (2007, chap. 1).

7. The charter of the Fojiao Hui and a letter to President Sun Yat-sen appeared in *Foxue congbao* (*Buddhist Miscellany*), no. 2, 1912.

8. The charter of the Zhonghua Fojiao Zonghui was published in *Foxue congbao*, no. 1, 1912, and *Zhongguo Di'er Lishi Dang'an Guan*, ed. (1998:705–14).

9. On the history of Buddhist associations, see Welch (1968:23–50), and Chen & Deng (2000:29–74).
10. On Chen Mingbin and the Baiyunguan, see Goossaert (2007, chap. 4).
11. On the Zhang Heavenly Masters, see Goossaert (2004).
12. For Chen Huanzhang's essay, together with the charter of the Confucian Association, see Chen Huanzhang (1913).
13. On the YMCA, see Dunch (2001).
14. On the question of religious authority in China, see Goossaert (2008).
15. Nedostup (2001, chap. 2). On the situation in Peking, see Goossaert (2007:77–80).
16. See the fascinating case of the Guangzhou Daoists during the 1930s in Li Zhitian (2002).

CHAPTER 9. SECULARIZATION AS RELIGIOUS RESTRUCTURING

1. At this point, our approach is different from the ideological understandings of secularization of the simplistic religio-secular conflict paradigm. The two interpretative models of the latter have been well summarized by Habermas (2003:104): “The replacement model suggests a progressivist interpretation in terms of disenchanting modernity, while the expropriation model leads to an interpretation in terms of a theory of decline, that is, unsheltered modernity.” But both of them make the same mistake: “They construe secularization as a kind of zero-sum game between the capitalistically unbridled productivity of science and technology on the one hand, and the conservative force of religion and the church on the other hand.”

2. Here “religious field” could be understood as the configuration of the interrelations among the given religious apparatuses that function respectively for producing, maintaining, and legitimating the power of a certain social group. For the theory of “religious field” and its critics, see Bourdieu (1971); Hervieu-Léger (1993:158–62).

3. Confucianism remains haunted to the present day by its lack of an institutional dimension and is not recognized as a religion in the PRC.

4. For the selective destruction of Chinese religions at the turn of the twentieth century, see Goossaert (2003); also compare Palmer's chapter in this volume on the evolution of the official anti-sect discourses in China.

5. Following the theory of Joachim Wach, Yang (1961) distinguished institutional religion and diffused religion in China. An institutional religion had its own system of theology, rites, and specialized organization of personnel, as represented by universal religions such as Buddhism. As for diffused religion, its theology, practice, and personnel were diffused in one or several secular social institutions. For example, the cult of ancestors was established in the family. Of course, these two sorts of religions were interdependent in reality.

6. These Buddhist disciplines could be considered a kind of folk law in