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**Claude Gilliot**

REVIEW OF

C. Schöck. *Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik.  
Zum Verhältnis von arabischer und aristotelischer  
Urteils-, Konsequenz- und Schlusslehre*

THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM  
THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES



C. Schöck. *Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik. Zum Verhältnis von arabischer und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und Schlusslehre*. Leiden: Brill (“Islamic philosophy, theology and science. Texts and studies,” 60), 2005. XIV+416 pp. ISBN 90-04-14588-5.

This book is the revised version of a thesis which was submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in February 2002. It offers a new approach to problems of Islamic hermeneutics and the understanding of Qur’ānic exegesis.

It is well known that a central problem of Islamic hermeneutics in Qur’ānic exegesis and in law is that of the indefinite pronouns (*al-asmā’ al-mubhama*) and other general statements (*al-alfāz al-‘amma*), such as: “Nay, but whoever (*man*) hath done evil and his sin surroundeth him; such are rightful owners of the Fire; they will abide therein” (2:81), or “As for the thief, both male and female, cut off their hands” (5:38), or “[...] slay the idolaters” (9:5), or “The evildoers (*fujjār*) are in hell” (82:14). The debate on the general expressions and indefinite pronouns goes back to the early time of Islamic theology and law as is attested in the generation of the Companions (pp. 10–13, 90–94).

With Wāṣil b. ‘Aṭā’ (d. 131/748) and Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) the discussion on this matter already reaches a kind of polarity which will continue to prevail in the history of Islamic theology. Wāṣil’s thought, in his understanding of “general” and “particular,” is based on the extension of the concept (closer to the Platonic and early Aristotelian tradition), whereas Abū Ḥanīfa’s point of departure is the content of the concept, its intention; he emphasizes the intentional aspect of the “particular” corresponding to a “common” *in* the “particular” (closer to the classical teaching of Aristotle) (pp. 2–3).

The question of the precedence of an extensional or intentional conception is not only fundamental for the reaching of judgment by the Islamic theologians, but also for the concept of faith, as we shall see (pp. 104–111, on Abū Ḥanīfa; pp. 112–179, for the Mu‘tazilīs).

Indeed, if faith (*īmān*) comprises the performance of all religious duties (“acts of obedience,” *tā‘āt*) and excludes the sins (“acts of disobedience,” *ma‘āṣī*) (Wāṣil/Mu‘tazilīs), the signification is “extensional”; faith is the sum of the acts of obedience which are subsumed under faith. But if faith is knowledge (*ma‘rifa*), inner and outer assent (*taṣḍīq, iqrār*) that cannot be divided and cannot increase or decrease (Murji’a/Abū Ḥanīfa/Ḥanafīs), then it is understood as intentional and definitional (p. 4).

Both reference fields (*Bezugsfelder*) already exist in the Aristotelian writings on logic. Representatives of the extensional comprehension of concept include Plato’s successor Xenocrates (d. 314 BCE), successors of Aristotle, including perhaps Theophrast (d. ca. 285 BCE) and later

Themistius (d. 388 CE), and above all the Neoplatonist Porphyrius (d. ca. 305 CE).

The interpretation of the general Qur'ānic expressions and indefinite pronouns became a central issue between the two rationalist schools, the Mu'tazilīs and the Murji'īs/Hanafīs, particularly the controversy on the understanding of the so-called "threat of punishment verses" (*āyāt al-wa'īd*), and generally speaking the relation between the "promise and threat" (*al-wa'd wa-l-wa'īd*). The starting point was not logic, but a dogmatical controversy.

It should be noticed, however, that "according to the thesis of this work, the beginnings of the *kalām* coincide with the inception of the reception of Late Antiquity logic. More explicitly stated, the beginnings of the reception of Late Antiquity logic are a deciding factor in the new quality of the controversial dogmatic which is called "dialectic" (*kalām*), that is, logic within disputation, in the way that it can also be traced back to the Aristotelian topics" (p. 14; Schöck refers here to Josef van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam* [Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1991-97], vol. 1, pp. 45–56, henceforth *TG*).

Schöck has tried here "to systematize the doctrines of the Arabic-speaking and writing Muslim theologians and logicians from dogmatical, linguistic and logical aspects, and to work out the overlaps and mutual interferences of koranic exegesis, grammar and logic. Moreover, structural similarities and convergences, like the similarity between the Mu'tazilī and Stoic doctrine of consequence, do not yet necessarily allow to conclude that there are dependencies. However, thought patterns like Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā's determination of the relation of general to special, or of whole to part, and Abū Ḥanīfa's definitional determination of 'faith', suggest an influence of the tradition of Late Antiquity" (pp. 15–16).

It should be noticed that, even if this book follows a chronological order, each of its seventeen chapters can be read as a unit in itself (chap. 2–17, chap. 1 being the introduction, and chap. 18, the summary and the conclusions; followed by an English translation of this chapter, pp. 426–39).

In the first chapter (pp. 18–30), Schöck presents Theophrast (d. ca. 285 BCE) and Alexander of Aphrodisias's (d. ca. 200 CE) conception of the absolute, necessary and possible judgment. It should be recalled that according the peripatetic logic, the *wa'īd* verses of the Qur'ān are unquantified, and assertoric, categoric and conditional/hypothetic judgments, or statements (*akhbār*) or premises. A nominal sentence like "The evildoers (*fujjār*) are in hell" (82:14) is, according to the view of Ibn al-Muqaffa', an indefinite (*muhmal/adioristos*) statement, that is unquantified, assertoric (*muṭlaq/aplōs*), that is "simple" (German *schlechtinnig*; Latin

*simpliciter*) in regards to time and matter. It is a declaration concerning something actual (German *Vorliegendes*) (*mawjūd/uparchon*), without modalisation, that is without differentiation from being necessary or possible (*imkān/endechesthai*).

For Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā conditional sentences like “Nay, but whoever hath done evil and his sin surroundeth him; such are rightful owners of the Fire...” (2:81) have the same status: the conjunction of protasis (antecedent) and apodosis (consequent/trailer) in such sentences is indefinite, like the relation of the subject and the predicate in Qur’ān 82:14.

It will be seen in the following chapters of the book that this view is in accordance with the understanding of the Murji’ī theologians, headed by Ibn Shabīb and Ibn al-Rāwandī (chap. 10 and 11), but it contradicts the Arab grammarians and the Mu’tazilī theologians (chap. 4, Sībawayh and Farrā’; chap. 9, Abū ’l-Hudhayl and Nazzām).

However, two different interpretations of the assertoric statement have been transmitted from the logic tradition of Late Antiquity. According to the understanding of Theophrast, the “absolute premise” (*al-muqaddama al-muṭlaqa/protasis... tou uparchein*) is open to the specifications “possible” or “necessary.” According to Alexander, it is open to the specification regarding the special time in which the judgment is actual (p. 29).

If we compare the ancient interpretations referred to with the Murji’ī objections to Wāṣil b. ‘Aṭā’s “Position between the two positions” (*manzila bayna ’l-manzilatayn*), we can understand why the translators of Aristotle have translated *protasis... tou uparchein* as *al-muqaddama al-muṭlaqa*. *Muṭlaq* or ‘*alā ’l-iṭlāq*, literally “detached/unbound” renders in the Aristotelic translations and commentaries *aplōs* (simple, *simpliciter*), that is “detached” (*abolutus*) from any determination, from time and modus. Already the Murji’ī theologian Abū Shāmir (end of the 2/8th c.) used *muṭlaq* in the meaning of “detached/unbound/unlimited” (pp. 29–30), e.g. *fāsiq muṭlaq* (“unrestrained/simple transgressor”; p. 155).

Chap. 3 (pp. 31–78) is devoted to the extensional interpretation of the general terms (*Allgemeinbegriffe*) by ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd (d. ca. 144/761) and Wāṣil (d. 131/748). The interpretation of the article *al-* as a quantifier (all-quantifier), which shows the universal extension of the determined term (e.g. *al-fujjār*, or *al-fājir*) goes back to ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd. For him the validity of the *wa’id* verses is general: “the singular and the plural of a noun connected with the article denotes a collective, which includes all those who are denoted by the same name” (p. 428). Therefore God’s *wa’id* is a “promise of punishment” for all transgressors of the law. With the exception of Abū Hāshim (al-Jubbā’ī, d. 321/933) (pp. 276–84), the Mu’tazilī theologians have followed him. Wāṣil, in his refutation of the argumentation of ‘Amr, <<understood those sentences as a consequence from the second of the first>> (p. 429): from the “evildoers” follows “in

hell,” and from “whoever hath done evil and his sin surroundeth him” follows “such are owners of the Fire.” These sentences are valid without ambiguity (they are *muhkam*) and must not be interpreted.

In the study of the positions of the grammarians (Sībawayh, Zajjāj, Farrāʾ) (chap. 4, pp. 79–88), Schöck shows that they understand verses like Qurʾān 2:81 as conditional sentences, in other words implications (*luzūm*). According to Sībawayh and the Muʿtazilī Abū ʿl-Hudhayl, the consequent (apodosis/*jawāb/jazāʾ/tālī*) follows necessarily from the antecedent (protasis/*shart/muqaddam*). In “As for the thief, both male and female, cut off (*fa-qṭaʿū*) their hands” (5:38), he converts the definite *nomen agentis* (*al-sāriq/al-sāriqa*) into a conditional protasis (“when/if somebody steals”) (p. 83). Conditional here is equivalent to an all-quantification and to a modus of necessity. This understanding of the sentence or this propositional logic (G. *Aussagelogik*) is not above all a product of the Arab grammarians of the 2/8th c., but preceded it in the discussion on the salvation status of the sinners (p. 88).

Under the title “Early controversies about the limitation of the promise of recompense and the threat of punishment (*al-waʿd wa-ʿl-waʿīd*)” (chap. 5, pp. 89–103), Schöck scrutinizes the qualification/limitation (*Einschränkung*, rendering also the Arabic *istithnāʾ* “exception”) of the Qurʾānic verses on recompense and punishment. For instance, must Qurʾān 4:93: “Whoso (*man*) slayeth a believer of set purpose, his retribution (*fa-jazāʾuhu*) is hell. . .,” be linked with 4:48: “God forgiveth not that a partner should be ascribed unto Him (*an yushraka bihi*). He forgiveth save that (*mā dūna dhālika*) to whom He will.”?

Or in 2:191: “And slay them (i.e. the polytheists of Mecca) wherever ye find them [...]. Temptation (*fitna*) is worse than slaughter.” Early exegetes understood the phrase “temptation is worse than slaughter” to mean that polytheism is worse than slaughter, and linking it with 4:48, they concluded that God forgives slaughter to whom he will. The controversies on those matters go back to the generation of the Companions.

These issues are documented in a well known controversy between al-Hārith b. ʿUmayra, a pupil of the Companion Muʿādh b. Jabal (d. ca. 17/638) and Ibn Masʿūd (d. 32/652 or 33/653) on the verses of promise (recompense) (pp. 90–91; for the translation see Gilliot, *Exégèse, langue et théologie en islam. L'exégèse coranique de Tabari* [Paris, 1990], p. 216) concerning the relation between “I am a believer” and “(I am) in Paradise.” Ibn Masʿūd and his pupils champion an understanding of the sentence which corresponds to the comprehension of Sībawayh, about 150 years later, which is called in Latin: *posito antecedente ponitur consequens* (*shartʾ/antecedens, jazāʾʾ/consequens*). It seems that Ibn Masʿūd takes up the extreme Murjiʾī position, which will be that of Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767): faith “weighs” more than a transgression (*fiṣq*).

But a question remained: how can a “believer” be defined? Here Schöck studies the well known “formula of exception/limitation/*Einschränkung/ istithnā*” of Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778): “I am a believer, if God will,” which is to be put into relation with Qur’ān 4:48: “God forgiveth not that a partner should be ascribed unto Him. He forgiveth save that to whom He will (*li-man yashā’u*).” The limitation of “I am a believer” has a corresponding rule in the Latin Middle Ages: *modus tollendo tollens*: a disjunctive syllogism, “mode which, by taking away, affirms,” i.e. “by annihilating the consequent, the antecedent is annihilated” (*perempto consequente perimitur antecedens*), that is by taking away “in Paradise,” “believer” is taken away. He whom God does not forgive his misdoings is not in Paradise and so is not a believer, because the name (*ism*, i.e. believer) is necessarily followed by “in Paradise” (p. 97).

The solution of the problem of the relation between promise of recompense (*wa’d*) and “transgressions of the duties” (*dhunūb*) by the limitation (*istithnā*) of the name “believer” with the formula of exception could not seriously compete with the solutions of Wāsil and Abū Ḥanīfa, but it prevailed in the circles of the traditionists (*muḥaddithūn*) and, thanks to Ibn Ḥanbal, entered the Ash‘arī school.

Schöck also studies the position of Quraysh b. Anas al-Anṣārī (d. 209/824) on the limitation of the verses of punishment. To him the general promise of punishment in Qur’ān 4:93 is limited by 4:48. This last verse became an important Ḥanafī-Murji‘ī proof for the limitation (*istithnā*) of the universality of the punishment verses (pp. 98–101). Abū ‘Amr b. al-‘Alā’, on the other hand, limited these verses on the basis of God’s generosity (*karam*) and grace (*faḍl*), quoting in support of his view not a Qur’ānic verse, but ancient poetry (pp. 102–103). It should be noticed that “generosity” remains in Ḥanafī theology a notion parallel to “grace.”

Mu‘tazilī prosopographers claim that Wāsil was the originator of *kalām* or of Mu‘tazilī logic (pp. 67, 104). For Shāfi‘ī the initiator of this theology was Abū Ḥanīfa (p. 104; see van Ess, *TG*, I, p. 191, with ref., n. 4). This means that Wāsil and Abū Ḥanīfa are representatives of the two schools of thought (*Denkrichtungen*) between which the Islamic controversial theology develops. In the oldest extant Ḥanafī documents the definitional apprehension of faith, and the quantification and modalization of statement and imperative are constitutive elements of Abū Ḥanīfa’s teaching. This is the reason why chap. 6 (pp. 104–118) deals with Abū Ḥanīfa’s understanding of these matters.

For Abū Ḥanīfa, acknowledgement (*iqrār*) and faith (*īmān*) are not an act, but an attribute (*ṣifa*) which is “acquired like a possession or a specific quality” (p. 106). Faith is a permanent quality and belongs to the subject of faith as an intrinsic quality (*wesenhafte Eigenschaft*). In the Ḥanafī understanding it is a name (*ism*), which, like genre, species,



difference, belongs to whom it belongs in the same way (p. 107). This understanding of faith is reminiscent of Aristotle's unity of definition. For Porphyrios also non-augmenting and non-decreasing is a distinguishing mark (attribute) of the definitional (p. 105).

Another important point in the view of Abū Ḥanīfa is the distinction he made between genre or species as a whole and the general/generic concept (*Gattungsbegriff*) or specific concept (*Artbegriff*), as a presupposition of the "specification of the general." (p. 112). The name "(the) pig" designates indeed all the pigs as *denotata* (*musammayāt*) of the concept, but does not necessarily mean so in a statement "all pigs," if the statement is not explicitly (universally) quantified. The form of nearer determination by an explanation/explicitation (*tafsīr*), specification (*takhṣīs*) and limitation (*taqyīd*) was applied by Abū Ḥanīfa not only to subjects or predicates in a statement, but also to imperatives, as in Qur'ān 5:38: "As for the thief [...], cut off their hands." This sentence is both true and false: true for some of the thieves, not true for others. The interpretation specifies the meaning of the absolute (*mutlaq*) expression "the thief" (p. 113).

We can remark that here, like in an example of Theophrast (Phanias possesses knowledge/Phanias does not possess knowledge), the principle of the excluded third is overruled.

In chap. 7 (pp. 119–151), Schöck presents the doctrine of judgment in *al-Mantiq* of 'Abd Allāh b. al-Muqaffa' (d. after 139/756) or of his son Muḥammad with the following questions: Had the translation of Greek terms into Arabic an influence on this theological debate? How does this work deal with quantification and modalisation of the statements? Does this paraphrase of the *Organon* bear a reference to the conflict between Mu'tazilīs and Murji'īs on the intermediate position ("Position between the two positions") and the interpretation of the verses of punishment?

Chap. 7 (pp. 152–179) is entirely devoted to the distinction between names (*asmā'*) and qualifications (*awṣāf*) in the conflict around the intermediate position.

In the second half of the 2/8th c., the Murji'ī Ḥanafī Abū Shāmir (van Ess, *TG*, II, pp. 174–180, and *passim*) and Abū Mu'ādh al-Tūmanī (*TG*, II, pp. 737–738) put Abū Mu'ādh among the theologians whose assignment is uncertain. Like Abū Shāmir, Abū Mu'ādh was a Qadarī; he thought in the categories of the Mu'tazilī ethics of retribution, but he still did it under Murji'ī prognostic. Abū Shāmir and Abū Mu'ādh were conscious of the weak point of Wāṣil's doctrine of the position/status of the "wicked/transgressor" (*fāsiq*) between "believer" and "unbeliever" (see pp. 43–53, under the title: "Die Paronymie des Namen 'Frevler' (*ism al-fāsiq*)").

The name *fāsiq*, an active participle (*nomen agentis*), which is de-

rived from actions, should be the name of the agent after the action was complete (pp. 151–155, 435). Abū Shāmir raised the issue on a logical level, distinguishing between an absolute (*muṭlaq/‘alā ’l-ītlāq/aplōs /simpliciter*; cf. *Sophistici elenchi*, 4, 166b 16sqq./*K. al-Sūfistiqā*) and unrestricted predication on the one hand, and a predication in regard to something (*fī kadhā/ pê/secundum quid*) (pp. 155–157, 435), on the other hand. Abū Mu‘ādh, remaining on the grammatical level, distinguished between names (*asmā’*), independent of actions and not limited in time, and qualifications (*awṣāf*), which can only be predicated of a subject limited in time (pp. 158–161, 435).

Under pressure, the Mu‘tazilīs distinguished between belief in God in connection with actions of obedience and belief in God without connection with actions of obedience (pp. 162–167, 435). So ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān (d. after 260/874), and after him Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī (d. 303/916), distinguished between the name (*ism*) and the verbal qualification (*wasf*). According to Abū ‘Alī the transgressor/wicked (*fāsiq*) can only be *qualified* with the verb “he believes/he has believed” (related to time), but he cannot be *named* absolutely/simply (*muṭlaq*) with the *nomen* “believer” (p. 164).

However, after this, the Mu‘tazilīs established a distinction between grammatical names (linguistic predication) and class names (class predication) (pp. 167–172, 435). Whereas “the names of the language” (*asmā’ al-lughā*) last only for the duration of the act, and consequently for the duration of the interlacing of the act and the quality of the act, or, that is to say, the virtue (*khaṣla*), the “names of religion” (*asmā’ al-dīn*) subsist until the completion of the act. This was the solution of Abū ‘Alī, which was still modified by Ka‘bī (d. 319/931).

Chap. 9 (pp. 180–228) deals with the universality and necessity of judgments according to the doctrine of Abū ’l-Hudhayl (d. ca. 227/841), al-Nazzām (d. before 232/847) and their successors.

In Chap. 10 (pp. 230–239), Schöck explains the interpretation of the *wa‘īd* verses by Muḥammad b. Shabīb (died in the thirties of the 3rd/middle of the 9th c.), who, with Ibn Rāwandī, is the most important opponent of the Mu‘tazilī understanding of the “general.” Ibn Shabīb’s and Ibn Rāwandī’s understanding of these verses is in accordance with the Peripatetic term-logic. An unquantified statement/judgment with a universal (*‘āmm/kullī*) subject term is indefinite (*muhmal*). Among the Murji‘īs, Ibn Shabīb is the most consistent about the indetermination of the *wa‘īd* verses. According to Abū Shāmir and Ibn Shabīb, a *wa‘īd* verse is not only undetermined with regard to quantity, but also with respect to the occurrence of the expressed facts. According to that, “whoever (*man*) hath done evil and his sin surroundeth him; such are rightful owners of the Fire; they will abide therein” (2:81) should be understood in the fol-

lowing ways:

[a] “all or some who have done evil and their sin surrounds them, such are possibly owners of the Fire.”

[b] “all or some who are possibly owners of the Fire, will possibly abide therein.” (p. 235).

But referring to 82:14 “The evildoers (*fujjār*) are in hell,” he saw two types of *fujjār*:

[a] The evildoers, who are not Muslims, [necessary as *modus ponendo ponens*] will be in hell.

[b] The evildoers, who are among Muslims, [possibly as *possibile ad utrumlibet*; according to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī: *al-wa‘īd... ‘alā na‘t al-dawām am lā*, ad Qur’ān 2:82] will be in hell.

Both Ibn Shabīb and Ibn al-Rāwandī were instrumental in the success of the Murji‘ī doctrine, and the following chap. 11 “The quantification of the statement, Ibn al-Rāwandī and the Murji‘a” (pp. 240–271) is devoted to Ibn al-Rāwandī. It is not impossible that his *K. al-khāṣṣ wa-l-‘āmm* and *K. al-waqf* (über die *epochè?* i.e. *wuqūf*, abstention of judgment/*assensionis retentio*) could have been the same work (van Ess, *TG*, VI, p. 434, op. 24, 25, 28, seems to have another opinion on the relationship between the titles). In the parts of this chapter devoted to “those who do not decide” (*arbāb al-waqf*, or *al-wāqifiyya*) those who practice the *assensionis retentio* concerning the decision whether Qur’ānic verses which begin with an indefinite pronoun (*ism mubham*), with a universal/general noun (*ism ‘āmm*) connected with an article and governed with *inna*, or verses which begin with a noun which is grammatically a general expression (*lafz ‘āmm*), have a general or a specific (*khāṣṣ*) meaning (pp. 259–64). Baghdādī named under their representatives Ash‘arī and Ibn al-Rāwandī; Ghazālī and Āmidī named Ash‘arī and Bāqillānī (p. 259).

In chap. 12 (pp. 272–295), we find also doxographic reports of Nāshī al-Akbar (d. 293/906) on the concept of possibility.

The most important reversal of opinion from the Mu‘tazilī to the Aristotelian-Murji‘ī way of thinking can be observed in the generation of the pupils of Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā‘ī (d. 303/916). We know the controversies between the latter and Ash‘arī (d. 324/935). But the debates between the master and his son Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī (d. 321/933) are not less important (chap. 13, pp. 276–284). Abū Hāshim made a distinction between genre as a whole, the concept of genre and the syllogism contained in the judgment.

Fārābī’s (d. 339/950) commentaries on the *De interpretatione* or on the *Analytica priora* contain very few allusions to his concrete opponents, but we can understand that he was opposed to the Mu‘tazilī doctrines as regards the points which concern this study (chap. 14, pp. 283–372). Af-

ter Ibn al-Muqaffa', he dealt with the distinction between the articulation of a statement and the facts of the case indicated by the statement (pp. 411, 427). He made this distinction in confrontation with the Arab grammarians. The expression (*lexis/lafz*) corresponds to a matter (*ulè/mādda*) (pp. 137–141, according to Ibn al-Muqaffa'), but the grammatically correct composition (*sumplokè/ta'liḥ*) of the expression in a sentence is not necessary adequate to the materia. To be comprehensible on the basis of its articulation in speech, a sentence must be unambiguous with regard to quality (pp. 300–305), quantity (pp. 314–320) and mode (pp. 18–30). Fārābī explains well the difference between material contrariety, i.e. contrariety (*enantiotès/taḍādd*), and linguistic articulated contrariety, i.e. contradiction (*antiphasis/tanāquḍ*). For example, from the sentence: "the evildoers will be in hell" it cannot be concluded that some or all sinners will be in hell. Whether the facts of the case are possible or necessary can only be understood if the sentence contains a modal word.

For Ash'arī also, then Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) and Māturīdī (d. 333/944) arguing against "position between the two positions," "believer/ believing" and "transgressor" (*fāsiq*) are not contradictory (chap. 15, pp. 373–381). The argumentation of Māturīdī and Bāqillānī serves to clarify its Aristotelian origin (p. 375).

ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) wants above all to demonstrate the unambiguity of the Qur'ān (chap. 16, pp. 383–393). His understanding of denomination by the linguistic expression (*dalīl al-lafz*) has a correspondence/equivalence in the Stoic conception (pp. 386–387).

In chap. 16 (pp. 394–408), Schöck presents the conception of the quantification of the conditional premises by Avicenna (d. 428/1037). According to Fārābī and Avicenna the conjunction (*ittiṣāl*) of antecedent (protasis) and consequence (apodosis) in such sentences like Qur'ān 2:81 is as undetermined as the relation between subject term and predicate term in Qur'ān 82:14. They correspond with regards to quantification and mode to the indefinite, assertoric, categoric judgment. This understanding, as Schöck has demonstrated, is in accordance with that of the Murji'ī theologians, first of all Ibn Shabīb and Ibn Rāwandī.

Summing up the evolution of the debates between theologians, grammarians and logicians, Schöck remarks:

When Ḡazzālī finally, at the end of a process of increasing consciousness of the difference between grammatical articulation and abstract idea, distinguished between a general name (*ism ʿāmm*) and a universal concept (*ma'nā kullī*) the Mu'tazilī doctrine had already approached the end of its decline. Only in the field of grammar could a Mu'tazilī still be an authority.

However, Sunnī doctrine and Arab grammar were never fully

harmonized. Therefore in Qur'ānic exegesis the gap between Sibawayh's understanding of sentences as implications and the term-logical understanding was not closed. From the grammatical standpoint the revelation is understood according to Sibawayh's 'propositional logic', and from the standpoint of dogmatics the revelation is understood according to the Murğī'ī doctrine and Aristotelian term-logic (p. 437).

This has also consequences for the translation of some passages of the Qur'ān, e.g. 2:81 and 82:14. It was "obvious" for a medieval logician that such sentences are indefinite statements, "as it seems to be obvious for a modern reader that these sentences are implications" (p. 438).

There are very few errors in this book (p. 437, read "Sünde", not "Sunde"). The two indexes (Arabic words and terms, pp. 451–464; persons and groups, pp. 465–468) are very useful.

We regret that Schöck has not sufficiently taken into consideration the Khārījī views (only pp. 32, 43, 45, 259; and p. 8: Ibādī). She could, for instance, have consulted the Qur'ānic commentary of the Ibādī Hūd b. Muḥkim, e.g. for her p. 95, on "completeness (*istikmāl*) of faith" (see Gilliot, "Le Commentaire coranique de Hūd b. Muḥakkam/Muḥkim," *Arabica* 44 (1997): 179–233: p. 184 *akmilū*, p. 185 *al-mustakmilūn*, p. 186 *ikmāl*, p. 190 etc., with the references to the commentary itself); but also for the interpretation of Qur'ān 2:81, 5:38, 9:5, 82:14, etc.

In writing his *opus magnum*, Josef van Ess did not want "to smooth the way for loudmouths (*Sprüche klopfen sollte der Weg nicht geebnet werden*). But we could wish for an expansion of the scholarly dialogue in the field [of Islamic theology]" (van Ess, *TG*, I, p. XI; cf. Gilliot, "Une leçon magistrale d'orientalisme: l'*Opus magnum* de Josef van Ess," *Arabica* XL (1993/3): 345–402, esp. p. 352).

Without the work of van Ess, this excellent study of Schöck would not have been possible. However, in spite of its unavoidably analytical nature, it is an outstanding original synthesis of theology, Qur'ānic exegesis, logic and grammar in Islam through a fundamental "case-study." Schöck has succeeded in making clear the logic of theologians, exegetes, logicians and grammarians on essential issues. We hope that this important work will soon be translated into Arabic.

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